MISHNAH: These are the vows which he may dissolve: Matters connected with mortification¹. [E. g.], “if I wash, if I do not wash; if I wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.² 32:29–30) that a legally valid conditional contract must spell out the conditions both positively and negatively: If I do certain things, there is a stipulated consequence; if I do not, then the consequence is stipulated not to happen (Mishnah Qiddušin 3:3). The vow is understood to be: A qônām should be a certain thing for me if I ever wash; if I do not wash, the thing shall not be qônām. Since not washing is mortification, the husband has the right to void the vow. If the vow had been unconditional, the husband would have no jurisdiction over it.” Rebbi Yose said, these are not vows of mortification³.

footnotes: ¹ In addition, he can dissolve vows impinging on their marital relations, as explained later. ² These examples refer to conditional vows. One derives from the contract of the tribes of Gad and Reuben with Moses (Num. ³ His position is explained in Mishnah 2.

HALAKHAH: “These are the vows which he can dissolve,” etc. It is written⁵. 30:14. The verse ends: “Her husband shall confirm it or her husband shall dissolve it.”: “Any vow and any oath of prohibition to mortify.” That covers only vows which contain mortification. Vows regarding the relations between him and her, from where? “Between a man and his wife⁶. 30:17. One opinion in this Halakhah (Notes 11 ff.) and the consensus in the Babli (79b) hold that the dissolution of vows of mortification is permanent since it is expressly sanctioned by the verse but that dissolution of a vow regarding marital relations, which is the result of an indirect inference, is valid only as long as the marriage continues. Such a dissolution would be automatically voided for the divorcee or widow. The Mishnah mentions only vows the husband can permanently dissolve..” So far the husband; the father from where? Since the husband can dissolve only vows of mortification and matters between him and her, so the father can dissolve only vows of mortification and matters between him and her⁷. 155: V. 17 reads “These are the principles which the Eternal commanded to Moses between a husband and his wife, between a father and his daughter, in her adolescence, in her father’s house.” Now this verse is really an appendix to the laws governing the married wife. It is concluded that the restrictions which apply to the husband in relation with his wife in his house also apply to the father in relation to the adolescent daughter in his house..

footnotes: ⁵ Num ⁶ Num ⁷ This argument seems to be taken out of thin air. It is explained in Sifry Num

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the husband dissolves both vows and oaths⁸. 30:2, speaks of vows and oaths. (A vow refers to a thing, an oath implies the use of God’s name.). Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he dissolves vows but not oaths⁹. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish also disagree about the vows submitted to the Elder. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Elder permits both vows and oaths. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Elder permits vows, the Elder does not permit oaths. That of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish parallels that of Issi (Assi). A person came before Rebbi Yasa¹⁰ to have his vow permitted. He asked him, what did you swear? He answered, ὢ πόποι¹¹ Israel, that she should not enter my house. He said to him, ὢ πόποι Israel, she shall not enter your house!

footnotes: ⁸ The heading of the paragraph, Num ⁹ Except for v. 2, oaths are never mentioned. ¹⁰ Since Yerushalmi אִיסִּי is the same as Babylonian אַסִּי, the formal name should not be יוֹסֵי but יָסָה. ¹¹ Greek πόποι is classically an exclamation of surprise, anger, pain, etc.; it is later explained as “divinities, gods”. While the husband avoided using Hebrew or Aramaic expressions for God’s name, the Greek in this case has the meaning of “God of Israel”; this classifies the act as an oath, which R. Yasa refused to annul. The husband swore that his wife should no longer enter his house, i. e., he forced himself to divorce her and pay her the divorce settlement.

Rebbi Ze‘ira explained the Mishnah: “These are the vows which he can dissolve: Matters connected with mortification. [E. g.], ‘if I wash, if I do not wash; if I shall wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.’ Rebbi Yose said, these are not vows of mortification” but vows between him and her. “The following are vows of mortification¹²” following Rebbi Yose. For example, “she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me, he may dissolve.” The rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Vows between him and her are only dissolved as long as she is married to him. Rebbi Yose says, both vows of mortification and vows between him and her, if he dissolved them they are permanently dissolved¹³. That means, the rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Rebi Yose says, if he dissolves vows between him and her, they are permanently dissolved. What is the difference between them? If she said, any benefit from me shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Why can he not dissolve that? Because she did not say, any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain¹⁴. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila, both of them say: That is the essence of vows between him and her. In the opinion of Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing since we stated there¹⁵: “Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shall dissolve it since maybe he would divorce her, then she would be forbidden to return to him.”

footnotes: ¹² Mishnah 11:2. In this interpretation, Mishnah 2 is the continuation of the remark of R. Yose in Mishnah 1. ¹³ Since R. Yose also agrees that the husband dissolves both vows of mortification and those between him and her, there must be a practical difference between the two classes of vows to make the classification important. ¹⁴ A vow between him and her is only subject to the husband’s dissolution if it interferes with their marital relations. For R. Yose, he can dissolve a vow that would permanently forbid any sex with her after divorce; for the rabbis, he cannot dissolve the vow which comes into effect only after he will have lost the right of dissolution. ¹⁵ Mishnah 11:4, about a woman who vows not to do anything he tells her to do. The rabbis hold that he does not have to dissolve the vow since by law she is required to live with him and keep house for him, and nobody can abolish his duties under the law by making a vow. R. Aqiba holds that he must dissolve the vow since she might do more for him than is legally required and then would violate her vow. R. Joḥanan ben Nuri says that he would be well advised to dissolve the vow since she would not be able to do anything for him after a divorce. This implies that the husband may dissolve now the vow regarding matters between him and her which would become effective only after a future divorce.

