MISHNAH: Partners¹ who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another are forbidden to enter the courtyard². Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, each one enters into what is his³ 1:6 explains that the parties of a common courtyard can force a partition if the area of the courtyard exceeds a certain minimum. As the Babli explains, 46b, R. Eliezer ben Jacob refers only to a courtyard larger than the minimum. He holds that each square inch of the courtyard is potentially the property of one owner, only it was not determined who the actual owner is. Therefore, each of the partners can claim that he temporarily steps only onto his own property. It must be that R. Eliezer ben Jacob permits a straight walk from the entrance gate to the house door; this would be the domain belonging to the person’s house in a separation of properties.. Both are forbidden to put up there a grindstone or an oven, or to raise chickens there⁴. If one of them made a vow not to have usufruct from the other, he cannot enter the courtyard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, one can say to the other, I enter into my property, I do not enter into yours. One forces the one who made the vow to sell his part⁵.

footnotes: ¹ People who own houses built around a common courtyard. They are partners in the courtyard. One exits from the houses to the street only through the courtyard. ² For the anonymous Tanna, the entire courtyard is common property; nobody can enter the courtyard without stepping into the property of both of them. Therefore, neither one can enter his courtyard without profiting from the other’s property. ³ Mishnah Baba batra ⁴ Everybody agrees that the common courtyard can be used for private purposes only by the consent of all owners. If the person forbidden by a vow did not object to the other using the courtyard for his private purpose, he would make him a present of monetary value. ⁵ According to the Babli, this statement refers to the majority position. According to the Yerushalmi, this is part of R. Eliezer ben Jacob’s statement and is explained in the Halakhah.

HALAKHAH: “Partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another,” etc. The rabbis say, every single [square] hand-breadth is common property of the partners. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, each one enters into what is his. If the courtyard was divided by pebbles⁶, even the rabbis agree. If one of them went and sold his part, even Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees⁷. If they contracted between themselves to concede⁸ but in the contract agreed that they would not insist on excluding the other party from entering the separate domain of the other party. Then for the rabbis the split did not change anything., it is still in the hands of the partners. It is only needed if they did not contract between themselves to concede; what is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he buys higher and sells lower⁹”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he should not lend him nor ask him for anything¹⁰,”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And what Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim said, that he should not stay long¹¹?

footnotes: ⁶ Greek ψῆφος. If at some time they decide to mark the borders between the domains belonging to the different houses by rows of pebbles cemented into the ground, this amounts to a division of the common property and the rabbis will not hold that a formal contract is needed to disestablish the former common domain. (In modern Hebrew, the word means “mosaic”.) ⁷ If one of the partners sells his part, he can no longer claim to enter into what is his and even according to R. Eliezer ben Jacob he is forbidden to set foot in the courtyard. ⁸ They split the common courtyard as outlined in Baba batra ⁹ Chapter 3, Note 147. Does R. Eliezer ben Jacob permit transactions at the regular price? ¹⁰ Chapter 4, Note 99. Since no transfer of property is involved, does R. Eliezer ben Jacob agree? ¹¹ Chapter 4, Note 76. Does R. Eliezer ben Jacob agree that the visits have to be as short as possible?

“Both are forbidden to put a grindstone or an oven up there, or to raise chickens there⁴.” This is needed for Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob¹², for what he states about “partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another.” Because they mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another, does this imply that if they had not made vows not to have usufruct from one another, they would be presumed to concede one to the other¹³? Rebbi Jeremiah said, partners have the custom to concede one to the other in these matters. There¹⁴ 3:6. It is stated there that simply putting a stove, a grindstone, or chickens into a courtyard does not create a presumption of ownership, but building a foundation for the grindstone or an enclosure for the oven does., we have stated: “The following establish presumption of ownership.¹⁵ 12, Note 29 (Mishnah Baba batra 3:4).” Rebbi Eleazar said, if somebody raises chickens in a courtyard in which he does not dwell, this establishes presumption of ownership. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. As you look at it, if he had the right to raise them, he raised them. If he had no right to raise them, he established a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Benaiah: Partners can veto any activity of the other party in a courtyard except for washing¹⁶ 57b. The statement of R. Jeremiah does not appear in the Babli., for the honor of the daughters of Israel¹⁷. Rebbi Mattaniah said, that is, at a place where women wash, but not at a place where men wash¹⁸. And what you say except for washing in the courtyard [applies to] the entire courtyard except for the four cubits of that party where one cannot hinder anything¹⁹. But if the place was at an incline, one can veto even within the four cubits of another party since one might say to him, you pour out and it flows down to my place²⁰. It was stated: The place of an oven or a hearth does not establish a presumption of ownership, but roofing of any size on top of them establishes a presumption of ownership²¹ 3:6 it is asserted that only a wall of at least ten hand-breadths around an oven or a hearth does count. The text here is very close to Tosephta Baba batra 2:13: Putting an oven or a hearth in a courtyard does not establish a presumption of ownership, but making a roof of any size does.. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, only if the wall is useful for the oven.

