MISHNAH: If somebody said “I am a nazir” and another person heard it and said, “and so am I”, “and so am I”, “and so am I”,¹, A2 hears A1 and says “so am I”, A3 hears A2 and says “so am I”, A4 hears A3 and says “so am I”. all of them are nezirim. If the first one was permitted, all are permitted² 9:7.; if the last was permitted, the last is permitted and all others forbidden³. “I am a nazir” and another person heard it and said, “my mouth is as his mouth and my hair as his hair,” he is a nazir. “I am a nazir” and his wife heard it and said, “and so am I”, he can dissolve hers⁴ Chapter 10). but his vow remains. “I am a nezirah” and her husband heard it and said, “and so am I”, he cannot dissolve⁵.

footnotes: ¹ A1 declares to be a nazir ² If the first went to an Elder who dissolved his vow, the others did refer to a non-existent vow; their vows are non-existent. Cf. Mishnah Nedarim ³ In general, if Ai had his vow dissolved, automatically all vows of persons Aj, j i, are dissolved. ⁴ Even though the initiative is his, it does not limit his power to dissolve his wife’s vows (cf. Nedarim ⁵ Nobody can dissolve his own vow. If he could dissolve his wife’s vow, his own would be dissolved, as explained in the second sentence of this Mishnah.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody said ‘I am a nazir’ and another person heard it and said, ‘and so am I’,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “and so am I”, “and so am I”⁶. Who is the Tanna of conjunctions? Rebbi Jehudah⁷ 9:7, Notes 85–101.. But following Rebbi Meïr, “I am,” “I am”. Does the Mishnah require that all of them follow immediately after the speaking of the first⁸ is reduced to 2, is that because both A2 and A3 refer to the original vow, not that A3 refers to that of A2? In that case, there would not be time for three additional people to express their vow if the rule at the end of the paragraph be followed.? It was stated⁹ is quoted in the Babli, 21a, for the same conclusion.: If the middle one was permitted, all following him are permitted, all preceding him are forbidden¹⁰. The Mishnah applies even if not all of them follow immediately after the speaking of the first, but each one follows immediately after the speaking of the preceding person¹¹’ and another said ‘so am I’ but not immediately after him, the first is forbidden but the second is permitted.”. What means “to follow immediately after the speaking”? ¹² 2:1 (Notes 50–52), Moʻed qaṭan 3:7 (83c 1. 37). Babli 20b, Makkot 6a, Baba qama 73b, Šebuot 32a. In the Babli, the longer version has an additional word: “peace upon you, my teacher and master.” Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The time needed for greeting between two people. Abba bar bar Ḥana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The time needed for greeting between teacher and student, that he say to him, “peace upon you, my master.”

footnotes: ⁶ This version has only two people responding, with most of the Babli and some Mishnah mss. The paragraph is discussed in detail by J. N. Epstein, 2מבוא לנוסח המשנה, p. 477–479. ⁷ He holds that there is a connection between the statements only if they are formulated as conjunctions; cf. Chapter 1:2, Note 40, Giṭṭin ⁸ If the number of additional nezirim ⁹ The same baraita ¹⁰ This is only possible if Ai+1 refers to Ai’s vow, not to A1’s. Therefore, the original text of the Mishnah is correct and essential. ¹¹ This is explicit in Tosephta 3:2: “If somebody said ‘I am a nazir ¹² Berakhot

If one said, “I am a nazir for 100 days, and another heard it and said, “so am I for 100 days”, and repeated¹³ and said, “so am I”, the main [statement] becomes an accessory. If one said, “I am a nazir;” somebody said “and I” following immediately the first, another heard it and said, “so am I” following immediately the second. If the first became permitted, so does the second¹⁴. If the second became permitted, the third was not permitted¹⁵ disagrees with the argument of the preceding section and holds that, since the vow of the second is predicated on the first, the third also depends on the first but not on the third. Therefore, if the first vow is annulled, all are annulled; if any other vow is annulled, that alone is annulled but nothing else.. If one said, “I am a nazir twice,” and two people heard it and said, “so are we”, are they two nezirim or is each of them a nazir twice?¹⁶ If he was permitted, they were permitted. ¹⁷ He was not permitted. If two said, “we are nezirim,” another heard it and said, “so am I,” did he make a vow regarding both of them¹⁸. or did he make a vow parallel to each of them?¹⁶ If they were permitted, [he]¹⁹ was permitted; if [he]²⁰ was permitted, they were not permitted.

footnotes: ¹³ It is not clear who is speaking, whether the second is making an additional vow or the first is repeating after the second. In the first case, if the first had his vow permitted, the second was not permitted; the “main vow”, his hitching on to the first person’s, becomes an accessory to the second vow which needs separate permission. In the second case, the first vow of the first person (the “main”) cannot become permitted unless the Elder also permits the secondary vow (the “accessory”.) ¹⁴ And the third. ¹⁵ The Tanna of this baraita ¹⁶ The question is not answered. The answer is obvious both for R. Jehudah and for R. Simeon (Chapter 2, Note 100; Tosephta 2:8). ¹⁷ It seems that a sentence is missing: “If he was permitted, they did not become permitted.” ¹⁸ Then he would have vowed two neziriot ¹⁶ The question is not answered. The answer is obvious both for R. Jehudah and for R. Simeon (Chapter 2, Note 100; Tosephta 2:8). ¹⁹ Reading הוּתַּר “he was permitted” for incomprehensible הַיּוֹם “today”. ²⁰ Reading הוּא “he” for הֵן “they”.

