MISHNAH: The Sabbatical remits any loan¹, with or without a document². Store credit is not remitted; if it is transformed into a loan it is remitted. Rebbi Jehudah says, any preceding one is remitted³. Wages of a hired hand are not remitted; if they are transformed into a loan they are remitted; Rebbi Yose says, for any work that stops in the Sabbatical they are remitted; if it does not stop they are not remitted⁴ the Sabbatical or only during the Sabbatical. The hired hand cannot be a day-worker because the wages of a person hired for the day must be paid that same day.. If somebody slaughters a cow and divides it up on New Year’s Day³⁶, if the month was long it is subject to remission³⁷, otherwise it is not subject to remission. The rapist, the seducer, the calumniator³⁸. 22:29, the one for the seducer Ex. 22:16, the one for the calumniator who accuses his bride of adultery between the preliminary and actual marriages, Deut. 22:19., and all court documents are not subject to remission. If somebody gives loans on pledge³⁹, or deposits his documents⁴⁰ with the court, they are not subject to remission.

footnotes: ¹ The end of the Sabbatical year. ² In Talmudic tradition, there are three kinds of loan by document. If there is no surety given in the document, the status of the loan is the same as that of a loan given in front of two witnesses, without a written document. The standard loan contract establishes a lien by the creditor on all real estate the borrower may have. (Some tannaitic authorities hold that the absence of such a lien from a document is an error of the scribe; the existence of a lien may always be assumed.) Since the lien (known as “alienation of property”) is not specified, the lender can foreclose on such a loan only by lengthy court proceedings. If the loan is documented and given as a mortgage on a specific parcel of real estate, in the theory of the Yerushalmi it is a loan on a pledge and not remitted, as stated in Mishnah 2. ³ R. Jehudah holds that any new credit given by a store to a customer automatically transforms any previous credit into a loan. ⁴ It is to be discussed whether the work has to stop because of ³⁶ The butcher gives away meat both days of the New Year of the Sabbatical. It is forbidden to transact business on the holiday; therefore, the Mishnah avoids speaking about selling meat; the meat is distributed on the holiday, billed later by estimate. ³⁷ If the month of Elul was 30 days, the first day of the New Year really was the 30th of Elul, the second day the first of Tishre. The debt incurred on the first day enters the Sabbatical and is subject to remission; the debt of the second day is contracted during the Sabbatical and not subject to remission. ³⁸ These are all fines, and fines are never remitted. The fine for the rapist is spelled out in Deut ³⁹ The pledge is in the hand of the lender; the loan is not a claim on another person but the borrower must come and redeem his pledge. ⁴⁰ The obligation of remission of debt is one on real persons only.

HALAKHAH: “The Sabbatical remits any loan, etc.” ⁵37a, Rav and Samuel explain the Mishnah that “with a document” means a document with the alienation clause, “without a document” means either a document without the alienation clause or an oral loan. R. Joḥanan and R. Simeon ben Laqish explain “with a document” as a loan with a document without the alienation clause, and “without a document” as a loan executed before witnesses but without any written document, but a loan on a correct document, with the alienation clause, is always like a loan on a pledge and never remitted. The opinion of Rav and Samuel is accepted as practice in the Babli; the reports there on the positions of Rav and R. Joḥanan are not totally in accordance with the Yerushalmi. We can understand if it is without a document. With a document it should be treated similar to a loan on a pledge⁶ and not be remitted. Rebbi Joḥanan said, explain it for a document from which alienation of property is missing, following Rebbi Meïr⁷ 1:6 that a document without an alienation clause cannot be foreclosed in court.. A case came before Rebbi Joḥanan of a document without alienation of property and he instructed that it was remitted. Because we are interpreting the Mishnah, should we act on this⁸37a, referring to a case brought by R. Assi before R. Joḥanan.?

footnotes: ⁵ In the Babli, Giṭṭin ⁶ A loan on a pledge is not remitted in the Sabbatical, as stated in Mishnah 2. ⁷ He states in Mishnah Baba Meẓi‘a ⁸ Since we reject R. Meïr’s opinion and hold that the court will force the borrower to pay for every loan proven by a valid document, and will even allow the lender to foreclose real estate if the borrower does not pay, we cannot consider the Mishnah here practice to be followed. The same argument is quoted in the Babli, Giṭṭin

Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is only if he has no real estate⁹. Hence, if he has real estate it is not remitted. Rebbi Yose said, even if he has real estate it is remitted¹⁰. Rebbi Yose parallels Rav, since Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rav if he singled out real estate it is remitted¹¹ in Babli Giṭṭin 37a and in content, but not in the formulation, a Tosephta (8:6, speaking about a document of hypotheke, mortgage, cf. Note 22). {The treatment of mortgages in Yerushalmi and Babli cannot be directly compared since the Babli admits irrevocable mortgages for which the lender obtains the right to all yield of the land for a fixed period, usually 20 years, after which the parcel reverts to the original owner without repayment of the capital. In the Yerushalmi, all mortgages are redeemable.}. They said only “if he singled out”; therefore, if he did not single out it is not remitted.

footnotes: ⁹ Since the alienation of property clause refers only to real estate, such a clause in a contract with a landless borrower is devoid of meaning and without legal consequences. ¹⁰ He takes the Mishnah to apply to all borrowings (except mortgaging a well-defined piece of real estate), following Samuel and Rav in the Babli; cf. Note 5. ¹¹ While this text appears in both mss., in this and the next sentences the expressions “singled out” and “did not single out” must be switched: “Rebbi Yose parallels Rav, since Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rav if he did not single out real estate it is remitted. They said only ‘if he did not single out’; therefore, if he singled out it is not remitted.” Everybody agrees that a mortgage written on a well-defined piece of real estate is no longer a debt owed by the borrower but a lien on the land.The statement ascribed to Rav here parallels a baraita

“If somebody established a lien on a field for his wife but then went and sold it, if she wishes she collects from this field or she collects from any other property.¹³ in the Babli (Giṭṭin 41a) gives the option both to the wife and to any lienholder, both of whom have the choice of either going after unincumbered property of the husband or debtor or to choose the more complicated procedure of foreclosing the property from the buyer, letting the buyer then sue the seller to recover his damages. In the Babli, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel declares the original sale invalid if the lienholder is the wife since women cannot be expected to be willing to go through lengthy and complicated court proceedings.” Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Eleazar instructed following this baraita. The colleagues asked: Should she not collect only from the properties that are under the lien? Rebbi Yose said to them, there are unencumbered properties¹⁴ and you say, those under the lien? The baraita [applies] if he did not say¹⁵ you shall be paid only from this. But when he said, you shall be paid only from this, she may collect only from this¹⁶.

footnotes: ¹³ The lien is part of the marriage contract and covers the payments due the wife in case of dissolution of the marriage either by divorce or by the husband’s death. A parallel baraita ¹⁴ Which the wife can take with a minimum of legal steps. ¹⁵ In all these statements, “to say” means “to write into the appropriate document.” ¹⁶ The piece of real estate on which she holds the lien.

