MISHNAH: “I shall be a nazir [abstaining] from dried figs and fig cake¹.,” the House of Shammai say, he is a nazir²”, he became a nazir. The qualification he appended is irrelevant. (In the Babli, 9a, this argument is attributed to R. Meïr, who thinks that “people do not say nonsensical things.”), but the House of Hillel say, he is no nazir³ is permitted figs, his statement makes no sense and nobody can become a nazir by a nonsensical statement since Num. 6:2 requires that the vow of nezirut be “clearly stated.”. Rebbi Jehudah said, when the House of Shammai expressed an opinion, it was about one who said, they are qorban for me⁴ by vowing to abstain from figs and fig products. But anybody can make a vow to abstain from figs by declaring them qorban for himself (cf. Introduction to Tractate Nedarim.).

footnotes: ¹ Figs and all their derivatives are permitted to a nazir ² If he said “I shall be a nazir ³ Since a nazir ⁴ He disputes the Mishnah; nobody can become a nazir

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir [abstaining] from dried figs and fig cake,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the reason of the House of Shammai: because he mentioned the state of nazir²”, he became a nazir. The qualification he appended is irrelevant. (In the Babli, 9a, this argument is attributed to R. Meïr, who thinks that “people do not say nonsensical things.”). Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, because of substitutes of substitutes⁵; cf. Chapter 1, Note 19. In the Tosephta, 2:1, this is explicitly given as the reason of the House of Shammai. The Tosephta must have been unknown to the editors of the Yerushalmi.. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, a verse supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “So says the Eternal, as cider is found in the grape bunch, etc⁶. 65:8..” The Torah called a grape bunch “cider”. And people call a dried fig cider, because of substitutes of substitutes. What is the difference between them? If he said, “I shall be a nazir[abstaining] from dried figs and fig cake.” In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is a nazir, in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion he is not a nazir⁷ and the entire discussion only proceeds according to the House of Shammai. One has to assume that the person making the vow was asked what he understood by “dried figs.” If he answered, dried figs, R. Simeon ben Laqish cannot consider this as substitutes of substitutes, but for R. Joḥanan he still pronounced the word nazir. (This interpretation is that of Tosaphot Menaḥot 103a, s.v. הריני in the name of Rabbenu Tam.). “I shall be a nazir[abstaining] from a loaf of bread,” in Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is a nazir, in Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is not a nazir⁸. “From a loaf of bread,” he did not say anything⁹ was not used. One has to assume that the expression הֲרֵינִי was used, since הֲרֵי עָלַי כִכָּר would be a vow to abstain from bread as qorban (Chapter 1, Notes 44–45).. Rebbi Uqba asked before Rebbi Mana: The opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems to be inverted, as we have stated there¹⁰ 12:3. A voluntary flour offering is prescribed as an offering of fine wheat flour. Barley is prescribed only for some purification offerings which cannot be voluntary.: “ ‘I take upon myself the obligation to bring a flour offering from barley.’ He shall bring from wheat.” And Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, because he mentioned “flour offering.¹¹” And here, he says so? He accepts one and he accepts the other. He accepts¹² because he mentioned the state of nazir, and he accepts because of substitutes of substitutes. You should know that it is so since we have stated¹³: “If he said, the cow said.” She did not say anything; it is because he mentioned the state of nazir, and here he mentioned the state of nazir.

footnotes: ² If he said “I shall be a nazir ⁵ Since the House of Shammai accept very far-fetched comparisons and substitutes for a vow of nezirut ⁶ Is ⁷ This is difficult since the House of Shammai declare in the Mishnah that he is a nazir ⁸ A loaf of bread is not a grape derivative by any stretch of the imagination. ⁹ Since the word nazir ¹⁰ Mishnah Menaḥot ¹¹ One would have expected R. Simeon ben Laqish to hold that the vow of the offering was invalid since it was impossible. In the Babli, 9b, his opinion is quoted as generally accepted. ¹² He does not dispute the reason given by R. Joḥanan but only adds a second reason. ¹³ Mishnah 2:3. This discussion now also proceeds according to the House of Hillel.

Any expressions can be used for nezirut¹⁶ except the expression qorban. Any expressions can be used for qorban¹⁶ except the expression nezirut. If he said about a bunch of grapes, “I am locked away from you, I am separated from you, I am prevented from you, I am nazir from you,” he is a nazir. “It is for me qorban,” he only forbade it for himself as qorban¹⁷ for me,” he is forbidden all grapes and their derivates but is not a nazir.. If he said about a loaf of bread, “I am locked away from it, I am separated from it, I am prevented from it, it is qorban for me,” he only forbade it for himself as qorban.¹⁸, any restriction must be interpretated as a vow of qorban. “I am nazir from it,” he is a nazir¹⁹, not because of any connection with the loaf.. “Prevented” implies both nezirut and qorban. If somebody said about a bunch of grapes, “I am prevented from it,” if he wanted to eat it, one tells him, is it not holy for its money’s worth? If he redeemed it, one tells him, are you not a nazir²⁰ or nazir, it is both (and, in fact, is a triple vow since qorban may mean either a prohibition “as if it were a qorban” or an offering to the Temple.) Therefore, when the bunch of grapes was redeemed and its value given to the Temple, the person making the vow still cannot eat it since he might be a nazir (even though one vow cannot be both qorban and nazir.)?

footnotes: ¹⁶ If otherwise they are appropriate. ¹⁶ If otherwise they are appropriate. ¹⁷ He cannot use any of the grapes of the bunch but is permitted any other grapes in the world. If he said, “grapes are qorban ¹⁸ Since nothing connected with a loaf of bread has any relation with the rules of nazir ¹⁹ Because he used the word nazir ²⁰ An ambiguous vow has to be interpreted restrictively in all respects. If the vow could be interpreted as qorban

