MISHNAH: If somebody writes to his wife¹: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” he receives their revenues and if she should die, he inherits from her. In this case, why did he write “I shall have nothing to do with your properties”? If she sold or gave away, it is valid. If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues,” he does not receive their revenues during her lifetime but if she should die, he inherits from her. Rebbi Jehudah says, he continues to receive the investment results of her revenues² unless he writes: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues, without limits³.” If he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues during your lifetime and after your death,” he does not receive the revenues during her lifetime and does not inherit from her after her death. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if she dies, he should inherit from her since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah⁴ 111b, Sifry Num. 134. In the opinion of R. Ismael, this cannot be established from the pentateuchal law of inheritance (Num. 27:7–11) but from the books of Josua, 34:33, and 1*Chr.*2:22. According to R. Aqiba, the husband’s right of inheritance follows by twisting the text of Num. 27:11., and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid⁵ 7:14, Baba batra8:5. Quoted in Peah 6:10 (Note 159), Giṭṭin 9:1 (50a 1.48), Qiddušin 1:2 (59c 1.40), Baba meṣiʻa 7:10 (11c 1.11); Babli 56a/b, 83b, 84a, and 7 other quotes. As far as money matters go, his opinion is that of a minority of one; cf. Chapter 5, Note 207. He will agree that in matters of revenues, whose assignment to the husband is purely rabbinic usage, there are no restrictions in the freedom to contract..

footnotes: ¹ After the preliminary but before the definitive marriage, when he does not yet have the administration of her properties. ² If the wife invests some or all of the revenue from her holdings, these new holdings are not referred to in the renunciation. They represent new paraphernalia and as such their administration is the husband’s, who receives their yield. ³ I. e., even the yield of the k-th re-investment of prior yields, k = 1,2, …, is excluded by this contract. ⁴ Since in rabbinic interpretation (disputed by Sadducees/Karaites) the husband inherits from his wife but the wife not from her husband; cf. Babli Baba batra ⁵ As a general principle, this is Mishnaiot Baba meṣiʻa

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes to his wife¹: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he did not take her in⁶. But if he took her in, nobody can lose his rights by these expressions⁷ 8:1 (49b 1. 30 ff.) it is stated that the husband can deliver a bill of divorce to his wife by depositing it on her paraphernalia property only if previously he had validly renounced his rights to the income produced by that property because the right to income is an ownership right.. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is the word of Rebbi Ḥiyya: He who says that “my hands are removed from this field, my feet are removed from this field⁸ 77a; Baba batra 43a, 49a; Keritut 24b) notes that even between strangers such a formula would not transfer property rights.,” did not say anything. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does a Mishnah imply that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions? Did we not state there⁹: “If somebody was married to two wives when he sold a field¹⁰; if he dies and there is not enough money in his estate to satisfy the claims of both wives, the wives can reclaim the field from the buyer since their lien precedes his title. and the first one wrote for the buyer: I have no claims on you¹¹, the second¹² is not satisfied, she can repossess the field. one can take it away from the buyer’s hands,” this implies, not the first one. He said to him, that text itself implies that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions, but here the second wife cannot take anything away from the first¹³, and why can the first one not take it away from the buyer’s hands? For she writes to him: For any complaint I shall have regarding this field, I shall have nothing against you¹⁴ of a first wife has precedence over that of a second wife. Therefore, if the second wife recovers the field from the buyer, the first one may sue the second for the unsatisfied part of her own ketubah. Therefore, the first wife did not transfer any property rights by her statement to the buyer..

footnotes: ¹ After the preliminary but before the definitive marriage, when he does not yet have the administration of her properties. ⁶ The language quoted in the Mishnah is appropriate if the husband renounces his right to acquire the administration of his wife’s property. This must be done before the definitive marriage. The Babli agrees, also in the name of R. Yannai (83a). ⁷ Since he did acquire the right of administration by the definitive marriage, a contract executed after this moment would have to contain language of transfer of rights (by gift or sale) to be legally actionable.In Giṭṭin ⁸ If he tells his wife that he does not want to take care of her properties, this has no legal consequences since he is obligated to work for her. The only way he can remove his obligation is by a formal transfer of his right to her as a gift.The Babli (83a, 95a; Giṭṭin ⁹ Mishnah 10:6. ¹⁰ The field is mortgaged to both ketubot ¹¹ She agrees with the sale and promises not to sue the buyer. ¹² She was no party to the transaction. If her claim to ketubah ¹³ The second wife by her action does not diminish the claim of the first to the property. ¹⁴ All the first wife agreed to was not to sue the buyer. This prevents her from going to court but has no influence on her rights vis-à-vis others. It is stated in Mishnah 10:1 that the ketubah

If he wrote for her and she wrote for him¹⁵. Just as he did not lose his rights so she did not lose her rights¹⁶. If he wrote to her “from preliminary and definitive marriage”¹⁷, that is the disagreement between the Houses of Shammai and Hillel¹⁸. In the opinion of the House of Shammai she shall sell¹⁹; in the opinion of the House of Hillel she should not sell²⁰.

footnotes: ¹⁵ She wrote him the same text he wrote her, that “she has nothing to do with his properties.” ¹⁶ If she becomes a widow or divorcee, she is not prevented from claiming his real estate as payment for her ketubah. ¹⁷ “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, from preliminary and definitive marriage.” The question is, why did he mention preliminary marriage which gives him no rights of administration? ¹⁸ In Mishnah 8:1. ¹⁹ Since the House of Shammai give the wife the right to sell any inheritance she received while preliminarity married, the mention of the preliminary with the definitive marriage can only mean that the husband invites his wife to dispose of her property after definitive marriage as if it were only after preliminary marriage. ²⁰ Mishnaiot 8:1, 9:1 give only legal standing to the wife’s sales after the fact; they do not invite the wife to sell without her husband’s consent. For the House of Hillel, the husband mentions his disinterest in her properties after the preliminary marriage in order to give her the right to dispose of her properties without asking him, against the opinion of the House of Hillel. But this does not imply that after the definitive marriage he does not want to be asked, following Mishnah 9:1.

²¹ 23:1. The following explanation is simply one which seems reasonable to the author. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” and she inherited properties afterwards, what is the rule²²? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence²³? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: From his rights you can infer his obligations. If he had not written to her, would it make any difference, would he not receive its yield²⁴ contract gives the husband the right to the yield of any future properties coming to his wife during their marriage, whether foreseen or not, it follows that he can deprive himself of his right to yield, whether foreseen or not.? That means, from his rights you can infer his obligations. Rebbi Levi bar Ḥaita asked: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties which you shall inherit in the future,” what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence¹²⁶?

footnotes: ²¹ There are many different interpretations of this paragraph, detailed by R. Jehudah Rosanes in his Commentary מִשְׁנֶה לַמֶּלֶךְ to Maimonides, Hilkhot Iššut ²² This question is very elliptic. It is not obvious whether the document was written before or after the definitive marriage and whether the inheritance was foreseeable or not. If the document was written before the definitive marriage and the wife was in line for the inheritance, there is no reason why the husband’s renunciation of his rights would not be valid since that essentially is the case of the Mishnah. In addition, it is the right of any person not to accept an inheritance. Therefore, in view of the answer given, it seems that one speaks of an inheritance which was unexpected, that at the moment of preliminary marriage the wife was not a probable recipient of the inheritance but that later some prospective heirs died which made the wife the next surviving kin. Since such an occurrence is not foreseeable, no contracts can be concluded about them. If the document was executed after the definitive marriage, it would require an additional statement in which the husband cedes his rights to future yield to his wife. ²³ For example, in talmudic law a farmer cannot write a futures contract on his grain harvest before his seed has sprouted. Similarly, no contract can be written covering unexpected inheritances. ²⁴ Since the ketubah ¹ If the succinct language proposed by R. Jeremiah is invalid, the more explicit language of R. Levi is also invalid. The objection of R. Abun bar Hiyya is irrelevant as far as a separate contract is concerned. But certainly it would be possible for the husband to renounce his right to yield in the ketubah document itself, since what he acquires by the ketubah he can renounce in the ketubah. In that case, his wife's hand in acquiring estates never was his hand and she does not need his renunciation. ²⁶ In Nazir 2:5 (52b l. 41), the question is asked about a vow to pay for somebody's nazir sacrifices if a person will make a nazir vow in the future, an act over which the maker of the original vow has no control. The original vow is declared void since the text proposed by R. Levi ben Haita is also void.

