MISHNAH: Two robbery¹ 4:3 that the judges in criminal law were paid from the Temple taxes. judges were in Jerusalem, Admon and Ḥanan ben Absalom. Ḥanan said two things and Admon seven². If somebody went overseas and his wife now is demanding sustenance³, Ḥanan says that she is made to swear in the end⁴ or her husband returns and claims that she sold too much of his property. In both cases she has to provide an accounting and swear that nothing of her husband’s money remains in her hand.. The High Priests’ sons disagreed with him and said, she is made to swear in the beginning⁵ and in the end; Rebbi Dosa ben Hyrkanos endorsed their statement. Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai said, Ḥanan said correctly that she is made to swear only in the end.

footnotes: ¹ In most sources of the Babli גזירות. Probably this is simply a case of change of liquids. It is stated in Šeqalim ² All recorded statements of Admon and Ḥanan refer to civil law; the count refers only to those statements which were disputed by the High Priest’s sons. It is possible that the latter represented Sadducee practice. ³ She goes to court to obtain permission to sell from her husband’s real estate. She claims either that the husband did not provide her with household money before he left or that he stayed overseas longer than intended and that her household money is now exhausted. ⁴ Either news is received that her husband died and she requests her ketubah ⁵ The court should not grant her permission to sell her husband’s property unless she swears that all her claims are true.

HALAKHAH: “Two robbery judges were in Jerusalem,” etc. Did not Rebbi Phineas say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: 469 synagogues were in Jerusalem and each one of them had a Book house and a study house; the Book house for Scripture and the study house for Mishnah⁶ 3:1 (73d 28), Thr. rabbati 2:2, Introduction #12; in Ta‘anit 4, (69a 13) the number of schools is put at 500 in the name of Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. In the Babli, 105a, the number is 394.? But these two were appointed for robberies; to teach you that if anybody has the power to intervene, if he does not exercise his power the misconduct is attributed to him⁷. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: Naḥum the Mede also was with them⁸. In Rebbi Nathan’s opinion, three robbery judges were in Jerusalem.

footnotes: ⁶ Since every “study house” was a law school, it is obvious that Jerusalem had more than two judges.The statement of R. Phineas is also in Megillah ⁷ The other judges were for civil cases. Those appointed to watch over public order are personally held responsible; therefore these judges are remembered by name. In the Babli, 105a, it is asserted that judges in a criminal court can be paid, in contrast to civil judges. ⁸ In the Babli, 105a, this tradition is denied.

⁹ 1:4, 1. 66 f., Notes 198–208. The variant readings from there are indicated by ס. To the sources indicated there one may add Gen. rabba 85(8) (in the name of R. Immi.) Rebbi Ḥizqiya in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: Rebbi used to explain three verses for praise. “She sat at the entrance to the double spring.” Is this possible? Even the most brazen whore would not do that. But she lifted her eyes to the door to which all hope is directed; she said before Him: Master of the universe, do not let me leave this house empty. Another explanation: “She sat at the entrance to the double spring;” she opened his eyes and told him, I am single and pure¹⁴. “And Eli was very old; …, that they slept with.¹⁵” It is written “they bedded them¹⁶ overseas”, i. e., with the intent to return. In this version, the court will intervene in behalf of the married woman. But “if somebody left for overseas”, i. e., emigrated permanently, then the Mishnah only deals either with an abandoned wife or a widow, but not with a wife who expects her husband to return.”. Rebbi said, the women were bringing their nests¹⁷ to become purified for their husbands and they were deferring the sacrifices; the verse counts it as if they had slept with them. Rebbi Tanḥuma said, that is what he scolds them for: “Why do you disregard my slaughter sacrifice and my flour sacrifice?” Could he remove them from the serious sin and scold them for the simple one? “His sons did not walk in his ways,” that they were taking tithe and judging. Rebbi Berekhiah said, a camel caravan was passing by, they neglected public needs and dealt in merchandise.

footnotes: ⁹ This text is also in Soṭah ¹⁴ The courts will not intervene in the monetary affairs of married couples. After the husband’s death, the liquidation of the husband’s estate is a legitimate object of the court’s attention. ¹⁵ This is confirmed in the Babli, 107a, but rejected as practice, 107b. ¹⁶ Our Mishnah reads “if somebody went ¹⁷ The oath required in the opinion of the High Priests’ sons.

It happened that Rebbi Ismael allotted sustenance to a woman in the markets of Sepphoris¹⁰. What means “in the markets”¹¹? From the markets. Rebbi heard this and said, who told him that he¹² did not send her? Who told me that he did not leave for her¹³? Do the passers-by know? Rebbi Hila said, this is what Rebbi asked: Rebbi is of the opinion that the Mishnah does not speak of a married woman but of a widow¹⁴. He said, Samuel¹⁵ and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the Mishnah deals with a widow. It was stated in the House of Rebbi thus: “If somebody left¹⁶ overseas”, i. e., with the intent to return. In this version, the court will intervene in behalf of the married woman. But “if somebody left for overseas”, i. e., emigrated permanently, then the Mishnah only deals either with an abandoned wife or a widow, but not with a wife who expects her husband to return. for overseas and his wife demands sustenance.” They wanted to say, for him who says, the Mishnah speaks of a married woman, “in the beginning”¹⁷ that he did not send her, “in the end” that she did not put aside and did not act dishonestly. For him who says, the Mishnah speaks of a widow, “in the beginning” that he did not leave for her¹⁸, “in the end” that she did not put aside and did not act dishonestly. Samuel, Rebbi Berekhiah’s brother, said, that she did not renounce her ketubah in the orphans’ favor¹⁹ at the same time also renounces her claim to sustenance..

footnotes: ¹⁰ In the Babli, 107b, this is R. Abin’s version of what happened. Both in the Babli and here, “R. Ismael” cannot refer to the Tanna R. Ismael who lived in the South two generations earlier; the reference must be to R. Ismael ben R. Yose, the contemporary of Rebbi. ¹¹ Could the woman get permission to sell her husband’s property through an informal talk in the market? This would contradict all rules of judicial procedure. ¹² The absent husband. ¹³ That the husband provided his wife with enough money to cover her expenses until his return. ¹⁴ The courts will not intervene in the monetary affairs of married couples. After the husband’s death, the liquidation of the husband’s estate is a legitimate object of the court’s attention. ¹⁵ This is confirmed in the Babli, 107a, but rejected as practice, 107b. ¹⁶ Our Mishnah reads “if somebody went ¹⁷ The oath required in the opinion of the High Priests’ sons. ¹⁸ Before the husband left on his trip. ¹⁹ The initial oath required by the High Priests’ sons does not refer to the amount of money she needs, since this can all be settled by the accounting she has to deliver under oath in the end. She has to swear at the beginning that in principle she is entitled to sustenance, since a widow who renounces her claim to ketubah

