MISHNAH: For tort victims one estimates with best quality land¹, for a creditor with average quality, and for a woman’s ketubah with lowest quality. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel² (New York 1966), the name is R. Meїr. says, also for a woman’s ketubah with average quality.

footnotes: ¹ If a person is due damages and is not paid, he can ask the court for foreclosure. If the guilty party owns several pieces of land, the tort victim is indemnified, up to the value of his claim, from the land which carries the highest value per unit of surface area. A creditor whose mortgage does not specify a particular piece of land is indemnified from land which the court’s experts assess to be of average value among all of the debtor’s holdings. ² In all other Mishnah sources mentioned in M. S. Feldblum, Diḳduḳe Soferim - Gittin

HALAKHAH: “For tort victims one estimates with best quality land,” etc. “By an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property³ 14, also quoted by the Babli, 48b..” Rebbi Abba bar Pappaios said before Rebbi Yose, where do we hold⁴? If to qualify as damages, is that not what we stated “his neighbor’s ox⁵. 21:35; Mishnah Baba Qama 4:3. The rules of damages do not apply to Temple property, not for damages inflicted by Temple animals nor damages done to them. Quoted in the Babli, 49a.” but not the ox of Temple property? If for bodily damages, is that not what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: A private person can claim damages but not the Temple⁶? But we must deal with one who said, I obligate myself to give 100 minas to the Temple, ⁷ 49a, s. v. שור, and in the Constantinople edition of the Yerushalmi. If one accepts the text as it stands, one has to explain that the person making the vow thought that he could pay his vow in cash, but before he could do this, he had to pay damages and now he is short of cash. If one does not read the clause, then there is a straightforward statement that debts to the Temple in all cases are privileged like debts for damages (a statement considered and rejected by the Babli, 49a). The interpretation of the Babli, that damages inflicted on Temple property always must be paid in full, is incompatible with the Yerushalmi. when his ox went and did damage. You should not say, [the Temple] is a creditor and should collect from average quality land. Therefore, it was necessary to say that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land, by an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.”

footnotes: ³ A statement by R. Aqiba in Mekhilta dR. Ismael, Mišpaṭim ⁴ What does the statement about Temple property mean? ⁵ Ex ⁶ The formulation is ambiguous; it also could mean that the Temple never pays damages. ⁷ The following clause is missing in the quote of the passage by Tosaphot Giṭṭin

Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “Full and partial damages are collected from encumbered property.” One understands full damages⁸. 21:36 requires the owner of an animal with a history of causing damages to pay all damages in full. If the animal’s owner cannot pay cash, the Mishnah decrees that the damages be liquidated by the best available land, even if mortgaged.. Are partial damages not collected from the animal’s body⁹. 21:35 requires the damages inflicted by an animal which never before had caused damage to be paid from proceeds of a sale of the animal itself.? Rebbi Yose said, explain it when it was a docile ox which did damage and then his owner went and sold it. Its body already was encumbered to the injured party¹⁰ is not mortgaged land but the animal causing the damage, which can be repossessed by the owner of the damaged property from a buyer of the agressive animal.. The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it if he converted it¹¹ a loan. into a loan. Then it should be foreclosed only by average quality land! Since the debt originated in a damage claim, he may collect from best quality.

footnotes: ⁸ Ex ⁹ Ex ¹⁰ The “encumbered property” mentioned in the baraita ¹¹ The owner of the injured animal did not insist on immediate payment but agreed that the debt be liquidated as if it were

“His field¹². 22:4: “If a person destroys a field or a vineyard through animals by sending his livestock to graze on another’s field, the best of his field or the best of his vineyard he shall give in payment.” This is the basis of the Mishnah requiring that damages be paid with best quality real estate.”, except if it was mortgaged¹³ field” excludes third-party interests.. “His vineyard”, except Temple property. Where do we hold¹⁴? If somebody caused damage and then dedicated to the Temple, that is what we have stated¹⁵ 6:2: “If somebody dedicated his property to the Temple while he owed a ketubah to his wife or a debt to a creditor, neither the woman nor the creditor can collect from the Temple; but the redeemer redeems on condition to pay the ketubah to the woman or the debt to the creditor. If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas, [the redeemer] adds another denar and redeems these properties on condition to pay the debt to the creditor.” In order to combine two conflicting principles, viz., that vows cannot be used to escape obligations towards third parties, and that Temple obligations override all others, it is decreed that the Temple has to put the dedicated properties up for sale but collects only for the amount by which the value of the properties exceeds the obligation, with the third party buyer accepting the obligation to pay off the liens on the property. (It has to be a third party buyer since the person making the dedication would have to add another 25% to the redemption amount, Lev. 27:19.) Claims for damages have to be handled in the same way.: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas.” If somebody dedicated to the Temple and then caused damage, that is what we have stated: “ ‘His neighbor’s ox⁵. 21:35; Mishnah Baba Qama 4:3. The rules of damages do not apply to Temple property, not for damages inflicted by Temple animals nor damages done to them. Quoted in the Babli, 49a.’ but not the ox of Temple property.” Rebbi Yudan said, explain it if an ox of Temple property grazed on a private field. Rebbi Mana told him, we require Temple real estate and you say “on a private field”? But we must hold about one who said: I am obligating myself for 100 minas to the Temple; then went and caused damage. You should not say that between damages and a loan given before witnesses¹⁶ damages are privileged, and here damages are privileged against the Temple; therefore it was necessary to say “his vineyard”, except Temple property¹⁷.

footnotes: ¹² Ex ¹³ “His ¹⁴ What relation can Temple property have with damages due from a private person? ¹⁵ Mishnah ‘Arakhin ⁵ Ex ¹⁶ Not in documented form; the witnesses do not sign anything. Such a loan is not a mortgage and is not privileged. ¹⁷ The statement about Temple property is not to exclude Temple property from damage claims but to privilege Temple property relative to all civil claims.

“His field,” except movables. “His vineyard,” except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession. “ ‘His field,’ except movables.” About those who did not claim movables from the start. Is this different from what we stated: There is not only real estate; from where if he wanted to pay money? The verse says: “Money he shall return to its owner¹⁸. 21:33, speaking of somebody digging a hole in the public domain which then causes injury to another person’s animal. This damage has to be paid in money (or, in the Babli’s interpretation, in money’s worth). In the Babli, Baba Qama 7a, 14b, money is legal tender to liquidate all debts. The Yerushalmi gives the injured party the right to claim real estate in those cases in which the verse prescribed payment in real estate..” What did you mean to say that real estate is primary? Or¹⁹ should we say that money is primary? Then it should be irrevocably given to [the claimant] from the start! Do we not see rabbis who irrevocably give him real estate! “ ‘His vineyard,’ except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.” Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Nisa: If his father dug a cistern²⁰ which caused injury during his father’s lifetime. Property fell to him after his father’s death²¹. I might say that this property should be encumbered for that damage; therefore, it was necessary to say “his vineyard” to except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.

footnotes: ¹⁸ Ex ¹⁹ אי is Babylonian spelling for Galilean אוֹ “or”, אִין “if”, אֵי “not”. The first alternative applies here. ²⁰ In the public domain, cf. Note 18. ²¹ The injury claim was not paid during the father’s lifetime. By accepting the inheritance, the son became liable to pay the injury claim. If later he received inheritance from another source, e. g., grandparents, the later inheritance is not liable for claims stemming from a prior inheritance even if the son was the only known heir and therefore the grandparent’s property was potentially his.

“The best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay,¹². 22:4: “If a person destroys a field or a vineyard through animals by sending his livestock to graze on another’s field, the best of his field or the best of his vineyard he shall give in payment.” This is the basis of the Mishnah requiring that damages be paid with best quality real estate.” i. e., the party responsible for the damage, the words of Rebbi Ismael²², ed. Horovitz-Rabin p. 296; the interpretation of R. Ismael is quoted anonymously in Mekhilta dR. Simeon bar Ioḥai, ed. Epstein-Melamed p. 196, together with the interpretation given later to the opinion of R. Aqiba.. Rebbi Aqiba says, “the best of his field and the best of his vineyard”, of the person suffering the damage. It is difficult for Rebbi Aqiba, he suffered damage, and you say so²³? But the court see what the field was worth before it was damaged and estimates accordingly. As it was stated, it is possible if the grazing was on best quality land, one estimates from best quality, from lowest quality one estimates from lowest quality. How is this? The best of the lowest quality is quite good. If you say so you provide a windfall for the person suffering the damage²⁴. One looks at the field as if it was full of first quality [produce] and estimates for him from the best quality land; least quality one estimates from least quality land. It turns out that he pays with best quality for best quality and from least quality for least quality. From where has Rebbi Aqiba that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land”²⁵? It is not from the Torah, it is a decree. ²⁶, quoted in the Babli, 49b, in the name of R. Simeon (in some sources, R. Simeon ben Eleazar.) A similar, anonymous, text is in Tosephta Ketubot 12:2.“Why did they say, ‘for tort victims one estimates with best quality land’? Because of the robbers²⁷. That a man should say, why should I have robbed [land] in my hand, or land subject to a suit for damages on my hand? Tomorrow, the court will see my good field, take it from me, and support it by the verse, ‘the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay.’ ” So far his real estate. His pledge²⁸ was inferred from his real estate. Since his real estate [is taken] from the best quality, also his pledge [is taken] from the best.

footnotes: ¹² Ex ²² In the Babli, 48a, the attribution of names is switched; the same is implied by Mekhilta dR. Ismael ²³ Why should the person responsible only pay corresponding to the best remaining parts of a ruined field? ²⁴ According to R. Aqiba, the holdings of the person suffering the damage are graded into best, average, and lowest quality. In each category, the value of the damage is established and paid by the person responsible with his best real estate in the given category, up to the value established in court. ²⁵ Since he reads the verse as referring to the method of estimating the damage, not payment, the Mishnah has no biblical foundation. ²⁶ This is a baraita ²⁷ Since a robber of land is also inflicting damage on the person robbed. ²⁸ If the person responsible cannot pay directly, any pledge taken should be of his most valuable possessions.

²⁹” ‘For creditors, average quality,’ because of tricksters. That a man should not see a desirable field in his neighbor’s hand, lend him money, and contrives to take it from him. Then one should estimate only from the least quality! Rebbi Jehudah said, that is correct; but not to lock the door before people needing to borrow. For tomorrow he may need to borrow and does not find [a lender.]”

footnotes: ²⁹ A continuation of the Tosephta (Note 26). In the Babli, R. Jehudah agrees that loans should be foreclosed only by least quality land but R. Meїr states that to support credit one has to allow loans to be foreclosed from average quality.