“My mouth [shall be nazir] from wine²¹. Then it is a valid vow of nazir by Mishnah 1:2., my head from shaving, my hand from impurity, my foot from impurity; my head shall be nazir; my liver shall be nezirah,²² shall be nazir, he is a nazir as long as x is a body part necessary for survival (Babli 21b, Tosephta 3:3).” he is a nazir. “My walking shall be nazir; my talking shall be nazir”; he did not say anything. Why? Because he referred the vow to something on which life depends. “Vow, vow²³, “equal cut” (cf. Berakhot 1:1, Note 70; Nedarim 1:1, Note 18, 1:4, Note 159.) The nazir starts his obligation with a vow, mentioned “here” (Num. 6:2). Another personal obligation accepted by a vow is that of paying “the valuation of living persons”, mentioned “there”, (Lev. 27:2). In a different formulation, the argument is in Sifra Beḥuqqotay Parašah 3(6)..” Just as “vow” mentioned there refers to something on which life depends, so “vow” mentioned here refers to something on which life depends.

footnotes: ²¹ This refers to the Mishnah, where one person says “my mouth shall be like his mouth.” Somewhere it must have been mentioned that the mouth is the organ to which wine is forbidden. Similarly, if head or foot are mentioned, reference must be to the corresponding taboo imposed on the nazir ²² This is a separate set of rules. If somebody says, my x ²³ One invokes the rule of gezerah šawah

“ “I am a nazir, and you,” etc. If he was permitted, she is permitted²⁹. If she was permitted, he is not permitted.

footnotes: ²⁹ This must refer to Mishnah 1, the case that the wife says “and so am I”. Then her vow is dependent on his; if his vow is declared non-existent, so is hers. But in Mishnah 2, saying “amen” makes her vow independent of his; if his vow were permitted, hers would still exist.

What about, “and so am I³⁰,” how do you treat this? As “amen, it is confirmed for you,³¹” or “you did well³²”? The elder [Rebbi] Ḥiyya and the elder Rebbi Hoshaia. It is stated: If a woman made a vow to be anazir; her husband heard and said to her, “why did you make a vow of nazir? What did you do to make a vow of nazir? I would not like that you made a vow of nazir! There is neither vow nor oath here;” he did not say anything³³ 10:10, Note 95 (Babli Nedarim 77b).. But if he said, “you did well that you did make a vow of nazir; I liked that you did make a vow of nazir; if you had not made a vow of nazir I would have told you to make one”, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated on this, in all of these cases he cannot dissolve³⁴. But Rebbi Hoshaia stated: In all these cases, he can dissolve unless he said “amen” or “it is confirmed for you”, then he can no longer dissolve.

footnotes: ³⁰ The last case in Mishnah 1, if the husband says “so am I” to his wife’s vow. ³¹ Then he confirmed his wife’s vow. The confirmation of a wife’s vow by her husband is irrevocable. ³² This is talk, not confirmation. ³³ The only language which the husband is empowered to use is that of dissolution, הפרה. Any other language is invalid; cf. Nedarim ³⁴ In his opinion, confirmation of a vow is not restrictedr to a fixed formula, but dissolution would be.

MISHNAH: “I am a nazir, and you²⁴?” If she said “amen”, he may dissolve hers²⁵, and his is void²⁶ 13:14), against the Babli in Mishnah and Gemara which reads “confirmed”. Y. Qafeḥ in his edition of Maimonides’s Commentary notes (in his grandfather’s name) that the disagreement between Rav Jehudah and Abbai in the Babli (22b) may be based on different readings in the Mishnah.. “I am nezirah, and you²⁷?” If he said “amen”²⁸ but he confirmed her vow and, therefore, lost his power of dissolution., he cannot dissolve.

footnotes: ²⁴ The husband makes a vow and invites his wife to join him. As the Halakhah explains, he makes his vow conditional on her concurrence. ²⁵ By asking her, he did not waive his privilege of dissolving her vows. ²⁶ Since his vow is conditional on hers, his disappears with hers. “Void” is also the reading of Maimonides (in his Mishnah Commentary and his Code, Nedarim ²⁷ The wife makes a vow and invites her husband to join her. ²⁸ By this act, not only did he become a nazir

HALAKHAH: If she is permitted, he is permitted³⁵. If he is permitted, she is not permitted³⁶. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because he makes his vow conditional on hers, if he says, on condition that you [accept]³⁷.

footnotes: ³⁵ This now refers to the first sentence in Mishnah 2 and explains why his vow disappears with hers. The explanation is that given by Abbai in the Babli, 22b. ³⁶ Since her vow was an independent act. ³⁷ But if the Mishnah is taken as formulated, that the husband’s vow is absolute and the wife is only invited to participate, if she has her vow revoked by an Elder, his vow is not touched.

³⁸ 10:10, Note 95. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The husband who said “there is no vow, there is no oath,” did not say anything. Also the Elder who said “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” did not say anything. But everybody has to follow his own rules. The husband says “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” and the Elder says, “there is no vow, there is no oath”.

footnotes: ³⁸ Text from Nedarim

MISHNAH: If a woman had made a vow of nazir but drank wine or defiled herself for the dead, she receives forty [lashes]³⁹. If her husband had dissolved her vow but she did not know that he had dissolved her vow⁴⁰ when she drank wine or defiled herself for the dead, she does not receive forty [lashes]⁴¹. Rebbi Jehudah said, if she does not receive forty, let her receive blows of rebelliousness⁴².

footnotes: ³⁹ Since she violates biblical prohibitions, is duly warned by two witnesses, and persists in her action, she is subject to the biblical punishment of at most 39 lashes. ⁴⁰ Since the husband can dissolve his wife’s vows in her absence. ⁴¹ While there was criminal intent, there was no crime committed. The husband had legitimized her actions. ⁴² Rabbinic punishment, usually reserved for transgression of rabbinic rules.

HALAKHAH: “If a woman had made a vow of nazir,” etc. Biblical whippings are 39 lashes⁴³ 3:10.. One evaluates him; if he can stand it, one whips him, if not, one does not whip him. Blows of rebelliousness: one strikes him until he accepts⁴⁴ or until he dies.

footnotes: ⁴³ Mishnah Makkot ⁴⁴ To follow rabbinic rules.

