MISHNAH: If somebody said to another: go and marry me preliminarily to woman X, and [the agent] went and married her preliminarily himself, she is preliminarily married¹. Also, if somebody said to a woman, you are preliminarily married to me after thirty days and another man married her preliminarily within these thirty days, she is preliminarily married to the second man²; as a daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen she may eat heave³7:3 (Note 80) Rebbi disagrees and holds that the preliminary marriage of the second man disappears at the end of 30 days; this opinion is adopted by Samuel in the Babli, 59b, but not mentioned in the Yerushalmi Qiddušin.]. From today and after thirty days, and another man married her preliminarily within these thirty days, she is and is not preliminarily married³7:3 (Note 80) Rebbi disagrees and holds that the preliminary marriage of the second man disappears at the end of 30 days; this opinion is adopted by Samuel in the Babli, 59b, but not mentioned in the Yerushalmi Qiddušin.]. As a daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen or daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel she may not eat heave⁴.

footnotes: ¹ A person who accepts agency does not by this act lose the ability to legally act in his own behalf. As long as the agent did not sign a contract which subjects him to a fine unless he execute what he promised, the principal may consider him a trickster but has no legal recourse. ² At the moment at which the second man married her, she was legally single; his marriage is valid. After thirty days, when the first man’s preliminary marriage should enter into force, she already is a married woman. The preliminary marriage of a married woman to another man is nonexistent in law. It is not forbidden; only actions which exist in law can be forbidden. ³ If the groom is a Cohen, she is married to the Cohen; the existence of the first man is irrelevant. But if the first man gave her a wedding gift and said: you are preliminarily married to me now but the mutual legal obligations shall start only after 30 days (which would give the groom 13 months to arrange the definitive wedding), and if within these thirty days another man preliminarily married her unconditionally, neither of the two marriages can be unquestionably valid. Therefore, she needs valid bills of divorce from both men. [In Giṭṭin ³ If the groom is a Cohen, she is married to the Cohen; the existence of the first man is irrelevant. But if the first man gave her a wedding gift and said: you are preliminarily married to me now but the mutual legal obligations shall start only after 30 days (which would give the groom 13 months to arrange the definitive wedding), and if within these thirty days another man preliminarily married her unconditionally, neither of the two marriages can be unquestionably valid. Therefore, she needs valid bills of divorce from both men. [In Giṭṭin ⁴ The daughter of an Israel can eat heave only if she is certainly married to a Cohen; the daughter of a Cohen can eat heave only if she certainly is not married outside the clan.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody says to another: go and marry me preliminarily to woman X,” etc. He looks out for himself and is rewarded since his acquisition is valid, but he behaved treacherously⁵. The same holds for monetary transactions. If somebody says to another: go and buy for me goods X, and [the agent] went and bought [the merchandise] for himself, he looks out for himself and is rewarded since his acquisition is valid, but he behaved treacherously⁶. Rebbi Ze‘ira cursed those who saw another person trying to buy certain goods and outbid him. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Also about one who organizes a group against another⁷ 4 (1937), p. 379] explains that simply by having a group of people showing interest, even if no competing bid ensues, the hand of the seller is strengthened and the buyer forced to increase his bid., the rabbis quote: “A person who prevents a good thing coming to his neighbor abandons the fear of the Almighty.⁸ 6:14, interpretation of Targum. (In a Genizah fragment: “The rabbis of Caesarea quote.”)”

footnotes: ⁵ Babli 58b. ⁶ The Babli, 59a, agrees in general but points out that an agent must have some flexibility in warding off claims by third parties; it might be to the advantage of the principal if the agent acquires for himself rather than let the property fall into hostile hands. ⁷ S. Lieberman [Tarbiz ⁸ Job

If the agent was not identified as such by the witnesses⁹ and he says, I married her preliminarily for myself, but she says, to the first, the second is like one who says to a woman: I married you preliminarily but she says, you did not marry me preliminarily¹⁰. Also it is as if she said to the first, you married me preliminarily but he says, I did not marry you preliminarily. If she says, I do not know, the presumption is in favor of the second¹¹. If the agent was identified as such by the witnesses and he says, I married her preliminarily for myself, but she says, to the first, the presumption is in favor of the first¹². If she said, I do not know, both of them give a bill of divorce or, if they so desire, one gives a bill of divorce and the other marries definitively.

footnotes: ⁹ The witnesses to the preliminary marriage say that they did not know that the male was appointed as agent and, therefore, they did not listen carefully whether the male stated that he was marrying the woman for himself or for a third party. ¹⁰ The case treated in Mishnah 11. The party which asserts the existence of the marriage is forbidden to marry the close relatives of the other party. The party which denies the existence of a marriage is not forbidden to marry any close relative of the other party. ¹¹ If the ceremony was not announced as one of marriage by proxy and nobody noticed anything unusual in the formulas being used, it was not a marriage by proxy and the woman is certainly married to the agent. ¹² If the agent was announced as a proxy and nobody noticed anything out of the ordinary, it was a marriage by proxy.

Therefore¹³, if the second died within thirty days or divorced her, the preliminary marriage of the first is activated after thirty days. If he died after thirty [days] without having divorced her, the preliminary marriage of the first is not activated¹⁴. That is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: With any condition which was fulfilled¹⁵, even if later it becomes moot, she is preliminarily married. But with any condition which was not satisfied at the moment of preliminary marriage, even if later it became moot, she is not preliminarily married.

footnotes: ¹³ Referring to the second part of the Mishnah, about the man who stipulated that the preliminary marriage be effective only after 30 days. ¹⁴ If the second man was preliminarily married to her at the end of 30 days, the first preliminary marriage would be marriage to an already married woman; it is null and void. It cannot be reactivated even if the second man later dies. ¹⁵ At the time of the activation of the preliminary marriage.

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “This animal shall be an elevation sacrifice after thirty days.” If he sold it within the thirty days, it is sold; its dedication sanctifies¹⁶ 2:9, Note 120).. If he bought it back within the thirty days, the dedication as elevation sacrifice applies to it. After thirty days, the dedication as elevation sacrifice no longer applies¹⁷. But an elevation sacrifice cannot be compared to a woman¹⁸! Could an elevation sacrifice be compared to a woman? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it that the second man died¹⁹ from him. Therefore, the preliminary marriage of the first is void even if the second man, whose preliminary marriage was valid immediately, dies within the thirty days. but he had a brother. Since she is a candidate for levirate, the preliminary marriage of the first cannot be valid. Could an elevation sacrifice be compared to a woman? Rebbi Mattania said, explain it that he dedicated an animal with a permanent defect.²⁰ Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: There you say, my promise to Heaven is like my delivery to a private person²¹, and here, you say so? He answered him: there, immediately, but here if he says, after thirty days²¹.

footnotes: ¹⁶ Since nobody can dedicate anything which is not his, the first dedication was invalidated by the sale; the buyer may use the animal for any sacrifice, not just as elevation sacrifice (Nazir ¹⁷ Since at the end of 30 days the animal was neither his property nor in his possession. ¹⁸ As R. Abun bar Ḥiyya notes later in this paragraph, dedications follow rules quite different from acquisitions; it is difficult to understand why the dedicated animal could validly be sold. ¹⁹ He died childless. While the widow is not automatically married to the levir, she is prevented from marrying any other man unless she receives ḥalîṣah ²⁰ Then the dedication was not as elevation sacrifice but stipulated that the animal be sold and the money used as elevation sacrifice. In that case, it would not be necessary that the original owner buy the animal back but only that the buyer renounce his property rights before the end of 30 days. ²¹ Mishnah 1:6. If the animal is immediately delivered to the Temple, it cannot be sold. ²¹ Mishnah 1:6. If the animal is immediately delivered to the Temple, it cannot be sold.

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “This shall be an elevation sacrifice for thirty days,” it is an elevation sacrifice for thirty days; after thirty days it automatically becomes profane²³ 29a.. What is its status regarding larceny²⁴. 5:14–16.? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the larceny is clear²⁵. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Hila both say, the larceny is in doubt²⁶. “You are preliminarily married to me for thirty days,” she is preliminarily married²⁷. What is the difference between dedication and woman? We find that a dedication can be eliminated without redemption but we do not find that a woman could leave without a divorce document. Where do we find that a dedication can be eliminated without redemption? Following Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “they enter without paying.²⁸ 7:4. If a field donated to the Temple was not redeemed before the Jubilee year, it becomes profane property of the Cohanim (Lev. 27:21). In R. Simeon’s opinion, the reversion to profane status is automatic; the Cohanim to whom it is distributed do not have to redeem it from the Temple treasury.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it according to everybody regarding a bought field²⁹. 27:24).. “This is your bill of divorce for thirty days”: it is no bill of divorce³⁰ 4:8, Note 192). A shortened version of the text is discussed by Ran, Nedarim 29a.. Rebbi Isaac ben R. Eleazar said, when do you say that she is preliminarily married? If he effectuated the preliminary marriage by money. But if he effectuated the preliminary marriage by a document, since marriage documents were inferred from divorce documents³¹ and in the case of a divorce she is not divorced, so in the case of a preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.

footnotes: ²³ A different version, describing an animal designated as (most holy) elevation offering for 30 days and afterwards as (simply holy) well-being offering, is quoted as tannaïtic text in the Babli, Nedarim ²⁴ An animal dedicated as sacrifice is forbidden for all use; it cannot be used for work, nor can it be shorn for its wool. The question is whether illicit use of an animal temporarily declared a sacrifice triggers the penalties spelled out in Lev ²⁵ Since during the 30 days it is a sacrifice, if it was used then all the penalties are due. ²⁶ If the animal was sacrificed during the thirty days, any prior use was larceny. But if the animal was not sacrificed, then it reverts to profane status and its use was not illegitimate; it would be forbidden to dedicate an animal to atone for the larceny. The prior use was an “evil that cannot be corrected.” ²⁷ Permanently, even after 30 days. ²⁸ Mishnah ‘Arakhin ²⁹ A field which was not a family heirloom but bought from another owner automatically reverts to its hereditary owner in the Jubilee year. Even if in the meantime the field was given to the Temple by the buyer, it reverts without payment (Lev ³⁰ Since it is implied that after 30 days there should be no divorce, it is invalid. A divorce must be irrevocable to be valid (Giṭṭin ³¹ Chapter 1, Note 21.

Rebbi Abbahu³² in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “This animal shall be an elevation sacrifice after thirty days;” if he sold it during the thirty days, it is not sold; its dedication does not sanctify³³. For which purpose did he say: “after thirty”? To reserve for himself shearing and work³⁴. “Pick from this field³⁵ that it should be acquired by you after thirty days;” if he sold it within thirty days it is not sold, if he³⁶ dedicated it it is not sanctified. Why did he say, after thirty days? To reserve usufruct for himself³⁷. “Here you have this tetradrachma that your field should be mine after thirty days³⁸,” if he sold it within thirty days it is not sold, if he dedicated it it is not sanctified. What is the difference between this and a woman³⁹? But if he sold it, it is sold⁴⁰.

footnotes: ³² It seems that this name is incorrect since earlier R. Abbahu stated that the animal may be validly sold (Note 16). Since the name tradition in the first case is confirmed by a parallel, the quote here is the one to be questioned. ³³ This Amora holds that even “a delayed promise to Heaven is like an immediate delivery to a private person” (Note 21). ³⁴ For the first 30 days. ³⁵ This is authorization of transfer of ownership following Mishnah 1:5. Title to the field is transferred immediately even if actual possession by the buyer is deferred. ³⁶ The seller. ³⁷ The seller may harvest the field for the next 30 days. ³⁸ While real estate may be acquired by money (Mishnah 1:5), the language implies that both ownership and possession will be deferred for 30 days. ³⁹ Since it is stated in the Mishnah that money given now for a later acquisition of a woman in preliminary marriage does not prevent her from marrying another man in the meantime. ⁴⁰ To exclude any sale to a third party, either ownership or possession must have been transferred at the moment of transaction.

“Here you have money that your slave shall become acquired by me after thirty days.⁴¹” Some Tannaïm stated: The first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”⁴². 21:20–21. Killing a slave is murder. But if the slave dies because of a punishment he receives from his owner and lives at least 24 hours after the punishment, the owner’s act is not prosecutable.. But some Tannaïm stated: The second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. Some Tannaïm stated: Neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: Both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. He⁴³ 50a, R. Meïr. who says, the first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “if he dies in his possession⁴⁴. 21:20, the verse which declares the owner guilty of murder if he kills his slave..” He⁴⁵ who says, the second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “for he is his money⁴⁶. 21:21, the verse which exempts the owner from prosecution if the slave lives for 24 hours. “His money” indicates ownership..” He⁴⁷ who says, both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, the first because of “if he dies in his possession,” the second because of “for he is his money.” He⁴⁸ who says, neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, for he is not the first’s money and does not die in the possession of the second.

footnotes: ⁴¹ As explained in this paragraph, ownership is transferred immediately but possession is deferred for thirty days. ⁴² Ex ⁴³ In the Babli, Baba batra ⁴⁴ Ex ⁴⁵ In the Babli, R. Jehudah. ⁴⁶ Ex ⁴⁷ In the Babli, R. Yose. ⁴⁸ In the Babli, R. Eleazar.