Rebbi Simai preached: “And the man,³⁰. 24:11, about a creditor taking a pledge, quoted in full later in the paragraph.” that is the agent of the court³¹. 276 seems to read וְהָאִישׁ as “ ‘and any man’, to include the agent of the court” since the verse obviously refers to the creditor.. For if the creditor enters, he removes the best. If the borrower enters, he removes the worst. How is this? The agent of the court enters and removes from average quality. Rebbi Ismael says, it is a word from the Torah that the creditor³² should enter, for it is written: “The man whose creditor you are should bring the pledge out for you.” That is, his pledge. His real estate was inferred from his pledge. Since his pledge [is taken] from average quality, also his real estate [is taken] from average quality.

footnotes: ³⁰ Deut ³¹ Sifry Deut ³² The context would require to read “debtor”; this is an Amoraic statement in the Babli, 50a.

³³ 10:2, explained there in Notes 75–77, variant readings noted ש. The Mishnah notes that court judgments are not subject to the rules of the Sabbatical. This is obvious: A loan that is disputed is not remitted. A loan that was disputed but is now a [confirmed]³⁴ loan, is remitted. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is this also true for judgments? A loan that was disputed can be collected. A disputed loan turned into a [confirmed] loan is collected from property of average quality.

footnotes: ³³ Ševi‘it ³⁴ By judgment of the court.

If there is only best quality, one collects from the best quality, [only] average quality one collects from average quality, [only] worst quality one collects from worst quality. Best and average, torts are assessed from best quality, creditors and a woman’s ketubah from average. Average and worst, torts and creditors are assessed from average, a woman’s ketubah from worst. If his best quality was like everybody’s best quality, it is best quality. If his average quality was like everybody’s average quality, it is average quality. If his worst quality was like everybody’s worst quality, it is worst quality³⁵, quoted as such in the Babli, Baba Qama 7b. One can foreclose only existing property; the only question which arises is how to classify claims if there are properties of two different qualities but claims for all three. The Babli formulates this as: Do the notions of best, average, and worst refer to the available land or are these general notions used by realtors to classify properties?. If his best quality was like everybody’s average? Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ila asked: Let us hear from the following: Average and worst, torts and creditors are assessed from average, a woman’s ketubah from worst. But just as you need in the case that you have best and average quality, torts push creditors to the average, so in this case, of average and worst quality, should not torts push creditors to the worst quality³⁶ are universal, not referring to the debtor.? Rebbi Yose bar Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Explain it that he had best quality which he sold, and the creditors were already pushed to average quality³⁷ 8a. As Rashi explains, the loan was taken when there was best quality land; then automatically the average quality land was pledged to the creditor. When later the best quality land was sold, the pledge was not removed. When then a claim for torts was entered, it only could be additional to the existing lien. (The Babli lists three other possible explanations, all agreeing that in a normal case in which only two qualities of real estate are available, the better one is declared best, reserved for the satisfaction of tort claims.).

footnotes: ³⁵ The statement up to here is a baraita ³⁶ If his best quality is classified by realtors as average, nevertheless it is his best, reserved for satisfaction of tort judgmens, and creditors should be satisfied with second best quality, even if that is worst in universal classification. This seems to prove that the classifications mentioned in Mishnah and baraita ³⁷ His explanation is also given by Rav Ḥisda in the Babli, Baba Qama

“For a woman’s ketubah with lowest quality.” ⁴⁰ 12:5 (Notes 54–59) and one in Peah 3:9 (Notes 182–189). Rebbi Jeremiah said, they taught only for a ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz], but a ketubah of a thousand denar she collects from average quality⁴¹. Rebbi Yose said, even a ketubah of a thousand denar she collects only from lowest quality. It turns out that this disagreement parallels the following disagreement: “While she lives in her father’s house, she always can collect her ketubah; if she lives in her husband’s house, she can collect her ketubah for 25 years.”⁴² 12:5. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One stated this only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects forever. Rebbi Abbahu quoted in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she can collect only up to 25 years. It turns out that Rebbi Yose follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Jeremiah Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. As we have stated there⁴³ 3:9.: “If somebody signs over his property to his sons and signs over some real estate to his wife, she loses her claim to ketubah.” Rav said, if he sells through her⁴⁴, “if he lets them acquire through her agency.” One has to assume that this is meant here also.. Samuel says, if he distributes in her presence. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, they stated here a relaxation of the laws of ketubah. Rebbi Abba said, the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina is that it applies not only to a ketubah of a mina or two hundred, but even regarding a ketubah of one thousand denar they proclaimed a relaxation of the laws of ketubah.

footnotes: ⁴⁰ This paragraph is a rearrangement of a paragraph in Ketubot ⁴¹ The obligatory minimum she collects only from the lowest quality land; any excess she can take from average quality. The Yerushalmi does not give a reason why a woman can collect only from lowest quality real estate; the Babli (49b–50a) after a lengthy discussion decides that this is a necessary institution to induce men to get married. ⁴² Mishnah Ketubot ⁴³ Mishnah Peah ⁴⁴ In Peah

MISHNAH: One does not collect from encumbered property⁴⁵ as long as there is free property, even if the latter is of lowest quality. One may collect from orphans’⁴⁶ property only from the lowest quality.

footnotes: ⁴⁵ “Encumbered property” is property sold when there was a lien on it. If the lienholder cannot get satisfaction from the debtor, he can have regress on the buyer. But as long as the debtor has any real estate left in his possession, it has to be foreclosed before any claim can be raised against a buyer. ⁴⁶ As long as the orphans are underage.

HALAKHAH: “One cannot collect for usufruct,” etc. ⁵² 9:8, explained in Notes 187–197. The variant readings (including a parallel text in Šebuot 5:5) are given in Ketubot. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due, and some say, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should be eager to marry her. Some say, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there about an adult orphan, here⁴⁶ about an underage orphan.

footnotes: ⁵² This paragraph is from Ketubot ⁴⁶ As long as the orphans are underage.

MISHNAH: One cannot collect for usufruct⁴⁷, for improvement of the land⁴⁸, or for sustenance of the wife and the daughters⁴⁹ that after the husband’s death his widow and unmarried daughters be sustained by the estate (Ketubot 4:11–12). While the ketubah itself is a mortgage lien on all real estate acquired by the husband, the additional conditions cannot be foreclosed as a mortgage. from incumbered property, for the public good⁵⁰.

footnotes: ⁴⁷ If a robber took land by force, had its use for some time, and then sold it, the land itself can be reclaimed from the buyer but payment for the illicit use of the land can be exacted only from the robber himself. ⁴⁸ If the buyer of some property makes improvements, such as planting fruit trees, and then loses the property through the foreclosure of a prior lien, he can recoup his expenses for the improvements only from the original seller directly. ⁴⁹ It is a required condition in a ketubah ⁵⁰ All other Mishnah sources have an additional clause, either as original text or addition: “The finder shall not be made to swear, for the public good.” Since the statement is quoted in the Halakhah (Note 88), it should be read here also.

HALAKHAH: “One does not collect from encumbered property,”⁵³ etc. Rebbi Ḥanina said, because they have no fixed amount⁵⁴.

footnotes: ⁵³ This quote from Mishnah 2 is not in its place. The reference is to Mishnah 3 and the list of items which cannot be subject to foreclosure from a buyer. ⁵⁴ Mortgage liens are only fixed amounts. The same statement is in the Babli, 50b.

If [Reuben]⁵⁵ robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi⁵⁶, then Simeon came⁵⁷ and foreclosed it from Levi; then Levi collects from Reuben’s encumbered property and Simeon collects the usufruct from Levi’s free property⁵⁸. If Levi in the meantime improved [the property], Levi collects the capital from Reuben’s encumbered property and the improvement from Simeon’s free property. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan said, only if a third party’s buying preceded the improvement by this one⁵⁹. But if the improvement by this one preceded a third party’s buying, Levi can collect the capital even from Simeon’s encumbered property⁶⁰. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan said: With usufruct one proceeds in the same way⁶¹ 14b, where the situation described here is alluded to.. If he spent four denars and the improvement is worth six, Levi collects four denars from Reuben’s encumbered property and another two from Simeon’s free property. Rebbi Abin in the name of the rabbis there: Since he did not enter with permission, his hand is weak against Simeon⁶² 15:3, Note 71.). Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of the rabbis there: Since he entered with permission, his hand is strong against Reuben⁶³.

footnotes: ⁵⁵ Missing in the text but clearly demanded by the sequel. ⁵⁶ In all cases discussed, Levi is presumed to be an innocent buyer who did not know that the seller had no title. ⁵⁷ Who could prove his ownership in court. ⁵⁸ This follows the Mishnah and is unproblematic. ⁵⁹ If Simeon sold property before he knew that Levi had improved the property which he is going to retake, the eventual obligation of Simeon towards Levi is no lien on the real estate sold to the third party. In the Babli, 51b, a similar but tannaïtic statement applies only in case the field was sold by the buyer from the robber to another person, whose innocent purchase is protected. ⁶⁰ In this opinion, whose problematic aspect is discussed later, Simeon’s potential liability is an automatic lien on all his properties. ⁶¹ There also, it depends on when the obligation of payment started. The Babli agrees, Baba Meṣi‘a ⁶² Since for Simeon all that Levi did in his field was unauthorized, Simeon does not have to pay at all since he would pay only an amount equal to the smaller of investment or improvement, but since the investment is collected from Reuben, there is no enforceable claim against Simeon. (Cf. also Yebamot ⁶³ Since Reuben sold the field to Levi, the latter can collect from Reuben the value of the improvement, not only the amount of investment.

⁶⁴, #96). The text is practically identical with that of the ms. Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi; Levi went and gave it to Jehudah as a gift. Then Simeon foreclosed it from Jehudah. Jehudah has no regress on Levi since it was a gift. Levi has regress on Reuben since it was a sale. Did he not give it away as a gift? He can say to him, it was my intention to give it to him so he would return me favors⁶⁵. Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and gave it to Levi as a gift; Levi sold it to Jehudah. Jehudah has regress on Levi since he sold it; Levi has no regress on Reuben since it was a gift; as Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: No easement is created by a gift.

footnotes: ⁶⁴ This paragraph is discussed by Rashba in a letter to Meïri (Responsa attributed to Naḥmanides ⁶⁵ While goodwill cannot be easily quantified in monetary terms, it is of value and can be used in a claim against a robber.

Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi, and he⁶⁶ did not have time to write the foreclosure document before he died: whose is it⁶⁷ but before he could write the sales contract, he died. That is the case about which Samuel asked Rav in (Babli) Baba Meṣi‘a (15b), viz., if it turns out that the field was not his, but he went and bought it from the original owners, what are the rules? He told him, the first (the robber) sold to the second (the buyer) any present and future rights to the parcel.… And this is the explanation of this text according to my understanding: Reuben had robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi who did not realize that it was robbed. Afterwards, Reuben bought the parcel from Simeon, but Simeon had not yet written the sales contract when Reuben died: who is the owner? Rav Huna and Ḥiyya bar Rav: One says if the document was first, if the sale was completed before he died, the sale was final and Reuben did not transfer [the field] to Levi; this shows that Reuben did not intend to leave the field in Levi’s hands, ostensibly to leave it to his heirs. He does not spell this out since the sales document was not yet written. The other one said, there is no difference between written and not written, he wants the field to be Levi’s since he did not dispose of the field in a will. (The same Rav Huna and Ḥiyya bar Rav disagree in the Babli Baba Meṣi‘a (16a) about the time available to the robber to act to protect his credit.) Rebbi Mana has a different explanation: He says that in any case the field belongs to Reuben, following Rami bar Ḥama (in the Babli, Baba Meṣi‘a 16a) who said that Levi’s contract was not worth the paper it was written on. But Rebbi Yose bar Abun is of the opposite opinion, since Levi can tell him, is the field not now before you that you can turn the sale into a valid one. This follows Rava (in the Babli, Baba Meṣi‘a 16a) who told Rami bar Ḥama that Levi acquired the property by the trust he put in Reuben. But following your reading, since you read טרפו with ט, it is possible that this refers to a foreclosure document which Levi obtained against the robber after he had lost the field to Simeon, and that is the same disagreement we find there (in the Babli, Baba Meṣi‘a 16a); how long does a person have credit, Rav says until the start of court proceedings, Ḥiyya bar Rav says, until the foreclosure document was signed, and Rav Papa said, until the public sale.”? Rav Huna and Ḥiyya the son of Rav: One said, if he wrote the foreclosure document, it is Reuben’s, if not, it is Levi’s. The other one said, whether he wrote or did not write, it belongs to Levi. Rebbi Mana said, it is reasonable that it does not belong to Reuben since he can say to him, I sold you something which was not mine. Rebbi Yose said, it is not reasonable that it should not be Levi’s, since Reuben⁶⁸ can tell him, is this not before you? You are good to confirm the sale.

footnotes: ⁶⁶ “He” seems to be Simeon, who has to go to court and obtain a document which gives him the right to take the field from Levi. ⁶⁷ It should be obvious that the field is Simeon’s and after him his heirs. The paragraph is difficult to understand; the commentators all emend the text to fit their explanations, which can be disregarded. It seems that the question is to whom do the heirs have to address their foreclosure document.The problem is an old one; Meïri, after Rashi the second most important Medieval commentator, asked Rashba for an explanation (cf. Note 64). Meïri’s text read טרפו “his forclosure document,” Rashba’s read תרפו “his sales document.” This is Rashba’s anwer:“It is my opinion that our text is defective and it should be as follows: Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi, then Reuben bought it from Simeon ⁶⁸ Rashba reads "Levi" as text, not as correction.

Can one collect dowry from encumbered property⁷⁰; cf. Ketubot 6:6.? ⁷¹ 6:6 (30d 1.59), explained there in Notes 93–97. Variant readings are noted כ. Rebbi Ze‘ira said that Rebbi Joḥanan does not collect. Who collects? Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Ila collect. Rebbi Yasa was appointed custodian of orphans’ property. There were orphan [girls] who asked for dowry. He brought the case before Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim. Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim said, is it not better to provide for them from their father’s estate rather than from charity? Rebbi Eleazar said to him: If such a case came before our teachers, our teachers would not touch it; would we act? Rebbi Yose said, I shall give to them, and if some orphans would get up and complained, I would give it to them. They stood up and complained⁷²..

footnotes: ⁷⁰ Since providing a dowry for daughters is one of the obligatory conditions attached to a ketubah ⁷¹ This text is from Ketubot ⁷² This is the opposite of what is asserted in Ketubot

A judgment was rendered⁷³ (6:6, Note 98) it is only asserted that a judgment was given following R. Ḥanina. for Ṣippor bat Absalom. Rebbi Simon and Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Simeon bar Abba: I and our teachers collected for her from movables⁷⁴ obligations; cf. Ketubot 6:4, Note 67., following the custom of her place.

footnotes: ⁷³ In Ketubot ⁷⁴ Following the principle that local custom is the overriding determinant in the judicial interpretation of ketubah

Rav wrote to Rebbi, who transferred it to the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Ḥiyya wrote between the lines. If the orphans sold against the rules⁷⁵ are to be satisfied by real estate, any sale while some of the obligations are still open is against the rules., one collects for dowry but one does not collect for sustenance⁷⁶ 6:6. Since this claim exists even during the father’s lifetime, it has precedence over the widow’s claim to sustenance which starts only at her husband’s death.. If they accepted a lien⁷⁷. I do not know what this lien is⁷⁸ 69a, the question from the start was about a mortgage the heirs took out on real estate of their inheritance.. Levi stated: Both for a lien made by the father and for a lien made by the son, one collects for dowry⁷⁹ but one does not collect for sustenance⁸⁰ 69a.. Rebbi Abba said, there is no mention of a lien made by the father, only a lien made by the son. If one cannot collect during the father’s lifetime⁸¹ 4:6., not so much less after the father’s death? Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If the daughters are married, the widow is sustained by them⁸² 51a, the question never arises since the claims of the widow and the daughters are accorded equal status; this rule is quoted in Yebamot 15:3 (14d 1.68), Ketubot 4:8 (29a 1.25).. Rebbi Abba follows his own [opinion] and Rebbi Jehudah⁸² 51a, the question never arises since the claims of the widow and the daughters are accorded equal status; this rule is quoted in Yebamot 15:3 (14d 1.68), Ketubot 4:8 (29a 1.25). follows his own [opinion]. For the sister of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaggai: Even if they died, the widow is sustained by them.

footnotes: ⁷⁵ Since by talmudic rules, all obligations of a ketubah ⁷⁶ The daughters, who do not inherit if there are sons, have a claim of (in general) 10% of their father’s estate as dowry. Cf. Ketubot ⁷⁷ This was Rav’s question. The lien is a mortgage obligation. ⁷⁸ This is R. Ḥiyya’s note. Was the mortgage taken during the father’s lifetime or after his death? In the Babli, Ketubot ⁷⁹ From real estate sold or pledged. ⁸⁰ This is also quoted as Rebbi’s opinion in the Babli, Ketubot ⁸¹ Mishnah Ketubot ⁸² In the Babli, Ketubot ⁸² In the Babli, Ketubot

⁸³ 4:8, Notes 200–201. Variant readings are given there. What is the situation of grandchildren? Rebbi Mana said, grandchildren are like children. Rebbi Yose said, grandchildren are not like children. Rebbi Samuel, son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Mattaniah were sitting together. They wanted to say, the same situation applies to grandchildren here as there. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina said to them, inheritance by biblical law jumped on grandchildren.

footnotes: ⁸³ The Text is from Ketubot

There⁸⁴ 6:1. The subject is the biblical oath imposed on a person who denies an obligation (Ex. 22:8). The rabbinic interpretation of the expression אֲשֶׁר יֹאמַר כִּי הוּא זֶה is “if he [the defendant] agrees that there is a case.” If the defendant in a civil suit, in which there are no witnesses and no documents, denies the entire claim, he does not have to swear a biblical oath (he may have to swear a rabbinical oath). But if he agrees to part of the claim, he has to swear a biblical oath to free himself from the remainder. Only if the claim is advanced as tentative, then any admission by the defendant is a gift to the claimant and by rabbinic rule no oath of any kind is due., we have stated: “You⁸⁵ have in your hand a mina of my father’s; you⁸⁶ have to get from me only 50 denars. He does not have to swear since he is like a person who returns a find⁸⁷.” Rebbi Eleazar said, in this case they instituted a regulation as they instituted for a find, as we have stated⁵⁰: “The finder of a lost object shall not swear because of the public good⁸⁸.” Rebbi Abba said, this Mishnah [applies] when he said to him, you found my two oxen⁸⁹. But if he⁹⁰ said, I found your two oxen and returned both of them, but the other⁹¹ said, you returned only one, in that case they did not institute the rule⁹². Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In this case they did institute⁹³. But in the first case⁸⁹, it is a word of the Torah, as it was stated: I could think that if he said to him, you found my two oxen⁹⁴, but the other said, I found only one, should he be obligated [to swear]? The verse⁹⁵ 5:22, speaking of the sacrifice required of the person who swears falsely in the situation described in Ex. 22:8. says, “or if he found a find and disowned it;” that excludes this one who did not disown. But if he said to him, I was standing on my roof when I saw you dragging away two tied oxen, two tied oxen you dragged away from me⁹⁶, and he says, only one I dragged away; in that case they made no regulation. Similarly: “I was standing with my father when he was dying and he claimed from you a mina and you agreed to it⁹⁷. 22:8.,” and the other says, “I agreed only for 50;” in that case they made no regulation.

footnotes: ⁸⁴ Mishnah Ševuʻot ⁸⁵ The speaker is the claimant. ⁸⁶ The speaker is the defendant. ⁸⁷ The heir is not conversant with all the details of his father’s business dealings. Since he cannot swear that the father had not received payment, he has no case if the defendant denies the entire claim. The partial admission of the claim is the equivalent of a gift by the defendant to the claimant. ⁵⁰ All other Mishnah sources have an additional clause, either as original text or addition: “The finder shall not be made to swear, for the public good.” Since the statement is quoted in the Halakhah (Note 88), it should be read here also. ⁸⁸ If the owner claims to have lost more than the finder returns, the finder cannot be made to swear that he did not retain anything for himself, since otherwise nobody would return any find. ⁸⁹ As explained later, one ox was found but the owner claims to have lost two. Returning one ox is not accepting part of a claim of two. ⁹⁰ The finder. ⁹¹ The original owner. ⁹² He has to swear since both parties claim to be sure of their case. ⁹³ This is a case of returning a find and the finder is protected. ⁸⁹ As explained later, one ox was found but the owner claims to have lost two. Returning one ox is not accepting part of a claim of two. ⁹⁴ This cannot be more than a conjecture; the claimant cannot make a defendant swear about a hypothetical case. ⁹⁵ Lev. ⁹⁶ The claimant asserts as a certainty that he saw his two oxen in the finder’s possession. ⁹⁷ This is an assertion of a certain claim which falls under the rule of Ex

MISHNAH: If orphans rely on a property owner⁹⁸ or if their father appointed a guardian⁹⁹ 1:5, Note 82. for them; these are obligated to tithe their produce. A guardian appointed by the orphans’ father shall be made to swear¹⁰⁰; if he was appointed by the court he shall not be made to swear. Abba Shaul says, it is the other way around¹⁰¹.

footnotes: ⁹⁸ If orphans are adults (older than 13 years) but not able to act in real estate matters (younger than 20 years) and they seek assistence from a relative or acquaintance, that person is not a guardian but by rabbinic usage he has some rights and obligations of a guardian, in particular to see to it that the produce of the orphan’s fields is tithed so it becomes available for sale or for their own use. In general, a third person cannot give heave and tithe for others; this is another example of a “regulation for the public good.” ⁹⁹ Greek ἐπίτροπος, cf. Bikkurim ¹⁰⁰ At the end of his service, the court shall require him to swear that he retained nothing of the orphan’s property for himself. ¹⁰¹ The guardian appointed by the father’s will shall not be made to swear, so people will not refuse to serve. The court appointee, who does not have the deceased father’s trust, can be made to swear.