Rebbi Hila explained the Mishnah: “These are the vows which he can dissolve: Matters connected with mortification. [E. g.], ‘if I wash, if I do not wash; if I wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.’ ” What means “Rebbi Yose said, these vows are not vows of mortification”? They are vows between him and her. “The following are vows of mortification” is everybody’s opinion¹⁶.

footnotes: ¹⁶ He holds that Mishnah 2 can be read as being accepted by everybody. This implies that R. Yose does not disagree with the anonymous majority that the husband’s powers of dissolution of vows between him and her are restricted to the time of their marriage. He simply disagrees with the classification of the two examples quoted in the Mishnah and holds that not washing or not wearing jewellery is not done as mortification but to spite the husband.

“If I wash, if I do not wash.” It was stated¹⁷ not otherwise recorded.: “If I wash, if I do not wash; if I wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels”, these are vows of mortification. Both according to Rebbi Ze‘ira or according to Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yose seems to contradict his own opinion, as ¹⁸ 8:5, Notes 77–84. it was stated: “A water source belonging to the townspeople, between them and outsiders, they have precedence over outsiders. Between outsiders and their animals, the outsiders have precedence over their animals. Their washing and the lives of outsiders, their washing has precedence over the lives of outsiders.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, who is the Tanna who said that washing is a necessity for survival? Rebbi Yose! As it was stated: “One may use it neither for steeping nor for washing. But Rebbi Yose permits it for washing.” The opinions of Rebbi Yose are contradictory. There he says, washing oneself is not a necessity of life¹⁹. And here, he says washing one’s garments is a necessity of life! Rebbi Mana said, a person might put off washing himself but nobody puts off washing his clothes.

footnotes: ¹⁷ In a baraita ¹⁸ From here to the end of the next paragraph, the text is from Ševi‘it ¹⁹ “There” is the Mishnah here, where R. Yose qualifies not washing as not being a mortification.

¹⁸ 8:5, Notes 77–84. Jehudah from Ḥusa hid himself in a cave for three days because he wanted to find the reason why the necessities of life of one’s town have precedence over the necessities of life of another town. He came to Rabbi Yose bar Ḥalaphta and said, I was hiding in a cave for three days because I wanted to find the reason why the necessities of life of one’s town have precedence over the necessities of life of another town. He called his son Rebbi Abba and asked him about the reason why the necessities of life of one’s town have precedence over the necessities of life of another town. He said to him (Num. 35:15): “These [six] cities shall be”, each town shall be, and only afterwards their surroundings around them. He [R. Yose] said to him [Jehudah from Huṣa], what did cause you [this emharassment]? That you did not study with your companions!

footnotes: ¹⁸ From here to the end of the next paragraph, the text is from Ševi‘it

We understand “if I wash²⁰”. “If I do not wash”? Let her wash! Rebbi Mana said, if she said: “Any benefit from me shall be qônām for you after I shall have washed myself, if I ever wash myself.²¹” Why should he not dissolve for her? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, only when she said, “any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you after I shall have washed myself.²²” Why can he not force? Did not Rebbi Huna say, [if she vowed] any benefit from me [shall be forbidden] to you, he forces her²³ 5:7). and sleeps with her. Any benefit from you [shall be forbidden] to me, he has to dissolve²⁴. There is a difference because it²⁵ is a benefit for him and her. Rebbi Abba Mari said, If I wash [today], I shall not wash forever. If I wear jewellery [today], I shall not wear jewellery forever²⁶. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Nasa: If I wash I shall not wear jewellery; if I wear jewellery I shall not wash.

footnotes: ²⁰ The discussion here is to understand R. Yose, who classifies the vows as being between him and her. He cannot accept the explanation given in Note 2 but it must somehow refer to marital relations. If she makes a vow not to have any relations with him if she washes, it is clear that he may dissolve the vow as one between him and her. But if she makes the vow not to have any relations with him if she does not wash, why can we not rely on her washing, as normal people do? ²¹ The mention of “not washing” is not an independent vow. She makes the vow not to have any relations with him if she washes and then reinforces her statement by the assertion that she will not wash. ²² It is only a vow between him and her if she makes it clear that she refers to marital intercourse. ²³ He goes to court and has her declared an unruly wife; the court will deduct 7 denar from her marriage settlement per week and, if that settlement was reduced to zero, give the husband the right to claim 7 denar per week from any future inheritance or earnings (Mishnah Ketubot ²⁴ Since it is in his hand to dissolve the vow, he cannot sleep with her as long as her vow is in existence since “one does not feed a person anything forbidden to him” (Babli 81b). ²⁵ Sexual relations. ²⁶ R. Abba Mari disagrees with the preceding and holds that the vow means what it says, that it is only about washing (or wearing jewellery) and not about sex. R. Yose holds that a person can go for a day without washing or wearing jewellery; therefore, the vow described in the Mishnah is neither a vow of mortification nor one between him and her; the husband has no way of interfering with that vow. It might become a vow between him and her if she should wash that day.