²⁰ is also discussed in the Babli, 107b. If somebody together with his wife left for overseas, then she returns and says, my husband died, she shall be supported and collect her ketubah²¹ 15:1 states that in this case the widow may remarry without proof of the husband’s death, she certainly must be believed regarding the monetary implications of her husband’s death.. My husband divorced me²², she shall be supported from her ketubah since, as you take it, if she be a married woman, she must be supported from her husband’s; if she is no longer a married woman²³, she can be supported from her ketubah²⁴ minus the amounts already taken for her sustenance (Interpretation of the Babli).. ²⁵“If somebody returns from overseas and his wife requests support²⁶ but he says, let her earnings cover her sustenance, one listens to him²⁷. But if the court had allotted, what they allotted, they have allotted²⁸.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if her earnings are not enough for her support²⁹. In this case, does one listen to him³⁰? Following him who says, there is no support for the wife in biblical law, as we have stated: “The court will not determine food for a wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s.”³¹ 3:1, Notes 11–12. The marriage contract explicitly notes that the husband will “work for, honor, feed, and provide for” his bride “in the manner of Jewish husbands.” The language seems to imply that this is a contract following rabbinic guidelines; this is the position of Nachmanides and R. Asher ben Ieḥiel (Rosh Ketubot Chap. 13, Sec. 6.) Maimonides holds that nevertheless the obligation is biblical, Hilkhot Iššut 12:2. The wife may not sell Sabbatical produce for her needs since Sabbatical produce may not be used to pay debts of any kind. But if the husband is present, she may eat of his Sabbatical fruits; since his obligation to feed his wife is only rabbinical, this is not considered paying his debts with Sabbatical produce. Rebbi Yose says, if her earnings are sufficient for her support³² contract the wife is entitled to live as well in her husband’s absence as in his presence, the court is entitled to grant her money to make up the difference.. In that case, why what they allotted, they have allotted? Explain it, if they allotted excess.

footnotes: ²⁰ This baraita ²¹ Since Mishnah Yebamot ²² In this case she is not permitted to remarry unless she proves the fact of her divorce either by a court document or by witnesses. Since her word alone is not accepted in criminal law, it cannot be accepted in civil law. ²³ But she really is divorced. ²⁴ If her husband’s death later becomes known, she can collect only the amount of her ketubah ²⁵ Tosephta 12:4; Babli 107a. ²⁶ His wife took out a loan under the supervision of the court and now the wife requests him to repay the loan. ²⁷ He can request her to repay the loan from her own earnings. In the interpretation of R. Nissim Gerondi (Alfasi # 389), the husband has to pay the wife’s debt beforehand and then can recover from her earnings. ²⁸ If the court had empowered her to sell of the husband’s property, he cannot require her to buy it back. ²⁹ He explains the Tosephta in case that the earnings of the wife were not sufficient to cover her expenses; therefore the court was justified in giving her permission to sell and their order has to stand. ³⁰ In this case, why should the husband be able to refuse to pay for his wife’s borrowing. ³¹ Ma‘serot ³² He explains that the Tosephta is applicable even if the wife earns enough and does not have to go hungry in her husband’s absence. Since by the ketubah

If somebody was overseas and said, certain things should be given to his sons, his daughters are included³⁴. If he said that when he was dying, certain things should be given to his sons, his daughters are not included³⁵.

footnotes: ³⁴ For gifts between the living, people make no distinction between sons and daughters. Following the general linguistic rule that for mixed genders the masculine is used (in educated speech), בנים can mean both “sons” and “children”. ³⁵ Death-bed instructions are to be interpreted as referring to inheritance. Since in biblical law daughters do not inherit in the presence of sons, daughters are not included in the absence of specific instructions (cf. Mishnah 4:8).

Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥananel in the name of Rav; Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Abba bar Jeremiah: Practice follows Ḥanan in his two statements; practice does not follow Admon in his seven statements. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqula: In every case in which Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement, practice follows him¹³⁷.

footnotes: ¹ Similar statements are in the Babli, 109a. ³⁷ Only three of Admon's sayings are accepted in practice.

MISHNAH: If somebody went overseas and another person provided for his wife³⁸, Ḥanan says, he lost his money. The High Priests’ sons disagreed with him and said, let him swear on what he expended, that she shall collect; Rebbi Dosa ben Hyrkanos endorsed their statement. Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai said, Ḥanan said correctly that he put his money on a deer’s antler³⁹.

footnotes: ³⁸ The other person neither was appointed by the husband to provide for his wife, nor did the wife sign that she received his support as a loan, to be repaid at her husband’s return. ³⁹ The deer runs away and sheds his antlers every year; a person who puts his money on a deer’s antlers is declaring it ownerless.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody went overseas,” etc. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: If somebody pays off somebody else’s debt without the latter’s knowledge, is that the disagreement of Ḥanan and the High Priests’ sons²¹ 15:1 states that in this case the widow may remarry without proof of the husband’s death, she certainly must be believed regarding the monetary implications of her husband’s death.? Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the High Priest’s sons is that he would not expect his wife to starve. But here, [the debtor could say:] “I could negotiate with him and he would forgive some.” Think of it, if [the loan] was on a pledge! “I could negotiate with him and he would return my pledge.” So far about a creditor who does not push [for repayment]. Even for a creditor who pushes, we can hear from the following: “He may give his šeqel.” If somebody does not pay his šeqel, does one not take a pledge from him? This says, even for a creditor who pushes. You should know that this is so, as we have stated: “He can bring for him nests for males or females suffering from genital discharges, nests for childbirth, purification and reparation offerings” since nothing of these comes to [the other person’s] hand. And here also, that nothing should come into his hand.

footnotes: ²¹ Since Mishnah Yebamot

Rebbi Joshua ben Levi says, nobody is held responsible for his neighbor except for annona and head-tax. Rav said, anything for which one is held responsible for one’s neighbor has to be repaid. The strength of Rav is from the following: “He who appropriated a field and oppressors took it.” He did not hear that Rebbi Joḥanan said, they exacted a fine from a robber. Rebbi Abin asked, what is greater? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, and Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Julianus both said in the name of Samuel; one said, it is like annona and head-tax; the other said, it is not like annona and head-tax.