“As daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen she may eat heave⁴⁹.” Some Tannaïm state: She may not eat heave. Rebbi Hila said, the one who says that she may eat heave refers to the case that the second man is a Cohen, but the one who says that she may not eat heave refers to the case that the second man is not a Cohen.

footnotes: ⁴⁹ If the first man wanted the preliminary marriage to be valid only after 30 days, cf. Note 3.

“From today and after 30 days.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even preliminary marriages of a hundred men apply to her⁵⁰ 3:5, Notes 102–105 (5:1, end; Nedarim 10:6 Note 59); Babli 60a.. Rebbi Eleazar said, it was necessary [to state], even if the second preliminarily married her absolutely⁵¹. Rebbi Isaac bar Tebele asked before Rebbi Eleazar: As you take it⁵²; what the first acquired, he acquired; the remainder the second finished⁵³. He answered, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions⁵⁴? How is that? To any woman who is not acquired by one man only, even preliminary marriages of a hundred men apply.

footnotes: ⁵⁰ This refers to the case where a sequence of men said: “from now and after 30 days,” cf. Note 3. In this case, she is married to none of them completely; cf. Yebamot ⁵¹ The interpretation of R. Abbahu is not the only one possible. Since the Mishnah mentions the condition “from now and after 30 days” only for the first man, it is quite possible that the second marries her unconditionally. Then no other man can join the list of suitors but nevertheless the woman is still “married and not married”. ⁵² מַה נַפְשֵׁךְ is a technical term implying that a certain conclusion follows from two mutually exclusive premises. ⁵³ This elliptic statement can be explained as follows (R. Moses Margalit): If the statement of the first groom, “from today and after 30 days”, means that he requires 30 days to make up his mind and might annul the preliminary marriage, then it is obvious that the second contracted a valid marriage and the first is eliminated. But if “from today and after 30 days” means that he wants to be married now but his obligations start only after 30 days, the first acquired the right to preliminarily marry the woman after 30 days. If now the second man marries her unconditionally within the thirty days, which the first cannot hinder, his acquisition should have eliminated the option which the first had acquired. ⁵⁴ Incest and adultery prohibitions are so serious that no kind of intellectual acrobatics is applicable to them.

A student asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he gave it to her in the morning on condition that he divorce her in the afternoon⁵⁵? A certain David was of the opinion that anything acquires⁵⁶; Rebbi Ze‘ira said that after thirty days he acquires absolutely⁵⁷. But if the second one added absolute acquisition, I am reading for her: “Her first husband who had sent her away cannot return to take her back.⁵⁸. 24:4. If the second preliminary marriage was unconditional and the second man died, the first who had given a divorce whose validity may be suspect cannot marry the woman, since for the rule that a divorcee married to another man may not be taken back by her first husband, the divorce and the preliminary marriage to the second man was real.”

footnotes: ⁵⁵ From the following it seems that the question was about a case in which A gave a wedding gift to a woman stating that she should be preliminarily married to him “from now after a specified time” but divorcing her before the end of the stated period. B preliminarily married the same woman after A’s conditional marriage but before the divorce. The Mishnah refers to the situation after the end of the 30 day period, when both preliminary marriages are in conflict. That situation may be rectified by at least one divorce. But in the situation described here, the question remains whether a divorce is possible for a marriage which has not yet started. ⁵⁶ Therefore, a divorce is possible also for a partial marriage. ⁵⁷ He questions the possibility of divorce of a not yet existing marriage.A Genizah fragment adds a sentence which was lost by the Leiden scribe by homeoteleuton:ניתגרשה מזה מותר לזה. נית׳ מזה מותר לזה. ניתגרשה משניהן מותר׳ לאיזו … בשלא הוסיף בה השיניקניין גמור.If she was divorced by the first, she is permitted to the second; if she was divorced by the second, she is permitted to the first. If she was divorced by both of them, she is permitted to anybody [she likes]. If the second did not add absolute acquisition;The first two sentences are the conclusion of the previous text. The last sentence is the introduction to the following text. The text does not add anything to the understanding of the Leiden text. ⁵⁸ Deut

If both were Cohanim or brothers, both are forbidden⁵⁹. If there were three brothers; two of them contracted a preliminary marriage with her and then died. That is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated⁶⁰ 3:10, Note 137.: The wife of one deceased contracts levirate marriage but not the wife of two deceased men. If they were brothers, both contracted a preliminary marriage with her and then one of them died. Is she permitted to the second? As you take it, what he had acquired, he had acquired; the rest he inherits from his brother⁶¹. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, she is forbidden to him. Rebbi Yose said, the reason of Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi is that the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law who is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees the co-wife⁶² 2:2, Note 55. The argument of Note 61 is invalid: Levirate is possible only if the brother’s marriage was undoubtedly valid.. Rebbi Ḥanina said, Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said it correctly. Does she not become his because of his brother? To his brother she was forbidden⁵⁹; to him she should be permitted?

footnotes: ⁵⁹ Here starts a discussion of the statement of the Mishnah that the situation can be resolved if one of the men writes a bill of divorce and the other marries the woman. There are cases in which both must divorce and neither of them can marry: A Cohen may not marry a divorcee; this includes a woman who is divorced without ever being really married. The wife of a brother is prohibited to her brother-in- law except in the case of a required levirate marriage. In the case of the Mishnah, if the two men are brothers, the woman is forbidden to either of them as the brother’s wife. ⁶⁰ Yebamot ⁶¹ The argument is that the surviving brother should be allowed to marry both in his own right and as levir. ⁶² Yebamot ⁵⁹ Here starts a discussion of the statement of the Mishnah that the situation can be resolved if one of the men writes a bill of divorce and the other marries the woman. There are cases in which both must divorce and neither of them can marry: A Cohen may not marry a divorcee; this includes a woman who is divorced without ever being really married. The wife of a brother is prohibited to her brother-in- law except in the case of a required levirate marriage. In the case of the Mishnah, if the two men are brothers, the woman is forbidden to either of them as the brother’s wife.

“A daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel may not eat heave.” This is a necessary statement, even in case the second man is a Cohen⁶³. 22:12). It is stated here that she is excluded even if the claim of the Israel on her is only one of partial marriage..

footnotes: ⁶³ The statement of the Mishnah seems to be trivial since the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel is excluded from heave by biblical decree (Lev

MISHNAH: If somebody says to a woman: You are preliminarily married to me on condition that I give you 200 zuz⁶⁴, the half-sheqel piece, identified with the Roman denarius., she is preliminarily married and he is obligated to give⁶⁵ worth at the time he contracted the preliminary marriage. There is no time limit set for the liquidation of the claim. However, it seems that if she has to sue him in court for the 200 zuz, the preliminary marriage is invalidated.. On condition that I give you within the next 30 days; if he gave her within 30 days she is preliminarily married; otherwise she is not preliminarily married. On condition that I owe 200 zuz, she is preliminarily married if he has it. On condition that I show you 200 zuz, she is preliminarily married once he shows it to her⁶⁶; but if he showed it on his bank she is not preliminarily married⁶⁷.

footnotes: ⁶⁴ Accadic zūzum ⁶⁵ It is understood that he also gave a peruṭah’s ⁶⁶ He assures her that she is marrying a person of means; nevertheless it is not sufficient that he prove to her that he has the means; in order to be married she must be shown the actual coins. ⁶⁷ If he is a banker, handling his depositors’ money, he cannot show anything which is not his own capital invested in his business.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody says to a woman: You are preliminarily married to me,” etc. ⁶⁸, Halakhah 7:5, Notes 116–118. In the Babli, 60b, the rabbis who disagree with Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel hold that the conditional divorcee never is subject to ḥalîṣah or levirate marriage. There, we have stated: “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz, she is divorced and has to pay. If she did not manage to pay before he died, it was stated: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, she pays his father or his brother and is free from ḥalîṣah and levirate marriage. The same holds for preliminary marriage: “You are preliminarily married to me on condition that I give you 200 zuz;” if he did not manage to pay before he died, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, his father or his brothers pay and she is subject to ḥalîṣah or levirate marriage.

footnotes: ⁶⁸ This is a reformulation of the first paragraph of Giṭṭin

⁶⁹ 7:6, Notes 132–139; the contract text also in Eruvin 3 and later in Halakhah 3. A. Gulak (Tarbiz 5, 1934, pp. 126–133) has discussed the text in detail. The term σύμφωνον “agreement” appears in Egyptian papyri of the Byzantine period (after the middle of the fifth Century C. E.) and later in Justinian’s legislation to designate special stipulations within a written contract [R. Taubenschlag (Chapter 1, Note 369) p. 224]. In earlier Greek sources one finds only the adjective σύμφωνος, α, ον “agreeing”. Since the authorities quoted in the Talmud belong to the third Century, the term must have been in use in the Hellenistic world long before it appeared in surviving papyri. As a special stipulation, the symphōn contract has to be executed concurrent with the preliminary marriage; otherwise it could not undo the marriage without a divorce. This supplementary contract fulfills the same role as the Alexandrian Ketubah(Yebamot 15:3, Note 34, and the sources quoted there.) On the other hand, the delivery of property by the groom as pledge first is documented in Hammurabi’s laws; it appears in Roman contracts as arra (or arrha) sponsalicia (arra = ἀρραβών = עֵרָבוֹן) only in Byzantine times, clearly under the influence of Eastern usage. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, sometime in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.

footnotes: ⁶⁹ This text is also in Giṭṭin

⁷¹ to 60a. If the appointed time has arrived⁷² and he says, I gave, but she says, I did not receive⁷³: Rebbi Abun said, since he tries to wrest the contract from the woman’s hand⁷⁴, the burden of proof is on him. Think of it, maybe there was no contract⁷⁵? Rebbi Yose said, since he tries to forbid her to anybody, he has to prove that they entered into the contract⁷⁶. A case came before Rebbi Abbahu⁷⁷ stipulations were not satisfied and the marriage did not take place.; he said to him, go and deliver⁷⁸ gift; absent proof to the contrary, she has to be believed.. He answered, Rabbi, I did not acquire a wife and you say to me, go and deliver! Rebbi Abbahu said, it never happened to me that one got the better of me except this one. He rephrased and said: If he changed his mind, he shall deliver. If she changed her mind, she shall deliver⁷⁹ (V,l,5) double the value of the arra which has to be returned if the woman’s party decides not to proceed with the marriage. Talmudic law does not seem to have adopted this clause; it would be difficult to read it into R. Abbahu’s decision.] While the Babli does not know the institution of symphōn, A. Gulak sees in the rules of symphōn the precursor of the Medieval contracts of promise of marriage.. Is that not his former judgment⁸⁰? He rephrased to give it the status of a court document⁸¹ was drawn up by three witnesses who could act as a court. A court document whose genuinness was attested to cannot be attacked in court..

footnotes: ⁷¹ The interpretation essentially follows Gulak, Note 69. The paragraph is also discussed by Nachmanides, Nissim Gerondi (Ran), and Yom Tov ben Abraham Išbili (Ritba) in their Novellae ⁷² And for some reason the engagement was dissolved. ⁷³ The valuable object promised in the additional contract. ⁷⁴ The text of the contract specifies that the valuable object remain the woman’s property even if the marriage be cancelled. ⁷⁵ If there is no written document in the woman’s hand, the burden of proof is on her, not him. ⁷⁶ If they were married, and therefore she is forbidden to any man in the world except her husband, he has to show that the conditions of the contract were adhered to. ⁷⁷ In which the symphōn ⁷⁸ The woman stated that she did not receive the symphōn ⁷⁹ She has to return the gift or prove that she never received it. [Both Hammurabi’s codex (§§159–161) and the Corpus Iuris ⁸⁰ He still insists that the man has to deliver the valuable object if he cannot prove prior delivery. ⁸¹ As explained in the next paragraph, the symphōn

The following is the way of contracting: One witness for the groom and one witness for the bride; these two together select a third in order to have two witnesses for each side⁸² 3:1). The procedure justifies R. Abbahu’s position in the preceding paragraph that every symphōn has the status of a court document.. That is, if not both of them agree. But if both of them agree, both may invalidate the preliminary marriage⁸³, both parties can agree to call off the marriage. If there is a dispute, the document has to be submitted to the competent local court to determine that the relationship can be terminated without a divorce.. As, e. g., ⁸⁴. The reference is to Yebamot 13:16, Notes 133–134: A levirate marriage can be contracted only by sexual relations. If the sister-in-law was living in the levir’s house but claims that he never slept with her, she might be able to force him to give her ḥalîṣah. If they both agree, the court must accept their statement even though it may seem unlikely that a man would not sleep with a woman available to him. Similarly in the present case, even though a court will be reluctant to free a preliminarily married woman without a bill of divorce, if both parties agree to the existence of a symphōn, the court will have to hold that the preliminary marriage be void since it was conditional and the condition was not fulfilled.“if he said, I copulated, but she says, I was not copulated with. Even if he changed his story and then said, I did not copulate, he cannot be believed since from the start he had said, I copulated. But if from the start he said that he had not copulated, the two together can uproot the presumption.” If there was one witness for the groom, one witness for the bride, and the groom signed personally: Rebbi Abbahu said, it is a symphōn⁸⁵, Rebbi Abba said, it is preliminary marriage⁸⁶ are not satisfied, there is no symphōn and the preliminary marriage is unconditional., for I am saying that he did not really intend a symphōn but thought that it would permit her sister to him⁸⁷ is valid only to cancel a preliminary marriage if all rules are carefully observed as required for a court document..