HALAKHAH: “If orphans rely on a property owner, etc.” ¹¹⁰ 1:1, explained in Notes 61–69. Variants are denoted by ת.(Num. 18:28) “you” excludes partners, “you” excludes guardians, “you” excludes one who gives heave from what is not his. Did we not state (Terumot 3:3): “Partners who gave heave one after the other?” But one must be for Great Heave, the other for heave of the tithe. Did we not infer the laws of the Great Heave from heave of the tithe? But one is for practice, the other for action. “You” excludes guardians; but did we not state: “Orphans dependent on a home owner, or for whom the father had appointed a guardian, must tithe their produce.” The colleagues say, here for a permanent guardian, there for a temporary guardian. Rebbi Yose asked, does that apply to: “he may sell slaves but not real estate?” But here one deals with an adult orphan, there with an underage orphan.

footnotes: ¹¹⁰ From Terumot

¹¹¹ 4:5 (4b 1.50). Rebbi Joḥanan said, as a matter of principle one does not appoint guardians for orphans to their detriment, only to their profit; but if they are detrimental, they are detrimental¹¹². Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, neither as a matter of principle nor as a reaction, neither for profit not for detriment¹¹³. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: “One appoints a guardian for them¹¹⁴ 1:5: If an animal of an irresponsible person (a minor, an insane, or a deaf-and-dumb person) did damage, the court has to appoint a guardian to take care of the matter. This seems to imply that one appoints guardians for underage orphans who are defendants in a damage suit.” There is a difference about an ox, lest it continue to cause damage¹¹⁵. If it did do damage, from whom does one take payment? Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the orphans. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, from the guardian¹¹⁶. And even if Rebbi Joḥanan never taught this, does not his word imply it since he said if in the end they are detrimental, they are detrimental?

footnotes: ¹¹¹ There is a different but parallel treatment of the subject of this paragraph in Baba Qama ¹¹² If the estate of underage minors is sued, the court does not appoint a guardian to conduct their defense but one tells the claimant to wait until the orphans are adults. But if the estate has a claim to pursue, the court may appoint a guardian to prosecute their case; if the guardian is not successful, the orphans cannot sue him. ¹¹³ All suits involving an estate, whether by a defendant or a claimant, have to be postponed until the orphans are adults. ¹¹⁴ Mishnah Baba Qama ¹¹⁵ The Mishnah does not express a biblical principle but a rabbinic rule for the public good, that a dangerous animal should be slaughtered to prevent more damage. ¹¹⁶ If the animal did additional damage when the guardian already was in charge.

A guardian appointed by the orphans’ father shall be made to swear, for usually he is not checked out¹¹⁷. If he was appointed by the court he shall not be made to swear for usually he was checked out. Abba Shaul says, it is the other way around; a guardian appointed by the orphans’ father¹¹⁸ shall be made to swear, for he is like one who is paid¹¹⁹; if he was appointed by the court¹²⁰ he shall not be made to swear for for he can say to him, I am doing this as a favor to you. It turns out that Rebbi Joḥanan follows the rabbis and Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina Abba Shaul. Does Rebbi Joḥanan follow the rabbis? Even if he holds with Abba Shaul, a person acts as a trustee¹²¹.v. הלכה) quotes a slightly different text: בעי אינש מיתן זוזי “a person would be ready to pay money”. in order to be declared trustworthy¹²². Does Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina [follow] Abba Shaul? Even if he holds with the rabbis, a person is apt to slip away from an oath but not from payments¹²³.

footnotes: ¹¹⁷ A private person usually does not have the ability to judge the honesty of his friends. ¹¹⁸ This should read: “appointed by the court”. ¹¹⁹ Even if he is not paid, the reputation he obtains by publicly being trusted by the court may be worth money to him. Therefore, a person will not refrain from serving even if he has to swear in the end. The Babli agrees, 52b. ¹²⁰ This should read: “appointed by the father.” ¹²¹ Tosaphot (52b, s ¹²² Therefore, he can be made to swear. ¹²³ If people know they will have to swear, they will not be available to be appointed guardians. They will think that they are competent enough not to have to pay; very few people will refrain from becoming guardians because of the potential liability.

MISHNAH: If someone causes impurity¹⁰², or *dema‘*¹⁰³ is profane food mixed with heave, which is forbidden to lay persons and only permitted to priests, who will pay only a fraction of the value. Cf. Demay 1:3, Note 175., or libation wine¹⁰⁴, if it was unintentional he is free¹⁰⁵, intentional he is obligated¹⁰⁶. If Cohanim in the Temple intentionally made [a sacrifice] piggul¹⁰⁷ 19:7) is sacrificial meat on the third day after slaughter. The root seems to be preserved in Arabic فجل “to be soft”, as in Aramaic פּוּגְלָא “radish”, i. e., a soft, edible root. Applied to meat, which starts to decompose, probably a better translation would be “to be mushy”. In rabbinic interpretation, the deadly sin is not to eat the meat when it becomes unsanitary but to slaughter and offer the blood to the altar with the idea of eating the sacrifice after its allotted time. Since the blood is only handled by the Cohen, not the person offering the sacrifice, the Cohen could disqualify the sacrifice and inflict a heavy financial loss on the faithful bringing the sacrifice simply by telling him that he handled the sacrifice with the wrong intention. Since this also is an invisible damage, it is clear that some penalties are in order for the public good (Tosephta 3:8)., they have to pay.

footnotes: ¹⁰² This and the following cases all concern invisible defects which cannot be detected by inspection. Causing impurity to food can imply a diminution of value, since the food cannot be sold to people eating only in purity, or it can make it unfit for use, if the item was heave or any other sanctified food. ¹⁰³ Demaʻ ¹⁰⁴ Wine used in a pagan libation rite. Such wine is prohibited for all usufruct and makes all food and drinks it comes in contact with forbidden in the most minute amount. ¹⁰⁵ Since the damage is invisible, it does not fall under the tort laws. ¹⁰⁶ By a rabbinic rule for the public good (Tosephta 3:7), that people should not do damage with impunity. ¹⁰⁷ פִּגּוּל by biblical definition (Lev.

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yudan did not go to the assembly. He was standing with Rebbi Mana and asked him, what new was said? He said: So says Rebbi Yose, a person causing impurity does not have the status of a perpetrator¹²⁴, fromthe following¹²⁵ 9:2. If somebody stole heave and it became impure in his possession, he can hand it back to the owner and tell him, this is yours. But pure heave was food and impure heave can only be used as fuel; the difference in value cannot be claimed in court.: “Heave which became impure.” He answered: Explain it, if it became impure by itself¹²⁶; then you cannot infer anything, because of a Mishnah¹²⁷ 4:4. The Mishnah is part of R. Yudan’s argument since it states that if a person who is not duly ordained exercizes the function of a rabbi or judge, he is personally responsible for any damage he causes by a wrong decision. In the Babli, 53b, the same argument is made by Rav Papa.: “If somebody judged, absolved the guilty and obligated the innocent, declared the pure impure and the impure pure.” For Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: If he touched it with his hand¹²⁸. Samuel said: If he touched it with his hand. Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi says, it should have been logical that even intentionally he should have been free. Why did they say that he is obligated¹²⁹? That he should tell. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, it should have been logical that even unintentionally he should have been obligated. Why did they say that he is free¹³⁰? Because of a fine. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan comes from this: “If someone causes anything to become impure, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A person who puts a yoke on another’s cow is free in human law but guilty in Heaven’s law.¹³¹. 19) provided it never was used for work and never wore a yoke. Putting a yoke on such a cow for the shortest of times robs its owner of an enormous sum of money but, since the damage is not visible, it is not claimable in a human court. This follows the doctrine of R. Joḥanan that damages which cannot be observed on the object cannot be claimed in court.”

footnotes: ¹²⁴ Because an outside observer could not notice any change in the food which was made impure. ¹²⁵ Mishnah Baba Qama ¹²⁶ The passive formulation in the Mishnah invites this interpretation. ¹²⁷ Bekhorot ¹²⁸ The obligation to pay in this case is not by the declaration that something is impure, but by the act of the incompetent judge who handles the material in question when he declares it impure. Since a person can make impure only by an action, either touching or moving, he equally will be responsible under the laws of torts. ¹²⁹ It is obvious that “free” and “obligated” have to be interchanged. Since the prior argument showed that causing impurity is causing damage under the laws of torts, the person causing unintentional impurity should have to pay. The reason that courts refrain from applying the rules of torts in this case is that the damage is not visible and, in order to guard the owner of the impure food and others from unintentional sin, it is necessary to induce the person causing the damage to come forward and tell by granting him immunity. ¹³⁰ Here also, it is obvious that “free” and “obligated” have to be interchanged. Since the damage cannot be detected, it cannot be claimed in court. The obligation to pay is not derived from the laws of torts but is a regulation “for the public good” in line with the other rules of this chapter. ¹³¹ In the times of the Temple, a red (probably meaning reddish-brown) cow without any black hair was worth millions (as material for the purification from the impurity of the dead, Num

So far if he thought that it was profane¹³². If he knew that it was heave but he thought that it was permitted to make it impure? Let ushear from the following: “If Cohanim in the Temple intentionally made [a sacrifice] piggul, they have to pay.¹³³ in the Temple have to pay”, it follows that there must be a scenario in which a Cohen could cause piggul inadvertently.” Could the Cohen think that it was profane? Is there piggul of profane things? But we must hold that he knew that it was holy but thought that it was permitted to make piggul of sacrifices. And here, if he knew that it was heave but thought that it was permitted to make it impure.

footnotes: ¹³² This refers to the statement in the Mishnah that the person who inadvertently causes damage by making food impure does not have to pay. The only food where there would be a measurable diminution in value is sanctified food, of which heave is the most common example. ¹³³ Since the Mishnah does not state that “the Cohanim who cause piggul