Any expressions can be used for redemption except the expression “exchange”²¹. 27:10). While any attempt to redeem the animal while unblemished, i. e., to subtract it to profane status, is simply impossible, the substitution of one unblemished animal for another, while sinful, nevertheless is possible and results in both animals being dedicated to the altar. If an altar animal develops a blemish, its bodily sanctity is reduced to קְדֻשַּׁת דָּמִים “holiness of monetary value.” The animal must be redeemed, i. e., its sanctity transferred to the money paid for it, and the money then used to buy a replacement animal. In this case, a substitution is impossible; there is no shortcut to avoid the redemption process. Anything donated to the Temple treasury has only קְדֻשַּׁת דָּמִים from the start; it can be redeemed but not substituted.. Any expressions can be used for exchange except the expression “redemption.” If he said about dedications to the altar: “this one is for that one, exchange for that one, barter for that one,” it is an exchange²². “This is redeemed for that one,” it is no exchange²³. If he said about dedications for the upkeep of the Temple: “this one is for that one, barter for that one,” its money’s worth is engaged²⁴ 5:5).. “Exchange for that one,” he did not say anything²⁵. The other [expressions] serve for redemption and exchange. Dedications to the altar are subject both to redemption and to exchange. [Animals] dedicated for the upkeep of the Temple²⁶ who were dedicated before developing a defect, “this one is for that one,” if he wants to sacrifice a perfect animal, one tells him that its sanctity is for its money’s worth. If he wants to eat it after it developed a blemish, one tells him that it is holy as exchange²⁷: “Itself and its exchange shall be holy²⁸. 27:10..” Rebbi Isaac ben Eleazar said, since he knows that anybody who exchanges is whipped, it never occured to him to exchange²⁹.

footnotes: ²¹ Animals dedicated for use on the altar acquire what is called קְדֻשַּׁת הַגּוּף “bodily sanctity.” An animal used for the altar must be without blemish. Such an animal cannot be redeemed. It also should not be exchanged for another unblemished animal (Lev ²² Sinful but valid. ²³ If an unblemished animal was offered as exchange for an unblemished altar animal but the language of redemption was used, the transaction is void; the animal offered remains profane. ²⁴ The object originally given to the Temple has been redeemed by the object offered as redemption (provided that the monetary value of the thing given in redemption was stated; Mishnah Temurah ²⁵ Since תְּמוּרָה is impossible for anything but unblemished animals dedicated as sacrifices. ²⁶ This text is impossible since objects dedicated for the upkeep of the Temple are not subject to exchange but only to redemption. Unblemished animals may not be offered for the upkeep of the Temple; they automatically would be offered to the altar. Therefore, a “dedication for the upkeep of the Temple whose dedication preceded its defect” is an altar animal which developed a blemish and, therefore, has the reduced status of קְדֻשַּׁת דָּמִים and can be redeemed. Blemished animals cannot be dedicated to the altar; any such dedication is invalid. ²⁷ If an animal originally destined for the altar but later disqualified was redeemed not by money but by the offering of an unblemished animal and use of a term which can be interpreted to mean either redemption or substitution, the original animal is redeemed but the other animal is both a substitute and a redemption. It cannot be sacrificed since it is a redemption; one cannot wait until it develops a blemish with age because it is a substitution. It must be redeemed to eliminate the “holiness of monetary value” and then be sacrificed on the altar. ²⁸ Lev ²⁹ He objects to the construction of a case in which an expression was used that might mean both redemption and substitution. Since redemption is required but substitution is sinful, it is obvious that only redemption was intended.

Any expressions can be used for valuation³⁰. 27:1–8). The valuation depends on age and gender; it is fixed by the Biblical text (assuming a known ratio of the Biblical šeqel to the local currency.) “Money’s worth” of a person is the value he would fetch if sold as a slave. This worth can be promised by a vow, but not by a valuation. except the expression “money’s worth”. Any expressions can be used for money’s worth except the expression “valuation.” If he said about a human, “I shall pay his cost, I shall pay his settlement, I shall pay his estimate, I shall pay his valuation,” he has to pay his valuation³¹. “I shall pay his money’s worth,” he has to pay his money’s worth. “Estimate” is used as an expression both for valuation and money’s worth. A human has both valuation and money’s worth. If he said about a human, “I shall pay his estimate,” if he was good looking, he pays his money’s worth; if he was ugly, he pays his valuation³².

footnotes: ³⁰ “Valuation” is the sum fixed for vows in which a person promises to pay his or another person’s valuation to the Temple (Lev ³¹ If an expression is ambiguous but “paying the valuation” is one of the meanings, in the absence of a definite indication to the contrary that is the legal meaning. ³² In every case, he pays the larger sum.

The House of Shammai say, he is bound by a vow and is a nazir, but the House of Hillel say, he is neither bound by a vow nor is he a nazir³³, referring to food permitted to a nazir. The House of Shammai hold that he is forbidden all kinds of dried figs because of his vow, and he is a nazir since he used the word nazir. The House of Hillel hold that an inappropriate choice of words invalidates both vow and nezirut. This rejects R. Jehudah’s interpretation. The parallel in the Babli, 9b, shows that this is a baraita. There, it is given in two versions (of which the Yerushalmi text is a combination). In one, the House of Shammai say, he is bound by a vow and is a nazir, but the House of Hillel say, he is bound by a vow but not a nazir. In the other, the House of Shammai say, he is bound by a vow but not a nazir, but the House of Hillel say, he is neither bound by a vow nor is he a nazir..

footnotes: ³³ This refers to the Mishnah. The person made an inappropriate vow of nazir

MISHNAH: If he said: “this cow said, I shall be a nezirah if I be standing up,³⁴ if she be standing up. For the House of Shammai, he used the word nazir; for the House of Hillel what he said was meaningless.” or “this door said, I shall be a nazir if I be open,” the House of Shammai say, he is a nazir, but the House of Hillel say, he is no nazir. Rebbi Jehudah said, when the House of Shammai expressed an opinion, it was only about one who said, this cow shall be qorban for me if she gets up³⁵, but he is no nazir..

