MISHNAH: If somebody declared his jealousy to [his wife] and she went to a secluded place¹, even if he heard about it from a bird flying by² he has to divorce her³ since the divorce is a result of his own action. and pay the ketubah, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Joshua says, from the moment she is the subject of talk of women spinning by moonlight⁴.

footnotes: ¹ He declared his jealousy to his wife and he has no witnesses that she went to a rendez-vous with the presumed paramour. ² A rumor whose source he cannot trace. ³ R. Eliezer stated in Mishnah 1:1 that a husband needs no witnesses to bring his wife to the Temple after he declared his jealousy before two witnesses. If he heard a rumor that would give him a reason to act, his wife becomes forbidden to him until after she drank the water and was found innocent. If he is unwilling or unable to bring her to the Temple, he must divorce his wife and pay the ketubah ⁴ That means, if her infidelity is the talk of the town. R. Joshua holds in Mishnah 1:1 that the wife can be brought to the Temple only on the testimony of two reliable witnesses. But if her conduct is the talk of the town, the husband would have to assume that the rumor is true and that any sexual relations with her would be potentially sinful.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody declared his jealousy and she went to a secluded place,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: This entire chapter [deals with the case that] he warned her and said to her, do not be at a secluded place with man X, after he declared his jealousy and she went to a secluded place⁵. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if she did not go to a secluded place⁶. Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Yasa: Not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees, only he is lenient about witnesses to the hiding⁷. We have stated a disagreement. Some state it anonymously⁸. Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana⁹: Rebbi Joshua does not disagree with what Rebbi Eliezer said, only that we have stated: “Rebbi Joshua says, only if¹⁰ she is the subject of talk of women carding by moonlight.” Rebbi Abba Mari asked: There¹¹, Chapter 2, Note 30., Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, everywhere where Rebbi taught a disagreement and returned to the problem later and taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous opinion. And here he says so¹²?

footnotes: ⁵ That the husband had some information that his wife met the man forbidden to her. ⁶ If there is not even a single witness against her. ⁷ There is no difference of interpretation between R. Joḥanan and R. Simeon ben Laqish; the latter only follows the opinion attributed to R. Eliezer in Mishnah 1:1. ⁸ The opinion attributed to R. Eliezer in Mishnah 6:1. ⁹ R. Mana I. ¹⁰ This is the reading of the Mishnah in the Babli, which can be read as meaning that if the wife is the talk of the town, even a rumor of unknown origin forces the husband to divorce his wife. ¹¹ ‘Orlah ¹² If Mishnah 6:1 is stated anonymously, it would imply that in Mishnah 1:1 practice follows R. Eliezer. However, it is evident not only that general practice follows R. Joshua against R. Eliezer but also that in the case of the suspected wife, two witnesses of her misbehavior are needed to prohibit her to her husband. Therefore, the argument that R. Joshua only makes an anonymous statement precise is invalid.

We have stated: carders. Some Tannaїm state: spinners. He who said carders, they card wool. He who said spinners, they spin flax.

Where do we hold¹⁴? If about him who heard and did not know from whom he heard, it is like a bird flying by. If about him who heard and knew from whom he heard, it is a witness reporting the words of another witness¹⁵. But here we deal with the case that X [heard] from Y and Y from Z¹⁶; a word without foundation¹⁷. Arukh explains as Greek θεμέλιος “of the foundation”; Krauss suggests θεμελίωσις, ἡ, -εως “foundation”..

footnotes: ¹⁴ The information discussed by the women working by moonlight. ¹⁵ This is hearsay evidence about which in the case of a suspected wife Rabbis Eliezer and Joshua disagree in Chapter 1 (Notes 27, 28). ¹⁶ Hearsay of hearsay. ¹⁷ Reading of a Geniza fragment: תמילווסיס, which identifies the final letter as s

MISHNAH: If a single witness said “I saw her when she became impure”, she could not drink¹⁸ since, as stated at the end of Halakhah 4, his testimony “has feet”, i. e., after two witnesses for the declaration of jealousy and two witnesses that she went to a secluded place, the testimony that he saw them having sex is credible (if his testimony holds up under cross examination).. Not only that, but even a slave or a slave-girl are believed to cause her to lose her ketubah. Her mother-in-law, the mother-in-law’s daughter, her co-wife, her sister-in-law, and her husband’s daughter are trustworthy¹⁹ 15:4, Notes 81,82) because they are presumed to hate her.. They said this not to make her lose her ketubah but that she could not drink²⁰ pay the ketubah, which is not in the personal interest of these women..