Rav Huna in the name of Rav: If he mixed¹³⁴. If he made a libation and then mixed it¹³⁵, at the start he committed a capital crime and at the end he has to pay¹³⁶ 7:1, Notes 19–70) and idolatry is a capital crime, it seems difficult to understand why the culprit should pay. The Babli, 52b, notes that the argument is faulty in its understanding of the double penalty clause. The libation and the later mixing are two different acts. Even if there is only a libation, not followed by mixing with other wine, the libation can only be performed after the wine was poured into a vessel and the vessel lifted. Since we are speaking of wine belonging to a person other than the perpetrator, the latter becomes liable for all damages by lifting the vessel, some time before he commits the capital crime. It is clear, therefore, that the Yerushalmi view of the double punishment clause does not allow for splitting one action into separate parts.? Rebbi Abba objected: Think of it, if he killed somebody and broke the flask, at the start he committed a capital crime and in the end he has to pay¹³⁷? Rebbi Yose objected: Think of it, if he set fire to somebody’s grain stack on the Day of Atonement, at the start he committed a capital crime and in the end he has to pay¹³⁸ 7:1, Note 62.)? “If someone causes anything to become impure, or turn into dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine¹³⁹.

footnotes: ¹³⁴ He took wine which was used for a pagan rite and is forbidden for any use by a Jew, and mixed it with permitted wine of the same kind, so that the damage was not visible. In the Babli, 52a, this interpretation of “libation wine” in the Mishnah is attributed to Samuel. ¹³⁵ In the Babli, this is the interpretation of Rav. ¹³⁶ Since rabbinic doctrine excludes multiple punishment for one offense (cf. Terumot ¹³⁷ If somebody committed murder by administering poison in another person’s flask and in the act broke the flask, nobody will require the murderer to pay for the flask. ¹³⁸ Everything forbidden on the Sabbath is forbidden on the Day of Atonement (except that the crime will be punished by Heaven, rather than by the earthly court.) Since both making a fire and arson on the Day of Atonement are crimes punishable by Divine extirpation, no money is due (cf. Terumot ¹³⁹ Since the payment is a fine, not a judgment following biblical law, the principle of single punishment does not apply. This argument is mentioned in the Babli, 53a.

MISHNAH: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Gudguedah testified about a deaf-mute girl¹⁴⁰, Mishnah 14:3, Notes 20–24. “Testified” usually means a statement of practice from Temple times accepted by the Jabneh Academy as binding. who was married off by her father, that she must be divorced by a bill of divorce¹⁴¹, and about an underage girl who was married to a Cohen¹⁴² 1:2, Note 38)., that she may eat heave and her husband inherits from her if she dies, and about a stolen log which was used to build a house¹⁴³, that [the owner] has to take the value¹⁴⁴, and about a purification sacrifice of a stolen animal¹⁴⁵ which was not known in public, that it atones because of the order of the altar.

footnotes: ¹⁴⁰ She is presumed not to be able to read and write. Since she has no means of communication with the outside world, she is incompetent in law. She herself could not conclude a marriage valid by biblical standards, but her father can marry her off when underage in a biblically valid marriage. Cf. Yebamot ¹⁴¹ Since a divorce is a unilateral act by the husband as long as she is able to receive the bill. An insane woman, who cannot keep her bill of divorce, cannot be divorced. ¹⁴² Even if the father had died and she was married in a rabbinically valid marriage by her mother or brothers, from which she may walk out without formality before she reaches adulthood (cf. Yebamot ¹⁴³ In Babylonian versions of the Mishnah, it is added “for the benefit of repentant sinners”, as explained in the Halakhah. ¹⁴⁴ He cannot sue the robber for restitution of the original log. ¹⁴⁵ It is a sinful act to use any stolen or robbed animal as a sacrifice. If such a sacrifice would be declared invalid, no Cohen would volunteer to serve in the Temple for fear of unwittingly committing the sin of eating from an invalid sacrifice. Therefore, a sacrifice can be rejected only if it is known that it was obtained by illegal means.

HALAKHAH: ¹⁴⁶ 14:2, Notes 25–28. The readings from there are noted י.“Rebbi Joḥanan ben Guedgedah testified,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah asked before Rebbi Immi. His testimony seems reasonable for a hearing woman of sound mind, that she is divorced with or without her acquiescence. But a deaf-mute woman who has no will should not be divorced except with her acquiescence. But is it not testimony “that is an example”¹⁴⁷. The text here, “his father is the same”, does not make any sense; it indicates that the text in Yebamot is original.; does one add to a testimony? Rebbi Ḥanania is of the opinion that this refers to a hearing girl who was married off by her father (and mother¹⁴⁸) and became deaf-and-dumb. Rebbi Yose is of the opinion that this refers to an underage girl who was married off by her father (and mother¹⁴⁸) and became divorced.

footnotes: ¹⁴⁶ This paragraph is from Yebamot ¹⁴⁷ This is the text from Yebamot ¹⁴⁸ The mention of the mother is an addition here; legally the mother has no authority over her daughter. ¹⁴⁸ The mention of the mother is an addition here; legally the mother has no authority over her daughter.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, why did they say “an Israel underage girl eats heave,” that all should be eager to marry her for her attractiveness¹⁴⁹. Rebbi Shammai said, only if she knows how to keep her [valuables given for] preliminary marriage¹⁵⁰. Rebbi Immi said, a Mishnah said so, “married to a Cohen she eats heave.¹⁵¹ 5:4, speaking of a girl 3 years and 1 day old, could be used as counter-argument since such a girl, if married off by her father, is married even if mentally handicapped.)” Rebbi Ḥananiah said, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, for her attractiveness, that means, even if she does not know how to keep her [valuables given for] preliminary marriage¹⁵² 22:11)..

footnotes: ¹⁴⁹ And not be reluctant to take a very young girl off her parent’s hands. ¹⁵⁰ He wants to abolish the theoretical age of 3 years and one day for the marriage of girls and requires that she know the difference between something given for a legal obligation and a toy. ¹⁵¹ Since the Mishnah changes the topic from a deaf-mute to a minor it implies that only an Israel underage girl, which will reach understanding, but not a deaf-mute, is able to eat heave. It follows that as long as the girl is like a deaf-mute, having no understanding, she is not included. (A similar Mishnah, Niddah ¹⁵² R. Joḥanan could have said that a minor can eat heave because she has understanding, to emphasize the difference between the minor and the deaf-mute. Since he chose to represent the ruling as rabbinical, to help marrying off underage girls, it follows that he does not require the girl to understand the situation. If the girl is given in marriage by her father, she is married by biblical rule, is part of the priestly clan, and eats heave by biblical law. If she was an orphan married off by her mother or brothers, if she actually lives with her husband she is part of her husband’s household and was acquired by his gift of valuables (Lev.

Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rebbi¹⁵³ Assi: An underage girl has no definitive marriage to let her eat heave¹⁵⁴. Rebbi Immi said, a Mishnah said so, “married to a Cohen she eats heave.¹⁵⁵ 5:4. The Mishnah does not say “by definitive marriage ceremony” but “being married to”, i.e., living with her husband.” Rebbi Abin asked: If she was definitively married but had no intercourse, [the husband] sent her to her father’s house and she grew up, may she eat heave¹⁵⁶? Let us hear from the following: “Based on her earlier definitive marriage.¹⁵⁷, not otherwise attested to, which does not require any additional action to give all her rights to the adult married woman. The Babli (Yebamot 58a) quotes dissenting opinions without deciding the matter.”

footnotes: ¹⁵³ In the Babli, he always is called Rav Assi. ¹⁵⁴ An underage Israel girl married to a Cohen acquires the right to eat heave only by living with her husband, not by the definitive marriage ceremony. ¹⁵⁵ Niddah ¹⁵⁶ Since an adult married to a Cohen can eat heave immediately, during the wedding meal, before sleeping with her husband. ¹⁵⁷ There is a baraita

“If somebody stole a log and used it in building. The House of Shammai say, he has to tear down the entire building and return it. But the House of Hillel say, for the benefit of repenting sinners¹⁵⁸ 9:1, Tosephta Baba Qama 10:5, Babli Giṭṭin 55a., that he has to pay its full value.” Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? If he stole it planed, but if he stole and planed it himself, he owes him money¹⁵⁹ 9:2).. If he stole and planed it on the spot¹⁶⁰, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following¹⁶¹ 8:10, Baba Qama 10:6,7; Yerushalmi Baba Qama 9:1 (6d 1.28); as an object of controversy Babli Baba Meṣi‘a 101a.: “If somebody appropriates another person’s ruin and rebuilds it without prermission, one appraises it and his hand is weak¹⁶². If he wants to take his logs and stones¹⁶³, one does not listen to him.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It was asked in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: If somebody stores his bundle in somebody else’s ruin and wants to take it from there, does one not listen to him? He had not heard that Rebbi Jacob bar Idi¹⁶⁴ said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of civilisation¹⁶⁵. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. We would have thought that they disagree only in the Land, but not outside the Land. Since Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, because of civilisation¹⁶⁶, this implies that there is no difference between the Land and outside the Land. If he¹⁶⁷ wants to take [the value of] his logs and stones, what is the rule? One tells him, wait until he¹⁶⁸ dwells in it. Samuel said, one pays him immediately.

footnotes: ¹⁵⁸ Quoted in Baba Qama ¹⁵⁹ If he stole a piece of raw wood and turned it into building material, it cannot be returned to its original state. The robber acquired ownership of the material by changing it into something new; at the same time he incurred a debt to the original owner in the value of what he had taken (Mishnah Baba Qama ¹⁶⁰ Does acquisition by changing the object require removing it from the domain of the original owner? ¹⁶¹ Tosephta Ketubot ¹⁶² As explained in the Tosephta, the owner of the bundle pays the builder the smaller amount either of the increase in value of his land and the building expenses. ¹⁶³ Which already form part of the building. ¹⁶⁴ This should be “Aḥa”. ¹⁶⁵ One does not destroy houses except for an urgent need, either to avoid a collapse or to improve the housing stock. The question (Note 160) is answered in the negative. ¹⁶⁶ The formulation is universal יִשׁוּב “civilization”, not narrow יִשׁוּב אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל “settlement of the Land of Israel”. ¹⁶⁷ The illegal builder. ¹⁶⁸ The owner of the land.