It is written: “The Eternal will forgive her⁴⁵. 30:6,9,13. The verses refer to girls or women whose vows are dissolved by father or husband. The verses assume that they felt impelled to make vows for some hidden guilt. In the Babli, 23a, the verse is interpreted to refer only to the case of the woman violating her vow, not knowing that it had been dissolved. The speaker there and in Tosephta 3:14 is R. Aqiba..” This tells that she needs forgiveness. When Rebbi Jacob came to this verse, he used to say: If somebody needs atonement having intended to get pig’s meat but happened to get kosher [animal’s] meat, so much more one who had the intent to get pig’s meat and got pig’s meat.

footnotes: ⁴⁵ Num

It was stated⁴⁶: “A woman made a vow as nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I;’ if the first’s husband heard and told her, ‘it is permitted to you,’ the first one is permitted but the second forbidden⁴⁷.. Rebbi Simeon says, if she said, my intention was only to be like her, in her state, the second also is permitted.”

footnotes: ⁴⁶ Tosephta 3:10; Babl1 22a. ⁴⁷ The Babli explains that in contrast to an Elder, who has the power to retroactively annul a vow from the start, the husband can only annul his wife’s vow from the moment he heard about it. Therefore, for the second woman, the reference was to a valid vow and she is a nezirah

There, we have stated⁴⁸ 5:3: “If 5 people claim a deposit which he holds for them and he swears that he holds nothing of theirs, and this was false, he can be prosecuted for one perjury. But if he said, an oath that I hold nothing of yours, and of yours, etc. (using the singular in each case), he can be prosecuted for 5 perjuries. R. Eleazer says, [he can be prosecuted for 5 perjuries] only if he mentioned ‘oath’ at the end (to make it clear that he meant an oath for each of them singly.) R. Simeon says, only if he mentioned an oath in every case,” i. e., an oath that I hold nothing of yours, and an oath that I hold nothing of yours, etc. The following Mishnah 5:4 deals with the case that one claimant demands from him wheat, barley, and spelt which he holds, and he swears falsely that he holds nothing, he is prosecuted for one perjury. But if he swears that he holds neither wheat, nor barley, nor spelt, he is prosecuted for each item separately; R. Meïr says, even if he swore that he did not have wheat, barley, spelt. For this part of the Mishnah, cf. Ketubot 13:4, Notes 79–86.: “Rebbi Eleazar says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ at the end. Rebbi Simeon says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ for every item.” ⁴⁹ 5:4 (36b 1. 46). Rebbi Joḥanan said, [Rebbi Simeon implies]⁵⁰ if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest⁵¹ 103a.) As long as he did not say, “an oath for barley, and an oath for spelt”, he cannot be prosecuted for lying about these items.. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree with this⁵² that R. Jehudah is the anonymous Tanna of these Mishnaiot. He agrees that no prosecution is possible if the oath regarding the first item of the list was true.. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not⁵³, without further thought. This supports the colleagues’ interpretation.; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the baraita supports the colleagues: “A woman made a vow as nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I;’ if the first’s husband heard and told her, ‘it is permitted to you,’ the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. Rebbi Simeon says, if she said, my intention was only to be like her, in her state, the second also is permitted.” Because she said “to be like her, in her state;” therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state,” the first is permitted and the second forbidden⁵⁴. Since there, where there was no original nezirut, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more⁵⁵? When Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest, if he attaches⁵⁶: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.

footnotes: ⁴⁸ Mishnah Šebuot ⁴⁹ From here to the end of the Halakhah, a parallel text is in Šebuot ⁵⁰ The parallel text and the quote later in this paragraph show that the text in parentheses belongs here. ⁵¹ Since in the preceding Mishnah, R. Simeon held that the “oath” only referred to the first item on the list; if there was no perjury for the first item, there was no perjury. (The Babli agrees, Menaḥot ⁵² It is established in Šebuot ⁵³ When she said, “so am I”, she only referred to the first woman in her present state, as nezirah ⁵⁴ Interpreting R. Simeon’s opinion, they hold that any vow or oath only refers to the item mentioned as its object. ⁵⁵ The argument of R. Jacob bar Aḥa is rejected. If an accessory vow is interpreted maximally, an original oath cannot be intepreted minimally. ⁵⁶ He explicitly attaches the second and third items to the first. Then it is clear that he cannot be prosecuted for perjury if he swore correctly on the first item.

The following is obvious: If her husband did not dissolve for the first [woman] and she transgressed her vow, she is whipped. Can the second be whipped⁵⁷ while she undergoes the purification rite, when the second also violated her vow.? Rebbi Yose said, since one is whipped, the other also is whipped. Rebbi La said, this⁵⁸ follows Rebbi Simeon. Can the second not be considered like one who said, I am a nezirah after twenty days⁵⁹? Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion; for Rebbi Simeon declares him free, because his offering was not according to the custom of offerers.⁶⁰ 12:3 (formulated in the masculine), cf. Halakhah 2:4, Note 66. There does not exist an intermittent vow of nazir; if the second woman’s vow was valid, it remains valid.

footnotes: ⁵⁷ If the second woman stated that “my intention was only to be like her, in her state,” and the first violated her vow and now cannot be a nezirah ⁵⁸ R. Yose’s statement. ⁵⁹ That the vow should count again after the first woman was purified. ⁶⁰ Mishnah Menaḥot

MISHNAH: A woman who had made a vow of nazir and designated her animal⁶¹ when her husband dissolved her vow, if the animal was his, it leaves and grazes with the herd⁶². But if the animal was hers⁶³, the purification offering shall die⁶⁴, the elevation offering shall be brought as an elevation offering⁶⁵ 1., the well-being offering as a well-being offering⁶⁶. 7:16) while the nazir’s well-being offering follows the rules of thanksgiving offerings which may be eaten only during one day and the following night (Lev. 7:15). The nazir’s offering also needs an accompanying gift of bread, similar to the thanksgiving offering. But since the woman is no nezirah after the husband’s dissolution of her vow, the bread cannot be offered. (The bread is baked on the day it is offered; since the husband has to dissolve the vow before it has run its course, there is no dedicated bread.), to be eaten on one day; it does not need bread. If she had money not designated⁶⁷, it should be given as a donation⁶⁸. If the monies were designated, the value of the purification offering shall be thrown into the Dead Sea⁶⁹; one may not use it⁷⁰ but there can be no larceny⁷¹. 5:14–16 cannot be applied.. For the value of the elevation offering, they shall bring an elevation offering; it is subject to the law of larceny. For the value of the well-being offering, they shall bring a well-being offering, to be eaten on one day; it does not need bread⁷², but are not “The Eternal’s Sancta”, never subject to the rules of Lev. 5:14–16..