footnotes: ⁴ Everybody agrees that the common courtyard can be used for private purposes only by the consent of all owners. If the person forbidden by a vow did not object to the other using the courtyard for his private purpose, he would make him a present of monetary value. ¹² While the rabbis agree, for them the statement is immaterial since both partners are forbidden entry into the courtyard. ¹³ If somebody wants to put up an oven or a grindstone in the courtyard, can he presume to have the permission of all inhabitants of the courtyard without asking? ¹⁴ Mishnah Baba batra ¹⁵ In the absence of documents, a testimony of three years of undisturbed ownership together with a claim of legal acquisition (by buying, inheritance, or gift) entitles the occupant to a documentary title; cf. Yebamot ¹⁶ He disagrees with R. Jeremiah and the conclusion drawn from the formulation of the Mishnah. The same statement in the Babli, Baba batra ¹⁷ It cannot be expected that a Jewish woman would go to the river to do her washing there and be seen by everybody without shoes and with uncovered arms. ¹⁸ If men wash it is a commercial activity and that certainly needs the permission of the other dwellers in the courtyard. ¹⁹ A strip four cubits wide along the entire front of a house is private property of the owner of the house, not common property of the partners and, as a matter of principle, the owner of the house can do there anything he wants; the mistress of the house can wash there without asking anybody. ²⁰ That is not a matter of property rights but of torts; the injured party could claim damages. ²¹ In Mishnah Baba batra

Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Partners can acquire one from the other²² 8:1, Note 15, rabbinic practice does not recognize transfer of property by payment, but only by delivery or a symbolic act indicating delivery. Also, since anything found on a person’s real estate is his, one can state that real estate acquires for its owner (cf. Peah 5, Note 125; Kilaim 8, Note 46). If there is only one owner, delivery of goods into the courtyard is legal delivery and transfer of ownership. R. Joḥanan asserts here that even among partners on their common real estate one may assume, following R. Eliezer ben Jacob, that the place on which some merchandise is put is at least temporarily owned by the acquiring party alone. This supports the opinion in the Babli, 46b, that practice follows R. Eliezer ben Jacob. R. Abun bar Cahana follows the opinion of the anonymous majority, that common property is not divisible, and requires an action by the acquirer, either collecting the objects or at least moving them in a symbolic display of ownership rights. and are responsible for damages inflicted by one on the other²³ 3:8 to show that an owner is liable for injuries on his property suffered by anybody being on the property by right or invitation.. Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, if he said, collect and acquire. But if they were collected he does not acquire unless he moves.

footnotes: ²² As explained in Ševi‘it ²³ This statement is taken in Baba qama

“I enter my property, I do not enter yours.” And you say, one forces him²⁵? It was not said on this, but on²⁶: “I enter your partner’s property, I do not enter yours.” In that case one forces the [maker of the vow] to sell his part. If he says, you shall not have any usufruct from me. But not if he says, I shall not have any usufruct from you²⁷.

footnotes: ²⁵ There seems to be no reason why R. Eliezer ben Jacob should require a sale of the property. It is clear that following the anonymous rabbis a person who by the vow of another is prevented to reach his own house can sue to remove this obstacle and force the maker of the vow to divest himself of the real estate. ²⁶ Mishnah 2, speaking of a third person C visiting a partner B while partner A had forbidden him any use of his property. ²⁷ There is trouble only if A forbids all his property to C but not if A forbids himself any of C’s properties. Unfortunately, the word מוּדָּר admits of both interpretations. If A makes the vow, מוּדָּר בּ- means that A takes nothing from C, מוּדָּר מ- that C may have nothing from A. The Babylonian Mishnah 2 follows the first alternative, the Yerushalmi one the second.

MISHNAH: If anyone from outside was under a vow of no usufruct from one [of the partners], he should not enter the courtyard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, he can say to him, I enter your partner’s property, I do not enter yours.