footnotes: ³⁴ The rancher has trouble to make the cow get on her feet; he says, it seems to me that the cow made a vow to be nezirah ³⁵ Then the cow is forbidden to him as qorban

HALAKHAH: “If he said: ‘this cow said,’ ” etc. If he saw a Gentile passing by and said, “look what this Gentile said.³⁶.”” Then he is a nazir. Does this mean that he is a nazir because Gentiles cannot make a vow of nazir³⁷ must be the Jew’s.? He has not said anything! Let us hear from the following: “If he said: ‘this cow said’ ”. You said this only because he spoke the word nezirut. And here, he spoke the word nezirut³⁴ if she be standing up. For the House of Shammai, he used the word nazir; for the House of Hillel what he said was meaningless.. If he saw a Jew passing by and said, “look what this Jew said.³⁸.” Then he is a nazir. He³⁹ had not said anything. Does this mean that he is a nazir because Jews make a vow of nazir? Should we say that nevertheless he is a nazir or is he studying the case? So I am saying, “for example, if he was reading the Torah and mentioned nazir,naziq.⁴⁰, he cannot be a nazir in the present case.”

footnotes: ³⁶ It is understood that he said: “look what this Gentile said, I shall be a nazir ³⁷ Mishnah 9:1. Therefore, any vow of nazir ³⁴ The rancher has trouble to make the cow get on her feet; he says, it seems to me that the cow made a vow to be nezirah ³⁸ He attributed to him a vow of nazir ³⁹ The passer-by. ⁴⁰ Chapter 1, after Note 10. Since in that case he is not a nazir

Can a man be taken to nezirut by language appropriate for a woman⁴¹? There, they say, “a nezirah was passing by⁴² איעבר “passed by” (m.) for אי עבר “did not pass”. This refers to the case discussed in Halakhah 1:1 (Notes 2,23) that a person points to a nazir and indicates that he wants to be like him. It is admitted that he can point to a female.”. Can a man be taken to nezirut by masculine language? Rebbi Yose said, the notion of nezirut is defined in the masculine: “… or a woman if he clearly makes a vow.⁴³. 6:2: “A man or a woman, if he clearly makes a vow”. Since a verb referring both to a male and a female is used in the masculine by traditional grammatical rules, he infers that the masculine can be used in all cases.”

footnotes: ⁴¹ Probably one should translate: “a vow formulated in the feminine”; but the explanation given “there” (in Babylonia) then does not quite fit. ⁴² Reading with editio princeps ⁴³ Num

Unless the cow stood up, unless the door was opened⁴⁴? If the cow does stand up or if she never stands up?? Let us hear from the following⁴⁵ if a fact is true, B says that he will be nazir if it is not true, C says that he will be nazir if both A and B are wrong. The House of Shammai say, …”: “The House of Shammai say, they are all nezirim. But the House of Hillel say, only those are nezirim whose words turned out not to be true.” So is the Mishnah⁴⁶ if I be standing up”, for the House of Shammai has to be interpreted as a vow of nazir if the cow never stands up, since the cow standing up is the desired outcome; just as a woman who is afraid her son might die will formulate it saying her son certainly will not die. (It is possible to read a similar interpretation into the text of the Babli, 10b.): “Whose words turned out not to be true;” it is formulated in the opposite, as not to say that she should not bury her son. Even if the cow did not stand up, even if the door was not opened⁴⁷ in any case..

footnotes: ⁴⁴ Under which circumstances will the House of Shammai insist that the maker of the vow is a nazir ⁴⁵ Mishnah 5:6: “If people dispute facts; A says that he will be nazir ⁴⁶ The text is garbled here (and somewhat garbled in Halakhah 6:6): “So is the Mishnah: ‘Whose words turned out to be true;’ it is formulated in the opposite, so as not to bury her son.” The rancher’s statement, that his cow said, “I shall be a nezirah ⁴⁷ For the House of Shammai, he is a nazir

The House of Shammai say, he is bound by a vow and is a nazir, but the House of Hillel say, he is neither bound by a vow nor is he a nazir³³, referring to food permitted to a nazir. The House of Shammai hold that he is forbidden all kinds of dried figs because of his vow, and he is a nazir since he used the word nazir. The House of Hillel hold that an inappropriate choice of words invalidates both vow and nezirut. This rejects R. Jehudah’s interpretation. The parallel in the Babli, 9b, shows that this is a baraita. There, it is given in two versions (of which the Yerushalmi text is a combination). In one, the House of Shammai say, he is bound by a vow and is a nazir, but the House of Hillel say, he is bound by a vow but not a nazir. In the other, the House of Shammai say, he is bound by a vow but not a nazir, but the House of Hillel say, he is neither bound by a vow nor is he a nazir..

footnotes: ³³ This refers to the Mishnah. The person made an inappropriate vow of nazir

MISHNAH: If a cup of wine was prepared⁴⁸ for somebody who then said, “I am a nazir [abstaining] from it”, he is a nazir⁴⁹ cannot be partial. Once he mentions nezirut for one cup of wine, he is forbidden all wine, all grapes, all haircuts, and any impurity of the dead.. It happened that a cup of wine was prepared for a woman who already was drunk, when she said, “I am a nazir [abstaining] from it”. The Sages said that she only intended to say, “it shall be qorban for me.⁵⁰”

footnotes: ⁴⁸ Mixed with water. ⁴⁹ Since nezirut ⁵⁰ Since she was drunk, she certainly did not want to forbid all wine to herself, but only that particular cup which was too much for her.

HALAKHAH: “If a cup of wine was prepared,” etc. The Mishnah applies if he is not used to it⁵⁵ for one cup is actually a nazir applies only to people who are not used to getting drunk.; but if he is used to it, that is what we have stated: “It happened that a cup of wine was prepared for a woman who already was drunk when she said, “I am a nazir [abstaining] from it”. The Sages said that she only intended to say, “it shall be qorban for me.” Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: It is not even an expression of qorban. Why? Because one can neither use an expression of nezirut for qorban nor an expression of qorban for nezirut⁵⁶.

footnotes: ⁵⁵ The first part, in which the person who declares himself nazir ⁵⁶ As explained in Halakhah 1, Note 16.