footnotes: ⁸² We do not find in any other talmudic document that the witnesses testify for one party. The witnesses are supposed to testify to the genuineness of the document, equally for both sides. Each side chooses one representative and both together choose a third in the constitution of a court of arbitration (Mishnah Sanhedrin ⁸³ If there is a symphōn ⁸⁴ This has nothing directly to do with the topic of symphōn ⁸⁵ Since there are three signatures, as required. ⁸⁶ The groom may not appear as judge in his own case. Since the formal conditions of symphōn ⁸⁷ The groom might have wanted a document which would allow him to marry the bride’s sister if for some reason the preliminary marriage would end in divorce. But preliminary marriage triggers all incest prohibitions; a symphōn

Only if it be with his and her agreement⁸⁸ is a contract between parties of equal standing.. If it was symphōn in his opinion and preliminary marriage in her opinion⁸⁹.cit. Note 69) points out, since the disagreement is about the nature of the contract, not its contents, it is clear that even for the woman the preliminary marriage is conditional and will be void if any of the conditions were not satisfied. The difference in the status of the contract is that in case of preliminary marriage, the woman would have to return the arra and would have no right unilaterally to cancel the marriage., Rebbi Ḥanina⁹⁰ said, it is symphōn, Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it is preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥanina was taking up arms against Rebbi Ḥaggai, when Rebbi Hila said to him, accept Ḥaggai, for Ḥaggai is a thinking man; this is what Rebbi Ze‘ira said. In the first Adar⁹¹, Rebbi Hila died. In the second Adar, a case came before Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, and he wanted to rule following Rebbi Ḥaggai. Rebbi Samuel bar Immi told him, Rebbi Hila was wrong when he told you, accept Ḥaggai, for Ḥaggai is a thinking man⁹². Rebbi Ḥaggai said, a Mishnah⁹³ supports him: “ ‘You married me preliminarily’, and he says, ‘I did not marry you preliminarily.’ He is permitted her relatives but she is forbidden his relatives.” Rebbi Borqai asked before Rebbi Mana: Is it the same with symphōn⁹⁴?? He answered, a symphōn is not doubtful but the rules are identical for symphōn and⁹⁵ 4, 1933, pp. 377–378.) preliminary marriage.

footnotes: ⁸⁸ While preliminary marriage essentially is a unilateral act by the groom where the woman only has a right of refusal but no active role, a symphōn ⁸⁹ As A. Gulak (loc ⁹⁰ As shown subsequently in the paragraph, he really is the later R. Ḥananiah, not the earlier R. Ḥanina. ⁹¹ In an intercalary year, when the 12th month is reduplicated as “second Adar” to make sure that Passover fall after the spring equinox. ⁹² Since R. Ḥaggai reported R. Ze‘ira’s opinion, rather than his own. ⁹³ Mishnah 3:11. R. Ḥaggai on his own shows that the Mishnah supports R. Ze‘ira since it shows that one party can accept the consequences of preliminary marriage without imposing the same consequences on the other party. Since (Note 89) the preliminary marriage even in the woman’s opinion was conditional, the ability of the groom to unilaterally terminate the relationship is not impaired if one rules following R. Ze‘ira. ⁹⁴ Do the rules of Mishnah 3:11 also apply to symphōn ⁹⁵ Reading או as (ה)אוּ, not אוֹ (A. Gulak; cf. also S. Lieberman, ו=או=הוא, Tarbiz

If he performed a preliminary marriage during the validity of the symphōn, this is unconditional preliminary marriage⁹⁷ he could proceed immediately with definitive marriage, retroactively validating the symphōn as preliminary marriage. His action overrides the symphōn.. If he divorced⁹⁸. This also is unnecessary since the contract permits each party to declare its unwillingness to proceed with the marriage, thereby eliminating the preliminary marriage., the students of Rebbi Jonah said, divorce touched her⁹⁹; Rebbi Jonah said, divorce did not touch her¹⁰⁰. When Rebbi Jonah died, his students acted following him. They said, since after 30 [days]¹⁰¹ as final term for the definitive marriage. she would leave without a bill of divorce, how can you say that divorce touched her? But divorce did not touch her. If he died during the time stipulated in the symphōn, Rebbi Abbahu said, she is permitted to marry; Rebbi Abba said, she is not permitted to marry¹⁰² follows the rules of conditional preliminary marriage, the woman cannot marry another man without the family of the deceased giving up their option. The widow/bride naturally could exercise her option to invalidate the symphōn, but then she will have to return the arra.. Rebbi Mana asked the family of Rebbi Yose’s father: How did your master usually act? He said to him, when it was a long time¹⁰³ was far off, to require the woman to wait would be an unreasonable burden on her., he said that she should go and marry immediately. If the time was short, he said, what is the hurt if she waits? If he sent things during the validity¹⁰⁴, the groom sent additional gifts to his prospective bride. If these are also considered arra, the bride keeps them if the marriage does not take place by the action of the groom; if they are engagement presents they have to be returned. of the symphōn, Rebbi Mana said, [it follows the rules of] symphōn; Rebbi Abba said, [it follows the rules of] preliminary marriage. The rabbis take note of Rebbi Mana’s opinion¹⁰⁵..

footnotes: ⁹⁷ An unnecessary procedure since based on the symphōn ⁹⁸ During the period specified in the symphōn ⁹⁹ She is forbidden to marry a Cohen. ¹⁰⁰ It is as if a man not married to a woman divorces her; she is not touched by that action and free to marry a Cohen. ¹⁰¹ Or any other period specified in the symphōn ¹⁰² This discussion presupposes the opinion of Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel (Note 68) that the family of a man who dies after conditional preliminary marriage has the option to fulfill the conditions and force the widow to contract levirate marriage with the brother of the deceased. If a symphōn ¹⁰³ If the end of the period specified in the symphōn ¹⁰⁴ In addition to the contractual arra ¹⁰⁵ If the marriage does not take place, it would be incumbent upon the man to prove in court that the gifts were specifically designated as engagement presents, not arra

MISHNAH: “On condition¹⁰⁶ as marriage gift and specifies that he preliminarily marries her as owner of a bet kor, 30 bet se‘ah or 75’000 square cubits of agricultural land. If he actually is the owner of the land, she is married immediately; he can show her the title to his land later. that I possess a bet kor of arable land,” she is preliminarily married if he owns it. “On condition that I possess it at place X”, she is preliminarily married if he owns it at place X, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. “On condition that I shall show you a bet kor of arable land,” she is preliminarily married and he has to show her¹⁰⁷, but if he showed it in the valley¹⁰⁸ she is not preliminarily married. ¹⁰⁹ Rebbi Meïr says, any condition which is not formulated in the manner of the condition imposed on the tribes of Gad and Reuben is invalid¹⁰⁹, as it is said¹¹¹. 32:29–30.: “Moses said to them, if the tribes of Gad and Reuben cross over … but if they will not in arms cross over with you, etc.” Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said, that formulation was necessary¹¹² of arable land, but be not preliminarily married to me if I do not possess a bet kor of arable land.” for otherwise one would have understood that even in the Land of Canaan they should not inherit.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁶ He gives the woman a peruṭah ¹⁰⁷ Since he said “to show”, it means that she has to see it with her own eyes; it is not enough for him to prove his ownership to her. ¹⁰⁸ בִּקְעָא everywhere means open agricultural land not easily accessible. In all these conditions, a claim of ownership is understood. ¹⁰⁹ In the independent Mishnah mss. and later in the Halakhah here starts a new Mishnah 4. ¹⁰⁹ In the independent Mishnah mss. and later in the Halakhah here starts a new Mishnah 4. ¹¹¹ Num ¹¹² The involved formulation of the deed of Transjordan to the tribes of Gad and Reuben was necessary under the circumstances. A simple condition is valid; it is not necessary for a man to say: “Be preliminarily married to me on condition that I possess a bet kor

HALAKHAH: “On condition that I possess a bet kor of arable land,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah the son of Rebbi Hillel asked¹¹³: If somebody said, my son A should perform action X and receive property Y, and the rest of my sons shall inherit my properties; if he performs, he takes, but if he does not perform, he does not take¹¹⁴. Or maybe it is a difference since it is written: “To give to Nine and a half tribes.¹¹⁵. 34:13. This verse clearly excludes the Transjordan tribes from property in Canaan. Therefore, R. Ḥanaiah ben Gamliel’s argument is correct.” It is as if he said, my son A should perform action X and receive property Y, and the rest of my sons shall inherit my properties; if he performs, he takes, but if he does not perform, he does not take from here or from there.

footnotes: ¹¹³ He asks against R. Ḥanaiah ben Gamliel. ¹¹⁴ This does not disinherit A from sharing with his brothers. ¹¹⁵ Num

¹¹⁸ 3, 21b line 1 ff. There, we have stated: “A person can impose a condition of his ‘eruv.¹¹⁹. 16:29) “nobody shall leave his place of residence on the Seventh Day” is that on the Sabbath one may not go a distance greater than 2’000 cubits from the boundary of the built-up domain in which one resides. Since by tradition the diameter of the encampment of the Israelites in the desert was 12 mil, 24’000 cubits (Shevi‘it 6:1, Note 28), and certainly the Israelites were able to freely move in their camp on the Sabbath, it is clear that the restriction to 2’000 cubits is purely rabbinical. Therefore, it is open to manipulation. One of the accepted ways of manipulation is for a person to deposit some food, the ‘eruv, at the border of the permitted domain and declare that he intends to consider the place of that food as dwelling for the coming Sabbath. Then he still can move freely in the built-up domain, which is counted only as 4 cubits, but he has an additional 2’000 cubits on the other side of the ‘eruv, but nothing on the opposite side of the built-up area. Mishnah ‘Eruvin 3:5 permits a person to prepare a number of ‘eruvin which are mutually exclusive, and say: “If attackers appear in the East, my ‘eruv in the West shall be active; if they appear in the West, my ‘eruv in the East shall be active; if there is no danger, I shall be like the other inhabitants of my place.”” So is the Mishnah: “A person can impose a condition of his*‘eruvin*.¹²⁰, not to Qiddušin.” Rebbi Eleazar said, who is the Tanna of “if they came”, “if they did not come”? Rebbi Meïr¹²¹, it has to be spelled out that the ‘eruv shall be invalid if there is no danger; otherwise the person making the ‘eruv can never keep the Sabbath with the other inhabitants of his place.! Which Rebbi Meïr? The colleagues say, Rebbi Meïr of Qiddušin¹²² 3:5 is a direct application of Mishnah Qiddušin 3:3 and the baraita quoted in the sequel.. As it was stated: If somebody say to a woman: You are preliminarily married to me on condition that there will be rain¹²³ changed hands and a definite time was given for the duration of the condition.. If rain fell, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Meïr says, she is preliminarily married whether or not rain fell unless he doubled his condition¹²⁴. Everybody agrees that if he said, after rainfall¹²⁵ is given with the understanding that it is counted as marriage gift when it rained before a fixed date, that explains the modalities of the preliminary marriage, it is not a condition., if it rained she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Yose said, it follows Rebbi Meïr in Eruvin, as we have stated there¹²⁶ 3:4. Somebody put an ‘eruv near the Sabbath boundary. If it was somehow moved and now it is not clear whether it is inside or outside the Sabbath boundary: If it is still within the boundary, the person making it can reach it on the Sabbath and it is valid. If it is outside, it cannot be reached and is invalid. If it is in doubt, according to rabbis Meïr and Jehudah, the person making it can only move in the domain permitted both if the ‘eruv is valid and if it is invalid.: “If it be in doubt, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Jehudah say, he is a camel-donkey driver.¹²⁷ in doubt who cannot leave the four cubits at which he started the Sabbath.” Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Meïr said this only as a restriction¹²⁸. While this is also the opinion of Rif, most interpreters of the Babli hold that a double formulation is always required. Cf. Sefer Ha’iṭṭur I, p. 74 ff.. Rebbi Mana said, that is correct. He cannot acquire his ‘eruv since he is not able to enjoy it. [Why not] like the people of his place? If he had decided to leave his place¹²⁹ in doubt is a donkey-camel driver has nothing to do with the requirement of a double formulation. The ‘eruv cannot be valid if the person cannot reach it on the Sabbath; the person cannot have the domain available to the other residents since he had decided not to be part of the population for the coming Sabbath.. And here¹³⁰, she is not preliminarily married to the first, since no rain came. She is not preliminarily married to the second, since [the first] did not double his condition. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose¹³¹: Is this “if” not a reaction? He answered, there is a difference since the land was in their hand¹³² and he wanted to take it away from them.

footnotes: ¹¹⁸ From here to the end of the Halakhah, the text is also in Eruvin ¹¹⁹ The rabbinic interpretation of the biblical commandment that (Ex ¹²⁰ Since there are at least two. This remark belongs to ‘Eruvin ¹²¹ He will hold that even if there was only one ‘eruv ¹²² Mishnah ‘Eruvin ¹²³ If a peruṭah ¹²⁴ If it was not stated explicitly that there was no marriage without rainfall, the condition is void and the marriage valid unconditionally. ¹²⁵ If the peruṭah ¹²⁶ Mishnah ‘Eruvin ¹²⁷ The donkey driver has to go behind his animal; it will not move otherwise. The camel driver has to go in front of his animal and draw it by its bridle; it will not move otherwise. The camel-donkey driver cannot function at all; the usual Babli expression “donkey-camel driver” describes one who cannot move from between the animals as similar to the person with an ‘eruv ¹²⁸ R. Meïr requires a double formulation of a condition only for marriage and divorce, not for ‘eruvin ¹²⁹ The fact that the person with the ‘eruv ¹³⁰ A hypothetical case in which a first man contracted a preliminary marriage conditioned upon the timely arrival of rains, when a second man contracted an unconditional preliminary marriage with the same woman before the arrival of rains. Since she was not married when the second man came, it is impossible to say that the latter’s preliminary marriage were invalid. It is also impossible to say that it were valid, since the first man’s condition was not stated in the double formulation required by R. Meïr; she needs divorces from both men. ¹³¹ This question is directed against R. Ḥanaiah ben Gamliel. What was the necessity of the double formulation in the case of the tribes Gad and Reuben? The question should be asked not for the negative part but for the positive; was it necessary to state that the tribes will get the Transjordan territory if they come to fight in Canaan? ¹³² They already were in possession; to make this possession conditional needed the involved formulation.