footnotes: ¹⁸ Even though by biblical standards a single witness usually is not considered, here he is accepted by biblical standards as explained in Mishnah 4 to bar the husband from bringing his wife to the Temple. He is not a witness in a criminal case (against the wife and her paramour) but his testimony indirectly forces the husband to divorce his wife and also frees him from payment of the ketubah ¹⁹ These women are barred from testifying to her husband’s death (Mishnah Yebamot ²⁰ Then the husband has to divorce her and

HALAKHAH: “If a single witness said ‘I saw her when she became impure’,” etc. “And there is no witness against her²¹ 5:13.”; not only a witness [of good standing], from where even a male or female slave? The verse says, “and there is no witness against her”, any one²² 9(6)].. And following Rebbi Ismael? As Rebbi Ismael said²³30a, and Sifry Num. 7, this is quoted as everybody’s opinion., at any place where the Torah mentions “a witness”, in principle that means two witnesses unless the verse makes it clear that he is a single witness. It was found stated: Rebbi Ismael says two witnesses²⁴. 7. The Babli, 31b, explains the problem away by reading the verse “and two witnesses are not against her,” meaning that one is. If one does not need two witnesses, one does not need quality witnesses..

footnotes: ²¹ Num. ²² This follows R. Aqiba, who interprets every “and” as an addition [more explicitly Num. rabba ²³ In the Babli, 31b and Sanhedrin ²⁴ This seems to be the opinion of the Tanna of Sifry Num

Was our Mishnah [formulated] after Rebbi Aqiba agreed with Rebbi Ṭarphon²⁵ the Mishnah follows R. Aqiba before he changed his mind.? As it was stated: Rebbi Ṭarphon says, a single witness is believed to declare her impure²⁶ but not to let her lose her ketubah²⁷. Rebbi Aqiba says, just as a single witness is believed to declare her impure, so he is believed to let her lose her ketubah. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to him: Where do we find that a single witness proves anything in money matters²⁸. 19:15), the same verse is interpreted to mean that the testimony of a single witness in support of a claim of one of the parties can obligate a defendant to swear that he owes nothing (Šebuot 6:1 fol. 36d; Babli Ketubot 87b). In the case here, there is no claim from any of the concerned parties.? Rebbi Aqiba answered him, but where do we find that a single witness proves anything in matrimonial matters²⁹ Chap. 15).? But just as a single witness is believed to declare her impure, so he is believed to let her lose her ketubah. Rebbi Aqiba changed his mind and taught following Rebbi Ṭarphon³⁰.

footnotes: ²⁵ Since the Mishnah states that the single witness can also deprive the wife of her ketubah, ²⁶ This follows a general principle formulated in the Babli as: “A single witness is believable in matters of prohibitions.” For example, if a single witness shows that some food a person ate was of a forbidden kind, if the eater was unaware of the fact and therefore the sin was unintentional, he is obligated for a purification sacrifice on the testimony of a single witness. ²⁷ Since this needs two witnesses. ²⁸ While a single witness cannot prove anything in court (Deut ²⁹ Since they have implications in criminal law, marriage or divorce are invalid unless executed in front of two witnesses. It is true that a single witness can inform about the dissolution of a marriage by the husband’s death, but this does not have the status of testimony (Yebamot ³⁰ The rules of testimony for prohibitions (in cases which cannot lead to criminal prosecution) and money matters are distinct and testimony acceptable for one facet of a case may not be acceptable for the rest.

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If her mother-in-law said “I saw her when she became impure”, [you say that she did not drink. If then somebody else came and said, “I saw her when she became impure”], about what does he testify? If to make her drink, it was clear beforehand that she does not drink. He would come only to deny her ketubah to her, but one cannot make a person lose money on the testimony of one witness³³ (Note 18), this is because the court is biblically empowered to forbid her to her husband on the testimony (Note 24). But if the acceptable testimony is not needed, it is questionable whether its consequence should be enforced.! Rebbi Yose asked: If he heard from a bird flying by: “I saw her when she became impure”, you say that she did not drink. If then somebody came and said, “I saw her when she became impure”, about what does he testify? If to make her drink, it was clear beforehand that she does not drink. He would come only to deny her ketubah to her, but one cannot make a person lose money on the testimony of one witness³³ (Note 18), this is because the court is biblically empowered to forbid her to her husband on the testimony (Note 24). But if the acceptable testimony is not needed, it is questionable whether its consequence should be enforced.!

