MISHNAH: An oath about a deposit applies to men and women, unrelated persons and relatives, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth¹. From the mouth of another he is liable only if he denies in court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by his own mouth or the mouth of others, from the moment that he denies, he is liable. He is liable for intent about the oath, or error about it with intent about the deposit, but he is not liable for error about the latter². 5:25 (in addition to restitution of 125% of the amount embezzled) is due if the false oath was intentional, or if the oath was in error but the embezzling was intentional; it is not due if the oath was factually false because the maker of the oath did not realize that he had the deposit, or forgot about it. The Babli (but not Maimonides) reads the last word as שִׁגְגָתָהּ referring to the oath; he is not liable if he was ignorant of the fact that false oaths are forbidden and that they trigger liability for a sacrifice.. What is he liable for in case of intentional violation? A reparation offering in the value of two Šeqalim³. 5:25 prescribes a reparation offering “in its value”; the value defined in 5:15 as “Šeqalim”. An indeterminate plural always means 2 (Chapter 4, Note 8). The biblical Šeqel is the traditional “King’s weight” of about 12g silver, about equal to the tetradrachma of the early Principate, and double the rabbinic Šeqel of two zuz (cf. Qiddušin 1:1, Note 122.) Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Parashah 13(14)..

footnotes: ¹ In this respect the oath about money matters is equal to the rules of a blurted oath (Mishnah 3:11–12), not to the oath of testimony. All restrictions about women, relatives, and disqualified persons, refer only to witnesses and judges, not to parties in adversary proceedings. ² The sacrifice prescribed in Lev ³ Lev

HALAKHAH: “An oath about a deposit,” etc. ⁴, New York 1909, pp. 285–286 (G). It was stated: Is an oath in his own formulation of an oath of testimony like an imprecation; in his own words is an oath about a deposit like an imprecation⁵? Rebbi Yose said, since it is written “a person, a person⁶. 5:1; cf. Chapter 4:3 Note 31.”, everything is here and everything is there. Rebbi Mana said, an imprecation made in court is the topic of disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and the Sages⁷. ⁸ Chapter 5) and is the subject of extensive commentaries by Nachmanides, R. Nissim Gerondi, and Rosh. Cf. Babli 36a.He lied to his fellow man⁹. 5:21., if his confession was eliminated by the oath¹⁰. It excludes one who lied to one of partners; it excludes one who lied where there are witnesses and a document¹¹. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if two people took a loan from one person, even if they did not write “we are responsible and warrantors for one another”, they are responsible and warrantors for one another; but one does not act on this¹² 8(18) Jerusalem 1975 p. 179 Note 10).. If two made a joint deposit and one came to retrieve his property, one does not listen to him¹³. Should he not be treated as denying his part and be liable? If one made a deposit with two people. If one denied it, he is liable. If the other denied it, he is liable¹⁴. If the deposit was worth one peruṭa, does this not result in each of them bringing a sacrifice for half a peruṭa¹⁵ (a Hasmonean coin of about 2g bronze) is the smallest amount for which one may go to court. (Half- peruṭa coins have been found.) Since a half-peruṭa cannot be the subject of a law suit, it cannot be the cause of liability for any kind of oath. Should not the sacrifice for an oath about a half-peruṭa be forbidden as false dedication?? What here? If one would swear, and swear, and swear, would he not bring a sacrifice for half a peruṭa¹⁶, each one is for a third of a peruṭa.? There, each oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth. Here no oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth¹⁷ need separate atoning. A deposit given to two people jointly must be at least two peruṭas worth to trigger liabilities for sacrifices..