MISHNAH: “I am a nazir on condition that I may drink wine or become impure for the dead,” he is a nazir and forbidden everything⁵¹ is defined in the Torah and any stipulation contradicting a biblical law is void (Ketubot 9:1, Note 5).. “I knew that there are nezirim but I did not know that wine is forbidden to the nazir⁵², and when told that wine was forbidden to him declares that at the moment of the vow he was ignorant of its implications.”; wine is forbidden to him, but Rebbi Simeon permits⁵³. 6:2).. “I knew that wine was forbidden to the nazir but I thought that the Sages would permit me because I cannot live without wine, or because I am an undertaker;” he is permitted but Rebbi Simeon forbids⁵⁴.

footnotes: ⁵¹ Since nezirut ⁵² A person who declared himself a nazir ⁵³ Because the vow was made in error and such a vow is excluded by the requirement that the vow be clearly enunciated (Num ⁵⁴ For the majority, the vow is in error; for R. Simeon it is a frivolous vow.

HALAKHAH: The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr says, one has to double one’s stipulation⁵⁷ 3:3. A legal stipulation must follow the example of the stipulation between Moses and the tribes of Gad and Reuben (Num. 32), which covers both the positive (if they fulfill the stipulation, they will acquire the land in Transjordan), and the negative (if they fail to fulfill the stipulation, they will be given land in Cisjordan). Since in Mishnah 4 the person declaring himself a nazir failed to state that if he could not be a nazir on his terms, he would not be a nazir, his stipulation is invalid and he is a nazir.. It follows everybody’s opinion⁵⁸; one tells him: Watch and keep discipline⁵⁹. 12:28; a poetic formulation of the principle of Note 51.. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr⁶⁰ or Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema⁶¹, as it was stated⁶² 5:12; Babli Giṭṭin 84a.: “This is your bill of divorce, on condition that you not fly in the air, that you not cross the Sea on your feet, that is a bill of divorce. On condition that you fly in the air, that you cross the Sea on your feet, that is no bill of divorce; Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema said, it is a bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you should realize that he seeks a subterfuge for the bill of divorce⁶³, since he may claim that he is waiting for her to satisfy the stipulation. By declaring the stipulation invalid, the court will permit her to remarry and force him to pay., since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied. What is Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema’s reason? Since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied, it is as if the condition attached to the bill of divorce were satisfied⁶⁴.

footnotes: ⁵⁷ Mishnah Qiddušin ⁵⁸ The waiving of any stipulation in violation of biblical law (Note 51) does not depend on R. Meïr’s opinion. ⁵⁹ Deut ⁶⁰ As explained in Note 57. ⁶¹ Who holds that an impossible condition is considered nonexistent. Since a stipulation against biblical law is impossible, the condition mentioned in the first sentence of Mishnah 4 is considered nonexistent. ⁶² Tosephta Giṭṭin ⁶³ He thinks that he can doubly hurt his wife, by preventing her to remarry and not paying her ketubah ⁶⁴ In Tosephta and Babli: R. Jehudah ben Tema states as a principle that any stipulation which cannot be satisfied is only intended as a delaying tactic.

Does the Mishnah follow Rebbi Simeon⁶⁵? For “Rebbi Simeon declares him free, because his offering was not according to the way of offerers.⁶⁶ 12:3. If somebody vows an offering of barley flour (which cannot be a voluntary offering), the rabbis require him to bring an offering of wheat flour but “R. Simeon declares him free, because his offering was not according to the way of offerers.” One should assume that R. Simeon declares a person who wants to be nazir on condition that he may drink wine as “offering not according to the way of offerers.” Why does he not disagree in the first case?” And Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because he reserved shaving⁶⁷. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If it is because he reserved shaving, does not the following state “it is forbidden to him, but Rebbi Simeon permits.” Did he not reserve shaving [and] impurity but Rebbi Simeon frees him⁶⁸? There is a difference, because of an opening for the vow⁶⁹ Chapter 9), the vow is automatically revoked. In the Babli, 11b, this argument is attributed to Rav Assi. In the Tosephta, 2:3, it is explicitly attributed to R. Simeon.. If it was because of an opening for the vow, does not the following state “he is permitted but Rebbi Simeon forbids”? Rebbi Simeon does not recognize it as an opening for the vow but the rabbis recognize it as an opening for the vow. Why? Because he connects his vow with his life⁷⁰. One understands, to drink wine. The defile oneself for the dead? It is his profession to bury the dead⁷¹ annulled because he has to defile himself for the dead is the undertaker..

footnotes: ⁶⁵ Since R. Simeon is quoted as disagreeing in two of the three cases quoted in Mishnah 4, does one have to assume that he agrees in the first case? ⁶⁶ Mishnah Menaḥot ⁶⁷ Since the person making the vow did not stipulate that he may shave, the vow is valid for the prohibition of shaving and a partially valid vow is valid. ⁶⁸ The vow is partially valid; why is it not valid? ⁶⁹ Since he bases his vow on an argument which will automatically grant him a revocation of the vow (cf. Nedarim ⁷⁰ If he needs wine for medical purposes, the use of wine must be permitted to him. ⁷¹ The only person who can have a vow of nazir

MISHNAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave⁷²” means to pay for the three required sacrifices which enable a nazir to shave his head. It seems that most nezirim were poor and depended on charity to pay for their sacrifices; cf. Berakhot 7:3, Notes 78–89. a nazir,” if another heard him and said: “I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,” if they are clever, they will shave one another⁷³; otherwise they have to shave other nezirim.

footnotes: ⁷² “To shave a nazir ⁷³ They will have fulfilled their vows without added expenditure.