Rebbi Jehudah bar Sisin¹³³, Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazy in the name of Rebbi Aḥa. They formulated the symphōn according to Rebbi Meïr¹³⁴. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, asked: Why does it have to follow Rebbi Meïr but not also the rabbis? Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” Why can he not say “on condition” but not double his stipulation? If he did not double his stipulation, could this eliminate the preliminary marriage¹³⁵? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everywhere Rebbi Meïr holds that from “no” you infer “yes”, except here¹³⁶ 11a,13b; Ševu’ot 36a) emphatically holds that R. Meïr requires a double formulation since he does not infer a positive statement from a negative one. For example, a statement “this shall for me be not profane” implies a dedication for the rabbis but not for R. Meïr.? Rebbi Mattaniah said, one is more restrictive in matters of incest and adultery.

footnotes: ¹³³ An Amora of this name is not otherwise documented in Talmudic literature. Probably the reading of ע “R. Jehudah ben Shalom” is correct. ¹³⁴ Since it states both that there is preliminary marriage if the conditions are satisfied but none if they are not satisfied. ¹³⁵ Even the rabbis must require an extra stipulation which will eliminate the preliminary marriage if the conditions are not satisfied. ¹³⁶ The Babli (Nedarim

MISHNAH: If a person contracts a preliminary marriage with a woman and then says, I was of the opinion that she was a Cohenet but she is a Levite, a Levite but she is a Cohenet, poor but she is rich, rich but she is poor, she is preliminarily married since she did not trick him¹³⁷.

footnotes: ¹³⁷ His relations with other people are not influenced by his erroneous opinions, as long as he alone is responsible for them.

HALAKHAH: ¹⁰⁹“Rebbi Meïr says, any condition,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, she¹³⁸ Hatterumot 51:6) the statement does not refer to the preceding Mishnah, but to Mishnah 4: Even if there are witnesses who can testify that the groom told them that he was going to marry a Cohenet, as long as she did nothing to suggest that idea to him, she is validly married. is preliminarily married as if by witnesses. Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: She is preliminarily married as a restriction¹³⁹.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁹ In the independent Mishnah mss. and later in the Halakhah here starts a new Mishnah 4. ¹³⁸ A woman preliminarily married with a condition that was not expressed in double form and was not satisfied. He holds that for R. Meïr she is married unconditionally. In the opinion of Nachmanides (reported in Sefer ¹³⁹ For him R. Meïr agrees that the woman cannot be married if the stipulation was not fulfilled. But he will hold that if a second man married her, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them since both of them have equal claim on her.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Immi: Reuben owes to Simeon; he transferred [the debt] to Levi¹⁴⁰. Levi became poor¹⁴¹; then Reuben owes nothing to Simeon. That is, if it was not done in bad faith, but if it was done in bad faith, he is obligated.

footnotes: ¹⁴⁰ And Simeon accepted the assignment, thinking that Levi had good credit. The case belongs here because it frees Reuben from liability as long as he did nothing to inflate Levi’s credit in Simeon’s eyes. ¹⁴¹ Levy and Kohut explain as Greek ἀπορέω, “to become poor”.

Similarly, the pedlars directed the village wax chandlers to a merchant. The merchant absconded. The case came before Rebbi Mana, who said, if it is a matter of pennies, they were negligent¹⁴². If it is a matter of denars, it is the way of merchants to move around.

footnotes: ¹⁴² The wax-chandlers should have collected their debt expeditously; but for a large debt the pedlars remain obligated.

A person met another in the market place. He said to him, give me the linen which you hold for me. The other responded, give me the denar which you hold for me. The first said, give me the linen and deduct the denar. The case came before Rebbi Mana, who said to him, you admitted that you owe him a denar; he did not admit anything about the linen. Go and give him the denar! Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Immi¹⁴³ will agree that this is not the law but that he obligated him lest the other deny his liability for the linen.

footnotes: ¹⁴³ One is tempted to read “R. Mana” for “R. Immi”.

A person owed another one 100 denars on a document¹⁴⁴, “papyrus, roll of papyrus”.. He sent 50 with an agent and instructed him: If he does not surrender the document, do not give him anything. The case came before Rebbi Immi. He said, go and give it, for we know. Think of it, Rebbi Immi [might die]¹⁴⁵ Moshe, דמת instead of דמר, is confirmed by the Genizah text as to meaning but not as to formulation.! One writes for him a proclamation of the court¹⁴⁶. If one accepts for another person, the rabbis here say, what he accepted, he accepted for the claimant.

footnotes: ¹⁴⁴ Greek χάρτης, Latin charta ¹⁴⁵ Reading of the Geniza fragment. It makes more sense than the reading “who said” of L. The emendation of Pene ¹⁴⁶ The agent was not empowered to pay the 50 denars without getting the document; the creditor was not willing to give the document for less than full payment. R. Immi told him to deliver the document and receive a court document instead which documented the remaining claim.

¹⁴⁷ 1:6, Notes 181–199 (ט). The Genizah text simply refers to the Giṭṭin text, reserving less than one line for the entire quote. Explanation: Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Yose ben Kipper descended to collect there for the colleagues when they were slandered. They asked but were not given anything. Then they came and wanted to take it back from them. They answered, we already acquired it. They said, we wish for you to accept it in good faith; they answered, we are unpaid trustees. They approached Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai who told them, there it is, all of it. They took Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, whipped him with ropes, and took it from him. When they returned here, he went to his father and told him, look what your son did to me! He asked him, what did he do to you? He answered, if he had taken my position, they could not have taken anything from us. He asked him, why did you act in such a way? He said, I saw that they were a unanimous court, their hats were a cubit wide, they were directing blows, my brother Yose was bound and the whip ascended and descended. I said, does my father have another Dositheos? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, you say that for somebody who cannot give a warranty in good faith. But if somebody gives a warranty in good faith, one takes from this one and gives to the other. If somebody forgave a bond to another person: Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mamal: one said it is forgiven; the other said it is not forgiven unless he handed over the bond.

footnotes: ¹⁴⁷ Text and translation are from Giṭṭin

MISHNAH: If somebody say to a woman: You are preliminarily married to me after I convert, or after you are converted¹⁴⁸, after I am freed, or after you are freed¹⁴⁹, after your husband has died¹⁵⁰, or after your sister has died¹⁵¹. 18 for which no criminal penalty is indicated in Lev. 20. But Lev. 18:18 is read as: “A woman in addition to her sister you are unable take, to be co-wives, to uncover her nakedness in addition to her, during her lifetime.” The act of preliminary marriage is here defined as impossible during the sister’s lifetime., or after your levir has given you ḥalîṣah¹⁵². 25:5, which reads: “If brothers dwell together and one of them die without children, the widow of the deceased is unable to be an outside man’s.” Cf. Yebamot 1:1, Notes 93–103; Note 166 below., she is not preliminarily married. Similarly, if somebody say to another, if your wife have a daughter, she shall be preliminarily married to me, he did not say anything¹⁵³.

footnotes: ¹⁴⁸ While marriage exists for Gentiles, preliminary marriage is a uniquely Jewish institution. If one or both parties are Gentile, no preliminary marriage is possible. ¹⁴⁹ A slave cannot marry. Therefore, if one or both parties are servile, no preliminary marriage is possible. ¹⁵⁰ A married woman cannot marry another party. A preliminary marriage in anticipation of the husband’s death is impossible. ¹⁵¹ If the man was once married to a woman, her sister is forbidden to him during the woman’s lifetime. This is the only incest prohibition of Lev ¹⁵² This Tanna follows the majority interpretation of Deut ¹⁵³ A marriage contract cannot be concluded as a futures contract on anything which does not yet exist. The Mishnah in the Babli states in addition that if the wife of the prospective father-in-law was visibly pregnant, the contract is valid. The Halakhah shows that the Yerushalmi clearly holds that a woman is said to exist only from the moment of her birth, not while she still is in her mother’s womb.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody say to a woman,” etc. They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the difference between this and one who says, “this shall be heave for this standing produce after it has been cut”¹⁵⁴? He said to them, there, it is in his power to cut; but here, it is not in his power to be freed¹⁵⁵. Rebbi Ephes asked, think of it, if she was his slave girl¹⁵⁶? Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, “after you are freed”, she is made dependent on another person’s will¹⁵⁷ ‘Arukh Yore Dea’ 267:58). (The classical commentators of the Yerushalmi incorrectly read the Babli’s explanation into the Yerushalmi text.).

footnotes: ¹⁵⁴ It is impossible to give heave from standing grain since the obligation of heave starts only at the end of the harvesting process. Nevertheless, the farmer can set aside a certain amount for heave at the start of the harvest to cover everything he will harvest in the future. Then why is it impossible for somebody who at the moment is unable to contract a preliminary marriage to give a gift which is to become a marriage gift as soon as the obstacle to his contracting is removed? The same question is asked in the Babli, 62a. ¹⁵⁵ But it is uniquely in the power of the slave’s owner, or, in the case of Gentiles, in the power of the rabbinic court to whom they must apply for conversion. ¹⁵⁶ Since it is in his own power to free her. In the Babli, 62b, the question is attributed to R. Abba bar Mamal. ¹⁵⁷ In the case of the owner marrying his own slave girl, it is purely a matter of formulation. By making it conditional, “if you be set free”, he abdicates his own power. The Yerushalmi will agree that if the owner simply marries his slave girl, without mentioning her need to be freed, by one action he sets her free and marries her (R. Moses Isserles in Šulḥan

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia and Rebbi Jehudah Neśia were sitting together. They said, let us say something on the subject of preliminary marriage. If somebody say to his¹⁵⁸ wife, here you have a peruṭaḣ that you should be preliminarily married to me after I have divorced you, what is the rule? They laughed and got up¹⁵⁹. Rebbi Yose said, why did they laugh? Did not Rebbi Abba bar Mamal say, “after you are freed”, she is made dependent on another person’s will; and here “after you are divorced,” she is made dependent on another’s will¹⁶⁰. If you want to find a difficulty. ask the following: A person went to preliminarily marry a woman. Another person overtook him and said to her, you should know that the man who is coming to preliminarily marry you has a bad mind. In the future he will abandon you. But here you have this peruṭah that you should be preliminarily married to me after he will have¹⁵⁸ divorced you¹⁶¹. What is the rule?

footnotes: ¹⁵⁸ Translation follows the Genizah text. ¹⁵⁹ The Babli, 62b, takes R. Hoshaia’s question seriously. Naturally, the answer to the question as stated is simply that the action is invalid since a married woman cannot marry again while married, not even her own husband. ¹⁶⁰ In the opinion of the Babli, the reason is that while the husband can divorce her unilaterally, he cannot marry her again against her will. This is the “other will” which is involved here. ¹⁵⁸ Translation follows the Genizah text. ¹⁶¹ It was shown in 3:1 that if a man gives a gift for preliminary marriage stipulating that the marriage be valid only after 30 days, and another man came, married, and divorced her within those thirty days, the first man’s marriage is valid. The problem naturally is that “30 days” is an objective standard, not depending on another’s will; but the clause “if the other man will have divorced you” makes it dependent on another’s will and invalidates the preliminary marriage.