footnotes: ³³ Even if we agree with the Mishnah that a single witness is empowered to forbid the woman to her husband and as a consequence to make her forfait her ketubah ³³ Even if we agree with the Mishnah that a single witness is empowered to forbid the woman to her husband and as a consequence to make her forfait her ketubah

From what Rebbi Yose said, “X ate suet, and they warned him,” he is not whipped³⁷. 7:23,25). If a single witness comes and accuses somebody of having eaten suet criminally, i. e., after having been duly informed by two adults that eating that suet would be a criminal offense, his testimony is nothing since he is a single witness. The entire paragraph is also in Nazir 8:1, fol. 57a. If one person said to him, that is suet, and two warned him, he is whipped³⁸. Is not the main testimony given by a single witness³⁹? From what Rebbi Jehudah is saying: “X is a nazir⁴⁰. 6. The witness testified that he heard X declaring a vow of nazir (cf. Berakhot Chapter 7, Note 79) but that he did not keep it. Again he is a single witness whose word carries no weight in court., he became defiled, and I had warned him,” he is not whipped. If one person said to him, you are a nazir, and based on this testimony he behaved like a nazir, when then he drank wine or became impure in the impurity of the dead, if two warned him, he is whipped. Is not the main testimony given by a single witness⁴¹? From what Rebbi Mana said, “X is the wife of a Cohen and whored; her husband, a Cohen, then had relations with her⁴² but I had warned him;” he is [not] whipped. If she went to a secluded place in the presence of two, and one said, I saw her that she became impure; when her husband, the Cohen, had relations with her but two had warned him, he is whipped. Is not the main testimony given by a single witness⁴¹?

footnotes: ³⁷ Eating suet from cattle, sheep, or goats, the part of the fat of sacrificial animals which is burned on the altar, is a crime (Lev ³⁸ If a single witness (after due examination by the court) testifies that a certain piece of meat is suet, that piece legally has the status of suet (Note 26). If then two people warn a third person that eating the meat would be criminal (thereby establishing intent; cf. Chapter 3, Note 121) and two witnesses testify to the act, this is testimony by two witnesses, valid in court, even though the status of the piece of meat as suet was based on the testimony of only one witness. ³⁹ By analogy, on the questions raised in the preceding paragraph, one might argue that the preceding information given either from a person precluded from being a witness in court or from an unsubstantiated rumor does not impair the validity of the later testimony. ⁴⁰ Num ⁴¹ The argument is totally parallel to the first one. ⁴² After she was desecrated, a felony (cf. Chapter 1, Note 123). ⁴¹ The argument is totally parallel to the first one.

MISHNAH: It would have been logical: Since the first testimony,⁴³ which does not forbid her permanently, is not confirmed if not from two [witnesses], the last testimony,⁴³ which forbids her permanently, should reasonably only be confirmed by [witnesses]. The verse says: “There is no witness about her⁴⁴. 5:13.”, any kind of testimony about her. ⁴⁷ There would now be an argument de minore ad majus for the first testimony! Since the last testimony, which forbids her permanently, is confirmed from a single witness, the first testimony, which does not forbid her permanently, should logically be confirmed from a single witness. The verse says, “for he found out about her a matter of sexual misbehavior,⁴⁸. 24:1. For the House of Shammai, this is the only reason admitted for a divorce (Mishnah Giṭṭin 9:10); for the House of Hillel, this is a reason why there must be a divorce.” and further, it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses a matter should be confirmed.⁴⁹. 19:15. The verse proves that in any judicial proceedings, דבר means a proof by two witnesses. Since the husband cannot make his wife drink unless he presents his case to the Temple court, all judicial rules apply here. But a divorce because of the wife’s adultery can be given by the husband on his own (even though to deprive her of her ketubah after the divorce he needs the judgment of a court.)”

footnotes: ⁴³ As the Halakhah explains, the first testimony is the testimony about the wife’s going to a secluded place, where R. Joshua requires two witnesses of good standing. The last testimony is that of adultery, where the preceding Mishnaiot accept even the proverbial “bird flying by”. The confirmation is the acceptance of the testimony by a competent court. ⁴³ As the Halakhah explains, the first testimony is the testimony about the wife’s going to a secluded place, where R. Joshua requires two witnesses of good standing. The last testimony is that of adultery, where the preceding Mishnaiot accept even the proverbial “bird flying by”. The confirmation is the acceptance of the testimony by a competent court. ⁴⁴ Num ⁴⁷ This is the second half of Mishnah 3. ⁴⁸ Deut ⁴⁹ Deut