MISHNAH: The following are vows of mortification. If she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me, he may dissolve. The produce of this province [is qônām] for me, he can buy for her from another province. The produce of this grocery store [is qônām] for me, he cannot dissolve. If he can get the necessities of life only from that grocery⁴, he may dissolve, the words of Rebbi Yose.

footnotes: ⁴ If that store is the only one which extends credit to him and he needs the credit, he can dissolve.

HALAKHAH: Samuel said, if she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me; if there was grain heaped in the grain container²⁷, he may buy for her from that²⁸. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “the produce of the people of this province [is qônām] for me, if there were strangers²⁹ selling there, he can buy from them.

footnotes: ²⁷ The word is explained as a contraction from סִיטוֹדָקֵּי, Greek σιτοδόκη “granary”. The grocer sells grain from his container. ²⁸ Samuel holds that a vow is future directed unless otherwise stated; it does not cover produce already harvested. ²⁹ Greek ξένος “stranger, host”.

It is written³⁰. 30:14.: “Every vow and every oath of prohibition to mortify a person.” For example, [a qônām] if I would taste peppers, if I would taste rolls³¹. Not only if that kind is available now; even if that kind is not available now, perhaps he might bring her some later on. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If there were two pieces before them, one nice and one not nice. If she desired the nice one³² and made a vow to forbid herself the less nice one, he may dissolve that. Why can he dissolve? The colleagues say, because of her mortification³³. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because of his mortification³⁴. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Samuel: A man can dissolve all vows except if she says, any benefit from me shall [be qônām] for X. That means he can dissolve: Any benefit from X shall [be qônām] for me³⁵. But did we not state: “The produce of this grocery store [is qônām] for me, he cannot dissolve.” Explain that following Rebbi Yose and they disagree with him, for we did state there³⁶: “If he can get the necessities of life only from that grocer, he may dissolve.” Rebbi Yose³⁷ said, because he gives him credit, he delivers to him³⁸. Rebbi Mana said, because he gives him good quality produce³⁹.

footnotes: ³⁰ Num ³¹ In the opinion of S. Fraenkel κολλίκιον, diminutive of Greek κόλλιξ “large round bread”. ³² There were two pieces of meat and she was afraid her husband would take the nicer (larger) one for himself. It is assumed that the servants cooked and brought the meal. ³³ She might change her mind and opt for the smaller piece. The Babli, 82b, holds that the husband cannot dissolve as long as she has enough not to be hungry. It does not discuss the case of a person becoming afraid of overeating. ³⁴ Since the verse speaks only of mortification whithout indicating to whom it refers, it is implied that the husband can dissolve his wife’s vow if it mortifies him. ³⁵ The Babli, 82a, agrees with both statements. ³⁶ Which is declared to be R. Yose’s opinion. ³⁷ The late Amora. ³⁸ Since he would have to go hungry if he is temporarily out of cash and could not pay another grocer, this certainly is potential mortification for him. ³⁹ R. Mana even considers it mortification if he had to take a lesser quality from another store.

MISHNAH: ‘A qônām that I shall not have benefit from people⁴⁰’ he cannot dissolve, and she may benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and peah⁴¹ are abandoned by the farmer who has no right to give them to a poor person of his acquaintance. Therefore, the poor receive these gifts from God’s bounty, not from the farmer.. ‘A qônām that priests and Levites can have no benefit from me’; they may take forcibly⁴². ‘These priests and these Levites can have no benefit from me;’ others may take.

footnotes: ⁴⁰ “People” means everybody except her husband, who is considered to be identical with her. ⁴¹ As is pointed out in the Halakhah, these agricultural gifts to the poor, described in Tractate Peah, ⁴² If the person (male or female) has farming property, the vow cannot free them from the obligations which are liens on agricultural produce.

HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not have benefit from people,’ etc. Rebbi Yoḥanan said, so is the Mishnah: “And she may benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and peah.⁴³ vol. 2, p. 264, Note 15.) The Babli, 83b, notes that the first sentence of the Mishnah implies that the husband is not “people”. The second clause, in its version, seems to imply that the woman can eat only from gleanings etc., not from the husband, who would be part of “people” and as such entitled to dissolve the vow. R. Joḥanan points out that the second clause is part of the first sentence, not a stand-alone sentence: The woman may eat from her husband and, in addition, gleanings, abandoned sheaves, and peah.”. It was stated⁴⁴: “And the tithe of the poor.” The tithe of the poor is not listed here. The tithe of the poor is given as acquisition; these by abandoning⁴¹ are abandoned by the farmer who has no right to give them to a poor person of his acquaintance. Therefore, the poor receive these gifts from God’s bounty, not from the farmer..

footnotes: ⁴³ This remark stands for a lenghty discussion in the Babli, whose Mishnah seems to read: “She may benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and peah.” (Cf. The Babylonian Talmud with Variant Readings, Nedarim ⁴⁴ Tosephta 7:4. The Babli, 84a/b, quotes verses which give the farmer the option either to distribute the tithe, then the woman is disqualified; or to abandon it on his threshing floor, then the woman may take it if she is poor. ⁴¹ As is pointed out in the Halakhah, these agricultural gifts to the poor, described in Tractate Peah,

⁴⁶ 6:3, explained there in Notes 59–76. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina said, a person gives his tithes for the benefit of goodwill. Rebbi Joḥanan said, a person may not give his tithes for the benefit of goodwill. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina? (Num. 5:10) “Everybody shall be the owner of his holy things.” Rebbi Joḥanan said “it shall not be his”. May he give them to whomever he likes?

footnotes: ⁴⁶ From here to the end of the Halakhah, the text (with minor variants) is from Demay

A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaninah: “A vow that no Cohanim or Levites should have any advantage from me, they should take against his will.” He explains it about a person who says, I cannot possibly give them any gifts. You should know that this is so, since we have stated: “These Cohanim and Levites should [not] have any advantage from me, let others take.” A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “An Israel can say to another Israel, here you have a tetradrachma and give this firstling to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.” He explains, if he already wanted to give it to two [Cohanim] and that daughter’s son was one of them; then one said, here you have a tetradrachma and give it whole to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.

They asked before Rebbi Zeїra: a Cohen to an Israel, Rebbi forbids. What does Rebbi Yose say? Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa said, so he responded to them: In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina, why is a Cohen to an Israel forbidden, not because it looks badly? Also Rebbi Joḥanan holds that from an Israel to an Israel it is forbidden because it looks badly. In addition, because of the following, as it was stated: “Cohanim and Levites who help at the threshing floor have no right either to heave or to tithe, and if the farmer gave, it is desecrated, as it is said (Lev. 22:15): ‘They should not desecrate the sanctified things of the Children of Israel,’ but they desecrate them! In addition, they said that their heave is no heave, their tithes are no tithes, their dedications are no dedications, and about them the verse says (Micha 3:11): ‘Their heads judge for bribes, [their priests are for hire].’ The Omnipresent brings over them three catastrophies; that is what is written (Micha 3:12): ‘Therefore, because of you Zion will be ploughed over as a field, Jerusalem will be desolate, and the Temple Mount a wooded hill.’

A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If somebody marries preliminarily giving heave, tithes, ‘gifts’, water for sprinkling, or ashes of the red heifer, she is married, even if the groom is an Israel.” He explains it with heave he inherited from his maternal grandfather, a Cohen.

MISHNAH: 4: ‘A qônām that I shall not work according to the wishes of my father, or your father, or my brother, or your brother,’ he cannot dissolve. ‘According to your wish,’ he does not have to dissolve⁴⁷. Rebbi Aqiba says, he has to dissolve, maybe she works more than the required minimum⁴⁸ 5:5.. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he shall dissolve since maybe he would divorce her, then she would be forbidden to return to him.

footnotes: ⁴⁷ Since she is obligated to keep house for him and work in the house, and nobody can annul his obligations by a vow. ⁴⁸ She would be sinning if she did anything for him over the legal minimum stated in Mishnah Ketubot

HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not work according to the wishes of my father,’ etc. There, we have stated⁴⁹ 5:4. The husband dedicated the wife’s income from her work to the Temple. He cannot dispose of what she needs for her livelihood. The question is only about what she earns in excess of her needs. The text of the first part of the paragraph is in Ketubot 5:5 in slightly extended form; the parallel discussion in the Babli Ketubot 58b–59a.: “If somebody dedicates his wife’s work, she works and eats. The excess? Rebbi Meїr says, it is dedicated; Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, it is profane.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree about the excess over five tetradrachmas⁵⁰5:9 that the husband has to give his wife a silver obolus every week as pocket money. If he does not give it, the Mishnah states that he has lost his claim to her earnings (and his dedication is void since nobody can dedicate what is not his.) He can also require her to spin wool in the weight of 5 Judean tetradrachmas.. He explains it in the case of one who supports his wife with food but does not give her an obolus for her needs⁵¹, as we stated: “If he does not give her an obolus for her needs, what she earns is hers”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they disagree about the excess left after [the husband’s] death; for he explains it if he does not support her with food⁵² 58b, this is Samuel’s position.) R. Joḥanan the Alexandrian holds that nobody can dedicate anything not in his possession; therefore, any disposition of his future inheritance which he makes during her lifetime is void.. But if he supports her with food, everybody agrees that it became dedicated⁵³. And here, he cannot dissolve! Rebbi Meїr says. he does not have to dissolve⁵⁴. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, hers. Rebbi Aqiba said, hers. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, his⁵⁵ and R. Aqiba in Nedarim both hold that the excess work of the wife belongs to the wife. Therefore, R. Aqiba requires the husband to dissolve the vow lest the wife give to her husband from her earnings and break her vow. But R. Joḥanan ben Nuri holds that the excess is the husband’s; therefore he only counsels the husband to dissolve to permit him to take his wife back after a divorce..