HALAKHAH: “If anyone from outside was,” etc. And we did not state “one forces”! Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “If he was a frequent maker of vows, one forces him,” because the other [partner] can say to him, one came to me and you did such and such to him; a second person and you did such and such to him; the third time he tells him either you undo your vow or sell your part.

MISHNAH: If one was under a vow not to have usufruct from another and he owns a bathhouse or an olive press leased out in town; if he retains the grip of a hand²⁸, Swiss legal German Hand, French (for real estate) main. on them, the other one is forbidden; if he retains no grip of a hand on them, the other one is permitted. If a person says to another, a qônām that I shall not enter your house, or that I shall not buy your field, if the owner died or sold it, the other one is permitted. That I shall not enter this house, or that I shall not buy this field, if the owner died or sold it, the other one is forbidden.

footnotes: ²⁸ “Hand” here means “possession”, as in Middle High German hant

HALAKHAH: What is the grip of a hand? One half, a third, or a quarter²⁹.

footnotes: ²⁹ If the lessee pays a percentage of revenue or gain (in the examples between 50% and 25%), the original owner is directly profiling from the other’s use of his facilities. But if the rent is a fixed sum, then no gain accrues directly to the building’s owner by people using bathhouse or olive press. The latter statement is explicit in the Babli, 46b.

“This, your house,” because of what do you catch him? Because of “your house,” “this”³³ to 46b) has a slightly enlarged text: משום ביתך או משום זה “because of ‘your house’ or because of ‘this’?” The text as it stands is completely intelligible. A vow because of “your house” becomes void if it is no longer the other’s, because of “this” is permanent.? If it collapsed and he himself rebuilt it, is it not “this”? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody said to his heirs, give a wedding house to my son or a widow’s house to my daughter, if it collapsed, the heirs are required to rebuild it.³⁴ does not say that if he said “this house” the heirs do not have to rebuild, it follows that “your house” is determining, not “this”. This means that if the house collapses and he rebuilds, it is forbidden, but if it is sold, it is permitted.” ³⁵ 9:14, source of the Mishnah. There, we have stated: “If somebody says to his son, ‘a qônām that you can not enjoy anything from me,’ if he dies, [the son] inherits³⁶. 27:6–11), not by his father’s will.. ‘During my lifetime and after my death,’ if he dies, [the son] does not inherit.³⁷” [Did we not state, ‘during my lifetime’, [the son] inherits; ‘after my death’, [the son] inherits?] What is the difference between the one who says it one by one and the one who says it by twos³⁸ forbidding his property during his lifetime, is valid, but the second one for the time after his death is invalid since nobody can forbid to another person anything not in his possession. Why does it become valid if combined?? ³⁹ switches the Mishnaiot quoted, respectively, by Rav Jeremiah and Rebbi Yose. Rav Jeremiah and Rebbi Yose [ben Ḥanina] both say, ‘a qônām that I⁴⁰ cannot enjoy these my properties during my lifetime and after my death,’ from the moment he said “these” he forbade to him during his lifetime and after his death⁴¹. Rebbi Yose said, we have stated in Nedarim what we did not state in S̄ebuot⁴². In Baba Qama, the text is: “We have stated in Neziqin what we did not state in Nedarim,” but there, the reference is to a Mishnah in Neziqin, cf. Note 39. The difference is not a variant reading.: “A qônām that I shall not enter your house, or that I shall not buy your field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is permitted. That I shall not enter this house, or that I shall not buy this field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is forbidden.” Because he said “this”. Therefore, if he had not said “this”, he would have⁴³ forbidden”. In Baba Qama this last sentence is missing; the preceding one reads: “Because he said ‘these’, he forbade to him both during his lifetime and after his death.” forbidden to him both during his lifetime and after his death.

footnotes: ³³ Rashba (Novellae ³⁴ Since the baraita ³⁵ From here to the end of the paragraph there is an approximate parallel in Baba Qama ³⁶ Since he inherits by biblical decree (Num ³⁷ Cf. Chapter 2, Note 15; Babli 47a. ³⁸ If he makes two separate vows, the first one, a qônām ³⁹ The text in Baba Qama ⁴⁰ It seems that instead of עלי “for me” one has to read עליו “for him”, as is clear from the rest of the sentence. ⁴¹ Both of them disagree with the position taken earlier by the editors of the Yerushalmi and assert that “this” overrides “your house”. If the house collapses and he rebuilds, it is permitted, but if sold, it remains forbidden. ⁴² There is no comparable Mishnah in Tractate Šebuot ⁴³ It seems that one has to read “had not