If she sold produce connected to the ground²⁷: Rav Aḥa said, as if she sold harvested [produce]²⁸; Rebbi Yose said, as if she sold a tenth of the ground²⁹. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, she cannot sell the produce³⁰. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so³¹ “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue³².” Rebbi Immi asked: If another person had written [real estate] over to her, would he³³ not receive the revenue? If he himself wrote, not so much more³⁴!³⁵ Rebbi Mattanah said, a baraita does not say so: "What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, real estate should be bought from the proceeds, and he eats its revenue." Is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! Rebbi Immi asked: If another person had written [real estate] over to her, would he not receive the revenue? If he himself wrote, not so much more? The baraita refers to the Mishnah, regarding property which the wife inherits during her marriage. Then the question is raised why does the husband eat the yield of property coming from others but not from his own gift. But in this version, the questions of R. Mattanah and R. Immi duplicate one another. The text of Rosh seems to be a contamination of the current and the following paragraphs. The passive voice, real estate should be bought, is that of our Tosephta text, in contrast to the quotes from both Talmudim in which he buys the real estate. In that version, the investment decision is not the husband’s. He said only “wrote over”, but not “sold”³⁶ 51b, also decides that the husband eats the yield of the field sold but not the one given as a gift.. What is the difference between one who writes and one who sells? He tried to find a reason to hide food from the wife³⁷.

footnotes: ²⁷ This refers to the statement in the Mishnah that the wife’s sale is valid if the husband had written that he had nothing to do with her properties. Since he retains the right to the revenue, she certainly cannot sell harvested produce which is her husband’s property. May she sell produce still standing? ²⁸ The sale is invalid. ²⁹ The sale is valid. ³⁰ Since the field becomes paraphernalia property, he retains the right to its yield. ³¹ Tosephta 9:2, Babli 83b. ³² Since the field bought with the sale price of the produce becomes the wife’s property, the revenue from revenue is revenue from the wife’s paraphernalia given to her by her husband and belongs to the husband. This is the case mentioned by Rav. ³³ The husband. ³⁴ Why do we need Rav’s statement in this case? ³⁵ The preceding text is quoted in a slightly different form by Rosh (9:1): רִבִּי זְעִירָא רַב יְהוּדָה בְשֵׁם רַב. הַכּוֹתֵב שָׂדֶה מַתָּנָה לְאִשְׁתּוֹ אֵין לוֹ אֲכִילַת פֵּירוֹת. אָמַר רִבִּי מַתָּנָה. מַתְנִיתָא לֹא אָֽמְרָה כֵן. אֵלּוּ הֵן פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת. מוֹכֵר פֵּירוֹת וִילָּקַח בָּהֶן קַרְקַע וְהוּא אוֹכֵל פֵּירוֹת. לָאו כְּכוֹתֵב שָׂדֶה מַתָּנָה לְאִשְׁתּוֹ הוּא וְאַתְּ אָמַרְתָּ אֵין לוֹ לֹא פֵירוֹת וְלֹא פֵירֵי פֵירוֹת. רִבִּי אִמִּי בְעָא. אִילּוּ אַחֵר כָּתַב לָהּ יֵשׁ לוֹ אֲכִילַת פֵּירוֹת. הוּא כָתַב לָהּ לֹא כָל־שֶׁכֵּן. Rebbi Ze'ira, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no claim to its yield. ³⁶ If the husband sold a field to his wife, he cannot claim the yield. The Babli, Baba batra, ³⁷ He gives the field to his wife that she should sustain herself from its yield and he would no longer have to care for her; for this purpose it is obvious that he does not want to take the yield.

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield³⁸. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield?³⁹ Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield⁴⁰. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so³¹ “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce⁴¹ holds that the husband has investment power over the yield revenue which he cannot take for himself. (Cf. Note 35, last paragraph.), buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue⁴². Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield⁴³.

footnotes: ³⁸ The statements are trivial since in the Mishnah both the rabbis and R. Jehudah agree that the husband has no right to the yields; their disgreement is whether the yield of any money saved from the revenues reverts to the husband or not. ³⁹ The answer should be a trivial “no” since the rabbis assign to the wife even the compound yield which R. Jehudah gives to the husband. ⁴⁰ It is obvious that he has no right to the yield which he disclaimed. It is claimed here also that he has no investment power over the part of the yield which his wife does not spend on herself; this explains why he has no right to revenues derived from revenues saved. ³¹ Tosephta 9:2, Babli 83b. ⁴¹ Since he sells but not she, the Tanna of the baraita ⁴² According to R. Jehudah, the wife alone has investment powers for the savings part of the yield, but the husband has the right to the investment yield if not disavowed explicitly. ⁴³ While he has no right to the yield from investments, he has the investment power unless explicitly disclaimed.

Rav⁴⁴ 8:6 (from a different editorial team). Rav Jeremiah was a contemporary of Rav, Rebbi Jeremiah lived about 100 years later. Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel⁴⁵, but not in the matter of words⁴⁶ if she dies he inherits from her, butnot because of his words, "since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody's condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid," in personal matters. But here we deal with money matters! Why did they say that the condition is invalid? Because in the end he acquired it.. Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel for he said, if she dies he inherits from her, but in matters of words, “since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid,” in personal matters. But in money matters, one’s stipulations are valid⁴⁷ 1:2 (59c 1.43), Baba meṣi‘a 7:10 (11c 1.11); in the Babli accepted with reservations in the name of R. Jehudah, 57a. and that is a money matter! Why did we say that the condition is invalid? Because in the end he acquired it⁴⁸ 8:6, the reason is given the practice follows R. Joḥanan ben Baroqa who holds that wills can be written only in favor of people who could be heirs (if a number of closer relatives had died.) Then the law of inheritance is compulsory and falls under the category of personal matters.. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The law should have been that if she⁴⁹ sold or gave it away it should be valid, for [the buyer] acquired it. Why did they say it is invalid? That a wife should not sell her husband’s property and say, it is mine⁵⁰.

footnotes: ⁴⁴ This is the correct text from the parallel in Baba batra ⁴⁵ This also is Rav’s position in the Babli, 83b, but with a reasoning diametrically opposed to that of the Yerushalmi. ⁴⁶ Rosh has a slightly different text: רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה בְשֵׁם רַב. הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל. שֶׁאִם מֵתָה יְרוֹשְׁתָהּ אֲבָל לֹא לְעִנְייָן דְּבָרָיו שֶׁאָמַר מִפֻּנֵי שֶׁהִתְנָה עַל מַה שֶׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה. וְכָל־הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה תְּנָאוֹ בָטֵל. בִּתְנָאֵי גּוּף. וְהָכָא בִּתְנָאֵי מָמוֹן אָנוּ קַייָמִין. וְלָמָּה אָֽמְרוּ תְּנָאוֹ בָטֵל. שֶׁבְּסוֹף הוּא זָכָה בָהֶן. Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, that ⁴⁷ A generally agreed principle in the Yerushalmi, cf. Qiddušin ⁴⁸ In Baba batra ⁴⁹ The definitively married wife should retain the right of disposal of her paraphernalia property since she retains sole ownership. ⁵⁰ She could claim that mortmain property was really hers to dispose of.

Rebbi Justinus had a case⁵¹8:6. The reading here is יוסטתא which is inconsistent with the second mention of the name. {Both Juste and Justine probably are provincial forms of Justus, Justinus (E.G.).} and he asked the rabbis who told him, leave you properties⁵³. He asked Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, who told him, enter your properties⁵⁴. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Who are those rabbis? What about Rav⁵⁵, Rebbi Joḥanan⁵⁶ (Note 48) that the basic provisions of the biblical law of inheritance are a matter of persons, not money., and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He said to him, Rebbi Justinus’s rabbis⁵⁷.

footnotes: ⁵¹ From the parallel in Baba batra ⁵³ He had no right to inherit from his wife. ⁵⁴ He confirmed him as his wife’s heir, acting as an appeals judge. ⁵⁵ Declaring that practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. ⁵⁶ Holding in Baba batra ⁵⁷ The local court whose rulings were overturned.

They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Following the Sages, if she died who inherits from her⁵⁸? Those, her brothers, inherit from her⁵⁹ 8:6 is more intelligible: Rebbi Joḥanan said, her father inherits from her [and after his death] her brothers inherit from her..

footnotes: ⁵⁸ The Mishnah only states that if the husband had renounced his rights, he could not inherit from his wife living and dead. It does not state who inherits. ⁵⁹ Here family certainly inherit from her but there seems to be no reason why they should not inherit as if she had been unmarried. The version in Baba batra

Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the brothers divided [the inheritance], the widow is supported by them⁶⁰ money but to live in her deceased husband’s house and be supported by his estate. While the ketubah proper is a lien on the real estate, the widow’s (and her daughters’) support is not. This means that the brothers may divide the inheritance while their father’s widow is still living.. For you should not say, they should be considered as if they had sold the properties and the widow would not be supported by these, since it is obvious that if they sold, they sold their own property⁶¹ 107a) strongly disagrees and holds that brothers who divided an inheritance are like buyers from one another but that they are liable in common for the debts of the estate..

footnotes: ⁶⁰ As stated in Mishnah 4:12, the widow has the option not to take the ketubah ⁶¹ And the widow has no regress on the buyer if the husband’s heirs do not fulfill their duty towards her. The Babli (e. g., Baba batra

Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Abbahu: It is written⁶² 36:4. The argument of the tribe of Manasseh is that if Salpaad’s five daughters (representing most of the Cisjordanian tribe) would marry outside the tribe, their territory would be inherited by their husband’s tribes and be lost to Manasseh.: “If the Jubilee will happen for the Children of Israel.” If the institution of the Jubilee exists⁶³, inheritances return; if the institution of the Jubilee does not exist, inheritances do not return⁶⁴1:1, Note 7.. It is the opposite way, it comes to tell you that even if the institution of the Jubilee exists and inheritances return, inheritance by biblical law does not return⁶⁵!

footnotes: ⁶² Num. ⁶³ I. e., as long as the 12 tribes were living on their ancestral lands. ⁶⁴ From the moment that the tribes of Gad and Reuben were deported by the Assyrians, in all other parts of Canaan the land no longer had to be returned to its original owners by the buyers in the Jubilee year. Cf. Ševi‘it ⁶⁵ While the verse does not directly prove that the wife’s property is inherited by her husband, it certainly implies that it is given to her sons as ancestral lands.