footnotes: ⁴ For this and part of the next Halakhah there exists a rudimentary Genizah fragment edited by L. Ginzberg, Yerushalmi Fragments ⁵ It was established in 4:14 (Note 119) that for requests of testimony imprecations without oaths and oaths without imprecations trigger liabilities for a sacrifice. As noted before, the natural setting of an oath or imprecation for testimony is one formulated by the claimant; for oaths about deposits it is one formulated by the defendant. No imprecations are mentioned in connection with oaths about deposits. The unresolved questions are whether an imprecation formulated by the potential witness triggers liability and what the status is of an imprecation substituting for an oath is a case of disputed monetary claim? ⁶ Lev ⁷ Not only oaths; Mishnah 4:1. ⁸ The following is also quoted by Alfassi (Shevuot ⁹ Lev ¹⁰ Liability for a sacrifice is created only if the false oath saves the defendant from a sentence which would obligate him to pay the claimant. Cf. S. Liebermann, Review of S. Asaph מספרות הגאונים, Tarbiz 5(1934) pp. 395–400. ¹¹ Swearing falsely to only one of the partners has no monetary consequences as long as the defendant did not also lie to the other partners. Swearing falsely about an obligation which can be proven by witnesses or documents is pointless. ¹² The implication that rules governing one debtor and two creditors can be applied to one creditor and two debtors is not found in the Babli but accepted by Rif (§1043) and all subsequent codifiers; the note that one does not act on this, but writes joint liabilities in all contracts, was not accepted by Rif and his successor Josef ibn Migash (cf. I. Tashma and H. Ben Shammai, Kobez al Yad ¹³ Without explicit authorization by one of the depositors to the trustee, a joint deposit may be returned only to the joint depositors. ¹⁴ If both trustees denied the existence of the deposit at different times, both are liable. ¹⁵ A peruṭa ¹⁶ Since he has to bring three sacrifices for oaths about one peruṭa ¹⁷ The previous argument is wrong. Multiple infractions all concerning the same peruṭa

Rebbi La: Both¹⁸ Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both are saying, there is no ”witnesses “here¹⁹ quoted at the start of the preceding paragraph the mention of “witnesses” should be deleted.. Why? Because they might die. But might not a document be lost? Therefore, the reason can only be that they might forget their testimony²⁰. There, we have stated²¹: “Where is my ox? He told him, it is lost. I want you to swear, he said, Amen. But witnesses testify that he ate it. He has to pay the value. If he confessed himself, he has to pay the value, and the fifth, and the reparation sacrifice²²..” The Mishnah [applies] if he does not know that there are witnesses. He comes to tell you, even if he knows that there are witnesses²³. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “If there were two groups of witnesses, if the first group reneged and after this the second, both are liable.²⁴” One understands that the first group becomes liable²⁵ it was accepted in court.. Why the second? Not because they might forget their testimony? ²⁶[Here also, because they (are commanded) to forget their testimony.]

footnotes: ¹⁸ Probably one should read ר׳ יוחנן instead of ור׳ יוחנן and delete the first “both”. G is of no help. The Babli (37b) only quotes R. Joḥanan. ¹⁹ While they agree that an oath denying any documentary obligation is futile, they hold that a debt proven only by the oral testimony of witnesses is difficult to enforce and, therefore, the debtor may see a chance to evade monetary obligations by a false oath. In the baraita ²⁰ There are several reasons why testimony by witnesses alone may be impossible; this might encourage false oaths. ²¹ Mishnah 8:4. ²² The second person has accepted to watch over the ox without being paid and without having the right to use the ox for work. If anything happens to the ox except cases of gross negligence, the trustee does not have to pay. The moment he uses the ox for his own purposes, he becomes liable for damages. Since he swears falsely that it was lost, he swears falsely for monetary gain and becomes liable. (Had he claimed that the ox was stolen, he would have had to pay the thief’s fine in addition to paying for the ox.) If he confesses in order to clear his conscience, he becomes eligible for atonement of his sin which is effected by paying an additional fifth (from above, i. e., a quarter from below) and a sacrifice in the value of 2 šeqalim ²³ The formulation of the Mishnah shows clearly that there were witnesses available when he swore falsely. Nevertheless, he has to bring a sacrifice if he confesses. Why do R. Joḥanan and R. Simeon ben Laqish have to formulate a statement which clearly is implied by a Mishnah? The answer is that the Mishnah may be interpreted that the trustee swore falsely in the belief that there were no witnesses; he swore for monetary gain. The Amoraic statement adds that even had the trustee known of the existence of witnesses, only they were not present at the moment of his oath, it still is an oath for monetary gain since the witnesses might forget their testimony in the meantime. The formulation “he”, not “they”, in the last sentence may support the reading of the Babli which only mentions R. Joḥanan. ²⁴ Mishnah 4:4. ²⁵ This text is very difficult and all commentators and editors follow the Babli (32b/33a) and switch the places of “first” and “second”, for the reasons explained in Halakhah 4:4, Note 54. But this seems to be excluded by the text of G, which becomes the more credible as its scribe clearly did not understand the text since he misread מצוּיִין “being apt to” as מצֻוִּים “being commanded”.Therefore one is forced to explain that the first group clearly violates their oath of testimony by reneging on it. The question is why the second group is not freed from their obligation by the first since strictly speaking only two witnesses are needed by biblical standards; any additional witnesses appear superfluous. The answer is that additional witnesses never are superfluous since any witness may forget, if not the whole incident so some detail which might invalidate his testimony in cross examination. One knows that the testimony of a group of witnesses is valid only after ²⁶ Added from G; cf. the preceding Note.