MISHNAH: “I am ḥerein for you⁴⁴ is an expression for a gift to the Temple of offerings that cannot be redeemed, Lev. 27:28. As a term for a vow, it is equivalent to qorbān.”, the addressee is forbidden⁴⁵. “You are for me ḥerem,” the vower is forbidden. “I am for you and you are for me,” both are forbidden. Both are permitted the institutions of the returnees from Babylonia⁴⁶ and forbidden the institutions of their own town⁴⁷.

footnotes: ⁴⁴ Ḥerem ⁴⁵ To have any usufruct from the vower’s property. ⁴⁶ These are detailed in Mishnah 5. They were destined for public use and are immune against private vows. ⁴⁷ Since both of them are partners in the public institutions of the town; cf. Mishnah 1.

HALAKHAH: “ “I am ḥerem for you”, etc. ‘A qônām that I shall not have any usufruct from you and anyone I would ask about you’, he has to ask about the first but not the second. Some Tannaïm state: He has to ask both about the first and the second⁴⁸. Samuel the son of Rebbi Joseph ben Rebbi Abun said, that follows the one who said “after the prohibition”⁴⁹. But for the one who said “after the vow”, a vow which is partially invalid is totally invalid⁵⁰.

footnotes: ⁴⁸ If a person vows not to have anything from a certain other person and any rabbi who would dissolve this vow, if he has second thoughts and asks a rabbi to disolve the vow, there are differing opinions on whether he then has to ask a second rabbi to dissolve his vow regarding the first rabbi. In the Babli, 90a/b, two questions are raised which are not found in the Yerushalmi: (1) What means first and second; maybe first is the rabbi whom he has to approach and second the object of the vow? (2) Is it clear whether a vow can be dissolved that has not yet led to any prohibition? ⁴⁹ This refers to the disagreement of R. Ismael and R. Aqiba (Chapter 3, Note 128; Halakhah 11:9, Babli 89a) whether the point in time which determines the rules is the moment the vow is made or the moment the prohibition is slated to begin. For R. Ismael, who holds that the moment of prohibition is determining, the second prohibition starts the moment the vower goes to see a rabbi. Therefore, that prohibition has to be dissolved also. But for R. Aqiba, who goes after the moment the vow was made, there is a vow only about one person and when that prohibition is lifted, the vow and the second case with it disappear. ⁵⁰ Mishnah 9:6, cf. Chapter 3, Note 84.

⁵¹ 8a, Sanhedrin 112a.“A person who makes a vow ‘to forbid himself the people of the town,’ if another person came and dwelled there for thirty days, [the vower] is permitted to deal with him. ‘From the inhabitants of the town,’ if another person came and dwelled there for thirty days, [the vower] is prohibited from dealing with him.⁵²” ‘A qônām that the people of my town cannot have any usufruct from me,’ he cannot ask the local rabbi⁵³. ‘The usufruct of the people of my town [is forbidden] to me’, he can ask the local rabbi. Some Tannaïm state, even in the first case he can ask, for it does not mean that [the rabbi] would dissolve his own vow⁵⁴. A vow of the community cannot be dissolved⁵⁵ 36a, Makkot 16a); since voter rolls change continuously, it is impossible to get all people who voted for the vow together to ask for dissolution.. A vow made in public cannot be dissolved⁵⁶ 36a, decides against this.. ⁵⁷“If somebody made a vow that another should not have usufruct from him, if the vow was made in the other’s presence, he can request the vow to be dissolved only in the other’s presence; if the vow was not made in the other’s presence, he can request the dissolution either in the other’s presence or in his absence.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, because of the shame; Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, because of the suspicion⁵⁸. 2:21), God dissolved his vow not at the Senna-bush but in Midian, with the consent of his family (Ex. 3:18)..

footnotes: ⁵¹ Tosephta 2:10, a slightly different version in the Babli, Baba Batra ⁵² “People of the town” are its taxpayers. The obligation to pay local taxes starts only with a residence of 12 months. “Town dwellers” are those who have to contribute to the local welfare fund. That obligation starts after thirty days. ⁵³ Since he is an interested party. ⁵⁴ The rabbi does not have to disqualify himself since formally he is only forbidden to dissolve his own vows and it is probably embarrassing to him to deal with a person who makes that kind of vow. ⁵⁵ This is generally agreed on (Babli Giṭṭin ⁵⁶ The Babli, Giṭṭin ⁵⁷ Tosephta 2:10. ⁵⁸ R. Joḥanan feels that the maker of an inappropriate vow should be shamed, R. Joshua ben Levi requires the other party to be present lest he thought that the vower broke his vow. The Babli, 65a, disagrees and holds that the rule is biblical. Since Moses had sworn to Reuel to stay in Midian (Ex