footnotes: ⁶¹ Really three animals for her prescribed sacrifice. ⁶² Since one cannot dedicate anybody else’s property, the animals are not dedicated. ⁶³ If the spouses had signed a contract of separation of properties by which the husband renounced his right of administration and usufruct. Then the wife can dedicate her property without asking the husband’s consent. ⁶⁴ Since an animal designated as purification offering can never be redeemed. ⁶⁵ Since elevation offerings can be brought as voluntary gifts; Lev. ⁶⁶ Most well-being offerings are voluntary gifts. But those are eaten during two days and the intervening night (Lev ⁶⁷ Money put aside for her sacrifices, without specifying which money should be used for which animal. ⁶⁸ Given to the special Temple account, to be used for elevation sacrifices if the altar otherwise would be vacant. ⁶⁹ Where it will be quickly dissolved by the chemicals in the water. “Throwing something into the Dead Sea” means: “making sure it cannot be used.” ⁷⁰ Since it is designated for a sacrifice. ⁷¹ Since the sacrifice cannot be offered, misappropriation of the money cannot be prosecuted; the rules of Lev ⁷² Well-being sacrifices remain the property of the offerer; they may be sancta

HALAKHAH: “A woman who had made a vow of nazir,” etc. Does this mean it became holy by dedication⁷³? But if a third person gave her a gift and said, on condition that your husband have no right of disposition over it⁷⁴ 11:8, Notes 69–70; Babli 24b.), then it is hers. Rebbi Mattaniah said, if he gave her power over his properties⁷⁵. If he comes to protest, it did not become holy; otherwise, it became holy.

footnotes: ⁷³ Since in the absence of a contract to the opposite, all property of the wife’s is administered by her husband, how can the wife dedicate animals for her sacrifices without asking her husband to do it for her? ⁷⁴ This is one scenario in which the husband has no say in what she does. (Cf. Nedarim ⁷⁵ The husband gives her the right to sign for everything concerning their properties. In this case, she is able to dedicate the animals but he retains veto power. In the scenario described in Note 63, he has no veto power.

There⁷⁶, you find it possible to say, “it should go grazing”, and here, you say so? There, the Elder eliminates the vow from the start; here, he⁷⁷ 74b. eliminates only from that moment onwards.

footnotes: ⁷⁶ Mishnah 5:3: If an Elder annuls the vow for which animals already had been reserved, the animals are profane. Why are the wife’s animals not profane if her husband dissolves her vow? ⁷⁷ The husband. In the Babli, 19a, the question of the reach of the husband’s action remains unanswered. Only for the Elder, the Babli agrees, Ketubot

Who dissolves her obligations⁷⁸. 30 gives the husband the right to dissolve his wife’s vows. But where is it written that the husband can eliminate the sacrifices which are implied by his wife’s vow?? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, it is a decree of Scripture: “He dissolved her vow;” he dissolved her obligation⁷⁹. 30:9: “If on the day of his hearing he stops her and dissolves her vow [and] obligations.”. The one who dissolved her vow dissolved her obligation.

footnotes: ⁷⁸ It is agreed that Num ⁷⁹ Num

It was stated: They⁸¹ was dissolved. The Mishnah mentions that no bread is offered; it is a logical consequence that the officiating Cohen does not receive a foreleg from the goat offered as well-being sacrifice since Num. 6:19 makes the gift of the foreleg dependent on the gift of bread. need neither bread nor foreleg. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Do well-being sacrifices which are brought after death⁸² need bread? He turned around and said, is it not the same during his lifetime, do they not come for nothing⁸³? You say, they need bread, and here they need bread. Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya that well-being sacrifices which are brought after dissolution do not need bread⁸⁴. What is the difference between death and dissolution? In the case of death, they already were prepared to need bread; In the case of dissolution, they never were prepared to need bread⁸⁵ cannot be brought before the period of the vow has expired; before that time the dedication is potential, rather than actual.. It was stated: There is a reparation sacrifice after dissolution⁸⁶; there is no reparation sacrifice after death⁸⁷. 7:7). Since purification sacrifices after death are impossible, so are reparation sacrifices.. If she died, her reparation sacrifice is not offered, since there is no reparation sacrifice after death. If he dissolved for her, her reparation sacrifice is offered since that reparation sacrifice does not come for nothing.

footnotes: ⁸¹ The sacrifices offered after a vow of nazir ⁸² If the estate of a deceased person included animals dedicated for well-being sacrifices, the heirs have to offer these animals in the Temple. ⁸³ A person made a vow for sacrifices and afterwards dedicated certain animals to satisfy his vow. If then these animals were lost or ran away, he dedicated other animals and offered them; when afterwards the original animals are found, they have to be sacrificed; this is “for nothing” since the vow already was fulfilled. ⁸⁴ Since this is stated in our Mishnah. The question is why did R. Abun bar Ḥiyya not conclude (with the Babli, 24b) from the Mishnah that well-being sacrifices after the dedicator’s death do not need bread? ⁸⁵ In the case of animals dedicated to fulfill a vow of well-being offerings, they can immediately be brought to the Temple and offered. But a well-being offering for a vow of nazir ⁸⁶ If the wife became impure before her vow was annulled, she incurred the obligation of a reparation sacrifice. If the husband then dissolves her vow, the obligation is not dissolved since his action is not retroactive (Note 77). ⁸⁷ Reparation sacrifices are parallel to purification sacrifices (Lev