He denied it²⁷. 5:22., not him²⁸ 22(6) more in detail: “About it but not about its finder.” This Tanna and both Talmudim reject the understanding of the verse as given in the Targumim, that the person swearing had found the lost property and now denies it. This would be covered by “robbery” listed in v. 21. Rather it is that the person searching for his lost property, such as his donkey mares, asks a person whether he knows either of the property or of the person who might have taken it. If he under oath falsely denies any knowledge, according to this Tanna be becomes liable for a sacrifice only if he wrongly denies knowledge about the property, not about the person who might have appropriated it. The big question then becomes, why should the person asked for testimony be liable for anything since by necessity he is a single person and the testimony of a single person cannot force a judgment. As Ravad explains in his Commentary to Sifra, this argument would be unconditionally valid only for oaths about testimony, not for oaths about causing monetary loss. His scenario is, e. g., that the lost animal was standing on another person’s property. The original owner took it but now the person from whom it was taken claims ownership and wants it back. The second person agrees that he found the animal but he disputes the fact that it is the animal which had belonged to the first. In this situation, testimony of one witness about ownership of the animal is sufficient for a judgment in favor of the first person since it is not a judgment to transfer property but to confirm an existing status. On the other hand, testimony that the second person took possession of some lost property but which failed to identify the property is worthless and its denial cannot trigger any liability by the potential witness.. ²⁹ 22(6), Babli Bava qamma 105b. In the Babli: “Three kinds of oaths [about lost property.]”“Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability³⁰. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so³¹. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.³²” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder³³. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

footnotes: ²⁷ Lev ²⁸ In Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq ²⁹ Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq ³⁰ In the Babli, this is attributed to the early Galilean Amora R. Ḥanina. ³¹ In the Babli, this is the authoritative opinion of Samuel. ³² As the Babli points out, if somebody swears although he does not not know about the whole affair he swears truthfully and no liability of any kind can arise. In place of “neither about it nor about its finder” one must read “about it and its finder.” ³³ Only the middle clause is in dispute between Ben Azzai and the first Tanna.

MISHNAH: What is an oath about a deposit? He said to him, “give me the deposit which you hold for me.” “An oath that I am holding nothing of yours;³⁴” or that he said to him, “I am holding nothing of yours;” “I am putting an oath upon you” and he said “Amen”³⁵; this one is liable. If he made him swear five times whether in court or out of court and he denied, he is liable for each single one. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because he may return and admit³⁶.

footnotes: ³⁴ This is the oath from his own mouth. ³⁵ This is the oath from another’s mouth. ³⁶ The rule that “after he told, he does not return to tell” (Halakhah 4:3, Note 30) restricts witnesses but not parties to a trial.

HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about a deposit,” etc. ³⁷ is taken from Yebamot 11:1 (Notes 30,34) as indicated in the Notes to 4:3. The text of G ends at the start of this Halakhah.A person, a person. Since here it is from his own words, also there from his own words. Since there it is from others’ words, also here it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut at the place it comes from: Since here it is said about his own words, so also here³⁸ about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said about it. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.

footnotes: ³⁷ This Halakhah is a reworking of Halakhah 4:3 with in most cases correctly switching “here” (5:21) and “there” (5:1) and “oath of testimony” and “oath of deposit”. The explanation of equal cut ³⁸ Obviously this should read “there.”

³⁹ Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative not liable for an oath about deposits formulated by others? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by others for an oath about deposits only from oaths about testimony, and since there relatives are not liable, so they neither are here? Rebbi Yose said, relatives here can be inferred from non-relatives there.

footnotes: ³⁹ This paragraph is a new question, with the arguments about oaths of testimony and deposits switched. In structure and argument it is completely parallel to 4:3, Notes 34,35.

Rebbi Yudan the Cappadocian asked: He made him swear five times by the formulation of others out of the court: would he not be liable only once⁴⁰? Rebbi Yose said, is this not the Mishnah: “Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they can come back and admit?” But here, since they cannot come back and admit, they are liable only once.

footnotes: ⁴⁰ If this refers to oaths about deposits, this would be the Mishnah and there would be no room for any question. It seems therefore that the question is asked about oaths of testimony and the hypothesis is that there should be liability for each one of the oaths.