footnotes: ⁴⁹ Mishnah Ketubot ⁵⁰ It is stated in Mishnah Ketubot ⁵¹ He holds that R. Meїr, who is the presumed author of an anonymous Mishnah, states that spinning the 5 tetradrachmas is for the silver obolus she receives, and the excess of her work is for the food the husband provides. In the case considered here, the husband has no right to the value of the first 5 tetradrachma weights of her spinning but he can dedicate all the excess. R. Joḥanan the Alexandrian will hold that the 5 tetradrachmas will pay for the food and the excess for the pocket money, then the excess is the wife’s property and the husband has no right to dedicate it. ⁵² He explains an arrangement that the wife takes neither food nor money from the husband and retains all her earnings for herself. In that case, the husband has no say about her earnings. But if she dies before him, he inherits from her and can dedicate what he wishes. (In the Babli, Ketubot ⁵³ R. Joḥanan holds that the spinning of the first 5 tetradrachmas pays for food and pocket money. Therefore, anything in excess is unincumbered property of the husband. ⁵⁴ Since she is obligated, she cannot avoid an obligation by a vow. ⁵⁵ R Joḥanan the Alexandrian in Ketubot

“Rebbi Aqiba said, he has to dissolve.” Rebbi Abba said, if she forbids the yields of her work, [vowing] not to work, he can force her up to the weight of five tetradrachmas. More than that he cannot force, for he has to be afraid that she may work more and it turns out that she profits from what is forbidden⁵⁶. Therefore, Rebbi Aqiba says, he has to dissolve his part. Rebbi Hila said, it is impossible for her to make exactly the weight of five tetradrachmas. He could force her up to the weight of five tetradrachmas; more that that he cannot force. He has to be afraid that she might be over the limit by a minute amount; then he would profit from what is forbidden⁵⁷ 1/32 of an obolus (about 4 mg in silver equivalent).. Therefore …⁵⁸.

footnotes: ⁵⁶ Since the excess is hers automatically. ⁵⁷ If she thinks that she spun the weight of five tetradrachmas but in fact she made a little more, then in accepting this he would be sinning inadvertently. It is in his interest to dissolve the vow. The smallest weight measurable in talmudic theory is the peruṭa, ⁵⁸ It seems that one has to insert here the text from R. Abba’s argument.

“Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he should dissolve.” Rebbi Hila said, the reason of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri is that even if he knows that if he divorces her she would be forbidden to return to him, she needles him until he divorces her⁵⁹.

footnotes: ⁵⁹ Since R. Joḥanan ben Nuri holds that the excess work is the husband’s and the vow would be active only after divorce, it seems that at this moment there is neither a vow of mortification nor one between him and her. How could the husband legally dissolve the vow? It seems R. Hila reads “she knows that if he divorces”. He argues that it is a vow between him and her since the wife, knowing that the husband would be extremely reluctant to divorce her, could be quite unpleasant with impunity and he would suffer.

MISHNAH: If his wife made a vow and he was under the impression that it was his daughter, or his daughter made a vow and he was under this impression that it was his wife. If she vowed to be a nazir and he was under the impression that she vowed a sacrifice, or if she vowed a sacrifice and he was under the impression that she vowed to be a nazir. If she woved to abstain from figs and he was under the impression that it was from grapes, or if from grapes and he was under the impression that it was from figs, he shall dissolve a second time⁶⁰.

footnotes: ⁶⁰ Since erroneous dissolutions or confirmations are invalid, the time limit for dissolution starts to run again the moment he is informed of his error.

HALAKHAH: “If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste these figs and grapes,” etc. Even if he heard and remained silent, even if he heard and confirmed⁶².

footnotes: ⁶² This refers to Mishnah 5. Even if he had erroneously confirmed the vow, once he is informed of the true situation, he may dissolve. This is explicit in the Tosephta, 7:4.

MISHNAH: If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste these figs and grapes, if he confirmed for the figs he confirmed everything. If he dissolved for figs it is not dissolved unless he also dissolves for grapes⁶¹. If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste these figs, that I shall not taste these grapes; these are two vows.

footnotes: ⁶¹ A partially confirmed vow is confirmed; a partially dissolved vow is not dissolved (Tosephta 7:4).