There, we have stated⁸⁸ 2:6.: “Leftovers for nezirim are for nezirim; what is left over from a nazir is for donation⁸⁹ with the expenses of their sacrifices but not all was used, the remainder has to be kept in trust to be used in the future for the same purpose. But if a person dedicated his own money for his sacrifices and had money left over, that should go to the account for offerings (Note 68)..” Rav Ḥisda said, only if his purification offering was presented last. But if his well-being offering waspresented last, what is left over is for a well-being offering⁹⁰ 2:6 also states that leftovers of monies for purification offerings go to the offerings account, but leftovers for well-being offerings must be used for well-being offerings.. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if his well-being offering was presented last, it is a general rule for a nazir that his leftover be for donation⁹¹ 2:6. In the Babli, 25a, this rule is attributed to R. Joḥanan (and, therefore, declared to be practice to be followed.). A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “The following are undesignated monies: any which contain money for purification offerings that should die. Even if he designated money for purification offerings that should die, it remains undesignated.⁹² 3:2 which decrees that money left over from unspecified funds set aside for nazir’s sacrifices must be given to the Temple’s offering account. Such money can be used for elevation or well-being offerings only if absolutely no money of purification offerings is mixed in (since one has to avoid the danger that the value of purification offerings be totally lost if anything goes wrong with that kind of sacrifice.)” A baraita supports Rav Ḥisda: “This is for my purification offering and the rest for my nezirut⁹³. Then he died. One commits larceny with all of them but not with part of them⁹⁴.”⁹⁵ is in the Babli, 26b; Tosephta Meʻilah 1:10. It does not say, when he died it should be given for donation.

footnotes: ⁸⁸ Mishnah Šeqalim ⁸⁹ If moneys were collected to help indigent nezirim ⁹⁰ Mishnah Šeqalim ⁹¹ Overriding the general rules of Mishnah Šeqalim ⁹² This refers to Mishnah Meʻilah ⁹³ The required elevation and well-being offerings. ⁹⁴ Since well-being offerings are not subject to larceny by its owner, misappropriation cannot be prosecuted unless one can prove that money for elevation offerings is involved. ⁹⁵ A different version of this baraita

Rav Ḥisda said, a nazir’s leftover bread shall be left to decay. Rebbi Yose said, that is correct. You cannot sacrifice it by itself since (reparation sacrifices)⁹⁶. 2), no offering of bread alone is authorized. cannot be brought alone. You cannot sacrifice it together with another nazir’s since no nazir sacrifices without bread⁹⁷. Therefore, it was necessary to say that a nazir’s leftover bread shall be left to decay. They wanted to say, the same rule applies to his leftover bread as to his leftover wine offering⁹⁸. 6:15, following the rules of Num. 15:1–16.. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, his leftover wine offering is most holy; it should be given to donation accounts⁹⁹ 2:5).. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, Samuel, Rav Ḥisda, and Rebbi Eleazar, all three said the same. Rav Ḥisda, as quoted here¹⁰⁰. Samuel, as Rebbi Yasa¹⁰¹ said, when I still was there¹⁰², I heard the voice of Rav Jehudah asking our teacher Samuel: If he designated his sheqel and died? He said, it should be given as donation¹⁰³ 2:5).. The leftover of his tenth of an epha¹⁰⁴: Rebbi Joḥanan said, he should bring it to the Dead Sea; Rebbi Eleazar said, it should be given as donation¹⁰⁵ 2:5)..

footnotes: ⁹⁶ Instead of אָשָׁם “reparation sacrifice” one has to read לֶחֶם “bread”. While there are all kinds of offerings of flour and baked goods (Lev ⁹⁷ Also, nowhere do we find a procedure to redeem sacrificial bread. ⁹⁸ Required in Num ⁹⁹ Since all leftovers of sacrifices characterized as “most holy” are to be given to the donation account of the Temple (Mishnah Šeqalim ¹⁰⁰ About wine offerings, in the interpretation of R. Yose ben R. Abun. ¹⁰¹ For historical reasons, one has to read ר׳ יסא instead of ר׳ יוסי. ¹⁰² In Babylonia. ¹⁰³ But leftover money to be used for the Temple tax of a living person is profane (Mishnah Šeqalim ¹⁰⁴ To buy the required flour offering belonging to a purification offering. ¹⁰⁵ Mishnah (Mishnah Šeqalim

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Money can be non-designated, no animal can be non-designated¹⁰⁶. Rav Sheshet said, it was stated thus: ¹⁰⁷ 6(2), Babli 27b, Keritut 27b.“I might think that one could not satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with an animal which he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin¹⁰⁸, or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he cannot shave for his nezirut with his father’s animal; but he could satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with money he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin, or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he can shave on money for his nezirut, any time it is not designated, but not if it is designated. The verse says¹⁰⁹. 4:29,32. For the nazir, Num. 6:14. The mention of his sacrifice in Lev. 4:32 is redundant; this is given as motivation for the restrictive interpretation of all three verses., ‘his sacrifice’, he can only satisfy his obligation with his sacrifice, not with his father’s sacrifice.” Talking about money, one mentions “not designated”.¹¹⁰

footnotes: ¹⁰⁶ Money can be used to buy any animal; an animal usually defines the sacrifice for which it can be used: A female exclusively for a purification offering, a young male for an elevation offering, an older animal for a well-being offering. The same argument is in the Babli, 26b. ¹⁰⁷ Sifra Wayyiqra II Parašah ¹⁰⁸ A minor sin is one not punished either by divine exstirpation or by capital punishment. The latter are major sins. Since all purification offerings are the same, if it were possible to use one’s father’s designated purification offering for oneself, it would not matter for which sin his father designated the animal. ¹⁰⁹ For purification offerings, Lev ¹¹⁰ But non-designated animals are not mentioned. This is Rav Sheshet’s support for Rebbi Abba’s statement.