⁶⁷ 22a). Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died⁶⁸? He said to him, his sale⁶⁹ is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died⁷⁰. If she sold and then he died⁷¹? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died⁷². Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah⁷³ later in this paragraph., this implies that her sale is a sale⁷⁴. It was stated⁷⁵ 8:4 (fragmentary), Yerushalmi Baba batra 8:9 (16c 1.19); Babli Baba batra 136b/137a (cf. R. Rabbinowicz, דקדוקי סופרים בבא בתרא. p. 374, Note ח).: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]⁷⁶. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them⁷⁷: to the testator’s legal heirs)..” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia⁷⁸ 136b), he is called “Rav Hoshaia in Babylonia”., the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y⁷⁹.. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.¹ 8:4 (fragmentary), Yerushalmi Baba batra 8:9 (16c 1.19); Babli Baba batra 136b/137a (cf. R. Rabbinowicz, דקדוקי סופרים בבא בתרא. p. 374, Note ח).⁸⁰” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will⁸¹, the text reads: “R. Yannai said, Rebbi agrees that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. R. Joḥanan said, not even as a gift between the living.” The statement of R. Mana (I)/R. Yannai simply means that X, the first heir, cannot give the properties away in a will since the will becomes active only after X’s death and at that moment the real estate is already Y’s property (as explained in the Babli, loc. cit.). R. Joḥanan’s statement is explained by R. Eliahu Fulda, that X may sell for his own needs because he is the owner, but he cannot give away since the original will prescribes that after X it must be given to Y.. So said Rebbi Mana⁸² before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons⁸³? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens⁸⁴. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell⁸⁵. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there⁸⁶. The wife may also sell some of her property and buy herself a burial plot (which, if used, becomes forbidden for all usufruct.), he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

footnotes: ⁶⁷ The first sentences are quoted by Naḥmanides in מלחמות ה׳ (in the Wilna edition of Alfassi, Yebamot ⁶⁸ The husband sold of his wife’s paraphernalia property during her lifetime. Since he was not the owner, he could not sell; the sale is void even when he becomes the heir. ⁶⁹ Naḥmanides writes מכרו; that may have been a correct ms. or it may be his (obvious) correction of the text. In these details, a medieval quote is not a witness to the text. ⁷⁰ While a son can legally sell his right of inheritance to a speculator (who would take the risk that the son might die before the father and his investment become worthless), the son cannot sell his father’s property before his father’s death; such a sale is void even after the son becomes the heir. ⁷¹ She sold of her paraphernalia properties, of which she is the owner, and her husband died during her lifetime. She sold irregularly since her husband had the administration of her properties during his lifetime but after her husband’s death the sale is valid. ⁷² The father is not required to inconvenience himself to leave his properties for his heirs. ⁷³ The reference is not to R. Jehudah (bar Illaï) mentioned in the Mishnah but to Rebbi, R. Jehudah ben Rabban Simeon, quoted in the baraita ⁷⁴ As explained at length later, the temporary owner is a total owner and may sell at will. The question why she would want to sell is addressed below. ⁷⁵ A similar text in Tosephta Baba batra ⁷⁶ This clause appears in all texts mentioned in the preceding Note; it is necessary to introduce the third beneficiary of the will. ⁷⁷ In the language of the Babli: If the second died while the first is alive, the properties should return to the first’s legal heirs (in Yerushalmi Baba batra ⁷⁸ In the Babli (Baba batra ⁷⁹ As the Babli explains in the name of Rav Hoshaia, for him there is a difference between “it should be given to X, then to Y, then to Z” and “you should inherit, after you Y, after him Z.” In the first case, the properties are given in usufruct but have to be preserved. In the second case, the properties are given in possession; the owner receives title. The only claim the successor has is to the real estate which still is in the preceding heir’s hand at his death; Y cannot complain if X sells the properties. This is made clear in the following baraita ¹ A similar text in Tosephta Baba batra ⁸⁰ In the Babli, the position of Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel is modified to mean that a sale is a breach of trust but not that it is void. Since a baraita which forces the Babli to its conclusion is not mentioned in the Yerushalmi, one has to assume that in its opinion for Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel there is no difference in the language of the will; in any case in which a succession of heirs is noted only usufruct is transferred and any sale of real estate is void. ⁸¹ In Baba batra ⁸² R. Mana II. ⁸³ Why should the wife have the power to sell the real estate whose proceeds go to her husband? Is it not that she received the properties on condition that after her, they should be given to her husband or children? ⁸⁴ She may sell for expenses which the husband is not required to cover. ⁸⁵ X may sell real estate only for his personal needs but the definition of personal need has to be very generous. ⁸⁶ In the Tosephta from Baba batra

Rebbi Yose said: Those who write “if she should die childless, her property should return to her father’s family” write a monetary condition which is a valid condition⁸⁷ (cf. Chapter 5, Note 226), vol. 1, Chapter VE, pp. 391–418..

footnotes: ⁸⁷ If the wife should die childless, both her mortmain and her paraphernalia properties return to her father’s family. This text (and its ramifications in medieval rabbinic literature) has been studied by M. A. Friedman, Jewish Marriage in Palestine

MISHNAH: If somebody died and left his wife, a creditor⁸⁸, and heirs, and he was owed a deposit or a debt by a third party⁸⁹, Rebbi Ṭarphon says, these should be given to the weakest among them. Rebbi Aqiba says, one does not show mercy in law! But these should be given to the heirs for all others have to swear⁹⁰ in cash (instead of being supported by the heirs for the rest of her life) has to swear that she did not receive anything during her husband’s lifetime. The creditor has to swear that his claim was not satisfied., only the heirs do not have to swear⁹¹.

footnotes: ⁸⁸ Who is secured by a mortgage lien on the deceased person’s real estate. ⁸⁹ Since a deposit is unsecured movable property, also the debt due to the deceased is presumed to be unsecured movable property. ⁹⁰ The widow who wants to receive her ketubah ⁹¹ Since as movable property the deposit or debt was not mortgaged, it becomes the heirs’ free property at the moment of death of the bequeather.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody died and left a wife,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, the weakest in his claim⁹². For example, one lent before witnesses, the other lent on a mortgage document; it should be given to the one who lent before witnesses. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the weakest in his body⁹³.. Think about it, if he is rich⁹⁴, like those of the family Andreas. Rebbi Aḥa said, the weakest in his body and poor⁹⁵. As the following: They gave to a relative of Rebbi Samuel bar Abba as the weakest⁹⁶ (cf. Note 102), the Gaonic decree that all ketubot have to be satisfied by movables changed practice in the Mishnah from R. Aqiba to R. Ṭarphon.]. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish brought slaves of Rebbi Jehuda the Prince⁹⁷ of the Patriarch to seize what he considered assigned by an erring court. and took it away from her. Rebbi Joḥanan was leaning on Rebbi Simeon bar Abba and said, what was done with that poor woman? He said to him, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish brought slaves of Rebbi Jehuda the Prince and took it away from her. Was he justified in doing this⁹⁸? Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should we say that Rebbi Joḥanan follows his doctrine and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish his own? Since they disagree: Everybody agrees that if they⁹⁹ err in arguments, one does not reverse. In the words of the Torah¹⁰⁰, one reverses. Where do they disagree? If one errs in a Mishnah, for Rebbi Joḥanan says, an error in Mishnah is like an error in arguments, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, an error in Mishnah is like an error in words of the Torah¹⁰¹ 6b.. What is said of the Mishnah is also said of words of the Elders¹, Rav Pappa accepts as non-reversible error only a judicial argument rejected by the appeals court but which does not contradict existing precedents..

footnotes: ⁹² In the Babli according to Rashi, the creditor of a lower ranked mortgage; according to Alfasi any creditor because he can collect only if he proves his claim. The claim of a person giving money before witnesses is very weak since he loses his money if both the borrower and his witnesses die. ⁹³ The same statements are in the Babli, 84a. There, R. Joḥanan says explicitly that it should be given to the widow; his argument is buttressed by a baraita ⁹⁴ If the creditor is rich, even if he lent without a mortgage he does not need special protection. ⁹⁵ The woman has precedence only if she is poor. ⁹⁶ It is to be assumed that by the middle of the Third Century the common practice was to prefer R. Aqiba’s opinion over that of any of his colleagues. Nevertheless, there was a court which followed R. Ṭarphon in the interpretation of R. Joḥanan. [In the opinion of Rosh ⁹⁷ As head of the Patriarch’s court, he ordered the familiares ⁹⁸ R. Joḥanan holds that the Patriarch’s appeals court erred in reversing the lower court’s decision. It is also mentioned in the Babli, 84b, that R. Simeon ben Laqish considers following R. Ṭarphon a reversible error. ⁹⁹ A lower court whose judgment was appealed to the Patriarch’s court. If it is a matter of weighing the evidence, the ruling of the lower court has to stand. ¹⁰⁰ An error that even school-children can detect. ¹⁰¹ R. Joḥanan’s position in this matter is not mentioned in the Babli; the opposing view is quoted as universally accepted in the name of Rav Sheshet and Rav Assi, Sanhedrin ¹ In the Babli, loc. cit.

Think of it, if they were exempt from swearing¹⁰² Ha-iṭṭur I, 23b (Note 16), followed by Rosh 9:2, the reading is הַגַּע עַצְמָךְ שֶׁפְטָרוּם מִן הַשְּׁבוּעָה “Think of it, if he exempted them from swearing”, i. e., the debtor agreed to a clause in the mortgage contract which exempted the creditor from swearing to his heirs. In the version of the ms., there are additional cases when the creditor is by law exempted from swearing; for example, if the due date is later than the debtor’s death (then the debt certainly was not paid) or if the debtor before his death acknowledged the debt.? One is biblical¹⁰³, the other is not biblical.

footnotes: ¹⁰² In Sefer ¹⁰³ Possession by the heirs is automatic by biblical law; all others have to prove their claims in court.