If somebody established a lien for another person on his field and then went and sold it; Rebbi Aḥa said, it is temporarily sold¹⁷. Rebbi Yose said, even temporarily it is not sold¹⁸. The strength of Rebbi Yose is from the following: He may induce his ox to flee; he cannot induce his field to flee¹⁹ 11b, Baba Batra 44b), that a mortgage on cattle is not valid, since the disposition of animals is outside the control of the lienholder. This implies that a valid lien puts the mortgaged property at the disposal of the lienholder.. Think about it, if [the field] was sold to a violent person²⁰! Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said: Violent persons are apt to fall²¹.

footnotes: ¹⁷ In the time between the sale and the lienholder’s foreclosure, the buyer is the rightful owner in all respects. This is the unquestioned position of the Babli. ¹⁸ Since the sale does not break the lien, the sale is invalid as far as the lienholder is concerned. The lienholder has only to enforce his rights vis-à-vis the debtor but does not have to sue the buyer of the land. ¹⁹ This refers to the rule, not otherwise quoted in the Yerushalmi, and brought as a statement of fifth-generation Amora Rava (Rav Abba bar Joseph bar Ḥama) in the Babli (Baba Qama ²⁰ The lienholder might be afraid of the consequences if he brings the buyer into court. ²¹ Even if the lien is temporarily unenforceable, nobody will give up his claim because of this.

It was stated: “If somebody mortgages²² a field to a woman for her ketubah²³ Chapter 3, Note 155. or a creditor for his claim and then sells it, that is sold and the buyer should beware for himself²⁴ seems to support R. Aḥa only. In Yebamot 7:1 (fol. 8a), Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel disagress and decrees that in the case of a ketubah the sale is void since we cannot require a woman to sue a third party for her rights.” This baraita if he said to her: you should be paid from this. They disagree if he says, you should only be paid from this²⁵..

footnotes: ²² Greek ὑποθήκη “mortgage”. ²³ Cf. Peah ²⁴ This baraita ²⁵ In this case, R. Yose declares the sale invalid, which does not contradict the baraita

Rav said, if she compromised [her ketubah], even if she did not extend credit, if she extended credit even though she did not compromise. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Unless she would compromise it and extend credit²⁶, if she compromised it and extended credit, is subject to remission. If she compromised it but did not extend credit, if she extended credit but did not compromise, it is not subject to remission.” “Compromised” means that she obtained partial payment of the ketubah and now cannot use the original ketubah document for the remaining claim but must produce a new document from the husband (for a divorcee) or the heirs (for a widow) for the remainder. “Extending credit” means that she does not insist on immediate payment but on payment terms as if it were the repayment of a loan. The Tosephta text follows Rebbi Ḥiyya; Rav makes the ketubah subject to remission in the Sabbatical even if only one of the conditions is met. (In the Babli, Giṭṭin 18a, the position of R. Ḥiyya is ascribed to Rav and that of Rav to Samuel.).

footnotes: ²⁶ This refers to Tosephta 8:4: “A woman’s ketubah

Because he extends him credit a second time, is the first turned into a loan?²⁷ Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Jehudah²⁸. But can he require payment on New Year’s Day²⁹? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Zeïra: About money for which he can believe him³⁰. And since he could ask him for payment, he should be able to give him money. And here, because he should have been able to give him money and he did not give, the first [debt] is turned into a loan³¹.

footnotes: ²⁷ This refers to the Mishnah, where R. Jehudah declares that the exemption of store credit from the laws of the Sabbatical only covers the last credit extended. ²⁸ This statement seems to be obvious since R. Jehudah only restricts the exemption of store credit. But the reference here is to Mishnah 2, where it is stated that store debt incurred on New Year’s Day may be subject to remission. While this Mishnah is anonymous, it is stated here (and in Halakhah 2) that it also is R. Jehudah’s and refers to a customer who took food from the store on both days of the New Year. For R. Jehudah this implies that the debt incurred the first day is subject to remission (at the end of the Sabbatical year.) ²⁹ Since handling money is forbidden on a holiday, payment cannot be asked for. ³⁰ The prior argument is rejected. If the customer is creditworthy, extending credit is tantamount to asking for payment and extending credit is permitted on the holiday. ³¹ The storekeeper is implicitly asking for payment by providing the food; cf. Note 36. Hence, non-payment automatically turns the credit into a loan and the farmer has a great incentive to ask for his money during the Sabbatical. The same argument applies to the butcher mentioned in Mishnah 2.

³² Rebbi Joḥanan says, for ploughing. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, for building. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, any work that stops because of the Sabbatical. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, any work that stops in any way. Does Rebbi Yose hold with Rebbi Jehudah³³; does not Rebbi Yose say, for any work that stops in the Sabbatical they are remitted, if it does not stop they are not remitted? But Rebbi Yose does not hold with Rebbi Jehudah³⁴ 7:5, that a banker never can be believed if he claims to have given change before he received the large coin.; while “Rebbi Jehudah says that it is not the way of a banker to give an as unless he has received a denar,” he agrees that the wages of the hired man are due only at the end³⁵.

footnotes: ³² This refers to the last sentence in the Mishnah, where R. Yose declares that wages for an unfinished job are remitted if not paid during the Sabbatical. R. Joḥanan holds that this applies only if the Sabbatical is the cause of the interruption; R. Simeon ben Laqish disagrees. ³³ Does R. Yose hold that payment for work done is turned into a loan the moment the work is finished and was not paid? This would parallel the opinion of R. Jehudah about store credit. ³⁴ This probably should read: R. Jehudah does not hold with R. Yose. The statement of R. Jehudah is in Mishnah Šebu‘ot ³⁵ The payment is due only during the Sabbatical and not subject to remission since only debts incurred before the Sabbatical must be remitted. The argument about store credit is not appropriate here.

⁴¹3:1 (fol. 58c). They are included here only because the two days of the New Year are mentioned in the Mishnah. Rebbi says, Nisan never was lengthened⁴² of Nisan (and Tishre) was never delayed when the New Moon was declared only after it had been observed. In these two months, messengers were sent to proclaim the exact dates of the holidays (Roš Haššanah 1:5). [For the details of the Tannaitic calendar, see the author’s Seder Olam (Northvale, NJ, 1998), p. 268–269.]. But did we not state⁴³ 4:5: Incense was prepared in one batch for an entire year, starting with the first of Nisan. Then it is stated that on the first of Nisan, “if the New Moon appeared in time, incense was taken from the new batch; otherwise, it was taken from the incense prepared the previous year.” This Mishnah implies that the month of Adar preceding Nisan could have either 29 or 30 days. Rebbi implies that this Mishnah is purely hypothetical.: “If the New Moon appeared in time”? If it would appear, it did not appear. Rav said, Tishre was never lengthened⁴⁴ 19b, also in the name of Rav, stating a tradition going back to the days of Ezra. The same statement is also in Yerushalmi Šeqalim 10:2 (fol. 39b), Sanhedrin 1:2 (fol. 18d).. But did we not state⁴⁵: “If the month was long”? If it would be, it never was.

footnotes: ⁴¹ This paragraph and the three following ones are from Roš Haššanah ⁴² This means that the start ⁴³ Mishnah Šeqalim ⁴⁴ Babli Roš Haššanah ⁴⁵ In the Mishnah here.