There, we have stated: “He heals him in the sense of personal healing but not in the sense of financial healing.” Rebbi Judan and Rebbi Yose. One of them said, here if the vow refers to his body, there if the vow refers to his property. But the other said, here if he has somebody else who can heal him, there if there is nobody else who can heal him. If he has somebody else who can heal him, he should not be able to heal him personally! Not by everybody is a person successfully healed.

Is not the property of the finder forbidden to the owner of the cow? Ulla bar Ismael in the name of Rebbi Isaac: If each man’s property was forbidden to the other.

Who is the Tanna of “the gain should be given to the sacred fund”? Rebbi Meïr! For Rebbi Meïr said, one commits sacrilege with prohibitions. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands? Let us hear from the following: “If he said, this loaf shall be dedicated, if he or another person ate it, they committed sacrilege; therefore, it can be redeemed. But if he said, it is for me [as if dedicated], if he ate it he committed sacrilege on goodwill but others would not commit sacrilege.” He said only, if he ate it. Therefore, to warm his hands is permitted. The students of Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: That is if he said I shall not eat it nor taste it; if he forbade only eating to himself. But the question was, if somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands?

⁴² As it was stated: “If somebody went overseas and another person provided for his wife.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, another. Therefore, the father⁴³ can recover. Rebbi Yose says, neither the father nor a third party can recover. There is a parallel disagreement, as we have stated there⁴⁴: “He⁴⁵ has the right to what she finds and to her earnings, to dissolve her vows, and to receive her bill of divorce, but cannot eat usufruct in her lifetime… He⁴⁶ is required to pay for her upkeep, her ransom, and her burial.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, the father⁴⁷ stated at the start of the parallel paragraph in 4:6: “If the husband refused to bury her, the father buries her and recovers his expenses in court.”. Therefore, a third party cannot recover⁴⁸. Rebbi Yose says, both the father or a third party can recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥaggai, both for burial as for upkeep the father can recover, a third party cannot recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, for burial both the father and also a third party can recover because it is unthinkable that his wife should be thrown to the dogs. For sustenance, neither the father nor a third party can recover⁴⁹.

footnotes: ⁴² A slightly different parallel to this paragraph is in Halakhah 4:6, Notes 149–150. ⁴³ Who was responsible for her sustenance before her marriage; Mishnah 4:6. ⁴⁴ Mishnah 4:6, Notes 138–140. ⁴⁵ The father of an underage girl. ⁴⁶ The husband after marriage. ⁴⁷ This refers to the baraita ⁴⁸ Burial expenses for an unrelated woman. ⁴⁹ Unless given as a loan or by a court-appointed guardian.

MISHNAH: Admon promulgated seven [rules]. If somebody dies and is survived by sons and daughters. If the estate is large, the sons inherit and the daughters will be sustained⁵⁰. If the estate is small⁵¹, the daughters shall be sustained and the sons shall go begging. Admon said, because I am a male, shall I lose? Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement⁵².

footnotes: ⁵⁰ From the estate. ⁵¹ If the entire estate is needed to sustain the daughters until they marry. ⁵² All underage children are sustained together.

HALAKHAH: “Admon promulgated seven [rules],” etc. ⁵³ 9:1, in a somewhat different formulation. How large is a large estate? Rebbi Ze‘ura, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: That there should be twelve months of sustenance for all of them⁵⁴. Samuel heard this and said, this is the opinion of Rabban Gamliel ben Rebbi⁵⁵, but the Sages say, until they⁵⁶ reach adulthood or are married. They asked before Rebbi Yose⁵⁷, the person who was asked is R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, R. Joḥanan’s successor as head of the Academy., what did you hear from Rebbi Joḥanan? He said to them, let us explain the words of the Sages by their words! Nathan bar Hoshaia asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, if there was sustenance for twelve months but the estate diminished in value? He answered him, since the heirs⁵⁸ started to eat with permission, they continue to eat until the last coin is gone.

footnotes: ⁵³ Most of this Halakhah is found in Baba batra ⁵⁴ Sons and daughters together. ⁵⁵ Gamliel III. ⁵⁶ The daughters, who have to be supported until either they marry or reach adulthood. ⁵⁷ This probably should read “R. Yasa” since R. Yose lived three generations after R. Joḥanan. In Baba batra ⁵⁸ The sons. He follows the majority opinion in the Mishnah that only the daughters are supported by a small estate, but he follows Rabban Gamliel III in the definition of a large estate. Practice almost always follows R. Joḥanan.

When does one appraise for them? Rebbi Mana said, one appraises at the end⁵⁹. Rebbi Ḥanina said to him, the words of the rabbis imply that one does not listen to you, for Nathan bar Hoshaia asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, if there was sustenance for twelve months but the estate diminished in value? He answered him, since the heirs started to eat with permission, they continue to eat until the last coin is gone! Therefore, one appraises at the start⁶⁰. Rav Ḥisda asked: If there was sustenance for twelve months and then the property increased in value⁶¹? Let us hear from the following, for Rebbi Ḥanina, Rebbi Yasa⁶², the statement is in the name of “the Babylonian R. Ammi”, i. e., R. Immi, the constant companion of R. Yasa. said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the heirs sold, they sold from their own property⁶³ as prior mortgage holder, the daughters cannot since their claim was created only at their father’s death, when the sons already were legal owners of the property. The same statement by R. Assi (= Yasa) in the name of R. Joḥanan is in the Babli, 103a.. So here, if it increased in value, their property value increased⁶⁴. If the estate was not sufficient for twelve months’ sustenance, may the sons say to the daughters, take what is yours and leave⁶⁵! Rebbi Abba said, is that a question? The Mishnah says that they cannot say so to them, as we have stated there⁶⁶: “If the orphans say, we accept the properties of our father for the value of an extra denar in order to take their mother’s ketubah; one does not listen to them but one appraises the properties in court.”

footnotes: ⁵⁹ At the end of 12 months. ⁶⁰ The only valid appraisal is one made immediately after the father’s death. ⁶¹ Can the daughters claim part of the value by which the estate has increased over the appraisal? ⁶² In Baba batra ⁶³ If the male heirs sold real estate from a small estate, their sale is valid since they are the heirs in biblical law; the rights of the daughters are purely contractual. While the widow can take the real estate away from the buyer for her ketubah ⁶⁴ The daughters cannot acquire any rights to the inheritance which they did not have immediately upon their father’s death. ⁶⁵ If there was more than enough to sustain the daughters but not enough for daughters and sons together, can the sons pay the daughters and take the remainder as inheritance? ⁶⁶ Mishnah 10:2.