MISHNAH: If he left produce taken from the ground¹⁰⁴, the one who takes them first¹⁰⁵ acquires them. If the widow acquired more than her ketubah sum, or the creditor more than his claim, the remainder, Rebbi Ṭarphon says, should be given to the weakest among them¹⁰⁶ 86 (1979/1980), 136–148.. Rebbi Aqiba says, one does not show mercy in law! But it should be given to the heirs since all others have to swear, only the heirs do not have to swear.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁴ Or any other movables not in the actual possession of the deceased. ¹⁰⁵ On condition that he have a legal claim on the estate, as widow or creditors do. ¹⁰⁶ The excess over the claim has to be assigned by the court. A detailed study of the divergent interpretations of this Mishnah in Yerushalmi and Babli was made by I. Francus, שיטת הבבלי והירושלמי בתפיסת מטלטלין לגביית, Sinai

HALAKHAH: “If he left produce taken¹⁰⁷,” etc. Both Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, if they were collected at a trading place¹⁰⁸ 10b). For R. Joḥanan, “a person’s courtyard acquires for him only by a conscious act.” Therefore, in a situation where an unlearned person could think that anything in a private domain to which the owner has a claim is automatically his, we may assume that the conscious act of acquisition is missing. This argument assumes that the first part of the Mishnah is everybody’s opinion and the difference between R. Ṭarphon and R. Aqiba refers only to the excess. In the Babli, the entire first part of the Mishnah is considered R. Ṭarphon’s and everybody agrees that “a person’s courtyard acquires for him automatically”; cf. Note 106.. But if somebody collected it in his house, his house acquired for him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he collected it in his house, his house did not acquire for him. For he thinks that they are his but they are not his. Does from this follow how the owner acquires his produce¹⁰⁹ in a Sabbatical year? Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say, from the moment he put them into his vessel. Rebbi Yose said, even if he put them into his vessel he did not acquire, for he thinks that they are his but they are not his¹¹⁰.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁷ In this and the preceding Mishnah, the Mishnah text differs in a few details from the common reading of most Mishnaiot but the text quoted in the Halakhah is the standard Mishnah text. ¹⁰⁸ “A place of Saracens.” The problem discussed here is quite different from that discussed in the Babli, 84b, by the same authors. In the Yerushalmi, it is supposed that the acquirer removes the produce from the public place since it is obvious that it would not be his when left in the public place. But if the produce was already in a place belonging to the claimant, according to Rav and R. Simeon ben Laqish “a person’s courtyard acquires for him automatically” (Babli Baba meṣi‘a ¹⁰⁹ The ripe produce is ownerless by biblical decree. Naturally, the owner of the property has the same right to take it as does everybody else. Anybody but the owner acquires simply by taking. How does the owner acquire, that taking from him would be theft? ¹¹⁰ He can acquire only by a) putting the produce into his vessel and b) declaring that it is his.

That widow took a slave girl¹¹¹. The case is also quoted in Qiddušin 1:3 in the discussion whether slaves are acquired under the rules of movables or of real estate.. The case came before Rebbi Isaac who said, what she took, she took. Rebbi Immi took her away, for she thought that she was hers but she was not hers¹¹². A similar case: The father of the sons of Shammai died and bequeathed a goat to them. The creditor came and took it. The case came before Rebbi Abbahu who said, he took his own property. Did we not state that if either an heir or a creditor came and took, one does [not]¹¹³. But the partial quote in Halakhah 8:10 proves that the original text was correct. remove from his hand; for they thought they were theirs but they were not theirs. Rebbi Jacob bar Zabdi said, Rebbi Abbahu agrees that if they¹¹⁴ sold it, or gave it as a pledge, or moved it to another place, if then the creditor came and took it one removes it from his possession.

footnotes: ¹¹¹ She took her as a servant from her husband’s estate as part payment of her ketubah ¹¹² If the widow could not point to an act of acquisition, the fact that the girl served her when she was a wife and continued to serve her when she was a widow does not make her the widow’s peoperty. ¹¹³ This word was written by the scribe; it was deleted by the first corrector and, therefore, is missing in editio princeps ¹¹⁴ The creditor can take an unsecured part of the debtor’s estate only if the heirs did not act as owners. The moment they acted as owners, and the father had not told them to liquidate his debts, the debtor can make himself paid only through regular foreclosure procedures in court.

Think of it, if they were exempt from swearing¹⁰² Ha-iṭṭur I, 23b (Note 16), followed by Rosh 9:2, the reading is הַגַּע עַצְמָךְ שֶׁפְטָדוּם מִן הַשְּׁבוּעָה “Think of it, if he exempted them from swearing”, i. e., the debtor agreed to a clause in the mortgage contract which exempted the creditor from swearing to his heirs. In the version of the ms., there are additional cases when the creditor is by law exempted from swearing; for example, if the due date is later than the debtor’s death (then the debt certainly was not paid) or if the debtor before his death acknowledged the debt.? One is biblical¹⁰³, the other is not biblical.

footnotes: ¹⁰² In Sefer ¹⁰³ Possession by the heirs is automatic by biblical law; all others have to prove their claims in court.

MISHNAH: If somebody engages his wife as grocer or appoints her as steward¹¹⁵ 1:5., he can make her swear any time he wants¹¹⁶. Rebbi Eliezer says, even about her distaff and her dough¹¹⁷.

footnotes: ¹¹⁵ To administer his properties. The word is the feminine form to masc. Greek ἐπίτροπος; cf. Mishnah Bikkurim ¹¹⁶ That her accounts are honest. ¹¹⁷ R. Eliezer disagrees with the anonymous Tanna and holds that the husband can make his wife swear that she did not take anything for herself from any domestic work she performed for him. (The Babli, 86b, is unsure whether R. Eliezer disagrees with the anonymous Tanna or holds that if the wife handles large sums of money, the husband can also make her swear on minutiae. In the latter version, the rabbis hold that a wife would rather want a divorce than be married to such a nitpicker.)

HALAKHAH: “If somebody engages his wife as grocer,” etc. Is Rebbi Eliezer not correct? What is the rabbis’ reason¹¹⁸? If you say so, there never would be peace in his house. If she broke vessels¹¹⁹, is she responsible as an unpaid or a paid trustee¹²⁰ 7:8, Šebuot 8:1: “There are four kinds of responsible people: Unpaid and paid watchmen, the borrower and the lessee. The unpaid watchman swears about everything (which is missing or broken, that it is not by his fault); the borrower pays for everything; the paid trustee and the lessee swear about broken, robbed, or dead (animals) and pay for what was lost or stolen (for if an animal is lost or stolen it is their fault since it was not guarded correctly.)” If the wife were an unpaid trustee, she would have to pay for the damage unless she can swear that it was not her fault. The same holds for the paid trustee except that she would have to pay for inattention.? It would be reasonable to consider her a paid trustee. They said, she is not even an unpaid trustee, for if you say so, there never would be peace in his house¹²¹.

footnotes: ¹¹⁸ Why do the rabbis permit the husband to make his wife swear only if she is entrusted with large sums of money? What is the difference between a business account and household money? In the Babli, 86b, the rabbis hold that a man who cannot trust his wife with household money should divorce her since “nobody lives with a snake in the same basket.” ¹¹⁹ In the course of regular household duties. ¹²⁰ The legal categories are defined in terms of shepherds, to agree with the biblical verses. Mishnah Baba meṣi‘a ¹²¹ The wife never pays for broken dishes.

MISHNAH: If he wrote to her¹²²: “I have no vow or oath against you,” he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs¹²³(Mishnah 4:10) or eventually her family if she was childless (Note 87). This “oath of heirs” is “that our mother did not tell us that the ketubah was paid, or that money of hers was due to others, etc.” or her business associates¹²⁴. “I have no oath against you, or your heirs, or your business associates,” he cannot ask an oath from her, or her heirs, or her business associates, but the heirs¹²⁵ can ask an oath from her, or her heirs, or her business associates.

footnotes: ¹²² This continues Mishnah 4. If the wife refuses to conduct a business or a stewardship for him if he does not believe her accounts and will require her to swear, all depends on the language of the contract between husband and wife. This Mishnah is really one together with Mishnah 6. ¹²³ If she died, he can make her sons swear who will inherit her ketubah ¹²⁴ They can swear that none of the husband’s money is in their hands. ¹²⁵ The husband’s heirs, after the husband’s death.

HALAKHAH: “If he wrote to her: “I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about properties over which she exercised control during her husband’s lifetime but even about properties over which she exercised control after her husband’s death are the heirs prevented from making her swear¹²⁶.

footnotes: ¹²⁶ This paragraph is in the wrong place; it refers to Mishnah 6 where the husband exempts the wife and her heirs from any oath imposed by him and his heirs. In that case the wife is exempted as long as she acts within the powers entrusted to her by her husband.