⁴⁶ 3:11, also quoted in Yerushalmi Roš Haššanah 4:6 (59c), Nedarim 6:13 (40a), Sanhedrin 1:2 (18d); Babli Roš Haššanah 32a; Sifra Emor Parašah 11(5).“When they sanctified the year at Usha⁴⁷, on the first day Rebbi Ismael, the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Baroqa led⁴⁸ prayer on New Year’s Day which consists of nine benedictions. The three first and the three last ones are those of everyday prayers; there are three additional ones proclaiming God’s Kingdom, מַלְכִיּוֹת, His remembering all living creatures, זִכְרוֹנוֹת, and the shofar blowing connected with the theophany on Mount Sinai, שׁוֹפָרוֹת, each one followed by blowing the shofar. R. Ismael ben R. Joḥanan ben Beroqa takes malkhiyot together with the third benediction, “sanctification of the Name”, and has as fourth benediction the usual holiday benediction, without shofar blowing. R. Aqiba takes the holiday benediction as part of malkhiyot; this is the rule followed today as established by Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel in the Tosephta. and recited following the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, we did not follow this at Jabneh. On the second day, Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Yose the Galilean led and recited following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, this we did follow at Jabneh.” But does this not mean that they sanctified it on the first and the second day⁴⁹? Rebbi Zeïra in the name of Rav Ḥisda: That year was disorganized⁵⁰. What is “the first, the second”⁵¹? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav: The first year, the second year⁵²! But was it not stated: the first day, the second day?

footnotes: ⁴⁶ Tosephta Roš Haššanah ⁴⁷ When the Synhedrion was reconstituted under a Roman emperor in the later second century. Any recollection that Rabban Simeon could have had of the Synhedrion at Jabneh must have been from his childhood. ⁴⁸ He was the reader for the musaph ⁴⁹ The story contradicts the assertion by Rav that Elul was never 30 days because, if it is clear that Elul is only 29 days one observed only one day for the New Year at the place of the Synhedrion. ⁵⁰ Something happened that made the Synhedrion unsure which day was the right one; in that case, the story must date to the beginning of Rabban Simeon’s presidency when his authority was not yet established. This is confirmed by the fact that Rabban Simeon could not instruct the other rabbis on which rule to follow. ⁵¹ Reading with the text in Roš Haššanah: מַהוּ הָרִאשׁוֹן וּמַהוּ הַשֵּׁנִי. ⁵² Rav insists that his tradition is correct and that the two prayers were said in two different years. It is pointed out that this contradicts the language of the Tosephta; the problem remains unresolved.

If they sanctified it before its time or after its lengthening, should I assume it was lengthened⁵³ 2:8).? The verse says (Lev. 23:2) “them”, you, “these are My holidays.⁵⁴ 25a and Sifra Behar Parashah 9(3). In Lev. 23:2 (Tell the Children of Israel and say to them, the holidays of the Eternal, you have to proclaim them as holy assemblies, these are My holidays), Lev. 22:4 (These are the holidays of the Eternal, holy assemblies; you have to declare them at their times), and Lev. 22:37 (These are the holidays of the Eternal; you have to declare them as holy assemblies) the word “them” is written defective אֹתָם so that it could also be read as אַתֶּם “you”. This is taken to imply that no holiday is sacred that is not proclaimed by the Synhedrion. Since the Synhedrion is human, it is error prone. The three “them - you” are explained in the Babli as “you, even if unintended, you, even if intentionally wrong, you, even in error.” In the Sifra, the three cases are “even if forced by an act of God, unintended, or in error.” This interpretation is the basis of the Jewish computed calendar which, being based on a constant mean synodal month and a base line outside the Land of Israel, is necessarily in error if compared with astronomical computations of the motions of the moon.” Before its time is not “My holidays.” Before its time, the 29 day, after its lengthening, the 32 day. From where that one intercalates the year because of the [men of the] diaspora that set out but did not yet arrive⁵⁵ 9(1). Since both the Children of Israel and God’s holidays are mentioned in Lev. 23:2, it is inferred that the holidays must be appropriate for all Children of Israel. {The rule itself, without Scriptural justification, is in Babli Sanhedrin 11a.}? The verse says (Lev. 23:2), “the Children of Israel, my holidays”. Make the holidays so they can be observed by all of Israel. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, only if they had reached the river Euphrates.

footnotes: ⁵³ Since a month can only be either 29 or 30 days, New Year’s Day can be only the 30th or the 31st of Elul. If the Synhedrion did not proclaim New Year’s on the 30th of Elul, then the 31st is automatically sanctified; whether it needs a proclamation is a matter of controversy (Mishnah Roš Haššanah ⁵⁴ This is explained in Babli Roš Haššanah ⁵⁵ This argument does not belong to the discussion about one or two days of the New Year since the intercalary month always has to precede Passover. The intercalary month is a necessary feature of any lunar-solar calendar. It is included here probably because it refers to the same verse and appears in Sifra Behar Parashah

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Ammi, in the name of Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi: If they sanctified it and afterwards the witnesses turned out to be perjured, it still is sanctified⁵⁶ 2:9; they are not explicit in the Babli. The paragraph here is the source of Maimonides, Qidduš Haḥodeš 2:2 (not recognized by the commentators ad loc.). Rebbi Assi stayed with Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi and asked him: Did you hear this from your father? He said, yes. Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not cross-examine the witnesses of the New Moon.

footnotes: ⁵⁶ The verses quoted in Note 54 imply that the holidays have to be declared. Since they are defined by the calendar months, it follows that the months have to be declared. Since the declaration is valid even if in error, it is not rescinded if an error is found. In any case, the error can not be of more than one day. The rules given here are implied by Mishnah Roš Haššanah

Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Jehudah since he could ask him for payment on New Years’s Day. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, Rav Amram, Rav Mattanah in the name of Rav: If somebody makes a loan to another person stipulating that he will not press for repayment, the Sabbatical will remit it⁵⁸. 15:2).. We did state: “If somebody slaughters a cow and divides it up on New Year’s Day,” and Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Jehudah⁵⁹. But can he require payment on New Year’s Day? As Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Zeïra: Since he could ask him for payment, he can believe him. And since he could believe him, he could pay him⁶⁰. And here, because he could have given him but did not give, the first [debt] is turned into a loan⁶¹.

footnotes: ⁵⁸ One should assume that the loan is not remitted in the Sabbatical since it can never be claimed and the Sabbatical law applies only to loans that can be claimed (Deut ⁵⁹ Since it is assumed that payment cannot be claimed on New Year’s Day since it cannot be given. ⁶⁰ The case of the butcher cannot be used to support Rav’s statement; in practice, Rav’s statement is rejected. ⁶¹ This sentence does not belong here but to Mishnah 1, cf. Note 31.

Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav: If somebody gives a loan to a person on condition that the Sabbatical not remit it, the Sabbatical does not remit⁶² 3b), Samuel is reported to have declared that the Sabbatical will remit. In the end, a fine distinction is made in the wording. If the contract reads that the debtor will not enforce the remission, that condition is valid. But if the contract reads that the Sabbatical should have no influence, that would mean abrogating a Torah law and the condition is invalid., as we have stated⁶³ 1:2, dealing with witnesses who falsely testify that a debtor has promised to pay within 30 days when in fact he is obligated to pay after ten years, they are sentenced to pay the present value of the debt due in ten years.: “Whether he gives it after thirty days or after ten years.” Are there ten years without a Sabbatical? Rav Huna said, Rav Naḥman bar Jacob and Rav Sheshet disagreed. One of them said, if the loan was given on a pledge⁶⁴, but the other said, if he writes him a prozbol⁶⁵.

footnotes: ⁶² In the Babli (Makkot ⁶³ Mishnah Makkot ⁶⁴ As noted in the Mishnah. In the Babli, this explanation is attributed to the later Amora Rava. ⁶⁵ Explained in the next Mishnah, cf. Note 80.

It was stated: “For thirty days he will not come.” What means “for thirty days he will not come”? Samuel said, if somebody gives a loan to a person without specifying details, he has no right to ask for payment until after 30 days⁶⁶ 10:1, where however the rule is qualified so that it is superseded by local usage if such usage is determined. This means that for the Tosephta, the 30 day rule is rabbinic in character. In the Babli (Makkot 3b), the rule is quoted by Samuel as a Tannaitic statement and the biblical proof given here by R. Jehudah is attributed there to Rav Mattanah.. Rav Jehudah came and explained (Deut. 15:9): “The Sabbatical year, the remitting year, is close.” Is not the Sabbatical year the remitting year? Why does the verse say: “The Sabbatical year, the remitting year, is close”? That you should not say, I am not permitted to ask for payment until after 30 days; after 30 days the debt will be remitted and I will not collect; therefore, it must say that “the Sabbatical year, the remitting year, is close.”⁶⁷ Did not Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, Rav Amram, Rav Mattanah say in the name of Rav: If somebody makes a loan to another person stipulating that he will not press for repayment, the Sabbatical will remit it? It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Ismael (Deut. 15:9): “The Sabbatical year, the remitting year, is close.” Is not the Sabbatical year the remitting year? Why does it have to say, “the Sabbatical year, the remitting year, is close”? That you should not say, all six years long his field is before me, his vineyard is before me, but after six years the debt is remitted and I cannot collect; therefore, it has to say “the Sabbatical year, the remitting year, is close.⁶⁸ goes as follows: If one gives a loan during a regular year, even if it is not a mortgage the lender might recover his loan from the crop of the borrower. But in the Sabbatical, there is no commercial crop, and when the next crop grows, the debt already is remitted. Hence, the verse speaks of any loan given in the sixth year, and nothing can be implied about the 30 day rule. {In Sifry Deut. #117, R. Yose the Galilean points out that the expression “the Seventh year, the remitting year” is needed to show that the Seventh year is not the seventh year after a loan has been granted but the seventh calendar year.}”

footnotes: ⁶⁶ This is a statement of Tosephta Baba Meẓi‘a ⁶⁷ The entire verse reads: “Guard yourself, lest there be in your heart an unworthy thought saying, behold, the Sabbatical year, the remitting year, is close, and you will be badly disposed towards your needy brother and not give him; when he would appeal against you to the Eternal then sin will be in you.” The verse is taken to deal with a case where the Sabbatical will remit without any possibility for the lender to recoup his loan. The only case found is that of an unsecured loan given less than 30 days before the date of remission when repayment cannot be claimed but the debt will be remitted. ⁶⁸ The statement of R. Ismael gives a different explanation of the verse; therefore, the biblical character of the 30 day rule is not established and the Yerushalmi is in accordance with the Tosephta, against the Babli.The argument in the baraita

“The rapist, the seducer, the calumniator³⁸. 22:29, the one for the seducer Ex. 22:16, the one for the calumniator who accuses his bride of adultery between the preliminary and actual marriages, Deut. 22:19..” Rav Jehudah said, Rav [said]: This follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, it depends on the one extending credit⁶⁹ 4:2, R. Simeon says that the fines are paid as a consequence of a court document, the money goes to the woman, and the obligation is not remitted in the Sabbatical. The rabbis hold that the obligation is a civil one, a “loan”, the payment goes to the creditor of the loan, viz., the father, and is remitted in the Sabbatical. The position ascribed to R. Meïr in this Mishnah is that the status of the obligation is that of a loan which is not remitted in the Sabbatical. {R. Simson holds that the position of R. Meïr is that of the rabbis, that the claims to fines are not remitted in the Sabbatical but that any judgment for fines not collected before the Sabbatical is remitted. If that were true, the position here should be described as that of the rabbis.} The main differences between loan and court decree is that in a forcible execution, loans are paid from the borrower’s real estate of average quality but court judgments covering torts from the best quality..

footnotes: ³⁸ These are all fines, and fines are never remitted. The fine for the rapist is spelled out in Deut ⁶⁹ Since the persons mentioned here have to pay only by order of a court, the question is why these cases have to be mentioned in the Mishnah separately and are not subsumed under the general notion of court judgments. The fines for the rapist and the seducer are spelled out in the Torah only for the נערה, a minor. The fines have to be paid to the father if at the time of judgment and payment the girl was a minor, to the woman if she was an adult at the time of judgment. The problem is, who receives the fine if she was minor at the time of judgment but an adult at the moment of payment. In Ketubot

“And all court judgments,” these are court decisions.⁷⁰

footnotes: ⁷⁰ Reading of the Rome ms: דיינין “of judges”.