An animal is not subject to the rules of the non-designated at the beginning¹¹¹, but it is subject to the rules of the non-designated at the end¹¹². Money is subject to the rules of the non-designated at the beginning, but it is not subject to the rules of the non-designated at the end¹¹³. Money is subject to the rules of the non-designated at the beginning, as we have stated: “If he had money not designated, it should be given as donation.” An animal is subject to the rules of the non-designated at the end¹¹⁴. It seems that one has to read: An animal is not subject to the rules of the non-designated at the beginning., as we have stated: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if he brought three animals but did not explain.¹¹⁵” They are subject to the rules of the non-designated at the beginning,¹¹⁶ is not subject to the rules of the non-designated at the end. as we have stated¹¹⁷ 1:10. The text there is more complete: “ ‘These are for my purification offering, the remainder is for the rest of my nezirut’, when he died. The money’s worth of the purification offering shall be thrown into the Dead Sea; one may not use it but there can be no larceny. The remainder may be used for either elevation or well-being offerings. One commits larceny about all but one cannot commit larceny about a part.” If the moneys were under the rules of the non-designated, any surplus would have to be used for donation, i. e., to buy elevation offerings. Since it may also be used for well-being offerings, it is not subject to these rules.: “ ‘These are for my purification offering, the remainder is for the rest of my nezirut’, when he died. One commits larceny about all but one cannot commit larceny about a part¹¹⁸.” It is not subject¹¹⁹ to the rules of the non-designated at the end, when he brought money and redeemed it for an animal. If he designated a donkey¹²⁰, it is as if he designated money. If he designated an ox¹²¹ who is required to offer one female and one male sheep, and one male goat. The Babli rules that the animal must be treated as a sacrifice unless it be blemished, when it follows the rules of money (27b)., Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Julianus, both speak in Shammai’s name. One says, he is like one who designates money; the other says, he is like one who designates an animal¹²². 27:10..

footnotes: ¹¹¹ Cf. Note 106. ¹¹² If an animal develops a defect and can no longer be offered on the altar, it must be redeemed and the redemption money may be used for any type of offering. ¹¹³ Cf. Note 121. ¹¹⁴ As written, this is a non sequitur ¹¹⁵ Mishnah 6:12. If somebody brings his three animals to the Temple without specification, the officiating priests do not have to ask him to designate the animals for specific offerings since the situation is clear, cf. Note 106. ¹¹⁶ This must read: Money ¹¹⁷ Tosephta Meʻilah ¹¹⁸ Since no money destined for well-being offerings can be misappropriated by its owner. ¹¹⁹ One has to read: “An animal is subject”, cf. Note 112. ¹²⁰ An animal unfit as sacrifice is simply representing its money’s worth. ¹²¹ A sacrificial animal in general, but not for a nazir ¹²² It cannot be redeemed unless it develops a blemish; Lev

MISHNAH: If one of the bloods was sprinkled for her¹²³ is completed. The husband cannot dissolve a vow which no longer is active., he cannot dissolve. Rebbi Aqiba says, even if one of the animals was slaughtered for her, he cannot dissolve. When has this been said? If she shaves in purity. But if she shaves in impurity¹²⁴ he may dissolve since he can say, I cannot stand an unseemly wife¹²⁵ she is forbidden to comb her hair, lest she tear one out.. Rebbi says, he may dissolve even if she shaves in purity, since he can say, I cannot stand a shorn wife¹²⁶ 11:1)..

footnotes: ¹²³ The essence of any sacrifice is that its blood should be sprinkled on the walls of the altar. Once at least one of the sacrifices was presented, the nezirut ¹²⁴ And then has to start anew. ¹²⁵ Since as a nezirah ¹²⁶ While she could wear a wig after shearing off her hair, the Babli (28b) explains that the husband can object to her wearing a wig, which is difficult to keep clean. Therefore, a vow which will cause his wife to have to wear a wig is one which causes pain to the husband and is one which he may dissolve (Mishnah Nedarim

HALAKHAH: “If one of the bloods was sprinkled for her,” etc. He dissolves for her because of her hair¹²⁶ 11:1).. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It is a decision of Scripture: “He dissolved her vows,” he dissolves what is on her¹²⁷. But he finds a special dispensation which empowers the husband to dissolve his wife’s vow of nazir. The verse, (Num. 30:9) is slightly misquoted; instead of הפר נדריה it should be והפר את נדרה. As in most cases, the argument is from the part of the verse which is not quoted: “But if on the day on which her husband hears it, he prevents her, and dissolves her vow which is on her …” This gives the husband the power to dissolve any vow she makes regarding what is on her; i. e., her hair. (In Sifry Num. 153, the verse is interpreted to mean that the husband has a say only over vows which are on her, i. e., after she made them. A preëmptive dissolution is invalid just as the Mishnah here states that a dissolution after the end of the period is invalid.). Whenever he dissolves her vow, he dissolves what is on her. Rebbi Eleazar said, it¹²⁸ completed once the blood of a single animal was sprinkled on the altar in the final ceremony. follows Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion, after she was transferred from the prohibition to the positive commandment¹²⁹ is completed according to everybody.. The rabbis say, “afterwards, the nazir shall drink wine,” after all these actions¹³⁰ may shave only after the conclusion of the entire ceremony.. Rebbi Simeon says, even after a single action¹³¹. Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi (Bevai)¹³². “When has this been said? If she shaves in purity. But if she shaves in impurity, he may dissolve since he can say, I cannot stand an unseemly wife.” Therefore, shaving in purity does not make her unseemly. Who holds that shaving does not make unseemly¹³³ to drink wine after the offering of one animal, before he shaves, he asserts that shaving and not drinking wine are separate matters.? Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, even Rebbi thinks so: “Rebbi says, he may dissolve even if she shaves [in purity], since he can say, I cannot stand a shorn wife.” Should he not say, I cannot stand an unseemly and shorn wife¹³⁴? Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi (Jehudah)¹³⁵ said that only for the purification sacrifice, since a purification sacrifice would be invalid if not in her name¹³⁶ after the slaughter of her purification offering, that offering would become invalid and would have to be burned outside the Temple precinct. Both elevation and well-being offerings may be used if the original intent became void.. That means, as long as it is alive it is surrendered to Heaven only by slaughter¹³⁷ 1:6) that “a promise to Heaven is like a delivery to a person”, an animal dedicated as purification offering becomes Heaven’s property only by its slaughter, in contrast to all other sacrifices for which the dedication also equals delivery..