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence⁷⁴ and of paying for another person’s sacrifices. If then he adds a vow to pay for another person’s sacrifices, he should be held liable for two sets of sacrifices., or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence⁷⁵? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir⁷⁶.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence⁷⁷.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days⁷⁸, not to the added term. unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation⁷⁹, he can fulfill his obligation by applying the sacrifices to himself..” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves⁸⁰ implies the obligation of the sacrifices, a later vow to pay for sacrifices establishes a separate obligation; it cannot be used retroactively for his own obligation.. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir⁸¹” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation⁷⁹, he can fulfill his obligation by applying the sacrifices to himself.. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second⁸², not for earlier ones.? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow⁸³. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge⁸⁴ whose sacrifices are paid for must be informed of the dedication for it to be valid. The same statement is in Pesaḥim 8:1(35d 1.13), but is denied in the Babli, Nedarim 36a..

footnotes: ⁷⁴ In that case, the second person by saying “I also” would accept the obligations of being a nazir ⁷⁵ One has to assume that it refers only to the first obligation pronounced by the first person. ⁷⁶ And he has to pay for another person’s sacrifices. ⁷⁷ The Babli, 11b, proves from the wording of the Mishnah that “I also” only refers to the first obligation pronounced by the first person. ⁷⁸ Since without further specification, “I also” only refers to the obligation of nazir ⁷⁹ Since the obligation to pay for a set of sacrifices precedes his own vow of nazir ⁸⁰ Since the vow of nazir ⁸¹ Cf. Mishnah 6. ⁷⁹ Since the obligation to pay for a set of sacrifices precedes his own vow of nazir ⁸² By the preceding argument, a vow to pay for sacrifices can be used for later vows of nazir ⁸³ It really is used in the inverse direction. If somebody makes a vow to pay for sacrifices, it does not matter whether or not the sacrifices were already due at the moment the vow was made. It is only for one’s own sacrifices that the order in which the vows were made does matter. ⁸⁴ Since an animal cannot be brought to the Temple without having been dedicated, and the dedication has to be for a specific obligation, the nazir

Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: If he said “I am obligated for the sacrifices of a nazir,” might he⁸⁵ make the vow of nazir in the future?If he made the vow without explaining⁸⁶ whose sacrifices are due on that day., he may shave any nazir, whether he already made the vow or whether he would make it in the future. If he explained⁸⁷ who was not yet a nazir at the time of his vow?? It can be compared to the following, as Rebbi Levi ben Ḥayyata asked: If he wrote to her⁸⁸ 9:1, Notes 22–23., “I shall have nothing to do with the properties which you might inherit in the future.” May a person make a condition on things not yet in existence⁸⁹?

footnotes: ⁸⁵ The person B whose sacrifices A just has vowed to pay. ⁸⁶ A did not put any condition on his vow; when he comes to pay for it, he simply pays for any needy nazir ⁸⁷ May he specify that his vow is valid only for a nazir ⁸⁸ A husband, who normally would have the administration of his wife’s property, writes a disclaimer to his wife in which he renounces all interest in her property. The details of this question are given in Ketubot ⁸⁹ Since Talmudic law does not admit futures contracts on produce which does not yet exist, there can be no valid vow for obligations that do not yet exist.

MISHNAH: “I am taking upon myself to shave half a nazir,” and his neighbor heard it and said, “I also am taking upon myself to shave half a nazir,” each one of them shaves an entire nazir, the words of Rebbi Meïr⁹⁰ must either be brought whole or not at all; the vow for half the sacrifices (which would be 1½ animals) is impossible. Since he made the vow, it has to be interpreted as a vow for a whole set of animals.. But the Sages say, each of them shaves half a nazir⁹¹..

footnotes: ⁹⁰ Since the sacrifice of a nazir ⁹¹ The vow simply was for paying half the expenses of one nazir

HALAKHAH: “I am taking upon myself to shave half a nazir,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav Ḥisda both say that they disagree if it was not spelled out. What are we dealing with? If he said, every half head⁹², everybody agrees that he completely shaves a nazir. If he says, half of the obligation, everybody agrees that he shaves half a nazir. But we are dealing with the case that he says: “half”. Rebbi Meïr says, as if he said half a head, but the rabbis said, as if he said, half of the obligation. Rebbi Yudan said, it turns our that leniency is a restriction. In the opinion of Rebbi Meïr who said, as if he had said half a head, he brings one sacrifice since the nazir can shave on one sacrifice⁹³ can shave even if he brings only one sacrifice. (Note that the vow is interpreted as meaning “half a head”, not “every half head”).. In the opinion of the rabbis who said, half of the obligation, he has to pay for a sacrifice and a half, half of the obligation of a person.

footnotes: ⁹² If he vows half of every animal, he has to give three animals since half an animal is no sacrifice. ⁹³ . Mishnah 6:7 states that a nazir

MISHNAH: “I shall be a nazir if I have a son,” when a son is born to him, he is a nazir; if a daughter, a sexless⁹⁴, or a hermaphrodite⁹⁵ 8:6; Notes 224–237; Niddah 1:1, Notes 27,28., he is not a nazir. If he said, “when I see a child of mine,” even if a daughter, a sexless, or a hermaphrodite were born to him he is a nazir.

footnotes: ⁹⁴ He has neither penis nor vagina. ⁹⁵ He has both penis and vagina. Cf. Mishnah Yebamot

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir if I have a son,” etc. A daughter counts for nothing, a sexless or a hermaphrodite are questionable⁹⁶ whose validity is in doubt must be kept. There is no problem for the majority who hold that a vow of nazir whose validity is in doubt is void. The Babli, 13a, disagrees and accepts the Mishnah as everybody’s opinion..

footnotes: ⁹⁶ This refers to the first part of the Mishnah. If the vow was conditional, a daughter certainly does not count as a son, but sexless or hermaphrodite might be crypto-males. This creates a problem only for R. Simeon who in the Mishnah holds that a vow of nazir