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he made him swear five times, since Rebbi Meїr considered “by his own words” as in court, would this determine the sacrifice on the first occasion, even without request⁴¹. 5:20 ff. is all about. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which others would formulate an oath if they have no claim.? It should come like the following:⁴² “Why do you go after us? An oath that we do not know any testimony relevant for you. He pays the value plus a fifth and brings a reparation sacrifice for two tetradrachmas, in distinction from an oath about testimony.”

footnotes: ⁴¹ This is a bad adaptation of the text in 4:3. Following R. Meїr, since assent to an oath formulated by others is inferred from oaths about testimony, if applied to money matters does this need a claim by the other party? There can be no question about “by his own words” since that is what Lev ⁴² This is a mangled quote from a text similar to the end of Tosephta 4:1: “He said to him, give me the deposit which you hold for me. Why do you go after me? An oath that I am holding nothing of yours. This one is liable and has to pay for the value of the object, an added fifth, and bring a reparation sacrifice for two tetradrachmas, in distinction from an oath about testimony.”A clear sign of the corruption is the use of the plural in the words of the claimant which makes no sense in a question about deposits.

Would he be “not liable” from others’ mouth for real estate? From others’ mouth would he be liable for a reparation sacrifice worth two šeqalim⁴³?

footnotes: ⁴³ For Babylonian sources (Babli 37b, Tosephta 4:1) it is obvious that the oath applies to claims for real estate which have to be proven by documents.

MISHNAH: If five people were claiming from him and said to him, give us the deposit which you are holding for us. “An oath that I am not holding anything of yours’ ”; he is liable only once. “An oath that I am not holding anything of you, and of you, and of you;” he is liable for each one separately. Rebbi Eliezer says, on condition that he repeat “an oath” at the end. Rebbi Simeon says, not unless he repeat “an oath” for each single one⁴⁴, p. 78, Note ז. The majority [following R. Meїr in Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq 17(1)] holds that an oath addressed to a group of people is a single oath, but one addressed to separate individuals counts as multiple oaths according to the number of persons mentioned in the oath. R. Eleazer holds that this is true only if the person swearing indicates that he intends the one sentence to be considered a separate oath for each individual addressed, by repeating at the end that “this is an oath.” Without such a final statement the mention of “oath” refers only to the first subject addressed in the oath. R. Simeon holds that a statement formulated as one oath is one oath; there is liability for multiple sacrifices only if it was clearly said that separate oaths were made for each claimant..

footnotes: ⁴⁴ In the Halakhah and in all parallel sources the name is not “R. Eliezer” but “R. Eleazar”. The latter name is correct as contemporary of R. Simeon; cf. R. Rabbinovicz, Diqduqe Soferim Ševuot

HALAKHAH: “If five people were claiming from him,” etc. I could think that also for an oath about a deposit He did not make one assenting to an oath like making an oath? Rebbi Eleazar said, this is not so. But also for an oath about a deposit we are treating one assenting to an oath like one formulating an oath⁴⁵11(3) state that in this case an oath imposed by another person does not trigger the liability for a sacrifice. The Yerushalmi considers this possibility and rejects it..

footnotes: ⁴⁵ The text as it stands is unintelligible. The first “also” contradicts what was stated in Halakhah 4:5 that the rules of oaths about testimony and deposits are derived from one another. An oath about testimony by its nature is imposed by another party; there it was established that the reluctant witness also is liable if he himself formulates the oath that he will appear as a witness and then reneges. Therefore, this “also” has to be deleted.The oath about a deposit by its nature is offered by the person denying that he is holding anything. The Babli (34b) and Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq

Rebbi Joḥanan said: The words of Rebbi Eleazar, only if he mentioned “oath” at the start and at the end⁴⁶. The words of the Sages, if he mentioned “oath” at the start but not at the end. Or if he mentioned it at the end but not at the start in the opinion of the rabbis he brings a sacrifice for each single one, in Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one sacrifice for everything⁴⁷. If he mentions “oath” at the start but did not mention it at the end, does the oath fall on the middle ones⁴⁸? Come and see: If he had mentioned it at the start and the end, did he mention it for the middle ones? But you are saying that it is valid; so here it is valid⁴⁹.