Ulla bar Ismael: By law, it should not atone even if it was [not] known in public¹⁶⁹. Why did they say that it atones? Not to let the altar be deserted¹⁴⁵. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish¹⁷⁰ said, by law, it should atone even if it was known in public. Why did they say that it does not atone? Not to let the altar accept robberies. How many are “public”? Rebbi Gorion in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Three people. Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “You brought robbed goods with the lame and the sick.¹⁷¹. 1:13.” Since lame and sick are obvious, so everything must be obvious.

footnotes: ¹⁶⁹ Babli 55a. There, Ulla explains that the sacrifice is not acceptable once the original owners have given up hope of recovery, since while abandonment makes a thing ownerless (Chapter 4, Note 88), ownership requires a conscious act of acquisition by the person in actual possession.. ¹⁴⁵ It is a sinful act to use any stolen or robbed animal as a sacrifice. If such a sacrifice would be declared invalid, no Cohen would volunteer to serve in the Temple for fear of unwittingly committing the sin of eating from an invalid sacrifice. Therefore, a sacrifice can be rejected only if it is known that it was obtained by illegal means. ¹⁷⁰ In the Babli this is attributed to Rav Jehudah and it is explained that abandonment by the former owner makes the object the property of the person in possession. ¹⁷¹ Mal

MISHNAH: There was no law of siqarii¹⁷² (members of organized crime bands armed with a sica, “curved dagger”, and the rules promulgated to deal with these. A. Gulak [Siqariqon, Tarbiz 5 (1934) pp. 23–27] objects to the derivation of siqariqon from sicarii since it is inconceivable that Rebbi’s court, in the early years of the third Century C.E. had to deal with the aftermath of the first revolt against the Romans, in the first half of the first Century. He proposes to see in the word a compression of σὺν κήρυκι to *συγκηρυκι “by herold” referring to the public sale of properties confiscated by the government which always was done by publicly announced auction. {While the Babli clearly connects the law of siqariqon with the first revolt against the Romans, the Yerushalmi squarely refers it to the revolt of Bar Kokhba. We know of no general confiscation of Jewish land after the first revolt; after the second there was at least the seizure of all Jewish property in and around Jerusalem. Since both Talmudim emphasize the cordial relations of Rebbi with the administration of the Severan dynasty and Rebbi clearly addressed a current problem, it seems rather that the law refers to a problem arising from a breakdown of internal security. Talmudic law certainly authorizes buying of property confiscated for nonpayment of taxes. Gulak’s interpretation is difficult to square with Mishnah Bikkurim 1:2.} A forced sale is intrinsically invalid since the seller can hope that in the future, when law and order are re-established, he may have a chance to appeal to a court and regain his property. But if a band of known sicarii give a property owner the choice of selling his land for a pittance or be killed together with his family, one may assume that he willingly gives the land to stay alive. In that situation, the land becomes the siqarii’s not only in possession but also in ownership, and may be sold by the current owner to any buyer. It is a matter of judgment of the court as to which situation does apply. in Judea for those killed in the war¹⁷³ to the first sentences in the Halakhah. S. Lieberman (Tosefta kiFshutah Giṭṭin p. 844) has noted that the reading “R. Joshua” in Mishnah 7 is clearly a scribal error since Rav, a student of Rebbi, states both in the Yerushalmi (Note 205) and the Babli (58b/59a) that he himself was a member of the court relaxing the siqariqon rules. Also, the Halakhah never refers to R. Joshua or any of his contemporaries. Therefore, one has to read in the Mishnah, with all sources other than the Mishnah in the Yerushalmi, “Rebbi assembled a court” in the first quarter of the third Century, to deal with the problem of organized crime in his own day. Together with the rules about kidnappings, this shows that the forces of the Roman Empire (at least starting with the Severan dynasty) were barely able to guarantee the external, but not the internal, security of the Empire. The Mishnah states that land taken from Jews during the war can be bought by anybody who has the means, without regard to any prior owner. (In this case, sicarii is a code name for Roman soldiers.) The Babli connects the Mishnah to a long string of tales about the first war against the Romans; this should not be taken as indication that the Mishnah refers to that war.. After those killed in the war there was a law of siqarii. How is this? If one bought from a siqarius and afterwards from the original owner, his acquisition is void¹⁷⁴; from the original owner and afterwards from the siqarius, his acquisition is valid. If one bought from a husband and afterwards from the wife, his acquisition is void¹⁷⁵; from the wife and afterwards from the husband, his acquisition is valid. This is the earlier Mishnah; a later court said that he who buys from a siqarius¹⁷⁶ gives a quarter to the original owner. When is this? If they have no means to buy, but if they have the means to buy, they precede everybody else¹⁷⁷. Rebbi (Joshua) assembled a court who voted that if it was in the siqarius’s hand for twelve months, any who wants to buy shall buy¹⁷⁸ and give a quarter to the original owner.

footnotes: ¹⁷² סִיקָרִיקִין or סִקָרִיקוֹן (in the Halakhah and everywhere in the Babli) is usually interpreted to refer both to sicarii ¹⁷³ “The war” refers to the revolt of Bar Kokhba and its aftermath, as shown by the parallel in Ketubot ¹⁷⁴ It was decided that the original owner retains claim to title even though he probably sold the land to save his life. Therefore, a potential buyer must first buy the right to title before buying the land. ¹⁷⁵ The husband is not the owner of his wife’s (paraphernalia) properties, but their administrator. While the details of the sale must be contracted by the husband, prior consent of the wife is needed; otherwise, the husband is not authorized to deal and anything he agrees to is illegal. ¹⁷⁶ Without needing prior consent. This is a regulation “for the public good”, to retain as much of the Land as possible in Jewish hands. ¹⁷⁷ If the original owner has the cash available, he can pay the full price to the buyer and take back his title to the land. ¹⁷⁸ After 12 months, the original owner lost his right to regain the land.

HALAKHAH: “There was no law of siqariqon in Judea” etc. ¹⁷⁹ 1:5 (Notes 196–199). Variants are given by כ. In earlier times they decided on a persecution in Judea because they had a tradition from their forefathers that Jehudah had killed Esaw, as it is written: “Your hand is on your enemies’ neck.” They went and enslaved them, took their fields and sold them to third parties. The original owners could come and repossess¹⁸⁰; therefore the land was left absolutely in the hand of the siqariqon since they refrained from buying¹⁸¹. “They decreed that the law of siqariqon should not apply in Jehudah¹⁸². When was this said? About war killings before the war¹⁸³. But about anybody killed in and after the war, the notion of siqariqon does not apply¹⁸⁴ applies.” The Yerushalmi text should not be corrected based on Tosephta or Babli. Since one refers to the war of Bar Kokhba and the Hadrianic decrees in its aftermath, it is clear that the situation during and after the war was worse than before the war. One does not speak of a forced sale but of the rights of the heirs of a person who was killed and his land taken by Roman soldiers or civilians. It is clear that there was no sale. Since the greater part of the Jewish population of Judea was either killed in the war or deported as slaves, it made no sense for the organizers of the survivors to take notice of prior ownership. One has to assume that “Judea” means the Judean hills, to exclude the settlements in the plain centered around Lydda..” But are those killed before the war not like those killed after the war? Explain it that a siqariqon came and robbed and suppressed; there was no time left to write the sales contract before murder engulfed the entire world, that practice should not be partial¹⁸⁵.

footnotes: ¹⁷⁹ This sentence and part of the next is also in Ketubot ¹⁸⁰ After the Jewish court system was reestablished under R. Jehudah. ¹⁸¹ As long as the court held that a forced sale was invalid. ¹⁸² Nobody had the right to reclaim from third parties land he had given away to save his life. ¹⁸³ In the anarchy between the begin of the revolt and the occupation of the Land by Roman forces. ¹⁸⁴ In Tosephta 3:10: “But about anybody killed in and after the war, the notion of siqariqon ¹⁸⁵ Robberies during the anarchy before the Roman invasion cannot be separated from what happened during the war; in both cases no documentation can be recovered.

“The law of siqariqon always applies in Galilee.¹⁸⁶” The law of siqariqon does not apply to movables¹⁸⁷. It was stated¹⁸⁸: “The law of siqariqon does not apply to foreclosures for a debt¹⁸⁹ and for tenant fees¹⁹⁰, the fee due by hereditary farmers of government land (cf. Ketubot 10:5, Note 91; Tosefta kiFshutah Giṭṭin p. 846). The Babli, 58a, treats ἀναφορά as robbery. It is not clear whether the term was also used for fees payable by hereditary tenants to landlords other than the government.. [A foreclosure for nonpayment of] tenant fees waits twelve months for the owners¹⁹¹, a Jewish farmer cannot apply to fill his place before 12 months after his eviction, to give the original tenant time to settle with the government. {The text is confirmed by Sefer haʻIṭṭur II, 68b; the explanation follows S. Lieberman in his commentary to Tosephta 3:11.}.” Rebbi Judah ben Pazi said, after twelve months one announces on four consecutive Sabbaths¹⁹². He explained it in two ways. If he¹⁹³ did not sell the property but installed a tenant farmer to produce a continuous stream of income. took it from a tenant and gave it to a tenant and the first wants to foreclose, he says to him, are you not a tenant? Leave it for me and what you cut, you cut¹⁹⁴ are not interested in selling, the original tenant cannot bid for the property. But during the 12 months accorded to him, he can offer the new tenant (who moved in in violation of the 12 months’ rule) not to sue him in rabbinic court, to enter the property under the terms accorded by the siqariqon, and let the new tenant keep any yield he already had reaped.. If he¹⁹⁵ are not interested in selling, exists where the new tenant can arrange with the original owner to stay in place if and when he manages either to buy from the organized crime group or to recoup his title with government help. took it from the owner and gave it to a tenant, the [owner] wants to foreclose, he tells him, what use do you have if you take it from me and he will take it from you, but what I can afford I shall give to you.

footnotes: ¹⁸⁶ Tosephta 3:10. In Galilee, the Hadrianic decrees were never applied to dispossess Jewish farmers. ¹⁸⁷ If one buys movables from an organized crime enterprise, one does not have to give anything to the former owners since these had given up hope to recover (cf. Note 169). ¹⁸⁸ Tosephta 3:10. ¹⁸⁹ If a Gentile forecloses for a loan, the Jewish buyer does not owe anything to a former Jewish owner. ¹⁹⁰ A. Gulak has shown that ἀναφορά (“offering, installment, means of repairing a deficiency”) was the equivalent of Roman vectigal ¹⁹¹ If a hereditary tenant is evicted for non-payment of the vectigal ¹⁹² After twelve months, there will be public anouncements that the twelve months’ grace period for the property (either one taken by organized crime or foreclosed for non-payment of the tax) has expired without action by the former owner. ¹⁹³ The sicarius ¹⁹⁴ Since the sicarii ¹⁹⁵ A similar situation in which the sicarii