This is obvious: A loan that is disputed⁷⁵ is not remitted. A loan that was disputed but is now a [confirmed] loan, is remitted⁷⁶. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is this also true for judgments? It is not necessary to say that a loan that was disputed can be collected⁷⁷. A disputed loan turned into a [confirmed] loan is collected from property of average quality⁷⁶.

footnotes: ⁷⁵ The debtor claims he does not owe the lender. As long as the case is not settled in court, everything is suspended. The loan cannot be remitted in the Sabbatical because it cannot be collected. If judgment is given for the lender, the judgment is a court document which is not subject to remission. ⁷⁶ If, after the court established the validity of the loan, the lender does not insist on immediate payment, the loan regains its original status. ⁷⁷ After a court judgment on a disputed loan, the debt can be collected after the Sabbatical. ⁷⁶ If, after the court established the validity of the loan, the lender does not insist on immediate payment, the loan regains its original status.

“If somebody makes a loan on a pledge”, Samuel says, even on a needle⁷⁸ 43b: “If somebody gave a loan of 1000 tetradrachmas and took as pledge the handle of a sickle, if he lost the handle he lost the 1000 tetradrachmas.” The Babli disagrees in practice and rules that the sum not remitted in the Sabbatical is equal to the value of the pledge.. (Deut. 15:3): “What you have on your brother you shall release;” that excludes your brother’s [property] in your hand. “What you have on your brother you shall release,” which excludes one who hands over his documents to the court⁷⁹. 113..

footnotes: ⁷⁸ This parallels the statement of Samuel in Babli Šebuot ⁷⁹ The last two sentences are also in Sifri Deut

MISHNAH: A prozbol⁸⁰ Chapter 3, Note 120. By Mishnah 2, instruments of indebtedness delivered to the court for collection are not subject to remission. Hillel substituted for actual delivery a document declaring the intent of the creditor to transfer his documents to the authority of the court without actually delivering them. does not remit. This is one of the ordinances of Hillel the elder. When he saw that the people refrained from giving loans to one another and transgressed what is written in the Torah, as it is said (Deut. 15:9): “Guard yourself, lest there be in your heart an unworthy thought saying,⁶⁷ etc.”, he instituted the prozbol. This is the essence⁸⁹. of prozbol: I declare before you, judges X and Y at place Z, that I shall collect any debt due me any time I wish. The judges sign at the bottom or the witnesses.

footnotes: ⁸⁰ A Greek legal term, προσβολή, “document recording the knocking down of a lot to a purchaser”, cf. Peah ⁶⁷ The entire verse reads: “Guard yourself, lest there be in your heart an unworthy thought saying, behold, the Sabbatical year, the remitting year, is close, and you will be badly disposed towards your needy brother and not give him; when he would appeal against you to the Eternal then sin will be in you.” The verse is taken to deal with a case where the Sabbatical will remit without any possibility for the lender to recoup his loan. The only case found is that of an unsecured loan given less than 30 days before the date of remission when repayment cannot be claimed but the debt will be remitted. ⁸⁹ In addition, all legal formalism that makes a document valid must be incorporated into the prozbol

HALAKHAH: From here⁸¹ they supported the notion that prozbol is from the Torah. But is prozbol from the Torah⁸² cannot be biblical.? When Hillel instituted it, they supported it from words of the Torah.

footnotes: ⁸¹ The sentence just preceding the Mishnah, giving biblical support to the rule that instruments of indebtedness in the possession of the court are not subject to remission. ⁸² Since the documents are not delivered, prozbol

Rebbi Ḥuna said, I asked before Rebbi Jacob ben Aḥa: Following him who says tithes [are from their words, it is understandable that Hillel instituted prozbol. But following him who says tithes] are from the Torah, does Hillel institute anything against the words of the Torah⁸⁴? Rebbi Yose said, from the moment that Israel was exiled to Babylonia, did they not become free from all commandments connected with the Land, but the remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah [because it is an obligation of the person⁸⁵. 111, the reason given is not this logical argument but the verse (Deut. 15:2): “this is the word of the remission: every creditor remit what is in his hand, what he loaned to his fellow; he shall not press his fellow because a remission was declared for the Eternal.” Since God is Lord over the universe, remission is applicable everywhere in the universe.]? Rebbi Yose turned and said, (Deut. 15:2) “this is the word of the abandonment, remit” as long as abandonment⁸⁶ is followed as a word of the Torah, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah, but when abandonment is followed as their word, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from their word. There⁸⁷36a) quotes only Rebbi’s statement below. The commentators of the Babli assume that the majority of rabbis oppose Rebbi. There seems to be no basis for that assumption. The sketchy treatment of the subject in the Babli is explained by Meïri (Magen Avot, ed. Last, London 1909, Chap. 15.)., they say that even one who holds that tithes are from the Torah will hold that the Sabbatical is from their word. As we have stated (Deut. 15:2): “this is the word of the remission, remit!” Rebbi says, these two remissions are the Sabbatical and the Jubilee. As long as the Jubilee is operative, the Sabbatical is from words of the Torah. If the Jubilees are abolished, the Sabbatical is operative from their words. When were the Jubilees abolished? (Lev. 25:10) “[All its] inhabitants.⁸⁸ 32b and Sifra Behar Pereq2(3). The verse reads: “You shall sanctify the fiftieth year and call freedom for all its inhabitants, a Jubilee it shall be for you so that everybody return to his ancestral land, everybody return to his family.” “Ancestral land” is the plot given to the family in the original distribution after the conquest. It follows that there can be no Jubilee if the distribution of land by Joshua is no longer known.” In the time when its inhabitants lived on it, not when they went into exile. If they lived on it but intermingled, the tribe of Judah in Benjamin, and the tribe of Benjamin in Judah, I could think that the Jubilee is operative. The verse mentions its inhabitants, “All its inhabitants;” you find that when the tribes of Reuben, Gad, and half the tribe of Manasseh went into exile, the Jubilees were disestablished.

footnotes: ⁸⁴ The disagreement about tithes is between R. Yose ben R. Ḥanina and R. Eleazar in Halakhah 6:1 (Note 11). “Their words” are the rabbinic institutions. ⁸⁵ While this may be the correct reason, the language is Babylonian rabbinic Hebrew; the insert probably is a gloss that found its way into the text. In Sifry Deut ⁸⁶ Agricultural Sabbatical. ⁸⁷ Babylonia. The Babli (Giṭṭin ⁸⁸ From here to the end of the Halakhah, the argument is also in Babli Arakhin

Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Even if they are in Rome⁹⁰ on the names of judges at another place (who probably will never know about the existence of this prozbol.) This implies that prozbol and the related documents do not have to be deposited with any court..

footnotes: ⁹⁰ It is possible to write a prozbol

Rebbi Abba in the name of the rabbis there⁹¹ 22a), this is also a statement of Rebbi Abba (in Babylonian Aramaic). A court usually is composed of three judges (Mishnah Sanhedrin 1:1); in the opinion of the majority of authorities, a court of two judges is incompetent. Now the Mishnah mentions only two judges and equates the signatures of judges and witnesses. Since witnesses must always be two, it follows that there is a situation in which the signature of two judges is valid even for those who disallow a court of two judges.: If three sat in judgment and one of them died, two sign and note: Even though we are two who sign, we were three in judging. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, our Mishnah implies this: “The judges sign at the bottom or the witnesses.” Does one learn court documents from prozbol? It was found stated: This about court documents was learned from the rules of prozbol.