footnotes: ⁴⁶ Then multiple sacrifices are due for multiple lies. ⁴⁷ In both cases, a single mention of “oath” at the end is equivalent in force to a single mention of “oath” at the start. ⁴⁸ This is a question only for R. Eleazar. Does R. Eleazar only require one sacrifice because he considers everything together as one statement, or does he restrict the oath to the denial of the claim of the first person mentioned? If the denial of the claim of the first person was correct, but some denials to other persons were false, in the first case the trustee would have to bring a sacrifice but not in the second. ⁴⁹ Since the difference between R. Eleazar and R. Simeon is that the latter requires a separate mention of “oath” for each single denial while R. Eleazar requires only two irrespective of the number of denials in between, it is obvious that the first eventuality mentioned in the preceding Note is the correct interpretation.

Rebbi Yudan from Cappadocia asked: What about “an oath that neither wheat, nor barley, nor spelt I am holding for you⁵⁰”? Is it as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end⁵¹? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once⁵². “I am not holding for you wheat, or barley, or spelt, an oath,” is this as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once⁵³. Is it so if this were a blurted oath? “An oath that I shall not eat; I shall not eat, an oath”? In the rabbis’ opinion he brings a sacrifice for each one⁵⁴. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion does he bring one for the entirety? Even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that he is only emphasizing the prohibitions⁵⁵. It only would be problematic if it were about the past. “An oath that I did not eat; I did not eat, an oath.” In the rabbis’ opinion he brings two sacrifices (for each one). In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one (for each)⁵⁶.

footnotes: ⁵⁰ The wording is that of Mishnah 5. However, there one has to translate “wheat, or barley, or spelt” and the oath is true only if he holds neither kind. But here the oath is true if he does not hold at least one of them. This follows from de Morgan’s formulas (using v “or”, “and”, ¬ “not”):¬(AvBvC) = ¬A¬B¬C,¬(ABC) = ¬Av¬Bv¬C. ⁵¹ This is a question following R. Eleazar, assuming that he disagrees not only in the case of Mishnah 3 but in all similar cases. ⁵² It is impossible to read this as three distinct oaths; there can be no disagreement between the rabbis and R. Eleazar in this case. ⁵³ This is a question for the rabbis. Does placing the mention of “oath” at the end of a sentence intended as oath constitute a second oath? ⁵⁴ Since this clearly represents two distinct oaths. ⁵⁵ Cf. Halakhah 3:11, Note 161. Since there is only one subject, R. Eleazar should consider the two clauses as parts of one statement and require only one sacrifice. But he will agree that the second statement is meant to reinforce the first; therefore if he breaks one he breaks both and must bring two sacrifices. ⁵⁶ For the rabbis, the two clauses are two separate oaths; for R. Eleazar they are two parts of one oath. Since the oaths have only one object, the references to “each one” or “all of them” are copyists’ errors induced by the use of these expressions in the other cases.

Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Jeremiah⁵⁷ asked: If one said, “an oath wheat and wheat I am not holding;” what? Let us hear from the following: “Not from place X, not from place Y,” he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, they considered a multiplicity of places like a multiplicity of kinds. If he had said, not from this place, not from this place; it would have been useful⁵⁸ that a false oath “I am not holding grain from place X nor from place Y” is considered only one oath. To be applicable to the question the same place name would have to be repeated..

footnotes: ⁵⁷ This name tradition is impossible. Either one has to read R. Jeremiah, R. Abbahu, or, since the question fits R. Jeremiah’s style, instead of R. Abbahu one has to read R. Abba (or the name of another last generation Amora.) ⁵⁸ If the same object is mentioned twice in an oath. There is no proof from a baraita

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: “10 oaths that I am not holding;” what?

Rebbi Yose asked: “An oath, an oath that I am not holding for you,” what? Rebbi Yose said, let us hear from the following: “ ‘An oath that I shall not eat this loaf; an oath that I shall not eat it’. Then he ate it. He is liable only once.⁵⁹” Because he mentioned “this”. Therefore, had he not mentioned “this” we would be liable for each one. Is it the same for a blurted oath? “An oath that I shall eat carcass meat, and wheat bread, and barley bread, and spelt bread.” Since he is not liable for carcass meat⁶⁰ he is not liable for the remainder.

footnotes: ⁵⁹ Mishnah 3:8 (3:7 in most independent Mishnah mss.). This clause is missing in the Mishnah of the Yerushalmi; another indication that the Mishnah of the Leiden ms. does not have the same source as the Yerushalmi Tractates. ⁶⁰ Mishnah 3:5; this argument follows R. Simeon.

MISHNAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan, the robbery, and the lost object which you are holding for me.” “An oath that I am not holding anything of yours;” he is liable only once. “An oath that I am holding for you neither a deposit, nor a loan, nor a robbery, nor a lost object;” he is liable for each separate item⁶¹. “Give me the wheat, and the barley, and the spelt, which you are holding for me.” “An oath that I am not holding anything for you,” he is liable only for one. “An oath that I am not holding wheat, and barley, and spelt, for you,” he is liable for each single one⁶¹. Rebbi Meїr says, even if he says, “wheat, and barley, and spelt,⁶⁸. 9:31–32) which in form is identical with the singular. In the Halakhah, the collective for R. Meїr is read as singular for the anonymous Tanna.” he is liable for each single one.

footnotes: ⁶¹ The same arguments made for oaths addressed to different people can be made for oaths covering different subjects; cf. Note 44. The dissents of RR. Eleazar and Simeon apply here also. ⁶¹ The same arguments made for oaths addressed to different people can be made for oaths covering different subjects; cf. Note 44. The dissents of RR. Eleazar and Simeon apply here also. ⁶⁸ Even if the defendant did not use the language of the claimant, as long as the meaning is the same there is liability for a false oath. The claimant used the vernacular plural to describe his claim; the defendant used the biblical collective (Ex

HALAKHAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan,” etc. ⁶² 4:3, explained there in Notes 48–60. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi (Yasa)⁶³: R. Jehudah. Since there is no Tanna R. Yasa, the reading “R. Jehudah” has to be accepted. In the next Halakhah, R. Jehudah is identified as the anonymous Tanna of Mishnaiot 3–5. will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, a baraita supports what the colleagues said. “A woman made a vow as a nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I’; the first woman’s husband heard it and dissolved [the vow] for her; the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. ⁶⁴, “R. Simeon said, if …” Since the next paragraph refers to R. Simeon, this must also be the text here. If she said, ‘my intention was only to be like her,’ both are permitted.” Because she said, “to be like her, in her state”. Therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state”, the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where the essence is not an oath, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? What Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest, if he connects: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.

footnotes: ⁶² This entire Halakhah is a slightly defective copy of a text in Nazir ⁶³ In Nazir ⁶⁴ In Nazir

The following is obvious: If her husband did not dissolve [the vow] for the first woman and she (remained)⁶⁵: “she violated her vow.” in her vow, she is whipped. Can the second he whipped? Rebbi Yose said, since one is whipped, the other also is whipped. Rebbi Yudan said, is this a stipulation of the court? Should not the second be treated as one who said, “a shall be a nezirah[after] thirty days”⁶⁶ is suspended while she undergoes the purification rite. Should the second woman’s vow be suspended while the nezirut of the first is suspended?? Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion, for he said, it depends on the collection⁶⁷: R. Simeon declares him not liable since his offering was not in the custom of offerers (Mishnah Menaḥot 12:3). A vow is either valid or not, it cannot be intermittent..

footnotes: ⁶⁵ Read with Nazir ⁶⁶ It is assumed that the first became impure; then her nezirut ⁶⁷ This sentence does not belong here; it is from the end of Halakhah 6. The correct text is in Nazir

“Give me the wheat, and the barley,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Jehudah imply collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices⁶⁹. How is this? A detail wheat, a detail barley, a detail spelt. Collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. Detail a third wheat, detail a third barley, detail a third spelt, are these taken together? Come and see; although he holds many details, even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. In which respect? To make him liable for sacrifices. If he held four kinds, two kinds in one detail, two kinds on two details. even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail⁷⁰. ⁷¹ 9:7, Notes 85–101. The following paragraph describes efforts by two men to divorce their wives with one document to save on costs for scribe and parchment. As Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything. What means “collectively”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, “X divorces Y and Z U.” What means “collectively”? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A.” Rebbi Ze`ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately that he needs the typical text⁷² text everywhere has טוֹפֶס “boilerplate document” which possibly is Accadic (from the Sumerian) ṭuppum “document”, the spelling here indicates Greek τύπος “figure, form” used as “prescribed form” (of the document.) and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit from this one; a qorban for this one and a qorban for that one.’ Each single one needs a separate opening.⁷³ 9:7.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.⁷⁴ 9:7.”