HALAKHAH: “It would have been logical: Since the first testimony,” etc. The first testimony is about being in a secluded place; the last testimony is about impurity. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Joshua, since Rebbi Joshua says⁴⁵, “he declares his jealousy and warns her by the testimony of two [witnesses], and makes her drink by the testimony of two [witnesses].” Rebbi Mana said, it even follows the Tanna, about whom was stated⁴⁶: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: He declares his jealousy before one witness or by himself, but makes her drink by the testimony of two [witnesses].”

footnotes: ⁴⁵ Mishnah 1:1, Note 4. ⁴⁶ Chapter 1, Note 16.

MISHNAH: If one witness says, she became impure, but another witness says, she did not become impure, or one woman⁵⁰ says, she became impure, but another woman says, she did not become impure, she would drink⁵¹. If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she did drink⁵². If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one [witness] says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.

footnotes: ⁵⁰ This case has to be treated separately since a woman, while she can point out facts, cannot be a formal witness. ⁵¹ Mishnah 1 stated that in case of certainty, the woman may not be brought to the Temple. In the case here, two contradicting statements cancel one another; there is uncertainty. In all cases, it is supposed that there are two witnesses who attest that the wife met another man in a secluded place. ⁵² One witness against two witnesses accounts for nothing.

HALAKHAH: “There would now be an argument de minore ad majus for the first testimony,” etc. ⁵³ Chapter 15, Notes 135–138 and here, Chapter 9, Halakhah 7. Gidul bar Miniamin in the name of Rav: Anywhere they accepted the testimony of a woman parallel to that of a man, a man can contradict a woman and a woman can contradict a man. Then one should state: “A witness says that she became impure, and a woman says that she did not become impure; a woman said that she became impure and a witness said that she did not become impure.” In the House of Rebbi they stated it this way. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Neḥemiah: One follows the majority of the testimonies. How is that? Two women against one woman they considered as if there were two witnesses against one witness. What you say refers to a woman and women. But if there were a hundred women against one [male] witness, they are like one witness.

footnotes: ⁵³ Essentially the same text, only referring to testimony of the husband’s death instead of the wife’s infidelity, in Yebamot

Rav Ada bar Aḥawah said, a single witness is believed to declare her impure, but a single witness is not believed to make her lose her ketubah.⁵⁴ Rav Ḥisda said, why did they say that a single witness is believed to declare her impure? Because the thing has feet to stand on⁵⁵ is a rabbinic institution.).

footnotes: ⁵⁴ He strictly follows the rule that a single witness is acceptable about prohibitions but not in money matters. ⁵⁵ The single witness is believed to prohibit her to her husband because there are two other witnesses who accuse her of going to a secluded place with another man. Then he can also be believed, by rabbinic rule, that the husband does not have to pay (certainly for those who hold that the ketubah