¹²⁸ 1:4, fol. 60b. Since at the end it treats a question from there which was not introduced here, it is clear that the text here is secondary. There¹²⁹ 3:3., we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally¹³⁰ and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.¹³¹29b. In 96b, this is a matter of dispute; the Tanna R. Yose holds there that the borrower pays the original owners.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others¹³² 36a, this is a matter of dispute which is decided (36b) in conformity with the Yerushalmi.. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus¹³³ 3:1 (the first sentence only), also quoted in Baba meṣi‘a 3:3 (9a 1.51).: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated¹³⁴ 7:13.: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated¹³⁵. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear¹³⁶? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he¹³⁷ wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first¹³⁸ 9:5 and the second Baba Meṣi‘a 3:3 with its Tosephta can be combined.. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear¹³⁹ reads here “that he cannot make her swear.” But the text is very clear, the fact that the husband freed his wife from having to swear about her fiduciary duties does not absolve her from responsibility and having to swear if she deviated from the framework of these duties.. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards¹⁴⁰. v. נדר; Sefer Ha‘iṭṭur 23a, Note ג.). Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him¹⁴¹ 3:1. Even if the original owner gave permission to the lessee to lend out his cow, the lessee is responsible for paying his lease the whole time the cow is in the hands of the non-paying borrower.. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died¹⁴²? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property¹⁴³. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act¹⁴⁴ 60b 1. 48: Rav Jehudah sent to R. Eleazar: A person having responsibility who handed it over to another (and something happened, who is responsible)? He said to him, the first one has to pay. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second one has to pay; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second one has to pay. (The following argument shows that one has to read that R. Joḥanan holds the first one has to pay.) In Qiddušin there follows the discussion of this paragraph, which shows that R. Yannai and R. Ḥiyya (the Elder) both agree with R. Eleazar and R. Joḥanan. The Babli, Baba qama 11b, attributes to R. Eleazar the opinion that the first one is free from paying if he did not have to pay under the original arrangement; in practice it is decided that the first one always has to pay unless the original owner agreed to the new arrangements.? He said to him, there are two¹⁴⁶ 115a.) against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student¹⁴⁷.

footnotes: ¹²⁸ This entire paragraph is from Qiddušin ¹²⁹ Mishnah Baba meṣi‘a ¹³⁰ Since the lessee does not have to pay for acts of God; Note 120. ¹³¹ The borrower has to pay for every defect that develops; Note 120. Agreed to in the Babli, Baba meṣi‘a ¹³² Otherwise the lessee violates the terms of his lease and becomes liable for every defect which develops. In the Babli, Baba meṣi‘a ¹³³ Tosephta Baba meṣi‘a ¹³⁴ Mishnah Baba meṣi‘a ¹³⁵ If he deviated from the original terms; even if he later subleased with permission (unless he explicitly requested immunity also for the later change.) ¹³⁶ Can the original owner of the cow go to court against the borrower from the lessee to have him swear that the cow died a natural death and, if the borrower refuses to swear, collect the value of the cow from the lessee, or can the borrower claim that he is involved only with the lessee and is immune to suits from third parties? ¹³⁷ The original owner, since the borrower is a business associate of his lessee. ¹³⁸ The first Mishnah Ketubot ¹³⁹ Cf. Note 127; editio princeps ¹⁴⁰ The wife can appoint others to fulfill part of her duties (in the example given, her adult sons from a prior marriage) only with her husband’s explicit agreement; they have to swear unless especially exempted (interpretation of Tosaphot 86b, s ¹⁴¹ This refers back to Mishnah Baba meṣi‘a ¹⁴² Is this true even if the original owners borrowed it back? ¹⁴³ In that case, the lessee does not have to pay. ¹⁴⁴ This refers to the problem dealt with in Qiddušin ¹⁴⁶ The quote should have been: R. Eleazar says in the name of the Elder R. Ḥiyya, R. Joḥanan says in the name of R. Yannai (which is the quote of the latter in Baba qama ¹⁴⁷ A lengthy discussion of this text is in R. Bezalel Ashkenazi, שיטה מקובצת כתובות (reprint Tel Aviv, n/d) p. 221 a/b. However, probably the text is not based on an original ms. since it is Babylonized, remarkable for such a careful author.

MISHNAH: “I have no vow or oath against you, neither I, nor my heirs, nor my business associates, against you, or your heirs, or your business associates,” he cannot ask an oath from her, neither he, nor the heirs, nor the business associates, from her, or her heirs, or her business associates. If she went from her husband’s grave to her family¹⁵⁷ be paid to her immediately on the basis of the ketubah document which is as good as a mortgage coming due., or she remained in her in-law’s family¹⁵⁸ but to be supported by her husband’s family for the foreseeable future; cf. Mishnaiot 12:3–4. but was not appointed as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. But if she was appointed as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future¹⁵⁰, but they cannot make her swear about the past¹⁵⁵.

footnotes: ¹⁵⁷ Then she requires that the full ketubah ¹⁵⁸ She prefers not to collect her ketubah ¹⁵⁰ Since they now are the owners and cannot be bound by their father’s dispositions. ¹⁵⁵ It is possible to explain this statement as a new paragraph, referring to Mishnah 7: Even a woman who was not appointed as steward, or whose stewardship ceased with her husband’s death, and who was not granted exemption from swearing, cannot be made to account under oath for the expenses of her husband’s burial.

HALAKHAH: ““I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. ¹⁴⁷ Rebbi Jonah said, only if she was made a steward during her husband’s lifetime. But if she was appointed as a steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can(not)¹⁴⁸ make her swear. That is the Mishnah: if she was not appointed a steward, the heirs cannot make her swear¹⁴⁹. If she was appointed a steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future¹⁵⁰, but they cannot make her swear about the past. What is “about the past”? From the time of death to the time of burial¹⁵¹. And Rebbi Yose said, even if he appointed her as steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can make her swear¹⁵². But did we not state¹⁵³: “If he did not appoint her as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If he appointed her as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future but cannot make her swear for the past.” He explains it about the first case¹⁵⁴. But if it is about the first case, Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about property over which she had control during her husband’s lifetime but even about property over which she acquired control after her husband’s death the heirs cannot make her swear. Explain it, from the time of death to the time of burial. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The heirs cannot make her swear from the time of death to the time of burial¹⁵⁵. Bar Qappara stated: That she should not abandon him and leave for her family¹⁵⁶.

footnotes: ¹⁴⁷ A lengthy discussion of this text is in R. Bezalel Ashkenazi, שיטה מקובצת כתובות (reprint Tel Aviv, n/d) p. 221 a/b. However, probably the text is not based on an original ms. since it is Babylonized, remarkable for such a careful author. ¹⁴⁸ Probably this should be deleted since the husband cannot give her immunity if he appoints her as testamentary executor unless he makes the appointment valid “one hour before my death”. ¹⁴⁹ If she is not the executor of her husband’s will and the husband had freed her from swearing about what she had overseen for him, the heirs cannot ask for an accounting of the past. ¹⁵⁰ Since they now are the owners and cannot be bound by their father’s dispositions. ¹⁵¹ As explained at the end, it is not desirable that the widow should hand over the estate to the heirs before her husband’s burial. Therefore, before the burial she is the husband’s agent and not the heirs’. The Babli agrees, 87a. ¹⁵² Probably some addition is missing such as “only for the future”. The entire sentence is a corrector’s addition. ¹⁵³ Mishnah 7, speaking of a woman who was freed by her husband from the obligation to swear, who resigned her stewardship at the time of her husband’s burial. ¹⁵⁴ Even in the case of Mishnah 5, the widow cannot be made to swear about the expenses of the funeral. The Babli agrees, 87a. ¹⁵⁵ It is possible to explain this statement as a new paragraph, referring to Mishnah 7: Even a woman who was not appointed as steward, or whose stewardship ceased with her husband’s death, and who was not granted exemption from swearing, cannot be made to account under oath for the expenses of her husband’s burial. ¹⁵⁶ The heirs, the beneficiaries of the estate, have the duty to bury the husband. It would be very bad for the reputation of the family if the widow would return to her own family before the burial because she fears to be accused by the heirs that she spent too much money on her husband’s burial. Therefore, she is prevented from resigning her stewardship before the burial and, in exchange, is freed from having to provide an accounting of the burial costs under oath.

MISHNAH: If she had compromised her ketubah¹⁵⁹, as explained in the next Mishnah., she shall not be able to collect without an oath¹⁶⁰ only in a court proceeding in which she will have to swear to the amount of the ketubah which still is unpaid.. If one witness¹⁶¹. 19:15). That rule is stated for criminal proceedings. In money matters, it is a rabbinic institution that the testimony of a single witness creates a presumption that he testified truthfully. The opposing party therefore either has to produce a witness who contradicts the first, or she can swear that her claim is not satisfied. testifies that [the ketubah] was paid, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. From orphans’ property¹⁶², or from encumbered property¹⁶³ lien on the property. If the ketubah cannot be paid by the estate, the widow has regress on the buyer. Clearly, the buyer can require the widow to swear for the same reason the heirs of the estate can., in his¹⁶⁴ had been paid before overseeing the payment of the ketubah. The Mishnah is repeated in Šebuot7:7. absence she shall not be able to collect without an oath.

footnotes: ¹⁵⁹ She had signed a receipt for part of the ketubah ¹⁶⁰ She can collect the remainder of the ketubah ¹⁶¹ A single witness cannot legally prove anything (Deut ¹⁶² Since the heirs are not usually cognizant of all business dealings between their deceased father and his wife (who might not be their mother), she has to swear that she did not receive any valuables on account of the ketubah. ¹⁶³ If the husband sold real estate after the date of his wedding, the sale did not remove the ketubah ¹⁶⁴ If the husband sends his wife a bill of divorce from abroad, the court handling the delivery of the bill of divorce to the wife will require her to swear that no part of the ketubah