As you say, after deduction for her ketubah, after deduction of burial costs, after deduction of loans by witnesses or by contract⁶⁷. After deduction for daughters’ dowries? For him⁶⁸ daughters’ dowries are listed together with the ketubah and outstanding loans as diminishing the free portion of the estate used to determine whether it is “small” or “large”. who says, one forecloses from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are privileged. For him who says, one does not foreclose from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are not privileged. Let us hear from the following⁶⁹: The widow and the sons are of equal rank⁷⁰, her claim of support by the estate is of equal weight with that of sons and daughters.. The widow and the daughters are of equal rank. The widow does not push the sons aside and the widow does not push the daughters aside. How is that? If there was enough for 12 months sustenance and a widow to sustain⁷¹. That explains that sometimes the widow pushes out the sons by means of the daughters. Just as she pushes out the sons by means of the daughters, should she not push them out by means of the sons⁷² is in worse shape, but the original meaning can be gleaned from it even if the original text is lost irretrievably: פְּעָמִים שֶׁאַלְמָנָה דוֹחָה אֶת הַבָּנוֹת עַל יְדֵי הַבָּנִים. כְּשֵׁם שֶׁהָאַלְמָנָה דוֹחָה לְבָנוֹת עַל יְדֵי בָנִים כֶּן תִּדְחֶה אַלמָנָה לְבָנִים. “Sometimes the widow pushes out the daughters by means of the sons. Just as the widow pushes out the daughters by means of the sons, should she not push the sons out?” Since clearly here the roles of “sons” and “daughters” are exchanged, the question is whether the widow’s sustenance should not preempt the daughters’ if the estate is not sufficient for all of them.? She might claim her ketubah and lose her right to sustenance⁷³.

footnotes: ⁶⁷ The value of the estate is computed only after all liens and debts have been deducted. ⁶⁸ In Halakhah 6:6, R. Ḥanina holds that daughters’ dowries are privileged, R. Joḥanan that they are not privileged. One would assume that practice would follow R. Joḥanan, but in Baba batra ⁶⁹ This does not refer to any discussion; it introduces a new topic. ⁷⁰ If the widow decides not to claim her ketubah ⁷¹ If there was just enough to sustain sons and daughters for 12 months but the widow also claims sustenance, then widow and daughters are sustained and the sons do not get anything. ⁷² This text does not make much sense. The text in Baba batra ⁷³ Her claim to sustenance is conditional; it cannot override the claim of the daughters which is absolute. The Babli disagrees, 43a, and declares that the claim of the widow precedes that of the daughter.

“The sons shall go begging.” Some Tannaïm state, “shall support themselves.⁷⁴, the Escurial ms. has a third reading יסחרו “shall go around.”” He who says “shall support themselves”, “make yourselves comfortable under the tree.⁷⁵. 18:4. The text reads וְהִשָּׁעֲנוּ תַּחַת הָעֵץ.” He who says, “go begging”, “may his children wander about begging, asking out of their ruins.⁷⁶109:10.”

footnotes: ⁷⁴ In Baba batra ⁷⁵ Gen ⁷⁶ Ps.

Rav Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥananel in the name of Rav; Ze‘ira in the name of Abba bar Jeremiah: Ḥanan made two statements, practice follows him; Admon made seven statements, practice does not follow him. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqula: In every case in which Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement, practice follows him⁷⁷.

footnotes: ⁷⁷ Except for small syntactical changes, this paragraph is identical with the one at the end of Halakhah 1, Notes 36, 37.

MISHNAH: If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil, and the defendant admits [that he owes him] vessels, Admon says, since he admitted part of the claim he is made to swear, but the Sages say, what he admitted was not of the kind that was claimed⁷⁸ 6:1) of Ex. 22:8 that the defendant has to swear that he does not owe more than he admitted. In Admon’s interpretation, a claim for amphoras of oil is a claim for oil and the vessels in which it is contained, but for the Sages it is simply a claim for a certain standard measure of oil; if ownership of the vessels is also claimed, it would have to be stated explicitly. This Mishnah is repeated as part of Mishnah Šebuot6:3, in a series of explanations of what means “agreeing to part of the claim.”. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement,

footnotes: ⁷⁸ If neither party has proof but the defendant admits to part of the claim, it is rabbinic interpretation (Mishnah Šebuot

HALAKHAH: “If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil,” etc. The Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free⁷⁹ 6:3. Since the deviations between the two texts are not easily described as variant readings, both texts are given here side by side. It is seen that the basis of discussion is Mishnah Šebuot6:6, not Ketubot 13:4. The major additions and changes in the Šebuot text are indicated by italics in the translation..

footnotes: ⁷⁹ Except for this sentence, which is redundant since it is repeated in the Mishnah with attribution of authorship, the Halakhah is a not quite complete copy of Halakhah Šebuot

Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free⁸⁰ 6:3 which states that if the claim was for wheat but the defendant admits an obligation for barley, the admission is not relevant for the claim and the defendant does not have to swear, except that Rabban Gamliel holds that any admission by the defendant obligates the latter to swear. This sentence is followed by a copy of the Mishnah here, detailing the difference between Admon and the majority about claims for oil with or without the containers. It is now claimed in the name of R. Joḥanan that if a claim is put forward for two unrelated items, the admission in full of liability for one item does not induce an obligation on the defendant to swear if he denies all liability for the second claim since the two claims, while stated together before the court and treated at the same time, really constitute two separate suits. This opinion is quoted in the name of R. Ḥiyya bar Abba in the name of R. Joḥanan in the Šebuot text and in the Babli, 108b; it is explicitly rejected in the name of R. Joḥanan in the Babli Šebuot 40a where R. Joḥanan, Rav Naḥman and Samuel are quoted as stating that any claims which form one suit have to be treated as one common claim. The inconsistency of the Babli was recognized by the early commentators.. And why did we state: “Rabban Gamliel obligates him”? This comes to tell you the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he obligates people. Rebbi Abbahu [supported] that of Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, the Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is obligated⁸¹40a; cf. the preceding Note. The Babli, loc. cit., implies that R. Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion in the matter is unknown.. Rav followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went with another to court before Rav. He started claiming from him barley, wheat and spelt. Rav told him, charge him with anything you have to charge, and in the end he will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free, did we not state⁸² 6:3. The Mishnah states that if one suit contains claims that have to be adjudicated following different rules of procedure, they cannot be consolidated and have to be treated separately. Since claims for real estate cannot be resolved by taking oaths (Mishnah Šebuot 6:5), if the claim was for movables and real estate, an admission by the defendant either of the claim for movables in full or for the claim for real estate either partially or in full cannot trigger an obligation to swear. “if he sued him for vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? If he is obligated for vessels about vessels, not so much more vessels for real estate⁸³ 6:3: A partial admission about movables triggers an obligation to swear about movables and real estate; a partial admission about real estate does not trigger an obligation to swear. As explained in this Mishnah, also Mishnah Qiddušin 1:5, and quoted in the Šebuot text, an obligation to swear about movables induces an obligation to swear about real estate.? What does he do with it? He explains it, to transfer an oath to him. But did we not state: If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil, and the defendant admits [that he owes him] vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for oil and he admitted vessels, everybody agrees that what he admitted does not refer to the claim, for Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna said in the name of Rav: The Mishnah deals with the case that he sued for vessels full of oil; the ones are full, the others empty⁸⁴ text for an intelligible version of this statement.. One understands vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abun formulates it as oil bucket⁸⁵. Can one not ask him in the end⁸⁶? If he lost his speech.

footnotes: ⁸⁰ The Mishnah referred to is Šebuot ⁸¹ The opinion of R. Simeon ben Laqish and Rav quoted here is that of R. Joḥanan and Samuel in Babli Šebuot ⁸² This is the next sentence in Mishnah Šebuot ⁸³ The last statement of Mishnah Šebuot ⁸⁴ See the Šebuot ⁸⁵ If the claim is not for storage vessels but for those used to draw oil from a large container. ⁸⁶ The disagreement between Admon and the rabbis is not one that is frequently going to happen in practice. Since the problem is one of semantics, does a claim for amphoras of oil imply separate claims for amphoras and the oil that fills them or is “amphora of oil” simply a technical term denoting a standard volume for which contracts of delivery are made? Any judge asked in such a matter will ask the parties to clarify the meaning of their statements and then it will be obvious whether the defendant accepted part of the claim or not. The difference in the interpretation could only arise if one of the parties cannot be asked, either if a party dies or if he loses his speech.

MISHNAH: If somebody obligates himself about money for his son-in-law⁹⁰ but then goes bankrupt⁹¹, she must wait until her hair grows white⁹². Admon says: “If I had obligated myself, I would have to wait until my hair grows white. My father obligated himself, what can I do? Marry definitively or divorce!” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement.

footnotes: ⁹⁰ At the time of the preliminary marriage, the father signed a promise to deliver a dowry in a fixed amount before the definitive wedding date. ⁹¹ This is the meaning of the term in medieval rabbinic and modern Hebrew. “He stretched his foot” might also mean that he ran away; he cannot be found to be asked to fulfill his promise. ⁹² The bride, being preliminarily married, cannot marry any other man. Since the father did not fulfill his obligation, she cannot sue the groom either for a definitive wedding or for support after 12 months from the preliminary wedding.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody obligates himself about money for his son-in-law,” etc. The Mishnah [deals with the case] that he obligated himself in her presence. But if he obligated himself not in her presence, even the rabbis will agree⁹³1:6). This implies in particular that a preliminarily married underage girl, whose father has promised money but has not paid, can always force a divorce once she reaches adulthood and is able to act in her own behalf. (The Babli, 109a, and Tosephta 12:4 hold that the court will intervene on behalf of a minor whose father does not pay and whose groom does not want to marry without money.).

footnotes: ⁹³ While one may give a person a benefit without his knowledge, one cannot impose an obligation on him without his knowledge (Mishnah Giṭṭin

It was stated⁹⁴: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, Admon and the rabbis did not disagree about one for whom the father had promised money but went bankrupt that she may sit until her hair grows white. Where did they disagree? If she promised herself. Admon says, she might say, “I was of the opinion that my father wants to give, but now my father does not want to give⁹⁵, what can I do? Marry definitively or divorce!” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement.

footnotes: ⁹⁴ Tosephta 12:4, Babli 108b. ⁹⁵ The legal basis for the annulment of the preliminary marriage is the fact that the usual (but not unique) way of executing the marriage is a commercial transaction in which the groom buys the bride’s agreement to the marriage by giving her an object of value (such as a gold ring.) The bride now claims that, if the groom does not want to marry her definitively as is, the transaction is invalid as מִקַּח טָעוּת “a commercial transaction entered into in error.” Since the marriage is no real commercial transaction, it can be dissolved only by a divorce.

MISHNAH: If somebody protests about a field when he himself had signed as a witness⁹⁶, Admon says: “The second one fits me, the first one was harder”⁹⁷; but the Sages say, he lost his right [of appeal]⁹⁸. If he made [the field] a marker for another, he lost his right⁹⁹.

footnotes: ⁹⁶ A goes to court to claim ownership of a parcel to which B holds title, and the contract by which B holds the land was signed by A as a witness to the sale. ⁹⁷ Admon says that a person can argue in court that he put his signature on a fraudulent contract without declaring himself a criminal by explaining what he did. In the case in question he argues that the seller was a violent person who would have injured him had he claimed his property from him but that the buyer was a civilized person whom he could sue in court; therefore, it was in A’s interest to sign the fraudulent document. ⁹⁸ By testifying in writing that the transaction was legitimate, he is prevented from changing his testimony. This is a general principle, “after he spoke (as a witness, cross-examined in court), he cannot come back and speak again (in the same case)”, cf. Halakhah 2:3, Notes 52–53. One has to assume here that the witness’s signature had been confirmed in court. ⁹⁹ If A himself executed a contract in which he described a parcel as being “bounded by B’s field”, he cannot later claim that the field was not B’s. In this case, Admon will agree with the Sages.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody protests about a field,” etc. Not only if he himself made it a marker for another [field], but even if a third person made it for a fourth, when he signed as a witness, he lost his right¹⁰⁰.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁰ C wrote a sales contract in which he sold a parcel to D and describing the adjacent properties mentioned the field in dispute as B’s field. If A signs as a witness on that contract, he cannot claim title to B’s field since, as noted by the Babli, 109a, witnesses never sign a document without reading it first.