HALAKHAH: Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it⁶³ 30: 14: “Her husband may confirm it or her husband may dissolve it.” The Tosephta (7:4) has a fifth version: The husband may confirm one and dissolve the other of two vows made at the same time, i. e., it is applicable to the situation described at the end of Mishnah 6.”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally⁶⁴, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. The Mishnah follows him who said, “he shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. As we have stated: “If he confirmed for the figs he confirmed everything. If he dissolved for figs it is not dissolved unless he also dissolves for grapes.” If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste a fig nor a grape berry, that is a matter of difference between Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Ismael says, the vow decides, and Rebbi Aqiba says, the prohibition decides⁶⁵.

footnotes: ⁶³ Num. ⁶⁴ The husband has only the choice to accept or to reject the wife’s vow in toto. ⁶⁵ In Halakhah 9, R. Ismael says the determining factor is the vow. A multiplicity of vows made at the same time is treated as a multiplicity; there are two separate vows in our case. R. Aqiba says that a multiplicity of prohibitions imposed at the same time are one prohibition; there is only one vow.

MISHNAH: ‘I knew that there are vows but I did not know that they can be dissolved.’ ‘I knew that one can dissolve but I did not realize that this was a vow.’ Rebbi Meĩr says, he cannot dissolve, but the Sages say, he can dissolve⁶⁶.

footnotes: ⁶⁶ R. Meïr holds that he had his chance; if he did not use it because of his ignorance, it is his fault. The Sages hold that the time for dissolution starts only when he is instructed about the law. In the Babli, 87b/88a, R. Meïr’s position is explained by his interpretation of the biblical verses.

HALAKHAH: “ ‘T knew that there are vows,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the reason of Rebbi Meïr: It is a subterfuge. He wants her to make vows so he can divorce her⁶⁷ sum (Mishnah Ketubot 7:6).. That is not so, he could have divorced her on the first occasion⁶⁸.

footnotes: ⁶⁷ This refers to the second case, when he admits that he knew he could dissolve his wife’s vows. Then he should have dissolved the vow immediately even if it was a borderline case. If it was a vow, it would be dissolved; if it was not a vow, no harm would have been done. We suspect that he wants to encourage his wife to make vows so he could claim that she always makes vows and one cannot expect from him to live with such a wife; he asks permission from the court to divorce her without payment of the ketubah ⁶⁸ This gives the position of the Sages who note that he could have started complaining at the first vow. Therefore, they accept his words at face value.

MISHNAH: If a person is by a vow prevented to benefit his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband shall have no claim to them, except what you trade for your needs.

HALAKHAH: “If a person is by a vow prevented to benefit his son-in-law,” etc. It was stated⁶⁹: “Neither do you”. Rebbi said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meĩr, for Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master⁷⁰ 1:3 (60a 1. 26), Babli 23b; Ma‘aser Šeni 4:4, Notes 89,96; Ketubot 6:1 (30c 1. 46); Eruvin 7:6 (24c 1. 62)]. Similarly, R. Meïr gives the husband property rights in everything his wife acquires. He will accept a contract in which the wife retains all her earnings while renouncing all support from her husband as a contract in which the wife acts by the husband’s authorization. The majority accepts separate property both for the slave and the wife.. Because he said “neither do you.” If he had not said “neither do you”, if the wife acquired, the husband would have acquired.

footnotes: ⁶⁹ In this version, the father cannot give his daughter an unrestricted gift. He must spell out a use; the daughter cannot save the money for an unspecified future. ⁷⁰ For R. Meïr, anything the slave acquires becomes automatically his master’s property. Therefore, no slave can buy his freedom from his master since he cannot have money that is not his master’s. Any money needed for his manumission must be in the hand of a third party [Babli 88b; Qiddušin

MISHNAH: “The vow of a widow or a divorcee, anything she forbids to herself shall be confirmed.⁷⁰ 1:3 (60a 1. 26), Babli 23b; Ma‘aser Šeni 4:4, Notes 89,96; Ketubot 6:1 (30c 1. 46); Eruvin 7:6 (24c 1. 62)]. Similarly, R. Meïr gives the husband property rights in everything his wife acquires. He will accept a contract in which the wife retains all her earnings while renouncing all support from her husband as a contract in which the wife acts by the husband’s authorization. The majority accepts separate property both for the slave and the wife.” How is that? If she said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she married within these thirty days he cannot dissolve. If she made the vow under her husband’s authority and he dissolved it, if she had said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she should become a widow or a divorcee within the next 30 days, it remains dissolved. If she made a vow, was on the same day divorced⁷¹, and taken back, he cannot dissolve. This is the principle: He cannot dissolve for any one who was on her own for one moment.

footnotes: ⁷⁰ For R. Meïr, anything the slave acquires becomes automatically his master’s property. Therefore, no slave can buy his freedom from his master since he cannot have money that is not his master’s. Any money needed for his manumission must be in the hand of a third party [Babli 88b; Qiddušin ⁷¹ She was definitively married or was an adult. By divorce she became an independent adult. If he remarries her, even on the same day, the vow precedes the marriage and is out of the husband’s power.