It turns out that one disagreement is like an other other disagreement, as it was stated: On the Day of Atonement, one has to detail one’s deeds, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Aqiba says, one does not have to detail the sin⁶⁰, Yerushalmi 1:9 (45c, 1. 48); Babli 86b. [There, the first author is R. Jehudah ben Baba. In the first hand of the Munich ms. the second author is R. Jehudah; this seems to have been the reading of Maimonides (Tešubah 2:3) and Tosafot Yešenim ad loc.]. Some Tannïm state, one has to detail the vow; some Tannïm state, one does not have to detail the vow. A person made a vow not to earn money. He came before Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom. He asked him, what did you forswear to yourself? He said to him, not to earn money. Rebbi Yudan said to him, is there anyone doing that? He said to him, as a gambler⁶¹. He said, praise to Him Who chose the Torah and the Sages who said, one has to detail the vow⁶².

footnotes: ⁶⁰ Yoma ⁶¹ Perhaps Greek κυβευτής, ὁ “gambler”. (In rabbinic practice, a professional gambler is inadmissible as a witness.) ⁶² If he had not asked, he would have dissolved the vow which did not warrant dissolution.

MISHNAH: What are the institutions of the returnees from Babylonia? For example, the Temple Mount, the courtyards⁶³, and the cistern in the middle of the road⁶⁴. What are the institutions of that town? For example, the town square, the bathhouse, the synagogue with the ark and the scrolls. And he writes his part to the Patriarch⁶⁵. Rebbi Jehudah says, one of them writes to the Patriarch and the other to a private person⁷². What is the difference between him who writes to the Patriarch and him who writes to a private person? The one who writes to the Patriarch does not have to perform an act of delivery⁷³ 4:8). Following the terminology of the Book of Ruth, in Babylonian/rabbinic terminology this act is called קִנְיָן “acquisition”., the one who writes to a private person has to perform an act of delivery. But the Sages say, in either case one has to perform an act of delivery. Rebbi Jehudah says, the people of Galilee do not have to write since their forefathers already wrote for them⁷⁴.

footnotes: ⁶³ The Temple courtyards. ⁶⁴ Traditionally made for pilgrims. ⁶⁵ In the case of Mishnah 4, if each one writes over his part of the public institutions of the town to the Patriarch, both of them are permitted to walk in the town and to use its institutions. ⁷² This is a continuation of the previous Mishnah. R. Jehudah permits either of the parties to donate their usufruct of public property to a third party even though public property is not transferable in this way. ⁷³ In talmudic legal theory, a transfer of property is only valid if the point in time of the transfer of property rights or of claims to property is well defined. This usually is done by the buyer (or recipient) or his representative giving to the seller (or donor) or his representative a vessel (or edge of garment) to hold temporarily. In talmudic theory, Boaz took off his shoe to acquire the right to buy back Elimelekh’s property and with it Ruth (by preliminary marriage) from Tob (Ruth ⁷⁴ They never recognized private rights of the citizens to public property. Therefore, the vower and the subject of his vow can use public property without formalities.

HALAKHAH: “What are the institutions of the returnees from Babylonia,” etc. So is the Mishnah: A town square which is crossed by a public road is as if from the returnees from Babylonia⁶⁶. A man used a Torah scroll for his preliminary marriage⁶⁷2:3, Note 46; Demay 4:2, Note 19; Yebamot 1:1, Note 63. to a woman. Rebbi Sabbatai and Rebbi Ḥasida brought the matter before Rebbi Yose who said, she is not married⁶⁸. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, you read the letter⁶⁹ and there is written in it “not only”. Rebbi Mana said, I asked before Rebbi Ḥizqiah, what means “not only”? Did he marry with a Torah scroll which is private property⁷⁰ 3:7, end), it is doubtful whether monetary value was transferred. (For that reason, a modern marriage is concluded by the gift of a gold ring without a stone, whose commercial value can be easily determined.)? He said to us, she is not married. That comes to tell you, even if he used the public Torah scroll⁷¹ to marry, that is “not only”. But that means, even if he used a privately owned Torah scroll to marry, that is “she is not married.”

footnotes: ⁶⁶ Tosephta 2:10. This is not an emendation of the Mishnah but an explanation: A town square which is crossed by an imperial highway is imperial, not local, property. ⁶⁷ Where the man has to give his fiancee something of value; cf. Peah ⁶⁸ A Torah scroll cannot serve as a marriage gift. ⁶⁹ Maybe it should be: I read the letter. ⁷⁰ Since a Torah scroll may be sold only if a person is in extreme difficulties (Bikkurim ⁷¹ In which every member of the synagogue has partial ownership. But since only the town council backed by a vote of the entire population could sell a Torah scroll, even if the man transferred his interest to his bride, he did not transfer disposable value.