footnotes: ¹²⁶ While she could wear a wig after shearing off her hair, the Babli (28b) explains that the husband can object to her wearing a wig, which is difficult to keep clean. Therefore, a vow which will cause his wife to have to wear a wig is one which causes pain to the husband and is one which he may dissolve (Mishnah Nedarim ¹²⁷ He disagrees and holds that living with a shorn wife imposes no hardship on the husband and, therefore, the general rules of vows do not permit the husband to dissolve his wife’s vow of nazir ¹²⁸ The Mishnah, which considers the nezirut ¹²⁹ From the moment when she starts the final ceremony, she is no longer forbidden to shave her hair but ordered to shave the hair and burn it in the fire under the well-being sacrifices. Since shaving the hair cannot be prohibited and required at the same time, the nezirut ¹³⁰ Cf. Mishnah 6:9. In their opinion, the nazir ¹³¹ Mishnah 6:12; cf. Note 128. ¹³² Read: Eleazar. ¹³³ Therefore “unseemly” cannot mean “shaven”; it must refer to the fact that she cannot drink wine. Since R. Simeon allows the nazir ¹³⁴ Therefore, the argument that the husband suffers if his wife does not drink wine is applicable only if her vow was not completed and she shaves in impurity. ¹³⁵ Read: Aqiba; the reference is to the Mishnah. ¹³⁶ If the husband were able to dissolve his wife’s nezirut ¹³⁷ Even though we say (Mishnah Qiddušin

MISHNAH: A man can declare his son¹³⁸ a nazir but a woman cannot declare her son a nazir¹³⁹.. How is this? If he shaved him or relatives shaved him¹⁴⁰; if he protested or relatives protested¹⁴¹ is voided. If the father already had dedicated either animals or the monies needed for them, they have to be treated according to the rules detailed in Mishnah 4 in the case of the woman who had prepared her sacrifices when her vow was dissolved by her husband., if he had designated animals, the purification offering shall die; the elevation offering shall be brought as elevation offering; the well-being offering shall be brought as elevation offering; it may be eaten for one day and does not need bread. If he had money not designated, it should be given as donation. If the monies were designated, the money’s worth of the purification offering shall be thrown into the Dead Sea; one may not use it but there can be no larceny. For the value of the elevation offering, he shall bring an elevation offering; it is subject to the law of larceny. For the value of the well-being offering, he shall bring a well-being offering, to be eaten on one day; it does not need bread. A man may shave on the basis of his father’s nezirut, but a woman may not shave on the basis of her father’s nezirut. How is this? If his father was a nazir and had set aside unspecified money for his nezirut when he died, and he said, I am a nazir on condition that I may shave on my father’s money, Rebbi Yose said, the money shall be given as donation, for he cannot shave on his father’s money. Who may shave based on his father’s nezirut? If both he and his father were nezirim and his father had set aside unspecified money for his nezirut when he died; this one shaves on his father’s nezirut.

footnotes: ¹³⁸ His underage son. Why a father should have such power is a matter of disagreement in the Babli, 28b/29a. ¹³⁹ Since rabbinic law knows no materna potestas ¹⁴⁰ If either the son or some relatives provided the sacrifices required while the father already had dedicated either animals or the monies needed for them. ¹⁴¹ If either the son or relatives protested the father’s action, the child’s nezirut

HALAKHAH: “A man can declare his son a nazir,” etc. ¹⁴² 3:9, Note 228.“A man”. This refers not only to a man; from where for a woman? The verse says, “afflicted with skin disease,” whether man, woman, or minor. If it is so, why is “a man” written? For the next theme, “a man is dishevelled and has open seams, no woman is dishevelled and has open seams.”

footnotes: ¹⁴² Since the Mishnah deals with a difference between a man and a woman, it quotes another difference, regarding people afflicted with skin disease. The text is from Soṭah

A man can declare a nazir, and a man can shave¹⁴³, and the son can shave on the offerings which his father brings for him.. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Meïr: ¹⁴⁴ 2:2. In 24 matters are the House of Shammai lenient but the House of Hillel stringent, and this is one of them: The House of Shammai say, a man cannot declare his son to be a nazir but the House of Hillel say, a man can declare his son to be a nazir. It was stated about those who are nazir from the womb¹⁴⁵. Some want to say, until he grows two pubic hairs¹⁴⁶ until the latter reaches adulthood.. Some want to say, until he reaches the time of vows¹⁴⁷ 5:6: “The vows of a girl 11 years and one day of age or a boy 12 years and one day of age are checked.” If they know what they are doing, their vows are valid.. Everybody agrees that he can no longer declare him a nazir once he reaches the time of vows¹⁴⁸.

footnotes: ¹⁴³ A man can declare his son to be a nazir ¹⁴⁴ Tosephta Idiut ¹⁴⁵ This sentence seems to be incomplete. ¹⁴⁶ I. e., the father can declare his son to be a nazir ¹⁴⁷ Mishnah Niddah ¹⁴⁸ Once a boy’s own vows are valid, his father can no longer make vows for him. In the Babli, 29b/30a, the matter remains undecided.

“If he shaved him or relatives shaved him; if he protested or relatives protested,” in any language it is a valid protest¹⁴⁹. If he sat before a barber¹⁵⁰, it is not a protest; may a relative protest¹⁵¹?

footnotes: ¹⁴⁹ No particular language is prescribed for these protests. ¹⁵⁰ The protest must be verbal; a silent action does not count. ¹⁵¹ If the child sits in a barber’s chair, may a relative protest for him? The question needs no answer since the relative can protest anywhere.