MISHNAH: If somebody went overseas and lost the way to his field¹⁰¹, Admon says, he shall go the shortest way¹⁰² but the Sages say, he has to buy a right of access for a hunded minas¹⁰³ or fly through the air.

footnotes: ¹⁰¹ He left for a long time and left his field untended. In the meantime, the neighbors ploughed their field and in time incorporated the boundary strip by which the farmer reached his field into their fields. Upon his return, he did not find any witnesses who could testify to where his access path had been located. ¹⁰² Since it is obvious that there had been an access path. ¹⁰³ Since “the burden of proof is on the claimant”, if he wants to take away a strip of land from any of the current owners, he must prove his case.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody went overseas,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, if he sues with reasons¹⁰⁴. This means, only if four [owners] surround him¹⁰⁵. Samuel says, even if one surrounds him on all sides¹⁰⁶. Joshua’s stipulation¹⁰⁶! “If he was lost in vineyards or fields, he crosses¹⁰⁷ and leaves until he reaches a road to his house, even a plot full of vineyards, for this is one of the conditions under which Joshua distributed the Land to Israel.”¹⁰⁸ Joshua stated this to leave, maybe to enter? Joshua stipulated for a person, perhaps for his cow¹⁰⁹? Rebbi Yose said, his cow usually returns; since a swarm of bees does not usually return, they treated it as if it were his body¹¹⁰.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁴ Admon gives the returnee a right of ingress if he can proof that he had a way and only its location is in doubt. The Sages require him to buy his right of way even if he can prove that he had one, as long as he cannot locate it. ¹⁰⁵ In his interpretation, the returnee cannot reclaim his lost right of way if he cannot be sure from whom to claim. R. Yose ben Ḥanina would give him a right-of-way if all four adjacent fields belonged to the same person; in that case, the proof that a right-of-way existed should be sufficient. ¹⁰⁶ As the Babli explains, Samuel agrees that the single owner of the four surrounding fields must give the returnee access to his field if he already had been the owner when the returnee left, since then certainly the owner of the surrounding fields took the lost path illegally. But if there were several owners when the returnee left, the current owner can claim that the returnee’s suit must be directed against that prior owner who had taken over his earlier path, not against the buyer. If it is not known who in that case was the owner who incorporated the returnee’s right-of-way into his property, the returnee cannot identify that owner, and loses his claim. The Babli, 109b, presents similar arguments in the name of other authors. ¹⁰⁶ As the Babli explains, Samuel agrees that the single owner of the four surrounding fields must give the returnee access to his field if he already had been the owner when the returnee left, since then certainly the owner of the surrounding fields took the lost path illegally. But if there were several owners when the returnee left, the current owner can claim that the returnee’s suit must be directed against that prior owner who had taken over his earlier path, not against the buyer. If it is not known who in that case was the owner who incorporated the returnee’s right-of-way into his property, the returnee cannot identify that owner, and loses his claim. The Babli, 109b, presents similar arguments in the name of other authors. ¹⁰⁷ One of the meanings of Arabic قدَّ. If somebody is lost in vegetation, he may cross growing fields and orchards until he regains his orientation. ¹⁰⁸ If the person who lost his way can cross other peoples’ fields, why can the returnee whose path was lost not cross into his field? ¹⁰⁹ A path to the field is worthless if the field cannot be ploughed because the cattle to draw the plough cannot enter. ¹¹⁰ The beekeeper can enter another person’s private domain to catch the swarm which left his hive; cf. 2:11, Notes 204–205.

¹¹¹ 4:2. Rebbi Jeremiah said, both Admon and Rebbi Aqiba said the same thing, as we have stated there¹¹² 4:2. The Mishnah belongs to a series of statements about commercial contracts. If somebody sold cisterns in his backyard to a third party, R. Aqiba holds that nobody buys anything which he cannot use; therefore, it is understood that the seller, by offering the cisterns for sale, did also offer access to them. But the Sages hold that people also buy real estate for speculation and, therefore, the sale covers only what is explicitly stated in the sales contract and nothing more.: “If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.” He had not heard that Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree when nothing was mentioned¹¹³. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included¹¹⁴, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included¹¹⁵ cisterns are sold., everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was mentioned. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he has to buy access. But in the case here, even while it is clear that he had access, everybody¹¹⁶ is not one of interpretation of commercial contracts but of enforcing a claim if it is not known against whom the claim could be enforced. agrees that he has to pay for access.

footnotes: ¹¹¹ In a slightly different formulation, this paragraph is also in Baba batra ¹¹² Mishnah Baba batra ¹¹³ The sales contract does not mention access. ¹¹⁴ If the right of access to the property was mentioned in the contract. ¹¹⁵ It is not necessary that access was excluded, it suffices if the contract states that only ¹¹⁶ This is not everybody; everybody except Admon. The question in Ketubot

MISHNAH: If somebody produces a promissory note on another person who in his turn produces a document that [the creditor] sold him a field¹¹⁷, Admon says, “if I really owed you, you should have collected what is yours when you sold me the field¹¹⁸;” but the Sages say, that one was smart when he sold him real estate because he can take it as a pledge¹¹⁹.

footnotes: ¹¹⁷ The field was sold after the note had become due. ¹¹⁸ The debtor can claim the debt documented in the I.O.U was forgiven since the creditor sold him something for the money which was due to him. ¹¹⁹ If the original mortgage stated that all present and future holdings of the debtor are pledged and the creditor was afraid the debtor would not pay, he seduced the latter into parting with his money by offering him real estate. If the debtor then does not pay, the creditor can take the real estate back and end up both with his money and his original property.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody produces a promissory note on another person,” etc. Rebbi Jonah says, if it is worth it¹²⁰; Rebbi Yose says, even if it is not worth it¹²¹. Think of it, if he had real estate¹²²! He can say to him, I want good real estate¹²³. Think of it, if he had good real estate¹²⁴! He can say to him, I want mine. In addition, he can say to him, to care for two parcels overtaxes my powers¹²⁵.