So far, if there were two contracts¹⁹⁶ of the Mishnah (Napoli) and the Vienna ms. of the Tosephta: “If one bought from a wife and afterwards from her husband, his acquisition is void; from the husband and afterwards from his wife, his acquisition is valid.” S. Lieberman (Tosefta ki-Fshutah Giṭṭin p. 847) considers this reading as “incomprehensible” and, against his declared intention, does base his text on the Vienna ms. in this case. But it seems that the text can be well understood, since all depends on the legal status of the property, whether it is mortmain or paraphernalia (cf. Yebamot 7:1, Note 1). Mortmain is the husband’s property; at the dissolution of the marriage the wife is entitled to receive it or its value back; during the marriage all she has is a mortgage lien on her husband’s properties. Therefore, if she sells mortmain properties, she sells what she does not have; this is invalid. But if the husband sells, she has a right of regress on the property if it should turn out that the estate is insufficient to cover her ketubah claim. A buyer may want to buy insurance against such a possibility by paying the wife for her final assent to the sale. If she receives a consideration for her signature, she cannot claim later that she only signed to please her husband. The Mishnah speaks of paraphernalia property, which is the wife’s and of which the husband only has rights of administration.. If there was one contract¹⁹⁷? Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ila both say, certainly the sale is invalid; i. e., if he bought from the wife and then bought from the husband. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Bevon both said, certainly the sale is valid; i. e., if he bought from the husband and then bought from the wife. But is not all the wife’s property administered by the husband? For the yield¹⁹⁸.

footnotes: ¹⁹⁶ This refers to the part of the Mishnah in which husband and wife sell from the wife’s real estate. It is clear that the Mishnah text underlying the Yerushalmi is not the Mishnah of the ms. (which frequently represents a different tradition) but that of the editio princeps ¹⁹⁷ In that case, the buyer might not pay separately for the wife’s signature. ¹⁹⁸ Of the paraphernalia property.

Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: So it is: If he sold to a first person and she signed, to a second and a third and she signed, she can collect from the last¹⁹⁹ mortgage and his property should be immune to the wife’s claims.. If it is insufficient, she collects from the one before the last. If this is insufficient, she collects from the one before the penultimate. On this, Rav said: For property which she brought him in her ketubah²⁰⁰, the value of which is written in the ketubah document and which establishes a mortgage on all the husband’s properties.. But property which she brought to him as paraphernalia²⁰¹, property she inherited or otherwise acquired during the marriage; any sale by the husband is invalid even if the wife signs the sale document after her husband; cf. Yebamot 7:1, Note 1., she collects from any she wants.

footnotes: ¹⁹⁹ She signed on the sales contract after her husband and claims that she did so to please her husband, not as a commercial transaction. The court will uphold this claim. But the earlier buyer can claim that when he bought the real estate, there were left sufficient assets to cover the wife’s ketubah ²⁰⁰ Dos aestimata ²⁰¹ Dos non aestimata

(The deaf-mute communicates by sign language.)²⁰² They say²⁰³, we had the means to buy; the buyer says, no. Rebbi Yose says, the field is always in the possession of the current owner²⁰⁴ II, 66d “the buyers”. The commentary (Note 176) lists all other authors who copied from there. since the burden of proof is on the claimant.

footnotes: ²⁰² This heading is misplaced; it belongs after the next Mishnah. Probably it should read “Halakhah 7” and quote Mishnah 7. ²⁰³ Here starts the discussion of Mishnah 7. Who has to bring proof if the heirs of the original owner say that they had the means to buy back the property but the actual buyer disputes their assertion? ²⁰⁴ In Sefer ha‘Iṭṭur

Rav said, I was of the voters²⁰⁵. There is no difference between a quarter in real estate or a quarter in money²⁰⁶. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, real estate for a denar a γραμμάριον²⁰⁷, two obols, a third of a denar’s (or drachma’s) weight. As measures of land, the denar is ¹/96 and the scruple ¹/288 of a iugerum of 28’800 Roman square feet. R. Yose ben R. Abun holds that the “quarter” mentioned in the Mishnah is computed from above, a quarter of the total expense which is a third of the price paid to the criminal. The computation from above is that of Samuel in the Babli, 58b., in money a quarter is a tremis²⁰⁸ a large coin mentioned in Threni rabba 1(14) as טרימיסיא..

footnotes: ²⁰⁵ This refers to the court convened by Rebbi which decreed that after 12 months the original owners or their heirs lost the right of first refusal but retained the right to an indemnity. The Mishnah does not spell out whether a third of the real estate should be returned or one speaks of a payment. ²⁰⁶ The same statement is in the Babli, 58b. ²⁰⁷ Greek γραμμάριον, the equivalent of Latin scrupulus ²⁰⁸ A third of an aureus;

MISHNAH: A deaf-mute communicates in sign language, and Ben Bathyra says, in pantomimes²⁰⁹ 5:10. Maimonides’s explanation is based on a meaning “to jump” (Cant. 2:8) meaning that the deaf-mute has to bring and handle the object., referring to movables. Underage children: their buy is a buy and their sale is a sale, referring to movables.

footnotes: ²⁰⁹ This is Rashi’s explanation, based on Job

HALAKHAH: “Ben Bathyra says, in pantomimes²¹⁰.” He hires and is hired²¹¹. The artless, small children²¹² p. 847) explains אפיוטות, הפיוטות as Greek ἑπτέτης, ἑπταετής, adj., “seven years old”. There is no reason to single out that age.. Rebbi Joḥanan said, because of their livelihood. Rebbi Mana said, even though Rebbi Yose raises difficulties in collecting forfeits²¹³ and invalid (Ketubot 5:5, Note 117); the court is reluctant to enforce such a clause. (In modern Hebrew, עִיצוּמִים are labor union actions just short of a strike.), he agrees that those who give their children to artisans that they collect forfeits because of the livelihood of people²¹⁴.

footnotes: ²¹⁰ This is the quote from the Mishnah but it is not discussed. ²¹¹ The deaf-mute, by sign language. ²¹² The uncommon Semitic word פָּעוּט is compared to Greek ἀποίητος “artless”, παιδία “childhood”. (Explanation of H. L. Fleischer.) S. Lieberman (Tosephta kiFshutah ²¹³ He holds that nobody signs a contract that imposes a fine on himself with the idea that he really will have to pay the fine. Therefore, a contract which contains a forfeit clause for each party may be asmakhta ²¹⁴ If an artisan bows out of a contract for an apprentice, he will have to pay a fine since the child needs to learn a trade to be able to make a living.

MISHNAH: The following was said for communal peace: A Cohen reads first, after him a Levite, after him an Israel, for communal peace²¹⁵ 5:5, Note 90).. One puts an eruv in an old house, for communal peace²¹⁶. A cistern which is close to a water canal is filled first, for communal peace²¹⁷. Finds of a deaf-mute, or an insane person, or a minor²¹⁸ fall under the category of robbery, for communal peace; Rebbi Yose says, complete robbery²¹⁹. Traps for wild animals, birds, or fish fall²²⁰ under the category of robbery, for communal peace; Rebbi Yose says, complete robbery. If one knocks off [olives] from high up in the olive tree²²¹, it falls under the category of robbery, for communal peace; Rebbi Yose says, complete robbery. One does not hinder poor Gentiles [from taking] gleanings, forgotten sheaves, or peah²²², for communal peace.

footnotes: ²¹⁵ In any public reading from the Torah, a Cohen has to be given precedence (if there is one present), followed by a Levite. If there is no Levite present, the Cohen is called for a second reading since all Cohanim are Levites (Maʻaśer Šeni ²¹⁶ In a common courtyard serving many houses with different owners one cannot carry on the Sabbath unless one symbolically unites all houses by depositing some common food in one of them. This is called עֵרוּב חֲצֵרוֹת “the combination of courtyards”. If one house was the depository for some time, one cannot change the place of deposit without insulting the owner of that house; therefore, it is forbidden to change. ²¹⁷ The order of filling cisterns (or irrigation of fields) is by the length of the side canal used by cistern or field, to avoid quarrels. ²¹⁸ These cannot legally acquire anything they find since they have no legal standing. But it is forbidden to act on this fact. ²¹⁹ The Halakhah will explain when taking finds from an incompetent person is a prosecutable offense. ²²⁰ If set in the public domain under rules which permit setting up such traps, the catch is private property and protected as such. ²²¹ Olives are harvested by shaking the olive tree and collecting under the tree. Those which did not fall off are left for the poor. The person who climbs into the tree to knock off the remaining olives is a poor person, not the owner of the orchard. What he knocks off and causes to fall under the tree is protected as his property. (The Mishnah in the Babli and in several Mishnah mss. is more explicit in speaking about the poor.) ²²² Since one supports the Gentile poor for communal peace.

HALAKHAH: “The following was said for communal peace,” etc. The saying of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai implies that it is of the words of the Torah, for Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Moses wrote this Torah and gave it to the Cohanim, the Levites (etc.)” and afterwards “to all the Elders of Israel.²²³. 31:9. The implication is that in all matters of reading the Torah the Cohanim and Levites have precedence over Israel Elders. In the Babli, 58b, the author of the statement is given as the Amora R. Mattaniah.” The saying of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Joshua said, never did I recite the benediction before a Cohen and I did not allow an Israel to do it before him²²⁴ 28a, the statement is attributed to the wonder-working R. Perida. In Yerushalmi Berakhot 5:5 (9d 1.3), the reference is that R. Joshua ben Levi never let any non-Cohen publicly recite Grace in the presence of a Cohen (Halakhah 5:5, Notes 163,164.). The saying of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Ḥanina said, in a city of only Cohanim, an Israel reads first because of communal peace²²⁵.

footnotes: ²²³ Deut ²²⁴ If it were a Torah obligation to give precedence to Cohanim, there would be no reason to point it out as a sign of particular religiosity. In the Babli, Megillah ²²⁵ If it were a Torah obligation, then even to avoid quarrels it would not be possible to call an Israel.