May his own vow of nazir and that of his father fall on him together¹⁵²? ¹⁵³ 5:15. It happened that Rebbi Ḥanina ben Ḥanina¹⁵⁴’s father made him a nazir and Rebbi Simeon ben Gamliel¹⁵⁵ checked him whether he had grown two pubic hairs. He said to him, why are you checking me? If my father’s nezirut is on me, I am a nazir; otherwise, I declare being a nazir. Rabban Gamliel stood up and kissed him on his head and said, I am sure that you will not die from old age before you taught instruction in Israel. Rebbi Eleazar bar Ṣadoq¹⁵⁶ said, I saw him sitting and explaining in Jabneh.

footnotes: ¹⁵² If he is between childhood and adulthood and it is not clear which vow would apply. The positive answer is given by the story. ¹⁵³ Parallels are in the Babli, 29b, and Tosephta Niddah ¹⁵⁴ In the Tosephta, Ḥananiah ben Ḥananiah. In the Babli, R. Ḥaninah. ¹⁵⁵ In both other sources, Rabban Gamliel. Since the story presupposes the existence of the Temple, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel would have to be the president of the revolutionary government in the war against the Romans, Rabban Gamliel his father. ¹⁵⁶ A Tanna of the first generation at Jabneh.

Rebbi Aḥa: Rebbi Immi said that Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked: May his bird be eaten when its neck was broken¹⁵⁷ by his father became impure, his father has to bring a couple of birds for him. Both birds (pigeons or turtle doves) are killed by having their necks broken by the Cohen’s thumbnail (Lev. 5:8). The meat of one of them, offered as purification sacrifice, should be eaten by the priests. If the boy’s vow is valid in biblical law, there is no problem. But if it is valid only rabbinically, then the priest who eats this meat commits two sins, since (a) he slaughters in the Temple what is not a legitimate sacrifice and (b) he eats meat forbidden outside the Temple precinct since it was not ritually slaughtered. In the Babli, 29a, R. Joḥanan holds that the vow is biblically valid; there are no problems. R. Simeon ben Laqish holds that the vow is rabbinic; his position is that articulated by R. Mani in this paragraph.? Instead of asking about a bird whose neck was broken, why do you not ask about a slaughtered bird¹⁵⁸ who finishes his term in purity, whether his purification offering could be eaten by the priests.? There is one doubt, here are two doubts¹⁵⁹ have only the problem of the validity of his vow in biblical law. The sacrifice of the impure in addition has the problem that the consumption of meat from a bird whose neck was broken is forbidden to everybody except priests in the Temple in the line of duty.. Rebbi Mani said, here also it is one doubt, as it was stated: One who perforates or tears out is not guilty because of profane slaughter in the Temple courtyard¹⁶⁰ 86a. There remains only the problem of eating the meat; the irregular slaughter in the Temple precinct is not an infraction.. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: There is not even one doubt, following him who says that slaughtering birds is not clear from the Torah¹⁶¹. 17:1–7. When the Israelites entered the Land, profane slaughter was permitted, Deut. 12:21. Profane slaughter has to be executed “as I commanded you”, i. e., by the method of slaughter used in the Tabernacle. In all of Lev., slaughter is described by the verb שׁחט, Arabic سحط “to cut the throat”. According to this argument, birds should be killed by breaking their neck, rather than by cutting their throat.: “They spread them a spread,”¹⁶². 11:32, speaking of the quail. In Sifry Num. 98, the metathesis שחט - שטח is attributed to R. Jehudah. they spread out slaughtered [birds].

footnotes: ¹⁵⁷ If the child who was declared nazir ¹⁵⁸ Since it is forbidden to bring profane animals into the Temple precinct, one could ask not about birds, but about the animals required for the nazir ¹⁵⁹ The sacrifices of the pure underage nazir ¹⁶⁰ It is forbidden to ritually slaughter profane animals in the Temple precinct. If the animals are killed in other ways than by slaughter, that prohibition was not violated (other prohibitions may have been violated). Cf. Babli Ḥulin ¹⁶¹ Ritual slaughter of four-legged animals is clearly prescribed in the Torah. In the desert, all non-sacrificial slaughter was forbidden, Lev ¹⁶² Num

So far, if they are equal. If he was nazir once, his son nazir twice? He and his son nazir once, [but] he was a pure nazir, his son an impure nazir, [or] he an impure nazir, his son a pure nazir¹⁶³ precedes the father’s dedication but the actual realization of the vow starts only after the father’s death? Both for the anonymous Tanna, who allows the son unrestricted access to his father’s dedicated money, and for R. Yose, the question arises whether the money can be used for a sacrifice for which it was not intended (money for the offerings in purity for the reparation offering of the impure or vice versa)? The questions are not answered, neither here nor in the Babli (30b).?

footnotes: ¹⁶³ Here starts the discussion of Mishnah 7. As explained in the next paragraph, R. Yose requires that the son’s vow precede the father’s dedication. How would R. Yose deal with the case that the vow of the son’s second nezirut

What is Rebbi Yose’s reason¹⁶⁴? “His offering to the Eternal for his vow”¹⁶⁵. 6:21., that (his sacrifice precede his vow)¹⁶⁶ 10(42), Yalqut #709. but not (that his vow precede his sacrifice). They wanted to say that Rebbi Jehudah¹⁶⁷ (but specified money has to be treated by the rules of Mishnah 6.) The opinion of R. Yose is shared by R. Eleazar (ben Shamua) and R. Simeon (ben Ioḥai). The problems with the text of Tosephta and Babli are treated at length by S. Lieberman (Tosefta ki-Fshutah p. 537–538). The Yerushalmi does not treat the anomaly that, by tradition, the daughter cannot use the father’s dedicated money even if she is the only heir (Babli 30a/b). would agree with Rebbi Yose. It was found said that neither of them agrees with the other.

footnotes: ¹⁶⁴ That the son’s vow must precede the father’s dedication. ¹⁶⁵ Num ¹⁶⁶ The two parentheses have to be interchanged. The correct text is copied in Num. rabba ¹⁶⁷ In the Tosephta, 3:18, it is explained that R. Jehudah and R. Meïr hold that any unspecified money in the estate can be used by the son for a future nezirut