footnotes: ⁹¹ In the Babli (Ketubot

If he has no real estate but his debtors have real estate, one writes a prozbol for him⁹² 3:8 that prozbol can be written only on the basis of real estate; the possession of one square inch is enough. In Tosephta Ševi‘it 8:9 it is made clear that the debtor must have real estate (to give the prozbol a status similar to a mortgage which is not remitted.) In Tosephta 8:8, the anonymous majority holds that in a chain of debtors, only the creditor of a debtor with real estate may write a prozbol but Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel asserts that the real estate of one of the debtors is good for all. The Yerushalmi here and a similar Babli (Giṭṭin 37a) follow Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel without mentioning his name.. How is that done? Ruben owes Simeon and Levi owes Ruben. Ruben has no real estate, Levi has real estate. One writes for Simeon on the properties of Levi.

footnotes: ⁹² It is stated in Mishnaiot 6 and Peah

MISHNAH: A predated prozbol is valid, postdated it is invalid. Predated documents of indebtedness are invalid, postdated they are valid. If one person borrows from five, one writes a prozbol for each single [creditor]. If five persons borrow from one, he writes only one prozbol for all of them. One writes prozbol only on the basis of real estate. If he¹⁰⁴. has none, [the other party] gives him the right to a minute area of their field. If he had a field mortgaged¹⁰⁵ in town, one writes a prozbol on it. Rebbi Ḥuẓpit says, one writes for a man on his wife’s properties¹⁰⁶ and for orphans on those of the guardians¹⁰⁷ 37a), documented claims of minor orphans are always under the supervision of the court, have the status of court documents, and do not need prozbol. The Babli is therefore obliged to interpret the Mishnah as speaking of debts incurred by the guardians for the living expenses of the orphans. This does not seem to be the position of the Yerushalmi.. A bee hive. Rebbi Eliezer says, it is like real estate: one may write a prozbol on it, it is not subject to impurity in its place¹¹⁴, and somebody who takes honey from it on the Sabbath is guilty¹¹⁵. But the Sages say, it is not like real estate, one may not write a prozbol on it, it is subject to impurity in its place, and somebody who takes honey from it on the Sabbath is not sanctionable¹¹⁶ 3:10.. If somebody returns a debt in the Sabbatical, he [the lender] says to him: “I am remitting.” If he [the borrower] says “anyway”, he [the lender] should accept it, for it is said (Deut. 15:2): “This is the word of remission¹¹⁷”. Similarly, a homicide exiled to a city of refuge whom the citizens of the town wanted to honor, should say to them: I am a homicide. If they tell him, anyway, he should accept it, for it is said (Deut. 19:4): “This is the word of a homicide.”

footnotes: ¹⁰⁴ It was shown in Note 92 that one of his debtors must have real estate for a creditor’s prozbol ¹⁰⁵ Even if the loan is paid back in instalments, that for a fixed number of terms the creditor works the field and takes all its yield, it remains the property of the debtor. ¹⁰⁶ Even if this is separate property, not dowry which becomes the husband’s property for the duration of the marriage. ¹⁰⁷ Greek ἐπίτροπος “guardian, attorney”. In the opinion of the Babli (Giṭṭin ¹¹⁴ No real estate and nothing permanently connected to the ground can become impure. ¹¹⁵ Removing food from the ground is the definition of harvesting. ¹¹⁶ While it is not permitted outright, there is no punishment for the action since no biblical Sabbath prohibition has been violated. The first part of the Mishnah is also in Uqeẓin ¹¹⁷ Once the word “remission” has been uttered, duty has been fulfilled.

HALAKHAH: “A predated prozbol is valid” because he diminishes its power, but “postdated it is invalid” because he increases its power⁹³ is a declaration that all documents in the hand of the creditor have to be considered as delivered to the court, predating the prozbol does not increase the number of documents covered, but postdating may increase their number. In the latter case, the testimony of the witnesses affixed to the document would be perjured.. “Predated documents of indebtedness are invalid” because he increases their power, but “postdated they are valid” because he diminishes their power⁹⁴.

footnotes: ⁹³ Since a prozbol ⁹⁴ As explained in Note 2, a document of indebtedness creates a lien on the real estate of the debtor. If the debtor sells any of his real estate after the document has been created, the lien is not removed. In case of nonpayment, the creditor can foreclose the parcel that was sold and let the buyer then try to recoup his money from the seller. Predating a document of indebtedness therefore might create a false claim to parcels sold before the document was executed; such a document must be invalid. But postdating the document might protect a buyer from the creditor; this is valid.

Who notifies⁹⁵ or document is pre- or postdated? The Rome ms. reads מודע which might be the more correct form.? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: the signatories of the document. But did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, they treated the statement of the signatories of a document as if their testimony had been cross-examined by the court⁹⁶ was predated or a financial document postdated can never be given by any witness to the document if genuinness of the signature of the witness is established from another source. [The statement of R. Simeon ben Laqish is discussed, in the same sense, in Babli Ketubot 18b, Giṭṭin3a.]? There⁹⁷ they could assert that they signed for the fact of the prozbol but not the date., it is about those who would say: We did not sign at all. But here they say, on this we signed, on that we did not sign.

footnotes: ⁹⁵ Who may inform that a prozbol ⁹⁶ Since in Jewish law, a witness may not change his testimony without disqualifying himself, a witness to a document is not admitted to testify to the falsity of the document unless he admits to perjury. Hence, testimony that a prozbol ⁹⁷ The rule of R. Simeon ben Laqish only applies if the authenticity of the document is in question. But for the prozbol

Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are really invalid⁹⁸. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he only counts from the time of writing. But did we not state: “A prozbol is valid, whether predated or postdated, but it only counts from the time of writing”? If you assert this for financial documents, what is the difference between a prozbol and a financial document⁹⁹ and debt documents are opposites, it is impossible to accept R. Simeon ben Laqish’s position for debt documents and probably also the baraita quoted.?

footnotes: ⁹⁸ Predated documents of indebtedness. ⁹⁹ Since the Mishnah stated that the rules of prozbol