There¹⁶² 3:6 and the relevant Halakhah (Notes 110–121). The text here does not make any sense and is not intended to make any sense. The Genizah fragment starts the quote of the Mishnah; the missing part of the line contained an instruction to continue the text in Nedarim. The same is intended here. We have a quote of the start of the Mishnah and a few words from the first paragraph of the Halakhah, ending with a complete copy of the last sentence, a sign that the copy now starts in earnest. It is clear that both scribes of the Genizah and the Leiden mss. considered the Nedarim text as the original for Qiddušin. For the reader’s convenience, here is the text omitted by the scribes: Halakhah 6: “These orchard trees shall be qorbān,” etc. If he saw the king’s cutting crew coming near, if he saw fire coming near, and he said: These orchard trees shall be qorbān if they are not cut, this garment shall be qorbān if it is not burned or torn. Were they sanctified retroactively or only for the future? What is the difference? If he used them. If you say that they are sanctified retroactively, he committed larceny. If you say that it refers to the future, he did not commit larceny., it was stated: “These orchard trees shall be qorbān if they are not cut, this garment shall be qorbān if it is not burned.” And it was burned. Were they sanctified retroactively? He committed larceny. If you say that it refers to the future, he did not commit larceny.

footnotes: ¹⁶² Mishnah Nedarim

¹⁶⁵ 3:6, Notes 114–121. Ḥizqiah said, if he redeemed them they revert to their sanctity. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he redeemed them they are redeemed. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “These have no redemption.” He explains thus: After they were cut they do not need redemption. Rebbi Yose said, what Ḥizqiah said refers to the case that he himself redeemed them. But if another person redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them. The argument of Rebbi Yose is switched: There, he says that if [another] redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them, but here, he says that if she was married to another man the qiddušin [of the first] were not removed! All that is questionable for him is if he gave her two peruṭot, one for the moment and one for after he divorced her; what is the situation?

footnotes: ¹⁶⁵ Nedarim

¹⁶⁶ 1:1 (א), Notes 95–100. In the Genizah text, the entire paragraph again is only worth one line’s mention. Rebbi Yannai said: More than 30 Elders voted: from where that qiddushin have no legal effect on a sister-in-law? The verse says, “the wife of the deceased may not belong to any outside unrelated man”, that she cannot have any existence with an outsider. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not a Mishnah? “Or after your levir will have performed ḥalîṣah with you, she is not preliminarily married.” And Rebbi Yannai praised him “those who pour out gold from the wallet,” “my son, they should not be removed from your eyes,” “get wise, my son, and make me happy, that I can answer those who insult me”, “give to the wise that he shall become wiser,” “let the wise listen that he increase in knowledge.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after all these praises I can explain it following Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba said that there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law!

footnotes: ¹⁶⁶ Yebamot

¹⁶⁷ 92b). While the marriage of the widow outside the family without ḥalîṣah certainly is sinful, it nowhere in the biblical text is punished as a criminal act; for Samuel this indicates that such a marriage should not be void by biblical standards. Samuel said, in our poverty, she needs a bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the Mishnah [said], “after your levir has given you ḥalîṣah”; but if he said, “after your levir has died,” she is preliminarily married¹⁶⁸. ¹⁶⁹ Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: A one-day-old girl can be preliminarily married by money; a girl of three years and one day can be preliminarily married by intercourse.” Rebbi Mana said, the Mishnah implies this: “Similarly, if somebody say to another, if your wife have a daughter, she shall be preliminarily married to me, he did not say anything,” because she does not exist. Therefore, if she does exist, she is preliminarily married.

footnotes: ¹⁶⁷ Here starts the discussion of the Mishnah dealing with the widow of a childless man. Samuel disagrees with the Mishnah; his position is accepted in the Babli as practice (Yebamot ¹⁶⁸ He holds that the Mishnah can be explained following Samuel. Even though the marriage by the widow of the childless man outside the family is valid, the marriage conditional on the action of the levir is invalid as explained by R. Abba bar Mamal. Therefore, the marriage conditioned on an act of God is valid, in particular also since after the death of the levir it no longer is sinful. ¹⁶⁹ Here starts the discussion of the Mishnah dealing with the newborn girl.

MISHNAH: If somebody says to a woman, be preliminarily married to me on condition that I speak for you to the government, or work for you as a worker, she is preliminarily married if he did speak for her to the government or did work for her as a worker; otherwise she is not preliminarily married¹⁷⁰ changes hands at the moment. The problem does not arise in the Babli, which instead of “be preliminarily married to me” reads הרי את מקודשת לי “you are preliminarily married to me”; that language implies that (a) at least a peruṭah changes hands at the moment of engagement and (b) the marriage, if valid, is in effect from the moment of giving. Both implications are absent in the Yerushalmi version.. On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. If the father died, she is preliminarily married¹⁷¹; if the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree¹⁷².

footnotes: ¹⁷⁰ As the Halakhah explains, there are two possible interpretations of this Mishnah, depending on whether or not a peruṭah ¹⁷¹ One interprets “on condition that my father agree” as “if my father does not object”. Since the father died, he can no longer object. ¹⁷² If the father has other sons, one tells him to free the woman from the obligation of levirate by rejecting the preliminary marriage.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody says to a woman, be preliminarily married to me,” etc. Rav said, we deal with the case that he gave her a peruṭah’s worth¹⁷³. Rebbi Immi asked (before Rebbi)¹⁷⁴: Do we not always deal with the case that he gave her a peruṭah’s worth¹⁷⁵? But so it is: “By what I shall speak for you to the government; if he did speak for her to the government for a peruṭah’s worth she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married.” “By what I shall work for you as a worker; if he did work for her as a worker for a peruṭah’s worth, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Only if she set aside a tetradrachma in her chest for him¹⁷⁶, she is married by the forgiving of the bill if she had the money to pay. This formulation avoids the problem of the Babli, that marriage cannot be effectuated by forgiving a loan, and the fee due a professional might be considered a loan slowly accreting through delivery of his services.. With what did he effectuate the preliminary marriage? As we have stated there: “If anything is bartered instead of money, if one party entered in possession, the other is obligated for its trade-in¹⁷⁷.”

footnotes: ¹⁷³ In the Babli, 63a, the uncontested opinion of R. Simeon ben Laqish. ¹⁷⁴ This should be deleted with G. ¹⁷⁵ In all preceding cases, if it says “be preliminarily married to me on condition”, it was understood that the proposal was accompanied by a marital gift. Then the present Mishnah would be unnecessary. But the new facet of this Mishnah is that preliminary marriage may be effected with lawyer’s or worker’s fees. ¹⁷⁶ The lawyer or the worker have to present the bill for their work; if the bill amounts to at least a peruṭah ¹⁷⁷ Mishnah 1:6, Note 521. By writing the bill, the lawyer puts a monetary value on his services.

“On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; if the father does not agree, she is not preliminarily married;” silently he does not agree¹⁷⁸. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” silently he agreed¹⁷⁹. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” silently he agreed. Rebbi Joḥanan asked Rebbi Yannai, can the Mishnah say so? He answered him, do you ask wretched Yannai to explain Qiddušin? Rebbi Yannai returned and explained the Mishnah: “On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; otherwise she is not preliminarily married,” he said on condition that [the father] express his opinion but he did not¹⁸⁰. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” as if he had given his opinion¹⁸¹. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” as if he had given his opinion¹⁸². Rebbi Ze‘ira said [before Rebbi Yasa]¹⁸³: Can Rebbi Yannai explain the Mishnah as he wishes? He answered him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, Rebbi does not refrain from stating generality and detail simultaneously¹⁸⁴. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah states thus: “On condition that I have a bet kor of arable land”, a generality; “at place X”, a detail¹⁸⁵.

footnotes: ¹⁷⁸ This is an example of the problem of the undistributed middle, frequently discussed in the Babli but rarely in the Yerushalmi. The Mishnah is silent on the status of the marriage if the father refuses to express an opinion. The formulation “if the father agreed” seems to imply that failure to give a positive reply is a rejection. If the formulation had been “unless the father objects,” the father’s silence would have signified assent. ¹⁷⁹ According to the argument of the preceding Note, if the father died without expressing an opinion, the marriage should be invalid. The second and third clauses of the Mishnah seem to contradict the first. ¹⁸⁰ One has to read the first clause as explained in Note 178, that there is no undistributed middle but the son made the validity of the marriage dependent on the explicit acceptation by his father. The father’s silence means rejection. ¹⁸¹ If the father died before he had an opportunity to react, the court may assume that he might have assented if he had lived; the woman is married to the extent that if another man married her preliminarily before the first one married her definitively, she would need a bill of divorce from both of them. ¹⁸² Even if the father had given his initial consent, if the son died before the definitive marriage the court will instruct the father to refuse to accept the marriage in order not to forbid the woman to a Cohen. This clause has nothing to do with the problem of the undistributed middle. ¹⁸³ Reading of G. The text of L is unacceptable; R. Ze‘ira cannot ask his student’s student R. Yose but he can ask his teacher and R. Simeon ben Laqish’s student R. Yasa. ¹⁸⁴ The three clauses of this part of the Mishnah refer to three different situations. In the first clause, a very restrictive interpretation is appropriate, in the second a very general one, in the third even a prior acceptance is turned into a rejection. This agrees with the general style of the Mishnah. ¹⁸⁵ Mishnah 3:3. The example does not quite fit the problem, but the general thrust is clear.

MISHNAH: “I preliminarily married off my daughter but I do not know to whom I married her preliminarily,” and somebody comes and says, I married her preliminarily, he is believed¹⁸⁶. This one says, “I married her preliminarily,” and that one says, “I married her preliminarily,” both give a bill of divorce or, if they so wish, one gives a bill of divorce and the other marries her definitively.

footnotes: ¹⁸⁶ Since the father has the right to marry off his underage daughter, if he believes that the person claiming her is his son-in-law, he has the right to marry her to him.

HALAKHAH: ¹⁹² 2:11 (ב) (Notes 184–195). G simply has a note: גרש בסוף פירקא תניינא דיבמות עד לא הכל … “One continues the end of the second Chapter of Yebamot as far as “he is not [trusted] in any way.”“If one says, I preliminarily married off my daughter”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer anything for another case from this ruling. What means, one does not infer anything for another case from this ruling? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In preliminary marriage, the same holds true. “I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I married her preliminarily,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry that woman.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “This one says, I married her preliminarily, and that one says, I married her preliminarily. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betrothe her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I married her preliminarily, and that one says, I married her preliminarily, and one of them jumped the gun and married her definitively. But if he said, I married her preliminarily and then married her definitively, and another one comes and says, I married her preliminarily, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I married her preliminarily, he is not trusted in any way.

footnotes: ¹⁹² Yebamot

MISHNAH: “I preliminarily married off my daughter, married her preliminarily and received her bill of divorce while she was underage,” and [now] she still is underage, he is believed¹⁸⁷. “I preliminarily married off my daughter, married her preliminarily and received her bill of divorce while she was underage,” and [now] she is an adult, he is not believed¹⁸⁸. “She had been kidnapped¹⁸⁹ and I ransomed her,” he is not believed whether she is underage or adult. If somebody said when dying, I have children, he is believed¹⁹³; I have brothers, he is not believed¹⁹⁴ presumption created at the time of his marriage (cf. Ketubot 1:4, Note 177; 5:5 Note 100; Gittin 3:4, Notes 92 ff.). If somebody preliminarily marries off his daughter without mentioning her name, the adult ones are not included¹⁹⁵.

footnotes: ¹⁸⁷ Since he has the right to marry his daughter to a man whose intercourse will make her unfit for the priesthood, he can also declare her unfit for the priesthood as divorcee without producing proof. ¹⁸⁸ Since he does not have the right to marry off his adult daughter, he cannot declare her ineligible for the priesthood without producing proof. ¹⁸⁹ And presumed raped, which forbids her to a Cohen. ¹⁹³ His childless widow is free to marry outside the family; she does not have to investigate whether his claim is true. The Torah empowers a father to recognize a son (Deut. 21:17); the court is not empowered to require additional proof (cf. Babli Baba Batra 134b). ¹⁹⁴ If he dies childless and had married his wife without telling her that he had brothers, he cannot now subject her to levirate with a brother-in-law she might be unable to locate since her husband's uncorroborated statement cannot undo the prima facie ¹⁹⁵ Since the father has no right to marry off his adult daughter. The Babli, 64b, points out that even if the adult daughter appoints her father as an agent to find her a husband, the father cannot contract the preliminary marriage without mentioning that he is an agent. Then the name of the principal automatically has to be stated.