²²⁶ 5:5, explained in Notes 167–175. The readings of the Leiden ms. are noted by ב, of the Rome ms. by ר, Rebbi Aḥa and Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Simai: In a city of only Cohanim, all of them lift their hands. For whom do they recite the blessing? For their brothers to the North and South. Who answers after them? Women and children²²⁷ text might allow almost adult children to join their fathers in the priestly blessing.. Abbaie bar Benjamin stated: People who stand behind the Cohanim are not included in the blessing. For those in front of them, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that even an iron wall does not interrupt. Those who stand to their side? Let us hear from the following: “If he intended to sprinkle before himself but sprinkled behind himself, behind himself but sprinkled before himself; his sprinkling is invalid. Before himself but sprinkled sideways, his sprinkling is valid.” This implies that those who stand to their side are included in the blessing. Rav Ḥisda said, it is necessary that the organizer be an Israel. Rav Ḥisda²²⁸ seem preferable since this style of repetition is not usual. said, if there was one Cohen, he says “Cohen.” For two, he says “Cohanim.” But Rav Huna said, even for one he says “Cohanim” since he only calls the tribe, lest you say, probably person X is an adulterer or a murderer,²²⁹ and he shall bless us? The Holy, praise to Him, said: Who blesses you? Am not I blessing you? As it was said²³⁰. 6:27, the verse following the text of the priestly blessing.: “They shall put My name over the Children of Israel and I shall bless them.”

footnotes: ²²⁶ A parallel is in Berakhot ²²⁷ There may be a material difference between the two texts since קטנים refers to all underage children but טף only to those who still need their mothers. The Berakhot ²²⁸ The name attributions in Berakhot ²²⁹ This is an exaggeration since a homicide is barred from reciting the priestly blessing. It simply means that people might be offended if others think that they could dispense blessings to them. It has to be emphasized that the Cohen is just fulfilling a hereditary duty; his person is not giving the blessing. ²³⁰ Lev

“One puts an eruv in an old house.” Rebbi Abin said, the Mishnah speaks of a prior dweller²³¹ is removed from it but the owner of the house. Therefore, if there is a new owner in an old house, one may move the location of the eruv. The statement is copied in Eruvin 6, 23d 1.40..

footnotes: ²³¹ Not the house is offended if the eruv

“A cistern which is close to a water canal is filled first.” Only if it passes through it²³². Samuel said, even if it is close by. There²³³, they say what is farther away but easy to drink from precedes one which is close by but difficult to drink from.

footnotes: ²³² In the Babli, 60b, this is one interpretation given by Samuel, that the owner of the cistern cannot be forced to install a lock. ²³³ In Babylonia. This is not mentioned in the Babli, which prefers to have the situation handled without set rules. “Drink” may mean “being irrigated”.

²³⁴ 4:4, Notes 80–90. Variants are noted מ. Cf. Note 236. Following the opinion of the rabbis there it is acceptable since there, they say in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: One to whom one gives a nut and he throws it away, a pebble and he keeps it, what is found in his hand is as if found on a garbage heap; a nut and he keeps it, a pebble and he throws it away, what is robbed from him is robbed because of communal peace; a nut or a pebble he takes, hides them, and produces them later, what is robbed from him is total robbery. He can acquire for himself but not for others. Rav Huna said, just as he can acquire for himself so he can acquire for others. Everybody agrees that his gift is not a gift since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “If a man give.” The gift of a man is a gift, but the gift of a minor is no gift, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, robbing from him is not clear²³⁵, Bulletin des Vereins jüdischer Lehrer und Kantoren der Schweiz 21 (1977), 4–5. unless he grew two pubic hairs. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that is, to recover from him by a law suit, but to have to bring a sacrifice for [a false] oath only if he grew two pubic hairs. But following the rabbis here, Rebbi Yose asked that even for himself he should not be able to acquire since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “A man to his neighbor”, until he be like his neighbor. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac explained it by the method of the artless. As we have stated there²³⁶.: “For underage children, their buying is buying and their selling selling, for movables.” But did we not state there²³⁷ 4:4.: “He cannot make them acquire through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is like his hand.” The rabbis of Caesarea say, here a minor²³⁸ with knowledge, there a minor without knowledge.

footnotes: ²³⁴ The text is from Maʻaser Šeni ²³⁵ מחזר is a misspelling for מְחֻוָּר, a Babylonian spelling for Yerushalmi מְחוּבָּר “(logically) connected; clear”. It is not derived from the Aramaic root חור “pale”. Cf. H. Guggenheimer, Zur Aussprache des Bet in talmudischer Zeit ²³⁶ Since the Mishnah is from here, this shows that the original is in Maʻaser Šeni ²³⁷ Mishnah Ma‘aser Šeni ²³⁸ The talmudic expression תִּינּוֹקוֹת שֶׁל בֵּית רַבָּן “schoolchildren” shows that the word denotes older children. The root is ינק “to suckle”.

“Traps for wild animals, birds,” etc. That is²³⁹, about large ones²⁴⁰. But small ones are as if inside his house.

footnotes: ²³⁹ The difference of opinion between the Sages, who hold that taking from them is only rabbinically forbidden, and R. Yose, who holds that taking from traps is biblically a sin. ²⁴⁰ Where animals are trapped but not immobilized; they cannot be considered acquired by the owner of the trap, in contrast to small traps which immobilize the prey. In the Babli, 60a/61b, in the interpretation of Rashi and R. Hananel, it is stated similarly that animals or birds trapped in nets are acquired by the trapper but those caught in larger contraptions constructed of planks are subject to the controversy of the Mishnah.

“If a poor person knocks off [olives] from high up in the olive tree, what is under him falls under the category of robbery²⁴¹) is close to the text of the Babli and most Mishnah mss., for communal peace; Rebbi Yose says, complete robbery.” That means, on the earth²⁴². But if he plucks with his hand, his hand acquires for him.

footnotes: ²⁴¹ The longer version of the Mishnah (indicated by italics ²⁴² What falls down on the ground is only protected by rabbinic rule. But what the poor person picks and puts in a vessel is his property by biblical standards.

²⁴³ 4:6, Notes 76–79. Variants from there are noted ד; a (Babylonian spelling) variant from the Venice print by ו. The text there is probably copied from a ms. which underwent fewer changes than the text here.“One does not hinder poor Gentiles [from taking] gleanings, forgotten sheaves, or peah, for communal peace.” It was stated: “In a town where Gentiles and Jews live together, one appoints overseers of charity from Gentiles and Jews; one provides for the Gentile and Jewish poor, visits Gentile and Jewish sick, buries Gentile and Jewish dead, and consoles Gentile and Jewish mourners. Also, one washes Gentile and Jewish clothes for the sake of peaceful coexistence.”

footnotes: ²⁴³ The text, to the end of the Halakhah, is also in Demai

A weaver asked Rebbi Immi, what about a Gentile wedding feast? He wanted to permit it to them from this: “Because of peaceful coexistence.” Rebbi Abba told them, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that the holiday of a Gentile wedding feast is forbidden? Rebbi Immi said, if it had not been for Rebbi Abba, we would have come to permit their strange worship; praised be He Who separated us from them.

MISHNAH: ²⁴⁴ 5:9, Notes 80–98. The variant ms. readings from there are noted ש. The last two paragraphs are also from Ševiʻit 4:3, Notes 50–57. A woman may lend to her neighbor, whom she suspects in matters of the Sabbatical, a coarse sieve⁸⁰ 69a., a fine sieve, grindstones, or an oven⁸¹ 4:6., but she should neither cull nor grind with her. The wife of a Fellow may lend to the wife of a vulgar⁸² 51a, the question never arises since the claims of the widow and the daughters are accorded equal status; this rule is quoted in Yebamot 15:3 (14d 1.68), Ketubot 4:8 (29a 1.25). a coarse sieve and a fine sieve, she may cull, grind, and sift with her, but she may not touch hers once water has been put in⁸³ 4:8, Notes 200–201. Variant readings are given there. because one does not support transgressors⁸⁴ 6:1. The subject is the biblical oath imposed on a person who denies an obligation (Ex. 22:8). The rabbinic interpretation of the expression אֲשֶׁר יֹאמַר כִּי הוּא זֶה is “if he [the defendant] agrees that there is a case.” If the defendant in a civil suit, in which there are no witnesses and no documents, denies the entire claim, he does not have to swear a biblical oath (he may have to swear a rabbinical oath). But if he agrees to part of the claim, he has to swear a biblical oath to free himself from the remainder. Only if the claim is advanced as tentative, then any admission by the defendant is a gift to the claimant and by rabbinic rule no oath of any kind is due.. All this has only been said for communal peace. One⁸⁵ encourages Gentiles in the Sabbatical year but not Jews. One greets them for communal peace.

footnotes: ²⁴⁴ The entire Halakhah is from Ševiʻit ⁸⁰ This is also quoted as Rebbi’s opinion in the Babli, Ketubot ⁸¹ Mishnah Ketubot ⁸² In the Babli, Ketubot ⁸³ The Text is from Ketubot ⁸⁴ Mishnah Ševuʻot ⁸⁵ The speaker is the claimant.

HALAKHAH: “A woman may lend to her neighbor,” etc. Rebbi Zeïra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does our Mishnah deal with the implicit case, rather than the explicit? He said to him, is the implicit case not explicit? He said to him, I can say a coarse sieve to count coins, a sieve to sift sand, grindstones to grind spices, a stove to put in flax bundles.

Rebbi Phineas asked: For what did they impose a fine? At a place where they sow and eat or at a place where they sow but do not eat? What is the difference? If one saw him buying from Saracens. ²⁴⁶ for the text that probably was omitted here. It is forbidden; if you say at a place where they sow and eat, if one saw him buying from Saracens it is permitted.

footnotes: ²⁴⁶ See variant readings and the translation in Ševiʻit

Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina asked: Has this been said for all of this chapter or only for this Mishnah? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Titus: From the fact that we state this Mishnah in Giṭṭin it follows that it was said only for this Mishnah.

There, we have stated: One does not knead or form bread with a baker working in impurity. And it was stated additionally: One should neither cull nor grind with him. And here, it says so? Rebbi La said, here for profane [bread], there for heave. Can you say heave at a baker’s? The colleagues say, one if he washes, there if he does not wash. The Mishnah supports the colleagues: “But she may not touch hers once water has been put in.”

²⁴⁹ 4:3, (Notes 50–57). The paragraph should not be taken as a variant of the text but as a hint to look up the original. Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Ammi. One said: “Plough it well then, I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical.” The other one said: “May you succeed” For him who says, plough it well, then I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical, what means “one greets them” in a Jewish way? “May you succeed.” For him who says to the Gentile “may you succeed”? Explanation: Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa and Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman passed by one of the ploughmen in the Sabbatical. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said to him, are you not Jewish? Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa said to him, did not Rebbi teach us (Ps. 129:8): “The passers-by did not say, the blessing of the Eternal be on you,” these are the nations of the world who pass out of the world, they did not say to Israel “the blessing of the Eternal is on you.” What does Israel say to them, “we bless you in the Name of the Eternal.” All blessings that come into the world because of us are not enough for you; not only do you not say, come and take from these blessings for yourselves, but you roll over us pro-rated contributions and fines, head taxes and annonae.

footnotes: ²⁴⁹ The essence of the paragraph is missing in this copy; cf. the full text in Seviʻit