MISHNAH: If his wife⁹⁷ had a miscarriage, he is not a nazir. Rebbi Simeon says, he should say: If it was a viable child, I am a nazir as an obligation, if not, I am a nazir voluntarily⁹⁸ in doubt must be kept.. If afterwards she had a child, he is a nazir⁹⁹ after the stillbirth.. Rebbi Simeon says, he should say: If the earlier one was a viable child, I earlier was a nazir as an obligation, and now I am a nazir voluntarily; otherwise, I earlier was a nazir voluntarily, and now I am a nazir as an obligation.

footnotes: ⁹⁷ For whom he made the vow described in Mishnah 7. ⁹⁸ He holds that a vow of nezirut ⁹⁹ Since according to the anonymous majority he did not observe nezirut

HALAKHAH: “If his wife had a miscarriage,” etc. Should one not be afraid that he might have been viable? Rebbi Joḥanan said, [the Mishnah] is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, any doubt of nezirut is permitted¹⁰⁰ if I have a son,’ and there was a son born to him but it is doubtful whether he is viable or not. R. Jehudah frees him since a doubt of nezirut is permitted. R. Simeon obligates him since a doubt of nezirut is forbidden.”. It was said to him that Rebbi Jehudah said so only for the end; but for the start even Rebbi Jehudah will agree¹⁰¹ has to be kept.. What is beginning and what is end? Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end¹⁰² had to precede the statement of duration.. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbu Abun said: Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac disagreed: Everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Where do they disagree? If it was once or twice¹⁰³.. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba considered it the end, Rebbi Samuel considered it the beginning. Rebbi Mana: The problem for Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac about one or two times is whether it is the beginning or the end¹⁰⁴.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁰ Tosephta 2:8: “ ‘I shall be a nazir ¹⁰¹ That a vow of nazir ¹⁰² Since a vow of nazir ¹⁰³ Whether he vowed one or two periods of nezirut ¹⁰⁴ In his opinion, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba had no problem with this case.

MISHNAH: “I am a nazir and a nazir when a son is born to me.” If he started counting for himself when a son was born to him, he finishes his own¹⁰⁵ and then counts for his son. “I am a nazir when a son is born to me, and a nazir.” If he had started counting for himself when a son was born to him he interrupts his own, counts for his son¹⁰⁵, and then finishes for himself¹⁰⁶.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁵ Then he brings his sacrifices and shaves. ¹⁰⁵ Then he brings his sacrifices and shaves. ¹⁰⁶ Since it is after shaving, he has to complete 30 days.

HALAKHAH: “ “I am a nazir and a nazir when a son is born to me,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: If he said, “I am a nazir for these 30 days and those 30 days.¹⁰⁷ for 30 days and then bring two sets of sacrifices to fulfill both vows?” Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: Is that not the Mishnah? “He interrupts his own, counts for his son, and then finishes for himself.” Not even if his wife is in the process of giving birth¹⁰⁸ for his son and only then his own even though they might start on the same day.? He said to him, his nezirut is not comparable to his son’s nezirut¹⁰⁹, but to the case that he said, “I am already a nazir and a nazir after twenty days.¹¹⁰ not after 20 days but after 30 days and after he acquitted himself of his obligatory sacrifices.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina both say: If he finished his nezirut, his son’s nezirut cannot start for him before he was shaving with a sacrifice. About a nazir who became impure, the opinions of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seem contradictory. There, he says, if a person impure by the impurity of the dead made a vow of nazir, his seventh day is counted¹¹¹. 19). There is no reason why he cannot start a period of nezirut on that same day. Quoted in the Babli, 17a, 18a.. If a nazir becomes impure, his seventh day is not counted112. 6:10).. In our case¹¹³., is he not like a person impure by the impurity of the dead, who made a vow of nazir? And is not the seventh day counted for a person impure by the impurity of the dead, who made a vow of nazir? Would this obligate him to bring a sacrifice for his impurity? But if a nazir who becomes impure, his seventh day is not counted; does it not obligate him to bring a sacrifice for his impurity? And here, because he is obligated to bring a sacrifice (of impurity)¹¹⁴, but it is not a sacrifice for impurity., the seventh day is [not]¹¹⁵ cannot start before he has acquitted himself of his prior obligations; therefore the 30th day of his nezirut, which corresponds to the 7th day of impurity, cannot be counted. counted for him.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁷ Since he vows twice for the same period of time, may he observe his nezirut ¹⁰⁸ If he made any of the vows described in the Mishnah while his wife was in labor, the Mishnah still requires him to first observe nezirut ¹⁰⁹ In the case of the Mishnah, the two periods cannot start together since it is possible that his wife’s labor be prolonged and there is a 50% chance that the child will be a girl. ¹¹⁰ Where he has to start the second period of nezirut ¹¹¹ If the person was purified by water containing some ashes of the Red Cow on the 3rd and 7th days of his impurity, he immerses himself in water on the 7th day and is pure (Num ¹¹³ Of the father expecting a baby boy. His vow is a new one, not a continuation of an old one as in the case of the impure nazir ¹¹⁴ The text is corrupt: He is obligated to bring a sacrifice for the end of his first nezirut ¹¹⁵ The text is corrupt: The count of the new nezirut

Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he polluted himself during his son’s nezirut but was warned because of his own nezirut, he is whipped¹¹⁶ is forbidden by biblical law to pollute himself with the impurity of the dead (Num. 6:6–7), if he pollutes himself intentionally and his criminal intent was ascertained because he was warned by two witnesses not to pollute himself and he did it anyway, he is punished in criminal law. In order to lead to prosecution, the warning must correctly state the law which might be broken.. If he dedicated his sacrifices, they are sanctified¹¹⁷ are only one extended vow. There, it is disputed by R. Simeon ben Laqish.. One does not consider what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “His sacrifice to the Eternal for his nezirut,¹¹⁸. 6:21. Tosephta 2:6, Halakhah 3:2 (52c 1. 37), Šebuot 4:4 (35c 1. 58) {Num. rabba 10:42}. In the parallel sources, the statement is accepted as practice.” i. e., his vow of nazir should precede his sacrifice, rather than that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir.