HALAKHAH: “If she went from her husband’s grave to her family,” etc.¹⁶⁵ Rebbi Ze‘ura said, this came down in the manner of a biblical oath. The ketubah is acknowledged in her hand for collection; it is as if collected. But since with the document of 200 there is an acknowledment of payment and she says, one mina [is due to her], she cannot be paid without an oath¹⁶⁶ by signing a receipt for partial payment without specifying the amount. The basic biblical text is Ex.22:8: “About any guilty behavior, about an ox, or a sheep, or a garment, or anything lost, if he agrees that this is it, the case of the two parties shall come before Elohim.” This is explained as follows (Mekhilta dR. Ismael, ed. Horovitz-Rabin p. 301; Mekhilta dR. Simeon bar Ioḥai ed. Epstein-Melamed p. 203; Babli Baba Qama 107a, Baba Meṣi‘a 5a,98a): The paragraph speaks in vv. 6–7 about a person who holds another’s property without being paid for his services, who will not have to pay if the property is stolen and the holder never used it for his own purposes. Then v. 8 continues about any behavior implying monetary obligation, i. e., any monetary claim of one person against another, and requires first that the object of the claim be well defined (an ox, a sheep, etc.) and that the defendant of the suit agree that “this is it”, i. e., that there is a case, then there shall be a trial before a judge acting as Elohim, as a representative of God as judge. In praxi this means that if the claimant cannot prove his case by witnesses or documents, the defendant can free himself from paying by swearing while holding a copy of the Torah and being subject to all the rules of judicial oaths. But if the claim is for one thing (e. g., an ox) and the defendant agrees only that something else is owed to the claimant (e. g., a sheep), or if the defendant disputes the entire claim, he cannot be forced to swear and the claimant loses his case. R. Ze‘ura notes that the case of the damaged ketubah has most of the features of a case requiring an oath by biblical standards, even though it seems otherwise since the divorced wife claims the remainder of the ketubah but the husband claims that all was paid. For that he argues that everybody knows that a ketubah becomes payable at the moment of divorce. Therefore, the husband is considered to have paid the ketubah sum and now he requests to get his money back, and the ex-wife disputes part of his claim. (In the opinion of the Babli, Šebuot 48b, 81a, this is held only by the House of Shammai; cf. Note 178.) There are two points why the case does not fit the framework of *Ex.*22:8: The person who swears a biblical oath does not have to pay, but in the case under discussion the wife swears in order to collect money. This is by rabbinic tradition. Second, since the ketubah is a mortgage lien (or: in talmudic times was a mortgage lien), the suit is about real estate and real estate claims cannot be settled by oaths (Mishnah Šebuot 6:5). This argument is explicit in the Babli, 87b, where the place of R. Ze‘ura is taken by (the slightly younger) Rami bar Ḥama..

footnotes: ¹⁶⁵ This quote has nothing to do with the Halakhah which discusses only Mishnah 8. ¹⁶⁶ He discusses the first case of the Mishnah, if she had compromised the ketubah

It was stated “compromised”. Not that she reduced her ketubah¹⁶⁷ 7:7 (38a 1. 25), Sanhedrin 8:6 (26b 1. 49); Babli 87b.. If her ketubah was 200 but she claims a mina, she is paid without an oath¹⁶⁸ was 1000 zuz, the husband claims that it was paid but he has no receipt, the divorced wife states that she received nothing but that her claim was only a mina, this is not conceding part of the husband’s claim (cf. Note 166) and she collects without an oath. It seems that the Yerushalmi would agree to that interpretation. On documents which show that 200 zuz written in the ketubah might mean 100 zuz in actual money (and the standards by which the value of a zuz is determined), cf. M. A. Friedman, loc. cit. Note 87.. What is the difference between one who compromises and one who claims less? Rebbi Ḥanina said, if she compromises there was a transaction between them¹⁶⁹; if she claims less there was no transaction between them¹⁷⁰ during her marriage. Therefore, anybody claiming that there was such a transaction in order to impose an oath on the widow would have to prove his case in court..

footnotes: ¹⁶⁷ This statement is quoted in Šebuot ¹⁶⁸ In the Babli, this is made more explicit: If her ketubah ¹⁶⁹ Therefore, the oath is required if only to protect creditors with claims against the estate. ¹⁷⁰ At least, there is no presumption of any transactions between her and her husband regarding her ketubah

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Since we stated there: “If one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid, she shall not be able to collect without an oath,” should it be similar that if one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was reduced, she shall not be able to collect the reduced sum without an oath? Rebbi Yose said, at the moment that one witness testifies that the amount should be reduced, he is like a single witness who contradicts the testimony of two [witnesses]¹⁷² document. but no single witness can contradict the testimony of two¹⁷³ since the preceding paragraph dealt with the case of no witnesses and there can be no oath if there are two witnesses..

footnotes: ¹⁷² The two witnesses who signed the ketubah ¹⁷³ There can never be an oath imposed for a lesser claim in the settlement of a ketubah

It was stated: If an heir’s father held a compromised promissory note, the son collects without swearing¹⁷⁴. In that the son’s power is greater than the father’s, since the son collects without swearing while the father can collect only by swearing¹⁷⁵. Rebbi Eleazar said¹⁷⁶ 48a. It is in the heirs’ power to swear that according to their best knowledge the claim is justified., nevertheless he has to execute an heir’s oath, “that our father did not charge us, that our father did not tell us, that we did not find a document among our father’s documents that this note was paid.¹⁷⁷ 7:7.” Rebbi Hoshaia asked, does the baraita¹⁷⁸ follow the House of Shammai? For the House of Shammai say, “she collects her ketubah and does not drink.”¹⁷⁹ 4:3, about a woman whose husband, having no witnesses, formally accused her of adultery but died before he could bring her to the Temple for the cleansing ceremony. Since the verse requires the presence of the husband at the Temple ceremony (Yerushalmi Soṭah, p. 180, Note 14), the woman is prevented from clearing her name. The House of Hillel hold that she cannot collect her ketubah since she cannot prove her innocence to the heirs (loc. cit. p. 185, Note 38) based on the general principle that “the burden of proof is on the claimant.” Since the House of Shammai also agree to that principle, it must follow that for them the ketubah is as good as paid and the heirs are the claimants who want to have the money back but who cannot prove their case. This shows that for the House of Shammai the ketubah is the widow’s property from the moment of the husband’s death. Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the House of Shammai is: Bring my husband and I shall drink¹⁸⁰ is the widow’s property from the moment of the husband’s death, but they hold that if the woman was ready to clear her name, any impediment which is not her fault cannot be held against her. The House of Hillel hold that the heirs do not have to pay her ketubah; since she brought the problem on herself by being seen with another man after having been duly warned by her husband in front of two witnesses; she cannot collect except by successfully clearing her name. The problem is discussed in similar terms in Soṭah 4:1, Notes 13–16.! But here, it would be in order that even his father would not have to swear. They instituted a rule that he has to swear¹⁸¹. They instituted that for him, but not for his son¹⁸². When he died, you put his son on the biblical rule.

footnotes: ¹⁷⁴ If the father had indicated that a certain part of the note was paid, and both the lender and the borrower had died, the lender’s son collects the remainder from the borrower’s son without swearing that no more than the sum indicated had been paid (assuming that the borrower’s son cannot produce a document or witnesses that more had been paid than was claimed), since he could not collect if he had to swear that he was 100% sure that his claim was in the correct amount. ¹⁷⁵ If the borrower had died. ¹⁷⁶ The same statement in the Babli, Šebuot ¹⁷⁷ Mishnah Šebuot ¹⁷⁸ The one mentioned at the start of this paragraph, and also the Mishnah (cf. Note 166). ¹⁷⁹ Mishnah Soṭah ¹⁸⁰ The preceding argument is invalid. The House of Shammai may not hold that the ketubah ¹⁸¹ His oath is a purely rabbinic institution for the prevention of fraud. Since it is rabbinic, it cannot be enforced if it would prevent anybody from collecting what is rightfully his. ¹⁸² Meaning, it could not be instituted as a burden on his son.

If a father became obligated to swear in court¹⁸³ and died, his son cannot collect. If it were otherwise, what could we say? Can a man let his son inherit an obligation to swear¹⁸⁴ 48a, this is a common formal statement by Rav and Samuel, not an obvious fact.? Rebbi Avin said, you mean, if a man compromised his document in court, his son cannot collect. Rav Ḥisda asked: Because he walked those two steps, he loses? If he compromised it outside the court, he collects. Because he compromised it in court, he cannot collect¹⁸⁵ 48a, R. Eleazar holds (with Rav Ḥisda here) that the heirs swear the heir’s oath (Note 177) in any case. R. Abin’s statement is rejected.?

footnotes: ¹⁸³ The context shows that the oath is a rabbinic one imposed on the person who wants to collect money. ¹⁸⁴ Since he lacks the knowledge about the details of his father’s business transactions, he can only swear a disclaimer of knowledge (Note 177) but not the required positive statement. In the Babli, Šebuot ¹⁸⁵ In the Babli, Šebuot

“If she had compromised her ketubah, she shall not be able to collect without an oath,” etc. ¹⁸⁷ 5:3, Šebuot 7:9. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due¹⁸⁸ 22a, this opinion is ascribed to Rav Assi., and some say¹⁸⁹ 7:9, this is attributed to R. Nathan [who is called “some say” in the Babli (Horaiot 13b)]; in the Babli (loc. cit.) it, together with R. Yannai’s explanation, appears in R. Joḥanan’s name., also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection¹⁹⁰ was not paid. R. Simeon grants this right only to the definitively married woman and the wife who becomes a widow after definitive marriage, but not to the preliminarily married who cannot claim support but only ketubah if widowed or divorced. Mishnah 11:1 gives the estate the right to the widow’s earnings in exchange for the support; it is held that R. Simeon thinks that, in general, the amount needed for her support is greater than her prospective earnings (Babli loc. cit.).. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should jump to marry her¹⁹¹ as dowry to attract a new husband.. Some say, also for robbery and torts¹⁹². Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.¹⁹³ 10:1: “If somebody robbed and used the proceeds to feed his children, [if the father died] they do not have to pay. But if it was mortgageable [real estate], they have to pay.”” For torts from the following¹⁹⁴ 5:2.: “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.¹⁹⁵” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable¹⁹⁶ 5:1, Babli 48b–50a; Baba meṣi‘a 9:14, 12b 1. 11) rabbinic practice demands that tort judgments have to be satisfied by best quality, financial debts by medium quality, and ketubah by lowest quality. In the opinion of most authorities, biblical law requires only minimal quality for the settlement of financial obligations. The rabbinic upgrading was a necessity to make it easier for people to get a loan. Since this argument is irrelevant for orphans, one does not need the Mishnah to know that mortgage debts paid by an estate are settled by low quality real estate. Where the Mishnah is really needed is payment for torts for which (Ex. 22:4) “the best of his fields or the best of his vineyards” are required. The statement therefore should be read: One pays even for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable; cf. Tosaphot 84a, *s. v.*לכתובת אשה.. But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable¹⁹⁷. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, here¹⁹⁷ about an adult orphan, there about an underage orphan.