HALAKHAH: “The vow of a widow or a divorcee,” etc. This refers to what Rebbi Ismael says, the vow decides; Rebbi Aqiba says, prohibition decides⁷². If vow and prohibition came together⁷³? How is that? She said, I shall be a nazir in 30 days. Her husband heard it and did not dissolve⁷⁴. He divorced her and remarried her within the 30 days. Is that when vow and prohibition come together⁷⁵ the moment I shall be married. R. Ismael says, the husband can dissolve (since the vow starts to be active in his domain, it is not a vow preceding the marriage). R. Aqiba says, he cannot dissolve (since the vow was made when she was a widow). In the case here, the remarriage was before the 30 days were over; for R. Ismael there is no question that the husband can dissolve the vow. For R. Aqiba the question is whether the divorce is counted to introduce a new domain, in which case he can dissolve, or is a continuation of the old, in which case he had his chance and did not use it. The question is not resolved.?

footnotes: ⁷² Cf. Note 65. R. Aqiba says the moment she imposed the prohibition is the decisive one; since at that time she had no husband, the vow is not under the later husband’s jurisdiction. R. Ismael says that the point of activation of the vow determines; there is no vow until after 30 days and the husband then can dissolve the vow. The Mishnah follows R. Aqiba. This interpretation of the opinions of Rebbis Aqiba and Ismael is forced by the Tosephta, 7:6, and is interpreted in this way in the Babli, 89a. ⁷³ It is the normal case that a woman makes a vow for immediate validity. But we are looking for a case involving a divorcee. ⁷⁴ For R. Aqiba, he had his chance and missed it. For R. Ismael, his inaction is irrelevant since the vow is not yet activated. ⁷⁵ The Tosephta states: A widow who said: I shall be a nazir

MISHNAH: The vows of nine young women⁷⁶ are confirmed: An adult who is an orphan, an adolescent who became an adult and is an orphan, an adolescent who did not become an adult but is an orphan. An adult whose father died, an adolescent who became an adult and her father died, an adolescent who did not become an adult and her father died. An adolescent whose father died and afterwards she became an adult, an adult whose father lives, an adolescent girl whose father lives. Rebbi Jehudah says, also if somebody marries off his underage daughter and she becomes widowed or divorced and returns to him, she still is an adolescent⁷⁷.

footnotes: ⁷⁶ In this introduction to the Mishnah, נערה is used in a nontechnical term “young female”, whether minor, adolescent, or of age. Later the same word is used in a more technical sense, “underage or adolescent.” The principle underlying the Mishnah is very simple: The vows of an unmarried girl are not subject to dissolution if either she has no father or she is emancipated from him either by coming of age or by having been definitively married and then divorced or widowed. ⁷⁷ R. Jehudah denies that an underage girl (not an adolescent) is emancipated from her father by marriage.

HALAKHAH: “The vows of nine young women are confirmed,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there are two⁷⁸. But why did we state “two”? To train the students. And according to Rebbi Jehudah, there are three.

footnotes: ⁷⁸ One category is the orphan and the minor or adolescent emancipated by dissolution of her marriage; the other is the adult. For R. Jehudah, the widowed or divorced minor falls in a separate category. The Babli, 89b, holds that the nine are R. Jehudah’s but that the majority recognizes the adult, the orphan, and the minor or adolescent emancipated by dissolution of her marriage.

MISHNAH: ‘A qônām that I shall not take any benefit from my father, or your father, if I shall do anything for you.’ ‘[A qônām] that I shall not have any benefit from you if I shall do anything for my father, or for your father.’ These he can dissolve.

HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not take any benefit from my father, or your father,” etc. It was stated⁷⁹ vol. 7, p. 501; Babli 89b.: Rebbi Nathan says, he cannot dissolve⁸⁰, but the Sages say, he can dissolve. Why can he dissolve? The colleagues say, because of his mortification⁸¹. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila say, because of her mortification⁸².

footnotes: ⁷⁹ Tosephta 7:7; cf. Tosefta ki-Fshutah ⁸⁰ The reason seems to be that the vow is neither a mortification nor does it hinder marital relations. The Babli gives as reason that the husband cannot dissolve as long as his wife did not work for him because the prohibition did not start. There is no hint of that in the Yerushalmi. ⁸¹ He feels badly about the situation; that is reason enough. ⁸² They hold that his being hurt can never be a reason. He gets the power of dissolution because she might be hurt by this in the future.

MISHNAH: Earlier they said, three categories of women have to be divorced and collect their ketubah: The one who says, I am impure for you⁸³ 21:7) is a woman who had sexual contact with a man whom she could not legally marry, and a married woman cannot marry anybody, she is forbidden to her husband who has to divorce her. Since it is not her fault, he has to pay the entire ketubah sum., or Heaven is between you and me⁸⁴, or I am separated from the Jews⁸⁵ payment.. They changed to say that a woman should not be encouraged to want another man and cause trouble to her husband. If she says, I am impure for you, she should bring proof⁸⁶. Heaven is between you and me, they should try to mediate⁸⁷ 65b, holds that the rabbi shall grant the divorce and not try to keep the wife in the marriage if she claims that their financial situation is such that she needs children to care for her in her old age and the husband cannot provide the children.. I am separated from the Jews, he shall dissolve his part, she shall live with him and be separated from the Jews⁸⁸.

footnotes: ⁸³ The wife of a Cohen who declares that she was raped without witnesses. Since the rabbinically accepted definition of a זוֹנָה (Lev. ⁸⁴ She claims that he is infertile. ⁸⁵ She made a vow not to sleep with any Jew. The earlier opinion was that a woman would not make such a vow unless she suffers from vaginism and sexual relations are painful for her. Since the vow is not frivolous, she can claim her ketubah ⁸⁶ Obviously not proof beyond a reasonable doubt but to make the claim plausible. ⁸⁷ As long as it is infertility, not impotence, she cannot force a divorce. The Babli, Yebamot ⁸⁸ Since she made the vow only against sleeping with Jews, not with any man in the world, one assumes that she can enjoy intercourse and only prefers Gentiles.