footnotes: ¹¹⁶ Since a nazir ¹¹⁷ In the Babli, 14a, in a different context, R. Joḥanan holds that his two neziriot ¹¹⁸ Num

Rebbi Judah asked before Rebbi Yose: Why should his nezirut not precede that of his son¹¹⁹ when his son was born, why should he not finish his own and only then start the nezirut honoring his son’s birth?? Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “This animal shall be dedicated as elevation sacrifice after 30 days.” If he sold it within the thirty days, it is sold; its dedication sanctifies¹²⁰ 3:1, 63c 1. 42.). He said, is that not, if one said “This”. Perhaps if he said: “I have the obligation¹²¹ is personal and has to be dealt with under the rules of personal responsibility.”? But the one who says, “I am”, is like one who says, “I have the obligation.”

footnotes: ¹¹⁹ This refers to the second part of the Mishnah. If he had started his own nezirut ¹²⁰ If the animal dedicated as one kind of sacrifice after 30 days was dedicated and used for another sacrifice within this period, it is perfectly legal since the prior dedication was inactive in the intervening period. (Quoted in Qiddušin ¹²¹ If a person dedicates an animal saying: “this animal is dedicated”, and anything happens to the animal before it is sacrificed, the owner does not have to look for a replacement. But if he says, “it is my obligation to bring”, he has to bring the dedicated animal and, if anything happens to it, the owner must provide a replacement. Therefore, if the animal was dedicated after 30 days but no longer exists, no replacement is due. But a vow of nazir

Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “Nazir after twenty days and nazir 100 days from now on.” He counts twenty days, interrupts and counts another 30 days, and counts another 80 to complete his first nezirut¹²² after 30 days and simultaneously makes a vow immediately to be a nazir for 100 days. Then he starts his immediate nezirut for 20 days, continues to count the 30 days of his other nezirut, brings his sacrifices and shaves, and counts the remaining 80 days of his immediate nezirut and brings the second set of sacrifices. Since the continuation of the interrupted nezirut is for more than 30 days, it is a valid nezirut and he does lose the initial 20 days..

footnotes: ¹²² Tosephta 2:10, Babli 14a. A person makes a vow to be a nazir

MISHNAH: “I shall be a nazir if a son is born¹²³ to me and a nazir for 100 days.¹²⁴ immediately.” If a son is born to him in less than 70 [days], he should not lose anything¹²⁵, after his son’s birth he starts counting 30 days, brings his sacrifices and shaves, and then finishes the count of the days missing for the vow of 100 days.. After 70 [days], he reduces to 70 since no shaving is for less than 30 days¹²⁶ for 30 days after his celebration for his son..

footnotes: ¹²³ An unspecified term, i. e., 30 days. ¹²⁴ He starts this nezirut ¹²⁵ As explained in Note 122, he starts his nezirut ¹²⁶ If less than 30 days were left in his count of 100, he must observe nezirut

HALAKHAH: ““I shall be a nazir if a son is born to me,” etc. It is obvious that the end of a day is counted as a full [day]¹²⁷ which by Mishnah 9 starts automatically at the moment of birth.. Is the start of a day counted as a full day¹²⁸ on his own count, does the day also count as a full day for the father?? Is that not the Mishnah: “after 70 [days], he reduces to 70,” not even a part¹²⁹. Therefore, the 70th day counts for both. In the Babli, 15a, this a statement attributed to Rav.? This implies that the start of a day is counted as a full day.

footnotes: ¹²⁷ If the son was born towards the end of a day, that day counts as day 1 of the son’s nezirut ¹²⁸ If the son was born during daytime and the father started the day as nazir ¹²⁹ If part of the day is not counted as a full day then if the son was born on the 71st day, no day would be lost. Since the Mishnah says that even in this case, a day is lost, it implies that without this rule the 71st day would count for both neziriot