footnotes: ¹⁸⁷ The Halakhah is repeated in Giṭṭin ¹⁸⁸ To preserve the orphan’s property. In the Babli, ‘Arakhin ¹⁸⁹ In the almost parallel text in Šebuot ¹⁹⁰ Mishnah 11:2 states that a married woman, for whose upkeep the husband is responsible, and whose husband does not fulfill his support duty, may sell from the estate without court supervision. The same holds for the estate after the husband’s death as long as the ketubah ¹⁹¹ Since in those times a single woman had few possibilities of earning a living, if the heirs were not her children she needed the ketubah ¹⁹² If the father had been found guilty of robbery or causing damage but died before he paid the sums assessed by the court. ¹⁹³ Mishnah Baba Qama ¹⁹⁴ Mishnah Giṭṭin ¹⁹⁵ An estate’s real estate holdings are classified by their values per unit of area. It is assumed that the higher the unit value, the easier it is to sell the property. The debtor in general will try to satisfy his obligations with real estate of the lowest quality. The property which per unit area is valued highest is called עידִית “elite”, the average בֵּינוֹנִית “medium”, and the lowest זִיבּוֹרִית “stony field”. These categories are not absolute; they refer to the holdings of an individual. ¹⁹⁶ This statement was not discussed by J. N. Epstein in his treatment of כֵּינִי מַתְנִיתָא (cf. Note 199). The statement should not be considered as emendation. A simple reading of the text will require that the statement apply to all cases in which an orphan’s real estate is to be alienated. In the opinion of both Talmudim (Giṭṭin ¹⁹⁷ The rules for the adult heir are the same as they would have been for the bequeather. ¹⁹⁷ The rules for the adult heir are the same as they would have been for the bequeather.

MISHNAH: If she had compromised her ketubah, how is that? If her ketubah was 1‘000 zuz and he said to her, you received your ketubah, but she says, I received only one mina, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. If one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid, how is that? If her ketubah was 1‘000 zuz and he said to her, you received your ketubah, but she says, I received nothing, and one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. From encumbered property, how is that? If he sold his real estate to others and she collects from the buyers, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. From orphans’ property, how is that? If he died and left his estate to the orphans, if she is paid out by the orphans she shall not be able to collect without an oath. Not in his presence, how is that? If he went overseas¹⁶⁴ had been paid before overseeing the payment of the ketubah. The Mishnah is repeated in Šebuot7:7. and she collects in his absence, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. Rebbi Simeon says, any time she asks for her ketubah, the heirs can require an oath from her. If she does not ask for her ketubah, the heirs cannot require an oath from her¹⁹⁸ (which would disqualify her from being supported) during her husband’s lifetime. But if she asks for her ketubah, they do not have to pay unless she swears, even if her husband had freed her from any obligation to swear. R. Simeon disagrees with Mishnaiot 5,6..

footnotes: ¹⁶⁴ If the husband sends his wife a bill of divorce from abroad, the court handling the delivery of the bill of divorce to the wife will require her to swear that no part of the ketubah ¹⁹⁸ If the widow prefers to be supported by the estate for an unlimited period, the heirs can never ask for an oath that she did not receive part payment of the ketubah

HALAKHAH: “If she had compromised her ketubah, how is that? If her ketubah was l‘000 zuz,” etc. “If one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid,” etc. So is the Mishnah¹⁹⁹: “If she collects in his absence, she shall not be able to collect without an oath.”

footnotes: ¹⁹⁹ J. N. Epstein, 2מבוא לנוסח המשנה p. 475 notes that this כיני מאתניתא is not an emendation but simply a quote from the third Mishnah which belongs to this Halakhah.

“If she collects in his absence, she shall not be able to collect without an oath.²⁰⁰ 7:7; it seems to be closer to the original form. That text for the main section is given here in smaller type; it is taken as basis of the translation, with the deviations from the text in Ketubot noted in the Commentary. The quote from the Mishnah is not in Šebuot since the Mishnah there deals with creditors in general, not only the divorcee or widow. Since the text from Šebuot has all the characteristics of being the original, the discussion of the Halakhah refers to contracts in general, not only to ketubot.” Can one collect from a person in his absence²⁰¹ 1:6. Since a ketubah, and also a loan document in general, is executed as a lien on all of the debtor’s properties, not on a specified piece of real estate, it cannot be foreclosed without court proceedings in the presence of the debtor or his representative.? Rebbi Jeremiah says, explain it about a contract for which interest is due²⁰². Would the court collect interest²⁰³? Explain it that it was guaranteed for a Gentile²⁰⁴.

footnotes: ²⁰⁰ The Halakhah (after the introductory paragraph) appears also in Šebuot ²⁰¹ It is a general principle in Jewish law that זָכִי‌ן לָאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא בְפָנָיו וְאֵין חָבִין לָוֹ אֶלָּא בְפָנָיו “one may benefit a person without his knowledge but one may not obligate him without his knowledge,” Mishnah Giṭṭin ²⁰² In that case the court will act for the benefit of the debtor if this satisfies the creditor. ²⁰³ Since taking interest among Jews is forbidden, the court will not enforce any interest clause in a contract. ²⁰⁴ If the Jewish defendant is sued as guarantor for a Gentile from whom the Jewish creditor may take interest legally, the court will recognize the contract as valid.

Alexis said before Rebbi Mana: We act much better than you do²⁰⁵ text, R. Mana speaks to the Gentile Alexis. In that text it is not always clear who is the speaker.. We send edicts²⁰⁶ text, if it is not simply a corruption, means “judgment that cannot be appealed.” Since the prefect also was the chief judge of the province, there is really no difference between the Roman administrative edict and the Jewish court’s letter of summons.. If he²⁰⁷ comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He answered him, we also act in this way, we have the herald announce for thirty days²⁰⁸. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He said to him, think of it, if he was in distant corners. He said to him, we send three letters, one after thirty days, one after the next thirty days, and one after the next thirty days²⁰⁹ New York 1944, p. 383. In Jewish Babylonia, the person who did not obey the first summons was put in the ban (Babli, 88a; against Tosafot s. v. ורבא).. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. Rebbi Ḥanina²¹⁰: R. Mattaniah. said, that is, if he was present at the trial and then fled²¹¹. But if he was not present at the trial, we²¹²: “they” (third person). cannot irrevocably give away, but only announce.

footnotes: ²⁰⁵ In the Ketubot ²⁰⁶ Greek διατάγματα; in Roman praxis referring to edicts of the emperor or the provincial prefect. The corresponding Aramaic word דִּין מוּגְמָרִין in the Ketubot ²⁰⁷ The debtor who refuses to appear in court for foreclosure proceedings. ²⁰⁸ The verb כרז “to announce” is formed from Greek κῆρυξ “herald”. Public announcements were usually made Mondays and Thursdays, the market days. ²⁰⁹ This was Roman practice in Egypt, cf. R. Taubenschlag, The Law of Graeco-Roman Egypt in the Light of the Papyri, ²¹⁰ In Ketubot ²¹¹ Once the validity of a claim has been established in court, the execution of the court order may proceed in the absence of the debtor. ²¹² In Ketubot

You find that one may say that Ḥanan²¹³ and Rebbi Simeon said the same thing²¹⁴ The Babli, 88b, rejects this statement and finds other cases to which R. Simeon may refer. It therefore also rejects the conclusion (Note 216) reached here.. Just as Ḥanan said, she shall swear only at the end, so Rebbi Simeon says, she shall swear only at the end. Just as you say, practice follows Ḥanan²¹⁵, so here practice follows Rebbi Simeon²¹⁶.

footnotes: ²¹³ Mishnah 13:1. If a man travelled overseas and his wife asks permission from the court to sell of his property for her upkeep, Ḥanan says that she can sell and only swears at the end, if either the husband returns or notice of his death is received, that she did not retain any of the husband’s property over and above the amount she was entitled to. Ḥanan’s opponents also require her to swear before permission is granted by the court. ²¹⁴ He admits the widow’s oath only if she demands her ketubah. ²¹⁵ Mishnah 13:1, on the highest authority of R. Joshua. ²¹⁶ By inference from the decision of Ḥanan.