HALAKHAH: “I preliminarily married off my younger daughter,” etc. “I preliminarily married off my daughter.” The underaged are included²⁰¹. 22:16), it is concluded that his statement concerning a daughter over which he has the power to give her away into marriage has to be accepted by the court without further documentation or corroboration., the adults are excluded²⁰². “My daughter was preliminarily married,” even the underaged are not included²⁰³. “I accepted my daughter’s bill of divorce,” the underaged are included, the adults are excluded. “My daughter was divorced,” even the underaged are not included. “I preliminarily married off my daughter to one of those disqualified for her,” he is believed. “I made her sleep with one of those disqualified for her,” he is not believed. “She had been kidnapped and I ransomed her,” whether she is underage or adult or had intercourse with one of those disqualified for her, he is not believed.

footnotes: ²⁰¹ Since Scripture bases the rules of a criminal procedure on the uncorroborated statement of a father who says “I gave my daughter to this man” (Deut ²⁰² Since the father has no right to give her away into marriage. ²⁰³ The language seems to imply that the father was not involved in the marriage. But an underage girl cannot be legally wedded without her father arranging the marriage. For illegal acts, the father’s standing is no different from any other person in the world; one needs two independent witnesses. The father, being his daughter’s relative, is automatically disqualified as a witness.

So is the Mishnah: “If somebody said when dying, I have children, he is believed; I have brothers, he is not believed;” Rav said, since it is in his hand to divorce, he is to be believed²⁰⁴. The word of Samuel agrees with this. A Persian when dying said to them: Give this man’s²⁰⁵ wife a bill of divorce. They asked him, why? Because of your wretched brother? After he died, the case came before Samuel who said, since it was in his hand to divorce, he is to be believed²⁰⁶. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is not to be believed. Ulla descended there²⁰⁷ and said this in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan; they²⁰⁸ ganged up on him. Think of it, if he was a Cohen²⁰⁹ 134b/135a, R. Joḥanan holds that a man who says that he divorced his wife cannot be believed without corroborating evidence. Then he cannot be believed if unexpectedly he declares to have a brother.?

footnotes: ²⁰⁴ One is not forced to say that the man married under false pretenses when he did not inform his bride of the existence of a brother; that now he cannot change her situation while maintaining the validity of his marriage, since he could conditionally divorce his wife, the divorce becoming active a moment before his death, and thereby protect her from the complications of levirate (in particular, in this case where the widow would be bound to an unknown brother-in-law whom she might be unable to locate). ²⁰⁵ His own. ²⁰⁶ There is no reason to believe that the bill of divorce was not written and duly delivered. Samuel’s decision was that the estate, after payment of the widow’s claims, has to be held by a court-appointed trustee for the brother as next of kin. ²⁰⁷ In Babylonia he proclaimed the Babylonian authorities Rav and Samuel to be in error. ²⁰⁸ The Babylonian scholars. ²⁰⁹ This is R. Joḥanan’s and Ulla’s argument against Rav and Samuel: Since a Cohen may not give his wife a conditional bill of divorce without forbidding her permanently to himself, and civil law does not make any difference in the personal standing of the parties, the Babylonian argument is invalid; the Mishnah is justified.In the Babli, Baba batra

Rav Sheshet objected²¹⁰: Does not the Mishnah disagree? “You married me preliminarily but he says, I did not marry you preliminarily; he is permitted her relatives but she is forbidden his relatives.”²¹¹ They said, so did it happen: Simeon bar Abba brought a bill of divorce and delivered it in front of one witness. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said, a single witness in marital matters is nothing²¹². Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Assi in the name of Assi²¹³ say: a single witness in marital matters is nothing? Rav said, one who performs a preliminary marriage in front of a single witness did not do anything²¹⁴. Samuel said, he who performs a preliminary marriage without prior negotiation is whipped, but the preliminary marriage holds. Mar Uqba in the name of Samuel said three things: He who performs a preliminary marriage without prior negotiation is whipped²¹⁵; one who sleeps with his betrothed in his father-in-law’s house²¹⁶ 1:5; Mishnah and Note 208). is whipped; one who insults the court bailiff²¹⁷ is whipped.

footnotes: ²¹⁰ The language is unusual; how can one object if no statement was yet enunciated? But it is impossible to move the question after the statements of Rav and Samuel because of the concurrent testimony of G (which admittedly is fragmentary at this point.) ²¹¹ Mishnah 12; the order of arguments is that of the Mishnah in the Babli.Rav Sheshet’s point is that the case treated in the Mishnah simply cannot happen. Either there are witnesses to the marriage, then there can be no dispute; or there are no witnesses, then there is no marriage. ²¹² There was no delivery, the woman is not yet divorced. The agent has to take the document back and deliver it anew in front of two witnesses. ²¹³ Unfortunately, these names are missing in G; there is an outside chance that the reference is to Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi, student of Rav. ²¹⁴ In the Babli, 65a, this is a statement of Rav Naḥman in the name of Samuel; it is stated explicitly that this holds even if the parties agree. ²¹⁵ In the Babli, 12b, this is attributed to Rav and rejected as practice in Nahardea, Samuel’s place. Probably this means that a betrothal is possible at the second, but not the first, date. ²¹⁶ As was the custom in Mishnaic times in Judea (Ketubot ²¹⁷ Who acts in an official capacity.

MISHNAH: If somebody has two groups of daughters from two wives and he says, I preliminarily married off my older daughter, but he does not know¹⁹⁶ whether the oldest of the older ones, or the oldest of the younger ones, or the youngest of the older ones who is older than the oldest of the younger ones, all are forbidden¹⁹⁷ except the youngest of the younger ones, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, all are permitted except the oldest of the older ones¹⁹⁸. I preliminarily married off my younger daughter, but he does not know whether the youngest of the younger ones, or the youngest of the older ones, or the oldest of the younger ones who is younger than the youngest of the older ones, all are forbidden except the oldest of the older ones, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, all are permitted except the youngest of the younger ones.

footnotes: ¹⁹⁶ When he took the money or signed the contract, he did not mention her name and now he does not remember which girl he had in mind when he contracted the marriage. ¹⁹⁷ They are forbidden to marry. None of them can marry an outsider for she may already be married. She cannot marry the man her father contracted with for he may be her sister's husband. That man has to write a separate bill of divorce for every girl. ¹⁹⁸ Since only she is unequivocally determined by the predicate "old".

HALAKHAH: “If somebody has two groups of daughters,” etc. Rav Ḥama said, two of two²¹⁸. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, for example I, who have two of two. The Mishnah [speaks of] him who has two groups of daughters from two wives, but if he has only one group and he said, the older, he married off only the oldest; if he said, the younger, he married off only the youngest.

footnotes: ²¹⁸ Even R. Meïr will agree that if one wife has more than two daughters, the intermediate ones will neither be called “old” or “young” but be specified by name. Therefore, the whole disagreement is about a man who has two daughters each from two wives.

²¹⁹, Halakhah 8:3 (Notes 36–45). In G, the entire reference to this text seems to have been in one missing line. There, we have stated: “ ‘Until before Passover’, Rebbi Meïr says, until it comes, Rebbi Yose says, until it passed.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: The opinion of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted; the opinion of Rebbi Yose seems to be inverted. The opinion of Rebbi Yose seems inverted: There, he says “until all the elder possibilities are exhausted, until all the younger possibilities are exhausted,” and here, he says so? He said to him: Since Ben Azai and Ben Zoma died, the perseverers disappeared; no perseverer was there until Jeremiah appeared. Rebbi Abba, son of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, said, why does he needle him? Did not great mountains find this difficult, did not Rebbi Eleazar already ask before Rebbi Joḥanan, does not the opinion of Rebbi Meïr seem to be inverted? He said to him, it is not inverted, the Mishnah is inverted, for in the House of Rebbi they stated: “ ‘Until before Passover’, Rebbi Meïr says, until it passed, Rebbi Yose says, until it comes.” He said: We ask “until before”, and you say so? He said to him, this is a Nabatean expression, “much before Passover”. Rebbi Abin said, everybody agrees that he is permitted on Passover⁴⁶. 21:21, the verse which exempts the owner from prosecution if the slave lives for 24 hours. “His money” indicates ownership.. Where do they disagree? The day before Passover. One of them says, until it passed, the other until it comes.

footnotes: ²¹⁹ This is essentially Nedarim ⁴⁶ Ex

MISHNAH: If somebody says to a woman, I married you preliminarily, but she says, you did not marry me preliminarily¹⁹⁹, he is forbidden her relatives²⁰⁰ but she is permitted his relatives. I she says, you married me preliminarily but he says, I did not marry you preliminarily, she is forbidden his relatives but he is permitted her relatives. “I am preliminarily married to you,” but she says, you are only preliminarily married to my daughter; he is forbidden the relatives of the old woman²²⁴4:7). While all relatives of the mother’s are also relatives of the daughter’s, the lists of forbidden unions are different in the two cases., and the old woman is permitted his relatives; he is permitted the relatives of the young woman, and the young woman is permitted his relatives²²⁵.

footnotes: ¹⁹⁹ And there is no witness present to support either of the parties. ²⁰⁰ While in the absence of witnesses he cannot force the woman to be married to him, since he declares himself to be married to her he has to observe all incest prohibitions which would follow from the marriage if it were real. ²²⁴ Since he claims marriage with her daughter, he is forbidden the relatives he could not marry had the claim been true (cf. Mishnah Yebamot ²²⁵ She did not claim being party to a marriage; it was her mother who claimed for herself but the mother’s action cannot impair the daughter.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody says to a woman,” etc. Rebbi Yossi said, it is reasonable that Rebbi Meïr not disagree in this case²²⁰. Rebbi Mana said, the entire series implies that he disagrees. Since there, where they are all²²¹ older and younger²²², you say that Rebbi Meïr disagrees, so here, where all are old compared to young or young compared to old, he certainly disagrees²²³.

footnotes: ²²⁰ This refers to the next Mishnaiot 12 and 13, where the question is whether the mother or a daughter was being married. There, R. Meïr’s name is not mentioned. R. Yose impies that the Mishnah is R. Meïr’s. ²²¹ Reading with G כּוּלָּם for כְּלוּם “nothing” of L. ²²² The case of two groups of girls from different mothers. ²²³ R. Mana seems to imply that also in Mishnah 11, and certainly in Mishnaiot 12 and 13, R. Meïr imposes incest restrictions on all parties, including those who deny being parties to a marriage.

MISHNAH: “I am preliminarily married to your daughter,” but she says, you are only preliminarily married to me; he is forbidden the relatives of the young woman²²⁴4:7). While all relatives of the mother’s are also relatives of the daughter’s, the lists of forbidden unions are different in the two cases., and the young woman is permitted his relatives; he is permitted the relatives of the old woman, and the old woman is forbidden his relatives.

footnotes: ²²⁴ Since he claims marriage with her daughter, he is forbidden the relatives he could not marry had the claim been true (cf. Mishnah Yebamot

HALAKHAH: “I am preliminarily married to your daughter,” etc. Rav Ḥuna said, one induces him to give a bill of divorce, and one forces him to pay a fine²²⁶.. Think of it, if he was a Fellow and knew that he would be obligated for a bill of divorce and a fine; if he went and married her sister, would one force the divorce of the certain because of the doubtful²²⁷ 3:4 where a man is forced to divorce his (rabbinically) preliminarily married wife and give ḥalîṣah to her sister. “Fellow” is used here not in the technical sense of a person observing the laws of ritual purity (cf. Introduction to Tractate Demay), but somewhat learned in the law.?

footnotes: ²²⁶ It is not clear from this text to which woman the bill of divorce has to be given. If sense is to be made of the text, one has to read it in the light of the Babli, 65a, where Samuel states that if a woman claims to be preliminarily married to a man, which claim he denies, one has to try to make him give her a bill of divorce to free the woman for marriage to another. In the case of the Mishnah, the bill of divorce would be for the mother; the daughter is not mentioned in the discussion. Rav, the teacher of R. Ḥuna, states that if he gave the bill of divorce on his own initiative, one can force him to pay the divorce settlement required by the law of ketubah ²²⁷ Rav Ḥuna’s statement is rejected as impractical. Assuming that the man either is reasonably well trained in the law or has access to legal advice, he can avoid being badgered into offering a bill of divorce and then forced to pay a hefty sum by threatening to marry the woman’s sister. Since the Mishnah permits him to marry the sister, one cannot ask him to give a divorce to his sister-in-law since by that act he would prohibit his prospective wife to himself. It is in the interest of the woman desiring the bill of divorce to make it clear that she has no monetary claims. (Explanation of D. Fraenckel.)The last sentence cannot be read as declarative: “one forces the divorce of the certain because of the doubtful”, meaning that the man would be barred from marrying the sister because of the unproven claim of the woman, since this would contradict both the Mishnah which permits the woman’s relatives to the man, and the general principle that in marriage matters only those statements count which can be backed up by the testimony of two witnesses. The case cannot be compared to Yebamot

MISHNAH: In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the father²²⁸. Who is this? A priestly, or Levitic, or Israel woman married to a Cohen, a Levite, or an Israel²²⁹. And in any case of a sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the blemished part. Who is this? A widow [married to] a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah to a common priest²³⁰. 21:7); the woman having received ḥalîṣah is a divorcee only by common practice. The child is “desecrated” in the sense of Lev. 21:7; the marriage prohibition is transferred to future generations., a bastard²³¹. 23:3. or a Gibeonite²³² 3:1, Notes 16–19. to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a Gibeonite or a bastard. In any case where a preliminary marriage with him is impossible but with others is possible, the child is a bastard. Who is this? This is one having sexual relations with any woman forbidden in the Torah because of incest or adultery²³³. 18,20; cf. Mishnah Yebamot 4:13.. And in any case where a preliminary marriage is impossible with anybody, the child follows the mother. Who is this? The child of a slave girl or a Gentile woman²³⁴2:5..