HALAKHAH: “Earlier they said,” etc. That is, if she cannot bring proof for her assertion, it is obvious that she is permitted to her house⁸⁹. Rebbi Hila said, would it not be reasonable that a fellow should be apprehensive⁹⁰ R. Hila suggests that the strictly observant should follow the earlier Mishnah in this case., and if he was a Cohen that she should be forbidden to eat heave⁹¹? There came a case before Rebbi Ḥanina, the colleague of the rabbis, and he permitted her to eat heave. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, my father knew the first and the last case. Soldiers⁹² entered the town. A woman came and said, a soldier⁹² embraced me and ejaculated semen between my knees. He permitted her to eat heave⁹³2:2).. There came a case before Rebbi Isaac bar Tevele of a woman who said, my cowhand⁹⁴ seduced⁹⁵ (Seduction of a minor is treated as rape; cf. Soṭah 1:1, Note 91.) me. He said to her, is the cowhand not forbidden? And he forbade her. Here, you say that he forbade her. There, you say that he permitted her. There, she came to forbid herself and he permitted her. But here, she came to permit herself and he forbade her.

footnotes: ⁸⁹ Since the later Mishnah states that she is not divorced, obviously she will be permitted to her husband. ⁹⁰ A “fellow” follows the rules of purity strictly, cf. Introduction to Tractate Demay. ⁹¹ In the Babli, 90b, this is the authoritative opinion of Rava. (There is internal and some ms. evidence that the author of this opinion is the less authoritative Rabba. In that case, the Babli would concur with the Yerushalmi that she may eat heave. But the legal tradition is to read Rava.) ⁹² Greek στρατιώτης, “warrior, commander”. ⁹² Greek στρατιώτης, “warrior, commander”. ⁹³ Since we do not know of the incident from any other source, “the mouth which forbade” (she, who tells of the encounter with the soldier) “is the mouth which permitted” (that there was no penetration) (Mishnah Ketubot ⁹⁴ Reading בֵּיהָם “the one who cares for the cattle” for ביאם because of the disappearance of guttural sounds; already noted by David Fraenckel. ⁹⁵ An adult woman is guilty of adultery if she lets herself be seduced and must be divorced without payment of the ketubah.

“Heaven is between you and me”: as Heaven is far from earth, so this woman should be far from that man. “They should try to mediate.” Rav Huna said, they should make a dinner and they will get used to be with one another by the dinner.

⁹⁶ It was stated: “I am jailed away from you, I am separated away from you”. Rebbi Jeremiah asked, why did one not state “taken away from”? Rebbi Yose said, that was stated at the end: “I am taken away from the Jews.”

footnotes: ⁹⁶ This is from Chapter 1, Note 74.

If she was divorced⁹⁷, let her go and cling to the Arabs, for she loves them.

footnotes: ⁹⁷ The woman who vowed not to sleep with Jews.

¹ If a woman made a vow to be a nazir; her husband heard and did not dissolve it: Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Jehudah say, he put his finger between her teeth⁹⁹, for if he wants to confirm, he can confirm. If he said, I cannot stand her being a nazir, he should divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon say, she put her finger between her teeth, for if he wants to confirm, he can confirm¹⁰⁰ 7:2, the Yerushalmi notes that if the husband by needling his wife pushes her to make the vow, Rebbis Yose and Simeon agree that he put his finger between her teeth.). If she said, I can stand it to be a nazir, he may divorce her¹⁰¹ without paying the ketubah.” Remove this, how can Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Jehudah say so in the Mishnah¹⁰²? Even in the later Mishnah, why did he not dissolve? Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon follow the later Mishnah¹⁰³. But you might say, the earlier Mishnah. Why did she make the vow?

footnotes: ¹ Tosephta Nezirut 3:12-13. In the Babli, Ketubot 71a, there is a lengthy discussion about the attribution of the statements to different authors. ⁹⁹ He is to blame if she bites and hurts him. ¹⁰⁰ She knows that she takes the risk that her husband would confirm her vow and she would be unable to serve him wine, or to cook dishes which require wine in the recipe, and that at the end she will be without her hair, so that the husband might get exasperated. (In Ketubot ¹⁰¹ If he cannot stand living with a nezirah. ¹⁰² It seems that the text here is somewhat defective, judging from the following parallel story. In any case, if he does not dissolve his wife’s vows, the husband is responsible for all consequences. ¹⁰³ In requiring the woman to repeat and affirm her statement.