⁵⁹ הא, the discussion starts: עֵד אֶחָד אוֹמֵר נִיטְמֵאת וְעֵד אֶחָד אוֹמֵר לֹא נִיטְמֵאת. “A single witness says, she became impure, but another single witness says, she did not become impure, …” Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: Here⁶⁰ 32b, 47b; Yebamot 88b, 117b; Ketubot 22b): “In any case where the Torah declared that a single witness can be believed, he has the status of two.” If the Yerushalmi would accept such a statement, it would have to accept R. Joḥanan’s statement here. One has to assume that the second witness states that he observed the woman and the other man during the entire time they were together in a secluded place and that nothing untoward happened., she did not drink but in the case of breaking the calf’s neck they did break it⁶¹. 21:1–9. If two witnesses came and one said that he saw the murderer but the other one said that he saw the murder but not the murderer, there is no testimony which has any standing in court. Therefore, the murderer is unknown.. Rav said, she did drink. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav⁶²: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That⁶³ implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would not drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid⁶⁴ 3:3–4), or a woman or a slave. These have no standing against a single believable witness; one needs at least two, following R. Neḥemiah in the first paragraph. In the Babli, 32b, the problem is solved in a first explanation that in the case of the first sentence, the two contradicting witnesses came to court together. Then there never was testimony and the woman is not held to be an adulteress. For the second case, the single witness came first and his testimony was accepted as fact. Then one needs two witnesses to annul the first testimony. The second explanation follows the Yerushalmi.. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the end say: “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink⁶⁵. How could Rav say, she would drink? ⁵⁹ הא, the discussion starts: עֵד אֶחָד אוֹמֵר נִיטְמֵאת וְעֵד אֶחָד אוֹמֵר לֹא נִיטְמֵאת. “A single witness says, she became impure, but another single witness says, she did not become impure, …” Rebbi Joḥanan said, she would not drink. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the first statement say: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rebbi Joḥanan say, she would not drink⁶⁵? They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel, the Mishnah talks about those whose testimony is invalid⁶⁶. They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel: The Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What does it mean, “the Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous”? He said to him, so says Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai⁶⁷: This entire chapter [deals with the case that] he had declared his jealousy and she went to a secluded place. She went to a secluded place by the testimony of two [witnesses]. If one of them said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion and about impurity⁶⁸. After the time of seclusion, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity⁶⁹. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw that she did not become impure while in the secluded place, how do you treat this? As a testimony which, if part of the testimony is thrown out, the entire testimony is thrown out, or does one accept the remainder of the testimony⁷⁰? They said in the name of Rebbi Abba Mari: Even he who says, if part of it is thrown out, all is thrown out, here one accepts the remainder of the testimony, since the matter has feet to stand on⁷¹.

footnotes: ⁵⁹ In the Yerushalmi text quoted by Tosaphot, 32b, s. v. ⁶⁰ In the first case treated in Mishnah 5, that there is the word of one witness against the word of another single witness, cf. Note 59. He amends the Mishnah to read: “She does not drink.” The reason seems to be the order in which the testimony is described in the Mishnah: The first witness says that she became impure. By rabbinic rules, he is believed. This means that his testimony counts as much as the testimony of two witnesses. In the language of the Babli (Soṭah ⁶¹ Deut ⁶² Since Rav accepts the text of the Mishnah as is, one attempts to show that that text is self-contradictory. ⁶³ Since the sentence states that in the presence of a witness who states that she became impure one needs at least two witnesses who state that she did not become impure in order to declare the matter one of doubt, it would follow that there is no scenario in which a single witness can invalidate the testimony of another single witness. This contradicts the first sentence of the Mishnah and Rav’s statement. ⁶⁴ A witness who cannot testify in money matters because his integrity is in question (Mishnah Sanhedrin ⁶⁵ If the Mishnah would state only the second and third cases, it would be a case of the undistributed middle and could be solved by postulating different scenarios for the different cases. But since the first case is stated apodictically, that way (the first explanation of the Babli) seems to be excluded and neither Rav nor R. Joḥanan can have a totally coherent position. ⁵⁹ In the Yerushalmi text quoted by Tosaphot, 32b, s. v. ⁶⁵ If the Mishnah would state only the second and third cases, it would be a case of the undistributed middle and could be solved by postulating different scenarios for the different cases. But since the first case is stated apodictically, that way (the first explanation of the Babli) seems to be excluded and neither Rav nor R. Joḥanan can have a totally coherent position. ⁶⁶ In the Babli, an anonymous statement in support of R. Ḥiyya (bar Abba, student of R. Joḥanan). ⁶⁷ Cf. Note 5. ⁶⁸ Since the testimony of this witness about the wife going to a secluded place must be accepted, since it is supported by a second witness, his testimony about her infidelity also must be accepted. ⁶⁹ There is no difference whether one of two witnesses first testifies together with another that the wife went with another man to a secluded place and then he alone testifies that at the occasion of another rendez-vous she committed adultery, or if the second occasion is mentioned by a third witness. In any case, since it is not claimed that the second witness was present at the second occasion, there are distinct testimonies and the statement about adultery does not have the status of validity conferred by two independent testimonies. ⁷⁰ This is a separate case. The two witnesses agree about time and place when the wife went to a secluded place with another man. The first witness claims to have witnessed the sexual act, the second witness claims to have observed the couple all the time but that nothing untoward happened. Their testimonies about what happened in seclusion must be thrown out. Does this invalidate the testimony that a secluded rendez-vous took place? In criminal proceedings, the entire testimony would have to be thrown out. ⁷¹ That there are two witnesses who testify that the husband formally declared his jealousy before them gives all following testimonies a basis which allows for the relaxation of the rules of criminal proceedings.