footnotes: ²²⁸ The child belongs to the same marriage class (detailed in Mishnah 4:1) as his father. ²²⁹ As the Halakhah points out, this list is far from complete; it contains only those cases in which there is absolutely no controversy. ²³⁰ The divorcee is forbidden to any Cohen by biblical decree (Lev ²³¹ Who is forbidden any endogamous marriage, Deut ²³² Cf. Halakhah 4:1. Notes 46 – 71; Ketubot ²³³ The child is a bastard in all cases of adultery; in cases of incest only those mentioned as deadly sins in Lev ²³⁴ Since preliminary marriage is a uniquely Jewish institution, Gentiles are automatically excluded since for them only definitive marriage exists (cf. Chapter 1, Notes 33–39.) The Jewish father cannot have any family relationship with his Gentile child: The widow of a man having only had a child with a Gentile woman is the widow of a childless man and subject to levirate marriage: Mishnah Yebamot

HALAKHAH: “In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage²³⁶ 8:2, Note 151), whose opinion is that of R. Yose in the Babli, 72b; for R. Jehudah the marriage would be sinful but not punishable, not included in the list of Mishnah 14 (Maimonides, Issure Bi’ah 15:7)., but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A priestly, or Levitic, or Israel woman married to a Cohen, a Levite, or an Israel.²³⁷” Rebbi Abin understood this from the second part: (In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the father.) [In any case of a sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the blemished part.]²³⁸ Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage, but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A widow [married to] a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a bastard or a Gibeonite.²³⁸” Could he not have objected to him: In the case of a disqualified priest married to the daughter of an Israel there is no sinful marriage but the child follows the blemished part²³⁹? In the case of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried, there is (no)²⁴⁰ sinful marriage but the child is unblemished since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The daughter of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried is enabled for the priesthood. What is the reason? [For she is an abomination,]²⁴¹. 24:4; quote missing in L; it is in Yebamot 4:13, Note 207. she is an abomination but her children are not an abomination²⁴².

footnotes: ²³⁶ Following the rabbis in Halakhah 4:1 (Yebamot ²³⁷ He pointedly avoids taking a position about marriages permitted to proselytes. ²³⁸ The text in parentheses is from L, the one in brackets from G. It is obvious that the G text is correct. ²³⁸ The text in parentheses is from L, the one in brackets from G. It is obvious that the G text is correct. ²³⁹ Halakhah 4:6. The question is not answered since the case presents a genuine inconsistency in the Mishnah. ²⁴⁰ Text of L; the interpretation has to follow G. ²⁴¹ Deut ²⁴² The marriage of the remarried divorcee is sinful but not incestuous; the formulation of the Mishnah correctly excludes this case.

²⁴³ 9:1, explained there in Notes 10–14; a slightly different text. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav: A proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly wives. What is the reason? Qualified men are warned against disqualified women and disqualified women against qualified men but not qualified women against disqualified men nor disqualified men against qualified women. Did we not state: “they should not take, should not take”, which teaches that the woman is warned through the man? They wanted to say, qualified women against disqualified men but it is only disqualified women against qualified men.

footnotes: ²⁴³ As noted in G, this paragraph is quoted in Yebamot

A proselyte came to Rebbi Yose and asked him, is it permitted to marry a bastard girl? He answered him, it is permitted. He continued and came to Rebbi Jehudah, who answered him, it is permitted²⁴⁴. 23:3), to whom marriage with bastards is forbidden (Yebamot8:2, Note 151; Qiddušin Halakhah 4:1, Note 105). But even R. Jehudah will agree that marriage of a proselyte with a bastard is not punishable. but you should know that the children of such a man would be bastards before Heaven²⁴⁵. He returned to Rebbi Yose and told him, since you knew that, why did you permit it to me at the start? He replied, I answered you what you asked me²⁴⁶. Rebbi Yose said, the proselyte can be compared to cotton²⁴⁷. While wool and linen cannot be mixed, either one may be mixed with cotton; cf. Introduction to Tractate Kilaim.. If one wants to use it with wool it is permitted, with linen it is permitted.

footnotes: ²⁴⁴ The language is somewhat difficult since for R. Jehudah proselytes are part of the “Congregation of the Eternal” (Deut ²⁴⁵ From his point of view, he is obligated to point out the implicit punishment meted out by Heaven for such an illicit union. ²⁴⁶ Since he holds that proselytes are not part of the “Congregation of the Eternal”, he is not obligated to point out that the children of the proselyte will remain outside the congregation if he marries a bastard. ²⁴⁷ Which is neutral for the prohibition of ša‘aṭnez

One understands “the daughter of an Israel to a bastard or a Gibeonite,” for it is written: “A bastard shall not come into the Eternal’s congregation.” Why does the verse say: “of his shall not come”? To disqualify²⁴⁸. 23:3 disqualifies the children from marrying in the congegration: “A bastard shall not come into the Eternal’s congregation, even the tenth generation of his shall not come into the Eternal’s congregation.” It seems that G had here another derivation, of which no trace is left in L and editio princeps.. Rebbi Abbu said, what means ממזר? “A strange defect.”²⁴⁹ This disagrees with what Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi²⁵⁰.rabba 65(2), this is attributed to the Tanna R. Jehudah (bar Ilai). said, “God installs singles²⁵¹ as heads of families,” even if there is a male bastard at one end of the world and a female bastard at the other, the Holy One, praise to Him, brings them and copulates them with one another. Rav Huna said, a bastard does not live more than thirty days.²⁵² In the days of Rebbi Berekhiah, a Babylonian immigrated here²⁵³; he was informed that this was a bastard. He²⁵⁴ said to him, support me²⁵⁵. He²⁵⁵ told him, tomorrow you will stand up in the community and I shall look for an allowance for you. He came and sat during the sermon. When he²⁴⁵ finished the sermon, he said, our brothers, support this man for he is a bastard. After the congegration had left, he²⁵⁴ said to him, rabbi, I requested material support from you but you destroyed this man’s life. He²⁵⁵ answered, by your life, life²⁵⁶ I gave you for Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna, said in the name of Rav: A bastard lives only thirty days. When? If he is not publicly known. But when he is publicly known, he survives.

footnotes: ²⁴⁸ Marrying a bastard, while sinful, is not punishable. Therefore, one might assume the children of a bastard not to be bastards; they are not conceived in deadly sin. But Deut ²⁴⁹ The word for “bastard” has no etymology in the Pentateuch (following J. Barth, the root is مذر “to be dirty”). ²⁵⁰ In Gen ²⁵¹ A single person in God’s eyes cannot be a bachelor who could find mates all around him; he must be an intrinsic single who has no known marriage partner. This is the bastard who cannot marry a Jewish partner, and as a Jew is unable to contract marriage with a Gentile (but cf. Halakhah 15). ²⁵² This sentence is missing in G; it is superfluous here but will be quoted later in a fitting context. ²⁵³ When at the end of the Fourth Century, Jews usually emigrated from the hostile Christian Roman empire to the more welcoming Persian empire. ²⁵⁴ The bastard. ²⁵⁵ R. Berekhiah. ²⁵⁵ R. Berekhiah. ²⁴⁵ From his point of view, he is obligated to point out the implicit punishment meted out by Heaven for such an illicit union. ²⁵⁴ The bastard. ²⁵⁵ R. Berekhiah. ²⁵⁶ Following the reading of G.

²⁵⁷ 8:3, Note 201; an addition to Rav Huna’s statement. The text is missing in G. When Rebbi Ze‘ira immigrated here, he heard voices call “he-bastard, she-bastard”. He said, what is this? There goes that of Rav Huna, since Rav Huna said, no bastard lives more than thirty days. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said to him, I was with you when Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: No bastard lives more than thirty days, when? If he is not publicly known. Therefore, if he is publicly known, he lives.

footnotes: ²⁵⁷ This is from Yebamot

It was stated: “If a Gentile or a slave had intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard²⁵⁸ 7:6 (Note 129), Ketubot3:1 (Note 22), Giṭṭin (Note 123); Babli Yebamot 45a. The entire baraita in Tosephta 4:15.; Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Simeon, the child is not a bastard, for a bastard is only from a woman forbidden to him by an incest prohibition for which the penalty is extirpation²⁵⁹ 4:14..” ²⁶⁰ Both of them explained the same verse, “nobody may take his father’s wife, etc.”²⁶¹ 4:15 (Notes 211–218). The prohibition of the father’s wife (who is not the mother) is repeated in Deut. 23:1 from Lev. 18:8, 20:11, to be connected with the exclusion of the bastard from endogamous marriage. Deut. 23:3. It is understood that a man’s child from his father’s wife is a bastard. The problem is to discern the legal principle which implies that the child is a bastard. Rebbi Meïr explains: Since his father’s wife is special in that he cannot have preliminary marriage with her, but she could have preliminary marriage with others, and the child is a bastard, so in all cases in which she cannot have preliminary marriage with him, the child is a bastard²⁶², is the corrector’s text. The second clause and a logical connection are missing from the scribe’s original text which makes no sense as it stands: רְבִּי מֵאִיר דָּרַשׁ. מָה אֵשֶׁת אָבִיו מְיוּחֶדֶת שֶׁאֵין לוֹ עָלֶיהָ קִידוּשִׁין. אֲבָל אִם הָיָה לָהּ עָלָיו קִידוּשִׁין הַוְלָד מַמְזֶר. Rebbi Meir explains: Since his father's wife is special in that he cannot have preliminary marriage with her, but if she could have preliminary marriage with him, the child is a bastard. Reading of G (lacunae in the text filled in brackets): רְבִּי מֵאִיר דָּרַשׁ. מָה אֵשֶׁת אָב מְיוּחֶדֶת שֶׁאֵין לוֹ עָלֶיהָ [קִידוּשִׁין הַוְלַד מִמְזֵר. אֲבָל] כָּל־שֶׁאֵין לָהּ עָלָיו קִידוּשִׁין הַוְלָד מַמְזֶר. Rebbi Meïr explains: Since his father's wife is special in that he cannot have preliminary marriage with her, so in any case in which she cannot have preliminary marriage with him, the child is a bastard. It seems that the original text underlying L was the text of G.. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah explains: Since his father’s wife is special in that she cannot have preliminary marriage with him, but she could have preliminary marriage with others, and the child is a bastard; this excludes the Gentile and the slave who cannot contract preliminary marriage with her or with others²⁴⁴. 23:3), to whom marriage with bastards is forbidden (Yebamot8:2, Note 151; Qiddušin Halakhah 4:1, Note 105). But even R. Jehudah will agree that marriage of a proselyte with a bastard is not punishable.. Rebbi Samuel bar Abba questions that first Tanna: The sister-in-law who whored cannot have preliminary marriage with him or with others²⁶³ 1:1, Notes 93–94. The widow of the childless man is obligated to definitively marry his brother in levirate; by biblical standards this requires no preliminary marriage. By the same token, she is unable to contract preliminary marriage with any other man before being released by ḥalîṣah (cf. Halakhah 5, Note 166). Any sexual relations she might have during the time she is waiting for her levir are sinful but neither adulterous nor punishable., but the child is qualified²⁶⁴! Rebbi Yannai in the name of Rebbi: If a Gentile or a slave had intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, in the name of Rebbi (Yannai ben)²⁶⁵ Rebbi: The child is neither qualified nor disqualified but dirtied²⁶⁶. Rebbi Jonathan went with Rebbi Jehudah Neśia to the hot springs of Gadara. There, he instructed: The child is qualified²⁶⁷. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this child improves as time goes by. Rebbi declared the child dirtied, his grandson declared him qualified. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda instructed in the name of all rabbis: The child is qualified. Rebbi Bevai said before Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The child is qualified. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if it is from that, one does not learn from a declaration. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, I know the story from beginning to end. Rebbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina went up to the hot springs of Gadara. He visited his father who said to him: Be careful, because there are those who are disqualified²⁶⁸, lest you injure them.

footnotes: ²⁵⁸ Yebamot ²⁵⁹ Mishnah Yebamot ²⁶⁰ In G, the following is a statement by R. Abbahu in the name of R. Joḥanan. ²⁶¹ A parallel discussion, among different Tannaïm, is reported in Yebamot ²⁶² This text, adopted by the editio princeps ²⁴⁴ The language is somewhat difficult since for R. Jehudah proselytes are part of the “Congregation of the Eternal” (Deut ²⁶³ Yebamot ²⁶⁴ To contract marriage “in the Eternal’s congregation.” ²⁶⁵ There is no R. Yannai ben Rebbi. Later the statement is quoted in the name of R. Gamliel (IV) ben Rebbi. G is illegible at this point. ²⁶⁶ If the child is female, she is not eligible as marriage partner of a Cohen. ²⁶⁷ Even for a Cohen. ²⁶⁸ Children of Jewish women from Gentile fathers.