footnotes: ¹²⁰ The Sages’ argument in the Mishnah is good only if the sale of real estate covers the entire amount due. ¹²¹ Even if the creditor cannot recover the entire amount of the bad debt, even partial recovery is better than nothing at all. ¹²² If the debtor had real estate and the I.O.U. was already secured as a mortgage. ¹²³ The argument is not detailed since a creditor can claim only to be paid by real estate of average quality (Chapter 9, Note 195; Chapter 12, Note 57). The argument given here makes sense only if one assumes with the following statement that the creditor can take back his own property. ¹²⁴ If the debtor already had real estate which would satisfy all demands of a creditor. [R. Nissim Gerondi (commentary to Aliasi) reads: “If he had no good real estate”, i. e. if the creditor did not have real estate worth while for such a transaction.] ¹²⁵ If he had to foreclose another parcel, he would have to work two fields. If he manages to foreclose his own, he has cash and only one field to work.

MISHNAH: If two people mutually produced promissory notes of one on the other, Admon says: “If I owed you, how come you borrowed from me?”¹²⁶ But the Sages say, each collects the amount of his note.

footnotes: ¹²⁶ The one whose note is dated later claims that his own indebtedness was paid off even though he has no receipt in his possession, since the other party could have taken its money back instead of taking out a loan.

HALAKHAH: “If two people mutually produced promissory notes of one on the other,” etc. If one borrowed a mina from the other, but the other borrowed from him 200 [zuz]. Rav Huna said, Rav Naḥman bar Jacob and Rab Sheshet disagree. One says, one counts one mina against the other mina, but the other says, each one collects the amount of his note¹²⁷. He who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, learns it from tame oxen who injured one another, where half of the excess damage is paid¹²⁸. 21:35 requires the owner of the animal to pay half of the damages caused by his steer. If two such steers fight with one another and injure one another, Mishnah Baba qama 3:9 prescribes that money changes hands only for the amount for which one injury was estimated to be larger than the other. Since the fighting steers create obligations for their owners, it is seen that mutual obligations can be counted one against the other.. He who says, each one collects the amount of his note, learns it from the Sages and Admon¹²⁹ can be upheld as lectio difficilior.. Can the Sages and Admon not agree that one counts one mina against the other mina? Because we have stated: Admon says: “If I owed you, how come you borrowed from me?” Therefore it was necessary to say, each one collects the amount of his note¹³⁰. If the holder of the note of 200 forgave a mina, but the holder of the note of a mina did not forgive. For him who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, already one mina against the other mina was counted¹³¹. But for him who says, each one collects the amount of his note, then what he forgave he cannot collect but what was not forgiven he can collect. If the note for 200 was written in a document but the loan for a mina was not written. For him who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, already one mina against the other mina was counted. But for him who says, each one collects the amount of his note, the holder of the written note can collect but the recipient of the oral promise cannot collect¹³².

footnotes: ¹²⁷ In the Babli, 110a, Rav Naḥman is identified as holding that each one collects the amount of his note, Rav Sheshet that one counts mina against mina. Rav Naḥman’s opinion is then restricted to the case that neither of the parties has money to satisfy his obligation and that the average quality of their respective real estate holdings is unequal. This means that in the Babli, Rav Naḥman agrees with Rav Sheshet except in the case where such a mutual accounting would be to the detriment of one party. This interpretation is excluded by the Yerushalmi’s examples at the end of this paragraph. ¹²⁸ If a steer which has no history of injuring other animals gores another steer, Ex ¹²⁹ Most commentators want to correct the text from מֵרַבָּנִין וְאַדְמוֹן to מֵרַבָּנִין דְּאַדְמוֹן “the rabbis opposing Admon.” But since מֵרַבָּנִין וְאַדְמוֹן can be interpreted as “the rabbis in their discussion with Admon”, the readings of ms. and editio princeps ¹³⁰ It is not necessary to read the Mishnah as prescribing that the notes have to be paid in cash and cannot be liquidated by accounting. Since Admon would allow one of the note holders to contest the other note without producing a receipt, all the rabbis say is that nobody can claim that a valid note was paid unless he produces a receipt. ¹³¹ No money changes hands since the two notes cancel one another out. ¹³² If one loan was given as a mortgage but the other as a loan before witnesses, the mortgage can be foreclosed from any property the debtor had but the loan before witnesses could be foreclosed only from property not otherwise encumbered. If there are any other mortgages outstanding on the debtor’s property, the holder of the loan before witnesses cannot foreclose.

MISHNAH: There are three districts for marriage, Judea, Transjordan¹³³ 9:2, Note 39. These districts are considered separate entities., and Galilee. One does not move¹³⁴ from one village to another village and from one walled city¹³⁵ 9:5, Note 216. to another walled city, except that in one district one moves from one village to another village and from one walled city to another walled city, but not from a village to a walled city or from a walled city to a village. One moves from a bad neighborhood to a better one but not from a better one to a worse one. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, not even from a bad neighborhood to a better one, because the better neighborhood tests¹³⁶.

footnotes: ¹³³ Cf. Ševi‘it ¹³⁴ The husband who married without stipulating that he has the right to determine the place of residence at will cannot force his wife to move, except within her own district to another place of approximately the same size. ¹³⁵ Cf. Berakhot ¹³⁶ A radical change of circumstances can cause medical problems.

HALAKHAH: “There are three districts for marriage, Judea, Transjordan, and Galilee.,” etc. The Mishnah¹³⁷ refers to the case that he was from Judea and married a woman in Galilee¹³⁸, or from Galilee and married a woman in Judea. But if he was from Judea and married in Judea¹³⁹, or from Galilee and married in Galilee, one forces her to move. ¹⁴⁰ the place of origin of the groom and the place of the wedding, in order not to leave any doubt in which district the husband could dwell without his wife being able to object.”‘I, x, am from Judea and married a woman in Judea,’ one forces her to move, ‘in Galilee’ one does not force her to move. ‘I, X, am from Galilee and married a woman in Galilee,’ one forces her to move, ‘in Judea’ one does not force her to move. One moves from a mostly Gentile village to a totally Jewish village but not from a totally Jewish village to a mostly Gentile village.¹⁴¹”

footnotes: ¹³⁷ The first sentence, which states that the husband cannot force his wife to move with him to a different district. ¹³⁸ Without pre-nuptual agreement it is understood that the woman stays in the district where she married. ¹³⁹ If the woman from Galilee came to Judea to be married, she cannot force her husband to live with her inGalilee but must live with him in Judea. ¹⁴⁰ Tosephta 12:5. They used to write in the ketubah ¹⁴¹ In the Tosephta: “One moves from a mostly Gentile village to a mostly Jewish village but not from a mostly Jewish village to a mostly Gentile village.” In Babylonia there were no totally Jewish villages.