footnotes: ⁶⁹ This determines the anonymous author of the Mishnah who makes the liability for sacrifices dependent on the way the vow is formulated as R. Jehudah. This is confirmed in the Babli, 38a. ⁷⁰ Irrespective of the complication of the transaction, there always is a formulation of the oath which avoids mentioning any detail. ⁷¹ From here to the end of the Halakhah the text is from Giṭtin ⁷² While the Giṭtin ⁷³ Mishnah Nedarim ⁷⁴ Mishnah Giṭtin

⁷⁵ 9:7, Notes 93–101. The omissions in the Giṭtin text show that the text here is original. (This has been recognized in the text there.) Samuel said. the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah; the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meïr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meïr, as Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything; “I am greeting X,” he only signed for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed everything? Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated: “Rebbi Meїr says, even if he says, ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt,’ he is liable for each single one;” and nobody says “even” unless he agrees to an earlier statement. Rebbi Ḥinena said, in Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, whether he said, “wheat, and barley, and spelt,” or “wheat, barley, spelt,” it is a general statement and details. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, if he said, “wheat, and barley, and spelt,” it is a general statement and details. If he said “wheat, barley, spelt,” it is a general statement without details⁷⁶.

footnotes: ⁷⁵ Giṭtin ⁷⁶ Since he reads the words as singulars, not collectives, the entire statement is one unit: “I am holding for you not even a single grain each of wheat, barley, spelt”.

MISHNAH: “You raped or seduced my daughter,” and he says “I did not rape, I did not seduce.” “I am asking you to swear,” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. Rebbi Simeon frees him from liability since he would not pay the fine by his own admission⁷⁷. 22:16) and the rapist of a virgin (Deut. 22:29). Since these fines are imposed in criminal law, they cannot be imposed based on a confession since all confessions are inadmissible in criminal court. It was established earlier (4:4, Note 40) that an oath can create liability for a reparation sacrifice only if the action of the defendant led to a claimant’s monetary loss.. They told him, even though he does not pay the fine by his own admission, he pays for shame and diminution by his own admission⁷⁸.

footnotes: ⁷⁷ The fines are the statutory fines of the seducer of a virgin (Ex ⁷⁸ Payments for inflicted shame, diminution of marriage prospects, and for rape victims’ pain, are civil claims for which “the admission by the defendant is worth 100 witnesses.” If the daughter is a minor, all money is due to her father.

HALAKHAH: “You raped or seduced my daughter,” etc. Rebbi Zeira, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The words of Rebbi Simeon [imply that] the main claim is for the fine, which is not so for the words of the Sages⁷⁹. Rebbi Illa said, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he claims the fine, shame and diminution; the words of the Sages if he claims shame, diminution, and fine⁸⁰. The rabbis say, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he advances three claims; the words of the Sages if he advances one claim⁸¹. Rebbi Zeira asked before Rebbi Yasa, did you hear explicitly from Rebbi Joḥanan, or from his word⁸²? Rebbi Yasa said, for he is of the rabbis’ opinion. Rebbi Mana said, even if he is of Rebbi Illa’s opinion, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he advances one claim; the words of the Sages if he advances three claims⁸³. “Not only matters for which he has to pay the capital, from where double payment, quadruple and quintuple payment, the rapist, and the seducer, and the calumniator? The verse says, *everything about which one would swear falsely.*⁸⁴ 22(9). This source quotes Lev. 5:21 instead of 5:24 quoted here. The cases enumerated in Lev. 5:21–22 are all about money or money’s worth which the defendant withholds from the claimant, a condition for liability for a sacrifice after a false oath. Double restitution is due from the thief, quadruple or quintuple from the cattle and sheep rustler who sells or eats the animal. The calumniator is the man who accuses his wife of adultery between preliminary and definitive marriages; if proven guilty in criminal court he pays a fine of 100 tetradrachmas (Deut. 22:19).” Is the calumniator’s not a fine? Rebbi Jeremiah says, this is Rebbi Simeon’s who said, all depends on the collection⁸⁵.