“A document dated on a Sabbath or on the Tenth of Tishrē, Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid and Rebbi Yose invalid. Rebbi Jehudah said to him, a case came before you in Sepphoris and you declared it valid. He said to him, I did not declare it valid, but if I did it, I did it.¹⁰⁰ 1:3, a slightly different version Babli Baba Batra171a. The date normally is written by the day of the month; if one checks one may find that the date given fell on a Sabbath. In the case of the Day of Atonement, one must assume that the date is given in terms of a Gentile calendar.” They wanted to say that he who holds it invalid [does so] because it¹⁰¹ might be later, and he who holds it valid [does so] because it might be earlier¹⁰²; but he who holds it invalid [does so] because it might be forged¹⁰³ evidence to declare the document forged, but he is open to proof that the document is genuine. This explains his equanimity when confronted with an apparent contradiction between his action and his formal statement. He will hold the document forged unless presented with evidence to the contrary. {The different interpretation of the Babli does not explain R. Yose’s agreement with the statement of R. Jehudah.}.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁰ Tosephta Makkot ¹⁰¹ The writing of the document, which makes the document predated. [The commentators all switch “later” and “earlier” in this statement, to adapt the language to that of the Mishnah. But the testimony of the two mss. forbids this emendation.] ¹⁰² And the document would be postdated. ¹⁰³ R. Yose also will agree that a document dated on a Sabbath or Day of Atonement, if genuine, probably is postdated and valid. He only states that the impossible date is prima facie

Rav said, only if both lender and borrower have real estate. But Rebbi Joḥanan says, if the creditor does but not the borrower¹⁰⁸., or the borrower but not the lender¹⁰⁹.. If he has no real estate but one who owes him¹¹⁰ will be used, cf. Note 92. has real estate then one writes him a prozbol. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Even if he has only one stalk in a field, one writes him a prozbol. But did we not state: Partners, sharecroppers, and guardians¹¹¹ have no prozbol? They say, there each single stalk is property of the partnership but here it is his.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁸ Then the lender can give a borrower a stalk in his field and write the prozbol ¹⁰⁹ This is the original institution of prozbol ¹¹⁰ Only one of the many debtors for whom the prozbol ¹¹¹ Neither of them is the sole owner of the property administered by him.

May one write for a guardian based on the orphans’ real estate? Let us hear it from the following: “One writes for a husband on his wife’s properties¹¹²”. May one write for a woman on her husband’s properties¹¹³ purely on the basis of his being trustee for others as well as property owner for himself. Similarly, we should admit the possibility of prozbol simply by the marriage of the lender to a property owner.? Let us hear it from the following: “And for orphans on those of the guardians”.

footnotes: ¹¹² The standard case that the husband administers his wife’s separate property is parallel to the guardians administering the orphans’ properties. ¹¹³ This must refer to a case where the wife gives up her right to be supported by her husband for the right to earn her own separate money. If the guardian administers the property of the landless orphans, then the Mishnah permits a prozbol

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The reason of Rebbi Eliezer (1S. 14:26): “The people came to the forest and behold, there was a flow of honey.” What do you understand from this? Rebbi Mana said, the thicket produced honey. If he had said from (1S. 14:27): “He dipped it into the forest of honey”, it would have been better. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: He really understood it from (1S. 14:27): “He dipped it into the forest of honey¹¹⁸.”

footnotes: ¹¹⁸ Since both יער “forest, bush country” and יערה “honeycomb” are based on the root وعر “to have a rough surface”, the words are identified.

Where do we hold¹¹⁹? If it is connected to the ground, everybody agrees that it belongs to the ground. If it is on two bars, everybody agrees that it is not like ground. But where we hold is if it rests on the ground¹²⁰. It compares to what Rebbi Zeïra said in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: One writes a prozbol on the space for an oven, also on the space for a hearth¹²¹ 37a) notes that the statement is needed only if the ground on which the oven sits is rented, not owned.. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, also on the space for a lamp.

footnotes: ¹¹⁹ What is the disagreement between R. Eliezer and the Sages? ¹²⁰ The beehive sits on the ground but is not fastened to it. ¹²¹ Oven and hearth are movable clay vessels that sit on the ground without being fastened. The Babli (Giṭṭin

Is it also the same for the space for bread, is that the disagreement between Rebbi Eliezer and the Sages? Honey is a product of the bee hive, bread is not a product of the oven¹²².

footnotes: ¹²² This refers to the statement that for Rebbi Eliezer, taking honey from the bee hive on the Sabbath is a desecration of the Sabbath. It is generally accepted that on the Sabbath one may take bread from the oven if it was fully baked before the Sabbath. The question is, does Rebbi Eliezer agree or does he disagree and for some reason his dissent was not considered in the rules of the Sabbath? He agrees that taking out the bread is not harvesting.

If somebody repays a debt in the Sabbatical even though he [the lender] says to him: “I am remitting,” the Sages are pleased with him. Rav Huna said, he says it in a soft voice and his right hand is stretched out to receive.

Rebbi Yose said, this means that if a person who knows one collection¹²³ goes to a place and they honor him for two, he has to tell them: “I know one collection.”

footnotes: ¹²³ He has memorized and understands one collection of Tannatitic statements (usually in the feminine, מְכִילְתָא).

MISHNAH: If somebody repays a debt in the Sabbatical, the Sages are pleased with him. If somebody borrows from a convert whose sons converted with him, he does not have to repay the sons but if he repaid, the Sages are pleased with him¹²⁴ 17b/18a) quotes the Mishnah in the form “the Sages are displeased with him,” and the text here, “the Sages are pleased with him,” is given only as a baraita. The meaning of the distinctions made in the Babli is not clear; therefore, Maimonides omits the rule in his Code. The only coherent explanation of the Mishnah is that given by Rabbi Isaac in Tosaphot (Qiddušin 18a, s. v. כאן) and R. Nissim Gerondi in his commentary to Alfassi (Qiddušin #596): Since a convert is like a newborn for Jewish law, the children converting with him are not legally his Jewish children and the law will not force the debtor to pay after the lender’s death. However, the children are his own children and not to pay the sons after their father’s death is reprehensible. If the convert has children after his conversion, they are his Jewish children and all laws of inheritance apply. The only problem arises if his pregnant wife converted with him. The Babli notes that in such a case, the Sages are displeased with any repayment to the child born after conversion. The reason given by the commentators is that the child is Jewish by birth; if the laws of inheritance did apply one would conclude that the child is legally a relative of his father and his older siblings. But the fact is that a Gentile father never can have a legal relationship with his child by a Jewish mother. For example, if a Jewish man marries his late father’s other wife, this relationship is incestuous and the marriage is non-existent; the woman can marry another man without a divorce. But if the child conceived as a Gentile would marry one of his late father’s wives other than his mother, while the marriage is not tolerated it is valid and would need a formal divorce. The Yerushalmi does not consider this unlikely case. {The Šulḥan Arukh,Ḥošen Mišpaṭ §127(2) decides otherwise, following what is reported in the name of Rashi.}. Movables are acquired only by being drawn close, but the Sages are pleased with everybody who keeps his word¹²⁵ 1:5. The rule is that by rabbinic decree, transfer of movable property can be accomplished only by actual or symbolic possession. This means that if the buyer pays before he takes possession, the seller is legally free to return the money and sell the goods to a higher bidder. However, doing so is morally reprehensible and the tricked buyer may ask the court to declare (Mishnah Baba Meẓi‘a 4:2): “He Who made the generation of the Deluge and the generation of the Tower of Babylon pay, He will make him pay who does not stand by his word.”.