And from where that a better neighborhood tests¹⁴²? Rebbi Levi in the name of Rebbi Ḥama in the name of Ḥanina: “That disaster should not cling to me and I die.¹⁴³. 19:19, Lot speaking to the angels who had told him to move to the mountains to escape the destruction of Sodom. The climate in the Moabite mountains is much healthier that in the plain of the Dead Sea. A slightly expanded version is in Gen. rabba 50(20) by R. Berekhia in the name of R. Levi. The Babli, 110b, quotes a verse of Sirach to the same effect.” He was in the plain and was directed to the mountains, and you say so? But from here that a better neighborhood tests!

footnotes: ¹⁴² That more healthy surroundings can cause problems. ¹⁴³ Gen

MISHNAH: Everybody moves to the Land of Israel but not everybody leaves¹⁴⁴. Everybody moves to Jerusalem but not everybody leaves. How is this¹⁴⁵? If he married a woman in the Land of Israel and divorced her in the Land of Israel, he pays her in coin of the Land of Israel¹⁴⁶ and bill of divorce were executed in the same country, it is clear that the sum stipulated in the ketubah, whose payment was triggered by the bill of divorce, has to be settled in the coin of the country.. If he married a woman in the Land of Israel and divorced her in Kappadokia, he pays her in coin of the Land of Israel. If he married a woman in Kappadokia and divorced her in the Land of Israel, he pays her in coin of the Land of Israel¹⁴⁷ determines the currency. But if he married in Kappadokia and had to pay in coins of Israel, it implies that the bill of divorce, the trigger of the payment, determines the currency. (In the Babli, 101b, and the Tosephta, 12:6, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel states that the place of executing the ketubah determines its currency.) The Babli, 110b, concludes that, since the Persian coins current in Kappadokia are better than the debased Roman coins in Israel, the obligation of the ketubah is a rabbinic institution and the possibility of paying with debased coin was part of the institution. The Yerushalmi (also Tosephta, 12:6) will argue that the Jewish coins of Israel, not the Roman coins, are meant and, therefore, the Mishnah proclaims a stringency which can only be explained by giving the ketubah biblical status.; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in coin of Kappadokia. If he married a woman in Kappadokia and divorced her in Kappadokia, he pays her in coin of Kappadokia¹⁴⁶ and bill of divorce were executed in the same country, it is clear that the sum stipulated in the ketubah, whose payment was triggered by the bill of divorce, has to be settled in the coin of the country.

footnotes: ¹⁴⁴ As explained in the Halakhah, if one part of the family wants to emigrate to the Land of Israel, the other has to follow. ¹⁴⁵ This word is not in the Babli; it is found in all Yerushalmi Mishnah mss. and Maimonides’s autograph Mishnah. It implies that the preference given to the coin of the Land of Israel is a consequence of the first part of the Mishnah.. ¹⁴⁶ This is unproblematic; since ketubah ¹⁴⁷ It is pointed out in the Babli that in terms of contract law, the two statements contradict one another. If he married in Israel and had to pay in coins of Israel, it implies that the ketubah ¹⁴⁶ This is unproblematic; since ketubah

HALAKHAH: “Everybody moves,” etc. If he wants to move to the Land of Israel but she does not, one forces her to move¹⁴⁸. If she wants but he does not, one does not force him to move¹⁴⁹. If he wants to move to Jerusalem but she does not, one forces her to move. If she wants but he does not, one does not force him to move¹⁵⁰. If he wants to leave the Land of Israel but she does not, one does not force her to leave. If she wants to leave but he does not, one forces her not to leave.

footnotes: ¹⁴⁸ In the Babylonian texts, Babli 110b and Tosephta 10:5, it is explained that “forcing” means that the refusing party is the guilty party in the ensuing divorce. ¹⁴⁹ In Babli and Tosephta: “One forces him”. ¹⁵⁰ The sentences about Jerusalem are missing in Babli and Tosephta.

“He pays her in coin of the Land of Israel.” This implies that the coins of the land of Israel are the best of all countries¹⁵¹ the Land but not of the Land. It must refer to the minting standards of the two revolts whose Jewish coins were intended to be used for the Temple tax and as such were of full weight, i. e. the “holy sheqel”. This also must be the meaning of the statement in the Tosephta 12:6, cf. S. Lieberman, תוספתא כפשוטה כתובות p. 389.. This supports him who says that a woman’s ketubah is from the words of the Torah¹⁵², against Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, as it was stated¹⁵³ a biblical obligation. In Mekhilta dR. Simeon bar Ioḥai p. 209, a Babylonian compilation in the opinion of J. N. Epstein, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel is quoted as saying that ketubah has no fixed sum from the Torah; i. e., the institution is biblical, “the mohar of virgins”, but the amount and all details are rabbinical. The Babli follows the saboraic rule that practice always follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel in the Mishnah; a principle not known to the Yerushalmi and certainly rejected here. Cf. also 1:2, Notes 112–120, 4:8 (29a 1. 30), 4:12 Note 248; Yebamot 7:2 Note 63, 15:3 Note 63. For biblical status of ketubah, Mekhilta dR. Ismael, Mišpaṭim 17 (p. 308, ed. Horovitz-Rabin).: A woman’s ketubah is from the words of the Torah. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, a woman’s ketubah is only an institution of the Soferim¹⁵⁴.

footnotes: ¹⁵¹ Since Palestine had no imperial mint in Talmudic times, this cannot refer to Roman coins in circulation, which were coins in ¹⁵² Because it has to be paid in terms of biblical coin standards. ¹⁵³ Babli 10a, in a first version. In the second version and in 110b, he is reported to consider ketubah ¹⁵⁴ I. e., dating from Ezra and/or his successors.