MISHNAH: If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah²¹⁷ due the divorcee. She has to sign a receipt or the bill of divorce has to be torn up to prevent her from collecting again in another court.. A ketubah without the bill of divorce when she says, I lost my bill of divorce but he says, I lost my receipt; similarly, the holder of an instrument of debt not accompanied by a prozbol²¹⁸; cf. Ševi‘it 10:3 ff., pp. 650 ff.; these shall not be paid. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, since the times of the persecution²¹⁹ and the distinctively Jewish bill of divorce had to be torn up as soon as they had been delivered. After the decrees were lifted in the reign of Antoninus Pius, the status quo ante was not restored. The fact of a divorce could be established by witnesses; the existence of a prozbol was assumed., a woman collects without the bill of divorce and the creditor collects without prozbol.

footnotes: ²¹⁷ The obligatory minimum amount of the ketubah ²¹⁸ If the debt documented in the instrument runs beyond a Sabbatical year, the debt is cancelled unless secured by a prozbol ²¹⁹ The Hadrianic decrees in Palestine in the aftermath of the war of Bar Kokhba when all Jewish ritual was prohibited. In those times, the prozbol

HALAKHAH: “From encumbered property, how is that?” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody disputes a court document, he is not trustworthy²²². Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba²²³ said to him: Is that not the Mishnah? “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah²²⁴ a private one, the court document which proves her status as a divorcee is enough to have another court direct that she be paid the divorce settlement. If divorce and payment were handled by the same court, she would not have to present anything.”! Rebbi Joḥanan said to him: Babylonian, after I removed the clay from the pearl, you say to me: Is that not the Mishnah? Rav said, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she produces she collects²²⁵ if the amount stipulated in it did not exceed the legal minimum. Since legally required terms do not have to be written in the ketubah(Mishnaiot 4:7–12), the amount itself does not have to be written (4:7) for the marriage to be legal.. He changed his mind and said, she collects even at a place where one writes a ketubah²²⁶ was written; R. Joḥanan’s opinion there is attributed to Samuel.; let anyone powerful object to this! Rebbi Yose objected: Was it not stated: She might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, and collect a second time²²⁷ which explains the precautions necessary to prevent that the same claim could be presented in different jurisdictions.? If those died. Are there not witnesses²²⁸? Bring them! They went overseas. Is there not an agreement²³⁰? Is there no registrar of agreements? There is a registrar of agreements; as you say, if a document is lost, one writes a replacement²³¹. This is what one says, if the ketubah was lost, one writes a new one²³¹. Rebbi Abba objected: Was it not stated, she might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, wait until he dies, and collect a second time²³²? Rebbi Yose bar Abun said to him: Would she not have to prove that she lived with him until he died?

footnotes: ²²² A document made in one court will be accepted by another court as valid. ²²³ He is the same R. Ḥiyya who stated the thesis; it is recounted how he was convinced to attribute the statement to R. Joḥanan. ²²⁴ Since the bill of divorce is a court document but the ketubah ²²⁵ This is all part of R. Joḥanan’s argument, that the Mishnah does not prove anything since Rav gave it an interpretation which has nothing to do with the divorce bill being a court document. Rav declares that there are places where one would not write a ketubah ²²⁶ R. Joḥanan asserts that Rav in the end did agree with him. The Babli disagrees, 89a, and asserts that Rav restricts the Mishnah to cases in which no ketubah ²²⁷ A similar text is in the Babli, 16b. This must be part of a baraita ²²⁸ In case no receipt was written or the document presented for payment was shredded. ²³⁰ Greek ὁμολογία “consensus”, a joint statement of payor and payee. ²³¹ The fact that it is a replacement has to be stated in the new document. Therefore, the new document cannot be used fraudulently as an original. ²³¹ The fact that it is a replacement has to be stated in the new document. Therefore, the new document cannot be used fraudulently as an original. ²³² From the heirs, as a widow.

Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna in the name of Rav: At a place where one writes ketubah documents, if he says I wrote, but she says you did not write, the burden of proof is on her to prove that he did not write. But at a place where one does not write ketubah documents, if he says I wrote, but she says you did not write, the burden of proof is on him to prove that he wrote²³³ evidence in questions of existence of documents..

footnotes: ²³³ In the Babli, 89a, this is an inference of Rav Anan from a statement of Samuel. Local usage is always prima facie

Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba found Rebbi Jonathan’s prozbol and ran to give it to him²³⁴. He said to him, I do not need it²³⁵ 37b, this is a statement of Rav Naḥman, that Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel’s elimination of the requirement to produce a bill of divorce or prozbol is permanent., as it was stated: The creditor can be believed if he says, I discarded this document²³⁶ and tore it up. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya: The Mishnah says so: “Since the times of the persecution, a woman collects without the bill of divorce and the creditor collects without prozbol.” Is that not impossible? I tore it without discarding²³⁷ to discard.? Here, I discarded and tore it²³⁸ was in existence when needed..

footnotes: ²³⁴ Since R. Ḥiyya is two generations younger than R. Jonathan, this must have been a very young R. Ḥiyya bar Abba. ²³⁵ In the Babli, Giṭṭin ²³⁶ The prozbol. ²³⁷ He cannot possibly ask for payment if he does not claim to have had a prozbol ²³⁸ This includes the claim that a prozbol

MISHNAH: Two bills of divorce and two ketubot, she collects two ketubot²³⁹ When he married her the second time, he wrote her a new ketubah (which he did not have to do, as explained in the Mishnah.) Then the new ketubah is a new obligation, additional to the old one, not superseding it.. Two ketubot and one bill of divorce, or one ketubah and two bills of divorce, or one ketubah, and a bill of divorce, and death; she collects only one ketubah since a person who divorces his wife and takes her back, takes her back on the basis of her prior ketubah²⁴⁰. If a minor was married off by his father, [his wife’s] ketubah is valid since he kept her by that understanding²⁴¹ becomes only valid at the moment the minor becomes an adult and stays married to his wife.. If a proselyte converted together with his wife, her ketubah is valid since he kept her by that understanding²⁴².

footnotes: ²³⁹ She was twice married and twice divorced from the same man. After the first divorce, she did not collect her ketubah. ²⁴⁰ Without documentary proof to the contrary, a man married twice to the same woman is presumed to owe only one ketubah. ²⁴¹ A minor cannot legally take on obligations. The ketubah ²⁴² The rabbinic court will enforce all obligations the groom had undertaken for his bride in Gentile law.

HALAKHAH: “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah,” etc. “Two bills of divorce and two ketubot” etc. But only if the bill of divorce is dated between the two ketubot²⁴³ was only intended to replace the first which was thought to be lost; a similar argument is in the Babli, 90a.. So far if they are equal. If one was for a mina, the other for 200 [zuz]²⁴⁴ and one bill of divorce. If the amounts are equal, the second bill replaces the first. If they are unequal, they cannot replace one another.? Rav Huna and Rav Jeremiah²⁴⁵ and Rav Ḥisda. One said, she collects the first one. The other said, she collects the second one and the excess²⁴⁶ should be larger, it now is a lien on the husband’s real estate only from the date of the second. Any real estate sold between the dates of the two ketubot cannot be taken by the divorcee. In the Babli, 43b, Rav Huna states that if she only claims the smaller amount she collects from the date of the first ketubah, otherwise from the time of the second. she collects from the date of the second.

footnotes: ²⁴³ Otherwise the second ketubah ²⁴⁴ This refers to the second case, that the divorcee presents two ketubot ²⁴⁵ Probably it should read: Rav Huna in the name of Rav Jeremiah; otherwise, the name of a first generation Amora should not appear between the names of two second generation Amoraim. ²⁴⁶ Even if the first ketubah

Rebbi Ḥanaiah said before Rebbi Mana: Does this not mean that if a person borrows from another, and then he borrows again, he has to declare “in addition to the first paper you have on me”²⁴⁷?? It is frequent that a woman says, my ketubah is lost, write me another²⁴⁸. Is it frequent that a man say, my paper is lost, write me another²⁴⁹? But it is possible that he should declare for him²⁵⁰.

footnotes: ²⁴⁷ Would two commercial contracts be considered under the same rules as ketubot ²⁴⁸ The husband would have to oblige, leaving the wife with two documents. ²⁴⁹ The debtor does not have to oblige; if he agrees in order to retain the possibility of future loans, the new contract will certainly be written so that the prior contract would be invalidated. ²⁵⁰ Instead of writing in the contract, the debtor could declare his multiple indebtedness in front of witnesses.

Rebbi Yudan from Sicily²⁵¹ brought this case²⁵² before Rebbi Yose: Did not Rebbi Abbahu²⁵³ṣi‘a 17a, R. Assi (Yasa) in the name of R. Joḥanan. say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Nobody should use a paper on which he borrowed and paid the loan back to take out another loan on the same day²⁵⁴? He said to him, here if he had paid back, there if he did not pay back²⁵⁵ was paid after the divorce, at the remarriage the husband has to execute a new ketubah. The Mishnah refers only to the case that the husband prefers to remarry instead of paying up.. ²⁵⁶6:3, Notes 88–89. It refers to the validity of the ketubah for the remarried divorcee. From the Babli, 90a, one might be led to read this statement as belonging to the next paragraph, about the ketubah of a minor’s wife, but this does not fit the interpretation given the statement in Demay. Rebbi Ḥanin stated before Rebbi Hila: Two Amoraïm, one said for ketubah but not for individual stipulations, the other said, both for ketubah and for individual stipulations.

footnotes: ²⁵¹ Or, “son of Sicinius” (E. G.). ²⁵² The statement that a man remarrying his divorcee can do that on the basis of the prior ketubah. ²⁵³ In the Babli, Baba Me ²⁵⁴ If the loan was paid back the day it was taken out (otherwise the paper would be predated and invalid). The reason given in the Babli is that the rights given by the borrower to the lender by handing over the contract to the lender were annulled by the repayment and cannot be resurrected. ²⁵⁵ Obviously, if the ketubah ²⁵⁶ This text is quoted in Demay

One understands a proselyte²⁵⁷. A minor²⁵⁸? Can a minor divorce²⁵⁹ cannot become due.? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I explained it following what Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Only if he slept with her when he regained sight or became sane mentally²⁶⁰ only if for some period she lived with him while he was legally competent. At that time, their marital relations validate the contract.. And here, if he slept with her after he reached adulthood.

footnotes: ²⁵⁷ He contracted the marriage as an adult. His conversion cannot invalidate his contractual obligations. ²⁵⁸ He cannot enter into valid contracts. If he dies, how can his wife enforce her claims against the minor’s heirs whose rights are biblical? ²⁵⁹ Since a minor cannot act in law, he cannot divorce his wife and her ketubah ²⁶⁰ In Chapter 1, Note 146. The wife of a deaf-mute or insane man can collect a ketubah