footnotes: ⁷⁹ Babli 38b. In the interpretation of the Babli, R. Simeon holds that a person will go to court for the claim of a sum fixed by law rather than one depending on the sentiment of the judges; the Sages hold that a person always will prefer a civil claim which can be settled by the agreement of the defendant to a criminal trial depending on witnesses. ⁸⁰ This argument is similar to the previous one. For R. Simeon one will prefer a criminal trial upon the successful completion of which the civil claims can easily be prosecuted; for the Sages one prefers the civil procedure, upon successful conclusion of which the claim in criminal court has much better chances. ⁸¹ This sentence most likely is corrupt; Rebbi Simeon deals with the situation where there only is a criminal case (one claim); the Sages consider the civil claims as paramount (three claims). ⁸² This is always a problem in oral tradition; it is not obvious who formulated the statement. In most cases of a lengthy chain of transmission, the actual formulation is not that of the first author. Since R. Ze`ira immigrated to Galilee after R. Joḥanan’s death. he has no way of knowing. R. Yasa explains that he formulated the sentence because R. Joḥanan had endorsed a position equal to that of the rabbis quoted earlier. ⁸³ There really is no material difference between R. Illai and the rabbis since a claim for the fine must be brought in criminal law; the claims for shame and diminution would have to be adjudicated later in civil court. The first claim according to R. Simeon is a single criminal claim. ⁸⁴ Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq ⁸⁵ Since he denied only the fine, not the capital amount.

MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable⁸⁵. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable⁸⁶. 21:32), it has the status of a fine.. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable⁸⁷. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable⁸⁸.

footnotes: ⁸⁵ Since he denied only the fine, not the capital amount. ⁸⁶ Since the amount payable is the biblically fixed amount of 30 šeqalim, about a Roman pound of silver (Ex ⁸⁷ The obligation of the master to manumit the slave whom he has injured is biblical and has the character of a fine. ⁸⁸ The person who denies any fine adjudicated under criminal law.

HALAKHAH: “ “You stole my ox,” etc. to the end of the Chapter. ⁸⁹3:10, Notes 143–156. Rebbi Isaac asked, should one have to pay the value of the slave by his admission? But what is his problem? Are the entire thirty a fine⁸⁶. 21:32), it has the status of a fine. or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, all the thirty are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “ ‘Your ox killed my slave’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is not liable.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he killed a slave covered with boils. He said to him, but it says afterwards, “ ‘Your ox killed my son’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is liable.⁹⁰ is not found in any other source.” You could explain it if he was covered with boils, then he would not be liable! You cannot do this, as we have stated⁹¹3:3, about a person killed by an ox known as goring. The entire sentence is not found in Ketubot; this seems to point to Ševuot as the primary source.: “If he killed a human, he has to pay his worth.” Rebbi Ezra said before Rebbi Mana⁹²: R. Ḥaggai before R. Yose; probably dittography. Explain it following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured⁹³. 21:30. It is not clear whether “his” refers to the slain person or the owner of the dangerous ox (Bava qamma4:8 Note 108). In Ketubot one reads the verse as referring to the owner of the ox; then it is obvious that the money is a fine even though its amount is not biblically fixed. On the face of it, this reading might be preferred; cf. Mekhilta dR. Ismael and Mekhilta dR. Simeon ben Ioḥai ad Ex. 21:30. Rashi in `Arakhin points to Ex. 21:30 as the source of the Mishnah there; the addition of the sentence (Note 91) supports the reading here as correct and that in Ketubot as corrected lectio facilior. Even according to the reading here, the identification of the redemption money as weregilt defines it as a fine.. He said to him, if following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured, all is a fine

footnotes: ⁸⁹ The entire Halakhah is also in Ketubot ⁸⁶ Since the amount payable is the biblically fixed amount of 30 šeqalim, about a Roman pound of silver (Ex ⁹⁰ This baraita ⁹¹ Mishnah `Arakhin ⁹² In Ketubot ⁹³ Ex

Does one tell him, be in the clear with Heaven? Let us hear from the following⁹⁴74b.: “It happened that Rabban Gamliel knocked out a tooth of his slave Tabi. He came to Rebbi Joshua and said to him, I found a reason to manumit my slave Tabi. He told him, you have nothing in your hand; fines only are imposed through witnesses and in court.” This implies that one does not tell him, be in the clear with Heaven. Rebbi Gamliel ben Rebbi Illai⁹⁵: ben Avina, at other places ben Ininia. R. Mana here is R. Mana I; in the preceding paragraph he was R. Mana II. asked before Rebbi Mana, does Rabban Gamliel hold with him who says, one is permitted to manumit? He told him, in itself it says that it is forbidden to manumit, for otherwise he should have manumitted him immediately.

footnotes: ⁹⁴ Babli Bava qamma ⁹⁵ In Ketubot