If he was born on the eightieth day, he eliminates ten¹³⁰ are counted, the last 10 are disregarded. (A gloss in Tosaphot 13b, s.v. לאחר has a different explanation.). If he was born on the ninetieth day, he eliminates twenty. If he finished his nezirut and came to complete his son’s nezirut and became impure within the first ten days, he eliminates everything¹³¹ and he starts counting his son’s days, as long as his 100 days are not completed, any impurity of the dead will invalidate all his nezirut (Mishnah 3:4). If the impurity occurs after he has counted 100 days, his days are immunized; the question is only what happens to the days he counts for his son.. Within the last twenty days? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rab and Rebbi Joḥanan both say, he eliminates thirty¹³² as prescribed in the Mishnah.. Rebbi Samuel said, he eliminates seven only¹³³. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Joḥanan think that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical with substantial eliminating¹³⁴ is forbidden to shave. If he shaves anyway, he loses 30 days of his count (Mishnah 6:5). But impurity of his body, called here “substantial”, invalidates everything from the start.? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if Rebbi Joḥanan thought that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical to substantial eliminating, why would he say that he eliminates thirty¹³⁵ for 100 days becomes impure (being defiled by a corpse) at any time before he has completed his count, he has to start a new count.? Should he not invalidate everything? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Explain it if he was born on a day unsuitable to bring a sacrifice¹³⁶ has to start anew if he was defiled before he could have offered his sacrifices. Could one think of a situation where he had finished his count and still could not have offered sacrifices? The answer is negative.. Think of it, if he was born in the night¹³⁷ 3:5,6 (73c 1. 8,10), Babli 20b, Sifra Ṣaw Pereq 18(7), based on Lev. 7:38., is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the night caused it. Think of it, if he was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice¹³⁸? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave when [the son] was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave before his son was born¹³⁹ starts on the day of the birth. He now cannot bring the sacrifices for thr prior nezirut since this would involve shaving his hair., he celebrates one shaving for both. If he had dedicated his sacrifices but did not manage to shave before his son was born. There¹⁴⁰., they say that he celebrates one shaving for both. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shaves and then shaves a second time. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: ¹⁴¹. 38 (best Sifry text in Yalqut Šim‘ony Num. #709).“They asked¹⁴², the persons who ask are R. Eleazar ben Šamua‘ and R. Joḥanan the Alexandrian. Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai: Assume that he was both a nazir and a sufferer from scale disease¹⁴³. 14) requires the healed patient to shave all his hair after a preliminary ceremony (14:8), undergo a week of quarantine, shave again, including even his eyebrows (14:9), and offer his sacrifices the next day (14:10). The only impurity forbidden to the nazir is the impurity of corpses; therefore, it is quite possible for a sufferer from scale disease to be a nazir (even though such a person could never shave before he is healed since he cannot enter the Temple precinct.), may he shave once and have it counted for his nezirut and his scale disease? He said to them: If he shaved¹⁴⁴ is better: “If each of them shaved …”. In the Babli: “If both of them shaved to grow or both of them to remove.” to remove hair, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves to remove hair whereas the sufferer from scale disease shaves¹⁴⁵ to have hair grow. They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness¹⁴⁶. 13, passim), it is severe while his diagnosis is complete (Lev. 13:45,46), and it is minor again during his quarantine in the process of purification. What Yerushalmi, Tosephta, and Sifry call גמרו “his completeness (of diagnosis)”, the Babli calls חֲלוּטוֹ “his absoluteness”., should it not be counted for the days of his count¹⁴⁷.)? Both of them shave to remove hair. (They said to him¹⁴⁸).. If both of them shaved before the sprinkling of the blood, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before the sprinkling of the blood and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after the sprinkling of the blood! They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave before the sprinkling of the blood!)¹⁴⁹. One should read with the Babli: “But the nazir shaves after the sprinkling of the blood and the sufferer from scale disease shaves before the sprinkling of the blood.” The nazir shaves after the sacrifices have been brought (Num. 6:18) while the person healed from scale disease shaves the day before he brings his sacrifices. The problem is that the students declare that both the nazir and the sufferer from scale disease in his preliminary purification shave before the sprinkling of the blood; this seems to presuppose the uncorrected reading in the preceding sentence. The only way to make sense of the statement is also to emend this sentence: “Both of them shave after the sprinkling of the blood,” and to refer to the blood of the bird used in the preliminary ceremony of the sufferer from scale disease (Lev. 14:7). He said to them, if both shaved before they immerse themselves in water, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before he immerses himself in water and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after he immerses himself in water¹⁵⁰ shaves after he immerses himself in water and the sufferer from scale disease shaves before he immerses himself in water.” The nazir shaves in the Temple, therefore he had to immerse himself in water to be able to enter the Temple. The sufferer from scale disease is required to shave before he immerses himself (Lev. 14:9).. They said to him, the matter is settled. It cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, it cannot be counted for the days of his count. It cannot be counted for purification; it cannot be counted for impurity¹⁵¹] is pure; it counts if he is impure.” The impure nazir shaves on the seventh day of his purification; this may be before he immerses himself. He has to shave before he brings his sacrifice on the eighth day. Therefore, a healed sufferer from scale disease who also is an impure nazir may combine his first shaving for his healing together with the shaving for his impure nezirut.. That is, if he was a nazir and sufferer from scale disease. But if he was a nazir and nazir, he may shave once for both.¹⁵²” What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? He explains that they disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish¹⁵³ is declared to be R. Simeon ben Laqish’s personal opinion, it is a minority opinion which does not represent practice..

footnotes: ¹³⁰ Since only the first 70 days of the father’s first nezirut ¹³¹ If the son was born on the 90th day of his nezirut ¹³² He has to keep 30 days in purity for his son and afterwards another thirty to finish his nezirut ¹³³ Of his own completed count, only the seven days of impurity of the dead are invalidated, following R. Eliezer (Mishnah 3:3). ¹³⁴ The nazir ¹³⁵ Obviously, if the nazir ¹³⁶ Everybody agrees that a defiled nazir ¹³⁷ No sacrifice can be offered in the night. Megillah ¹³⁸ The only sacrifices possible on the Sabbath are those which are explicitly commanded for that day. ¹³⁹ And automatically his new nezirut ¹⁴⁰ In Babylonia, they hold that not the dedication but rather the actual Temple ceremony determines the end of his nezirut ¹⁴¹ Tosephta 5:2, Babli 60b, Sifry Num ¹⁴² In Sifry ¹⁴³ While suffering from the disease, he is impure. The ritual of purification (Lev ¹⁴⁴ Probably, the text of Tosephta and Sifry ¹⁴⁵ After the preliminary ceremony, he shaves to have his hair grow to be shorn after a week. ¹⁴⁶ The impurity of the sufferer from scale disease varies with his status. It is a minor impurity as long as the diagnosis of his sickness is only tentative (Lev ¹⁴⁷ Of his quarantine, after which he has to shave again. (But then he shaves after 7 days, not at least 30 days as required for a nazir ¹⁴⁸ This must read: He said to them (as in Tosephta and Sifry ¹⁴⁹ The passage in parentheses is hopelessly corrupt. It is missing in Tosephta and Sifry ¹⁵⁰ One has to read (with the parallel sources): “But the nazir ¹⁵¹ Probably one should read with Tosephta and Sifry: תַּקִּין הַדָּבָר. לֹא עוֹלֶה בִּימֵי גְמָרוֹ עוֹלֶה בִּימֵי סְפִירוֹ. לֹא עוֹלֶה בְטָהֵר עוֹלֶה בְטָמֵא. “It does not count in the days of his completeness; it counts in the days of his count. It does not count if [the nazir ¹⁵² This sentence, which is not in any of the other sources, supports the Babylonians and contradicts R. Joḥanan. ¹⁵³ Since the baraita