“Rebbi Jehudah says, even if only one signs over his part to the Patriarch,” etc. So is the Mishnah: One of them has to sign over his part to the Patriarch⁷⁵.

footnotes: ⁷⁵ Not both of them to ordinary citizens. Cf. J. N. Epstein, מבוא לנוסח המשנה 2, Jerusalem-Tel Aviv 1964, p. 361, who raises the question whether the “Patriarch” is the head of the Academy or the head of the city administration.

MISHNAH: If a person who by a vow was forbidden usufruct from another has nothing to eat, the other donates [food] as a gift to a third party and the person is permitted it⁷⁶. It happened in Bet Ḥoron with a person whose father was by a vow forbidden usufruct from him; when he married off his son he said to a friend, here the courtyard⁷⁷ and the meal are given to you as a gift and they shall be yours until my father has come and eaten with us at the [wedding] meal. He said to him, if they are mine, they are dedicated to Heaven⁷⁸. He said, I did not give you my property that you should dedicate it to Heaven. He said to him, you gave me your property only that you and your father should eat, drink, and be friendly with one another and let the sin hang on my head. When the case came before the Sages they said, any gift with the proviso that if [the recipient] dedicated, it was not sanctified, is no gift.

footnotes: ⁷⁶ This was already stated in Mishnah 4:10; it is repeated as introduction to the definition of “gift”. ⁷⁷ His own courtyard, where the wedding takes place and his father is forbidden entry. ⁷⁸ They are Temple property to be sold for the upkeep of the Temple.

HALAKHAH: “If a person who by a vow was forbidden usufruct from another,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is obvious that this one was learned.

⁷⁹ 28a. Hillel the Elder had eighty pairs of students. The greatest among them was Jonathan ben Uzziel, the least important Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai. Once he fell sick and all came to visit him. Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai waited in the courtyard. He said to them, where is the least important among you who is a head in wisdom and a head for generations? Unnecessary to speak of the greatest among you! They said, he is in the courtyard. He said to them, let him enter. When he entered, he said to them “to let my lovers inherit substance; their treasuries I shall fill.⁸⁰. 8:21. Cf. Mishnah Uqeṣin 3:12.”

footnotes: ⁷⁹ Cf. Babli Sukkah ⁸⁰ Prov

“Rabbi Joḥanan said, it is obvious that this one was learned.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is what happened⁸¹ 133b with Shammai trying and failing to attack the method.: Jonathan ben Uzziel’s father vowed not to let him have any usufruct from him and in his will gave his⁸² part to Shammai. What did Shammai do? He sold some, gave some to the sacred fund, gave him⁸² the remainder as a gift, and said: He who wants to attack this gift⁸³, let him first get back [the merchandise] from the buyers and from the sacred fund; after that he can get [the remainder] back from this⁸² one⁸⁴.

footnotes: ⁸¹ The background of the last Mishnah. A similar story, with Jonathan ben Uzziel in the role given here to Shammai, is in the Babli, Baba Batra ⁸² Jonathan ben Uzziel. ⁸² Jonathan ben Uzziel. ⁸³ As circumventing the will of the donor. ⁸² Jonathan ben Uzziel. ⁸⁴ If somebody wants to shield himself from an accusation of “Beth Ḥoron gift”, he should give something away before giving to the person prohibited by the vow.

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Does this mean that nobody can give a gift to a friend on condition that he not dedicate it to Heaven⁸⁵? So is the Mishnah: Any gift similar to that of Beth Ḥoron, which was dishonest in that if [the recipient] dedicated, it was not sanctified, is no gift⁸⁶.

footnotes: ⁸⁵ Does such a clause invalidate any gift even if given honestly and permanently? ⁸⁶ In the language of the Babli, 48a: If the end proved that the beginning was dishonest. The Babli prefers to emend the first, not the last, sentence of the Mishnah.