²⁶⁹4:15, Notes 215–218. G only refers to that source. Even though Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah said in the name of Rebbi Simeon: If a Gentile or a slave came to a daughter of Israel, the child is acceptable; they agree that if she was female, she is blemished for the priesthood. Even though Rebbi Joshua said, the child of him who sleeps with his sister is acceptable, he agrees that if the child was female she would be blemished for the priesthood. A man came to Rav and said, since the children of this man’s mother are from an Aramean? He said, acceptable. Rav Ḥama bar Guria said to him, let your feet carry you away before Samuel comes and declares you blemished. Even though Rav said, if a Gentile or a slave came to a daughter of Israel, the child is acceptable, he agrees that if it was a female, she would be blemished for the priesthood.

footnotes: ²⁶⁹ This paragraph is from Yebamot

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said: There²⁷⁰45b., they state that the one who disqualifies, disqualifies from an unmarried woman, and the one who qualifies, qualifies even from a married woman²⁷¹. Rebbi Tanḥum bar Pappus sent and asked Rebbi Yose about two cases from Alexandria, one involving an unmarried woman, the other a married woman. About the married woman, he wrote him: “A bastard shall not come into the Eternal’s congregation.²⁷². 23:1. He decided against the Babylonian practice.” About the unmarried woman he wrote, be inventive²⁷³. It can be derived from Aramaic בדי “to invent a story”, or from a multiplicity of Arabic roots. In G one reads “you should recognize that”, meaning that both the girl and her child can marry in the congregation. The only argument one has for the text of L is that it is lectio difficilior., for your are not forewarned about the holy daughters of Israel. He²⁷⁴45b, is undecided whether it was R. Yose bar Abin or R. Yose bar Zavida) who declared the child of the married woman a bastard and that of the single woman qualified. He collected signatures from the members of his Academy to stress the importance of his decision. said to Rebbi Mana, take and sign; he signed. He said to Rebbi Berekhiah, take and sign, but he did not agree. After they ended the session Rebbi Mana was standing with Rebbi Berekhiah and asked him, why did you not sign? He answered, did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say that there, they state that the one who disqualifies, disqualifies from an unmarried woman, and the one who qualifies, qualifies even from a married woman²⁷⁵? He said, praised be the Merciful that I had not heard this doctrine, for if I had heard this doctrine I would not have signed and people would have said that the student²⁷⁶ disagrees with his teacher. Mar Uqban said, here, you say that the one who disqualifies, disqualifies from an unmarried woman, and the one who qualifies, qualifies from an unmarried woman, but about a married woman, nothing was said. The next morning he²⁷⁷ came and wanted to sign. He²⁷⁸ said to him, there is no space.

footnotes: ²⁷⁰ In Babylonia; Babli Yebamot ²⁷¹ R. Meïr who declares the child of a Gentile and a Jewish woman a bastard, does so even if the woman was single. R. Simeon ben Jehudah who declares the child qualified does so even if the mother was a Jewish woman married to a Jew. Practice in the Babli is decided according to R. Simeon ben Jehudah. ²⁷² Deut ²⁷³ The expression מבדין is a hapax legomenon ²⁷⁴ Rebbi Yose (the Babli, Yebamot ²⁷⁵ How can you qualify the child of the unmarried woman if the child of the married woman is a bastard? ²⁷⁶ R. Mana, the student of R. Yose. ²⁷⁷ R. Berekhiah, who had heard from Mar Uqban that R. Yose decided correctly according to the Galilean tradition. ²⁷⁸ R. Yose, who apparently was offended by R. Berekhiah’s behavior. R. Berekhiah was a great preacher but no great authority in law.

Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba went to Tyre. When he came before Rebbi Joḥanan, he asked him, what case did you handle? He said to him, a proselyte who had been circumcised but had not immersed himself²⁷⁹. He asked him, why did you not injure him²⁸⁰? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi²⁸¹ told him, leave him alone, he acted correctly not to injure him. The argument of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi seems inverted. There, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, in the name of Rebbi Gamliel ben Rebbi²⁵⁵: The child is neither qualified nor disqualified but dirtied²⁸². And here, he says so? Did we not state²⁸³ is missing in G.: If a proselyte was circumcised but not immersed, immersed but not circumcised, everything depends on circumcision, the words of Rebbi Eliezer²⁸⁴. 12:48 as formal requirement for conversion, but nothing else.. Rebbi Joshua says, immersion also is necessary²⁸⁵. 19:10.. But Rebbi Joshua ben Levi follows what Bar Qappara stated, as Bar Qappara stated: A proselyte who was circumcised but not immersed is qualified since there is no proselyte who did not immerse himself for his emission of semen²⁸⁶. 15:16,18.. Is that not difficult? The cleansing from a minor impurity is counted for him for a major impurity²⁸⁷? Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, since either one is for the holiness of Israel, it is counted for him²⁸⁸ 45b, in the name of R. Joshua ben Levi; a similar principle is promulgated by Rav Assi for a woman proselyte who follows the rules of family purity..

footnotes: ²⁷⁹ From the context it seems clear that the proselyte had married a Jewish wife and R. Ḥiyya bar Abba declared the child qualified to marry in the congregation even though his teacher R. Joḥanan held that the child of a Gentile and a Jewish mother was a bastard. ²⁸⁰ And declare the child a bastard since the father did not complete the process of conversion. ²⁸¹ Of the generation of R. Joḥanan’s teachers. ²⁵⁵ R. Berekhiah. ²⁸² Then at least R. Ḥiyya bar Abba should have declared any female child ineligible for the priesthood. ²⁸³ The statement of the baraita ²⁸⁴ Circumcision is mentioned in Ex ²⁸⁵ Since all the Childen of Israel, when they were converted to the Jewish faith at Mount Sinai, had to immerse themselves, Ex ²⁸⁶ Which is required even for lawful intercourse, Lev ²⁸⁷ The essence of immersion in water is not the fact of immersion but the intent of the action. The impurity of an emission is minor since it can be remedied immediately. The entrance of a proselyte into the Jewish system of impurity is a major undertaking. How can a routine immersion be the equivalent of a major ceremony? ²⁸⁸ The argument is quoted in the Babli, Yebamot

“Who is this? The child of a slave girl or a Gentile²³⁴2:5..” There²⁸⁹ 2:6. As long as the mother is Jewish, there is no difference between legitimate and illegitimate children; but children from a Gentile or servile mother are not their father’s children., we have stated: “Except what he has from a slave girl or a Gentile.”

footnotes: ²³⁴ Since preliminary marriage is a uniquely Jewish institution, Gentiles are automatically excluded since for them only definitive marriage exists (cf. Chapter 1, Notes 33–39.) The Jewish father cannot have any family relationship with his Gentile child: The widow of a man having only had a child with a Gentile woman is the widow of a childless man and subject to levirate marriage: Mishnah Yebamot ²⁸⁹ Mishnah Yebamot

²⁹⁰ 2:6 (ב), Notes 140–146. G only has a note to continue the text in Yebamot, Chapter 2. The story about Jacob from Kefar Naboraia is also in Gen.rabba7(2), Num.rabba 19, Pesiqta rabbati 14 ed. M. Friedmann 62b, Pesiqta dR.Cahana (Buber) Parah Note 99, Tanḥuma Ḥuqqat 6, Tanḥuma Buber Ḥuqqat 15; Eccl.rabbati 7(44). A slave woman: “The woman and her children shall belong to her owner.” A Gentile woman. Rebbi Joḥanan [said] in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai, it is written: “You shall not conclude marriage with them, your daughter you shall not give to his son”. And it is written: “For he will divert your son from following Me.” Your son from a Jewish woman is called your son; but your son from a Gentile woman is not called your son but her son.

footnotes: ²⁹⁰ From here to the end of the Halakhah, the text is from Yebamot

Jacob from Kefar Naboraia went to Tyre. They came to ask him, may one circumcise the son of a Gentile woman on the Sabbath? He wanted to permit it from the verse: “They determined their genealogies for their families according to their fathers’ houses.” Rebbi Ḥaggai heard it and said, he shall come and be whipped. He said to him, for what reason do you whip me? He said, from what is written: “Now we shall make a covenant to send away all foreign women and those born to them, etc”. He said, you want to whip me based on tradition? He said, “and it should be done according to the Torah.” He said to him, from which teaching? He said, from that which Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai, it is written: “You shall not conclude marriage with them,” etc.²⁹¹ He said to him, whip your whipping, because it is good to impress.

footnotes: ²⁹¹ Quoted in the preceding paragraph.

MISHNAH: Rebbi Tarphon says, bastards can cleanse themselves. How is this? If the bastard married a slave girl, the child is a slave. When he is manumitted, the son is a free person²⁹². Rebbi Eliezer said, he is a slave and a bastard²⁹³.

footnotes: ²⁹² Naturally, the son is not legally his father's son and heir; he cannot inherit except by a will. But he will be able to marry in the congregation. ²⁹³ In his opinion, manumission of the slave will not remove the stigma of bastardy.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Tarphon says, bastards can cleanse themselves,” etc. So is the Mishnah: A bastard is permitted to marry a slave girl²⁹⁴. 23:18. But R. Tarphon implies that the informal marriage of a bastard with a slave girl (or a free Gentile woman) has rabbinic blessing since 1) the bastard is precluded from contracting a marriage with members of the congregation and 2) having the possibility of sexual relations is a basic human right (Gen. 1:28). The Babli agrees, 69a.. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: Practice follows Rebbi Tarphon²⁹⁵. Rebbi Simlai instructed in Antiochia²⁹⁶, Rebbi Simai instructed in Kefar Seforaia²⁹⁷: Practice follows Rebbi Tarphon.

footnotes: ²⁹⁴ This is not an emendation of the Mishnah, but a logical inference. In general, a Jew is not allowed to sleep with a slave girl since any sexual relations with a person whom he could not marry violate Deut ²⁹⁵ Babli, 69a. ²⁹⁶ According to the Babli, his landlord was a bastard; he counseled him how to have marriageable children. ²⁹⁷ The name of the locality cannot be determined either from L (different versions of scribe and corrector) or from G.

²⁹⁸ 99a.“It was stated in the name of Rebbi Meïr: It can happen that a man and a woman give birth to five nations²⁹⁹. How is this? [A Gentile]³⁰⁰ had a male and a female slave who had children: these are Gentiles³⁰¹. If one of them³⁰² became Jewish, one is a proselyte and one a Gentile. If their master converted and converted them³⁰³ as slaves, [any children] are slaves.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this implies that if a Gentile had intercourse with a slave girl, the child is a slave³⁰⁴. 23:18, she has the right to freely associate both with slaves and Gentiles. The children of the slave mother always inherit their mother’s status; Mishnah 3:15.. “If he manumitted the slave girl and she had a son, the child is a bastard³⁰⁵. If afterwards he manumitted the slave and he begat a child, he is a freed slave.³⁰⁶” ³⁰⁷99a.“It can happen that a man sells his father to pay his mother’s ketubah. How is this? Somebody has a male and a female slave and they have a son. He manumitted the female slave, married her, and willed all his property to her son. That is one who sells his father to pay his mother’s ketubah.”

footnotes: ²⁹⁸ Tosephta 5:11–12; in slightly different form Babli Yebamot ²⁹⁹ A nation is defined here as a group of people following identical marriage rules. ³⁰⁰ Reading of G and Tosephta; implied by L. ³⁰¹ As far as Jewish marriage laws are concerned, there is no difference between a Gentile free person and a Gentile slave. ³⁰² One of the children. ³⁰³ If the parents become slaves in a Jewish household, the children will be slaves under Jewish law. ³⁰⁴ This rule is presupposed everywhere in the Yerushalmi. Since the slave girl cannot marry and is forbidden as sex partner to any free Jew by Deut ³⁰⁵ Once the woman is freed, if she continuous to live with the slave who was her de-facto husband as a slave, the child is a bastard for R. Meïr (Note 252). ³⁰⁶ Following Mishnah 3:15, there is marriage without sin; the child obtains the status of his father. ³⁰⁷ Tosephta 5:13; Babli Yebamot

³⁰⁸“Rebbi Meïr says, bastards will not be purified in the future, since it is said³⁰⁹. 9:6.: ‘The bastard will dwell in Ashdod’; one carried garbage to garbage and deviant to deviant. Rebbi Yose says, bastards will be purified in the future, since it is said³¹⁰. 36:25.: “I shall pour upon you pure water [and purify you]²⁸³ is missing in G..” Rebbi Meïr said to him, but it says only “from all your impurities and all your abominations I shall purify you.” Rebbi Yose said to him, if it had only said, “from all your impurities and all your abominations” and then stopped, I would have agreed with you. But since it adds “I shall purify you³¹¹”, from bastardy. Rebbi Huna said in the name of Rav Joseph, practice in the future will not follow Rebbi Yose³¹².

footnotes: ³⁰⁸ Tosephta 5:4, Babli 72b, in different formulation. ³⁰⁹ Za ³¹⁰ Ez ²⁸³ The statement of the baraita ³¹¹ Quoted in G; the “etc.” in L is better talmudic style, not quoting the part of the verse to which one really refers. ³¹² A repetition not logically necessary.