footnotes: ¹²⁴ This is the text in all Mishnah mss., whether Palestinian, Babylonian, or Maimonidean traditions. However, the Babli (Qiddušin ¹²⁵ The rules of acquisition are spelled out in Mishnah Qiddušin

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Eleazar said, only to his sons. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “only to his sons?” If he has sons, one should return it to his sons. If he has no sons, one should return it to his daughters. That you should not say, since the inheritance of the convert is not settled in the Torah¹²⁶. 27:6–11 appoint the sons as heirs; daughters are to inherit only if there are no sons. [However, by rabbinic decree unmarried daughters may claim a dowry before the inheritance can be distributed.] In the absence of children, the father’s family inherits in ascending and descending order; the mother’s family never inherits., he should return it to the children. Similarly, if somebody died who was the last of his family and he has no heir¹²⁷ except his mother one does not have to repay, but if the debtor repaid the Sages are pleased with him.

footnotes: ¹²⁶ The laws of inheritance in Num ¹²⁷ No relative on his father’s side can be found after diligent search.

¹²⁸ 94d, speaking of “the robber or one who lends on interest.” The Babli restricts the advice only to those robbers and lenders who have no income whatsoever except robbery and interest, and probably refers only to Rebbi’s time. The robber who repents and wants to return what he robbed, if somebody accepts it from him, the Sages are displeased with him.

footnotes: ¹²⁸ Tosephta 8:11 and Babli Baba Qama

Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody trades in promises¹²⁹ 3:14 (quoted in Babli Baba Meẓi‘a 49a, where Rav disagrees and holds that one is free to change his mind) and Yerushalmi Baba Meẓi‘a4:3,4 (fol. 9c-d)., there you say the Sages are displeased with him. But sometimes you say only¹³⁰ that one gives him up to “Him who made pay¹²⁵ 1:5. The rule is that by rabbinic decree, transfer of movable property can be accomplished only by actual or symbolic possession. This means that if the buyer pays before he takes possession, the seller is legally free to return the money and sell the goods to a higher bidder. However, doing so is morally reprehensible and the tricked buyer may ask the court to declare (Mishnah Baba Meẓi‘a 4:2): “He Who made the generation of the Deluge and the generation of the Tower of Babylon pay, He will make him pay who does not stand by his word.””.

footnotes: ¹²⁹ Nothing has been written, no money has yet changed hands, no act of acquisition has been performed. {The text here follows the Rome ms., the Leyden ms. and Venice print have מניין דאת אמר.} Parallels are in Tosephta Baba Meẓi‘a ¹³⁰ “Only” must be a scribal error since the curse by the court is more of a punishment than the displeasure of the Sages. The case here applies when money has changed hands but no act of acquisition has taken place. ¹²⁵ The rules of acquisition are spelled out in Mishnah Qiddušin

Rebbi Zeïra, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He who gives a ring as surety and wants to get out of the deal, may get out of the deal¹³¹ 48b) disagrees and considers taking a pledge as an act of acquisition.. Rebbi Zeïra asked before Rebbi Abbahu: A gold coin? He said to him, a ring. What is the difference between a gold coin and a ring? Gold coins are exchanged¹³², a ring remains as it is.

footnotes: ¹³¹ Since the ring is a deposit, taking the ring is not an act of acquisition. The Babli (Baba Meẓi‘a ¹³² If payment is made, the depositor can reclaim only a gold coin of the same value, not the identical piece.

Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody wanted to change his mind after he had promised a gift to another person, he may change his mind¹³³ 4:7 (fol. 55b), Baba Meẓi‘a 4:2 (fol. 9c-d), Babli Baba Meẓi‘a 49a. In the Babli, the statement is restricted to large gifts.. Rebbi Yose was with Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi; he said to him: Is that just no (Lev. 19:36) “and just yes?¹³⁴ 8(7), Babli Baba Meẓi‘a 49a: “Why does the verse mention ‘a just epha and a just hin’? Is not a hin a part of an epha, how can one have correct measures for one and not the other? One takes biblical hîn as rabbinic hēn ‘yes’. That your yes should be a yes and your no a no, the same in your mind and your mouth.”” He said, when he said it, it was a just yes. Rav disagrees since Rav said, when I tell my family to give a gift to somebody, I never change my mind¹³⁵. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “¹³⁶ 1:8, Baba Batra 5:2; Yerushalmi Qiddušin 1:4 (fol. 60b), Giṭṭin 8:1 (fol. 49b); Babli Baba Batra 85a. Where did they say that movables are acquired by being drawn close? In the public domain or in a courtyard which is not their joint property. In the domain of the buyer, when the deal was accepted¹³⁷; in the domain of the seller one never acquires until either he lift it up or he draw and remove everything from the prior owner’s property. In the domain of a depositary he cannot acquire unless he gave permission or rented their place out to him.” What does Rav do with this¹³⁸? One is if he was standing with him¹³⁹, the other if he was not standing with him. Rav disagrees since Rav said, when I tell my family to give a gift to somebody, I never change my mind. You should know because somebody had given surety on salt¹⁴⁰ 48b, the story is told of R. Ḥiyya bar Josef, who appeared before R. Joḥanan.; it rose in price. He came before Rav who said, either he should give corresponding to the surety¹⁴¹.cit., Rav holds that a surety gives a claim for the value of the surety while R. Joḥanan holds that a surety establishes a claim for the entire lot in question. The version of the story here implies that Rav was the judge. or he should be given up to “Him who made pay”. The arguments of Rav are contradictory. There he says, when I tell my family to give a gift to somebody, I never change my mind and here he says so¹⁴²? There it is for a legal rule; what Rav did himself was a measure of piety.

footnotes: ¹³³ Also in Ma‘ser Šeni ¹³⁴ This cryptic statement is explained in Sifra Qedošim Pereq ¹³⁵ This is taken as a legal statement; at the end it will be accepted as a moral precept only. ¹³⁶ Tosephta Qiddušin ¹³⁷ Things deposited on a persons’s real estate are his property as soon as he has the right to them. ¹³⁸ Why should he not change his mind since there was no acquisition and no money given? ¹³⁹ In this provisional answer, it is only asserted that the promise of a gift to another person is binding. But the question remains, why should it be binding if there was no acquisition, which could only be effected by removing the gift from the donor’s property? ¹⁴⁰ In the Babli, Baba Meẓi‘a ¹⁴¹ In the Babli, loc ¹⁴² For his own gifts he establishes the rule that a gift is unchangeable, for commercial transactions he says that they are reversible, even if that would be morally wrong.