MISHNAH: A woman went overseas with her husband. If there was peace between him and her and there was peace in the world and came and said, “my husband died”, she can remarry, “my husband died”, she can marry in levirate¹. If there was no peace between him and her but there was peace in the world, she cannot be believed². Rebbi Jehudah says, she is never believed unless she comes crying with torn clothes. They said to him, in any case she can remarry.

footnotes: ¹ Not only can she remarry but the local court will oversee the liquidation of the husband’s inheritance on her word. Since the consequences of her remarrying while her husband is alive are so devastating (cf. Mishnah 10:1) we trust that she will not knowingly remarry if her husband is alive. ² In the Babli and the independent Mishnah mss. there is another clause “if there was peace between him and her but no peace in the world.” Since the first sentence requires two conditions, peace between him and her and peace in the world, it is clear that the other clause was omitted by an oversight of the scribe. This is confirmed by the Halakhah, which discusses why in case of war she is not believed without supporting evidence.

HALAKHAH: “A woman went with her husband,” etc. Just as you say, ³ 2:4. This belongs to a series of statements illustrating the principle that “the mouth that prohibits is the mouth that permits”. If nobody at that place knew that she had been married before, then if she asserts that she was married she forbids herself for every other male. If then she qualifies the statement that now she is no longer married because she is divorced, her testimony must be accepted since if one believes her that she was married one must believe her that she is divorced; if one does not believe her that she was married, one does not have to believe her that she is divorced but it makes no difference since as an unmarried woman she can contract marriage. But if there were witnesses who could testify that she was married, she has to prove her case by documents or witnesses if she wants to remarry as a divorcee.“if there are witnesses that she is a married woman and she says, I was divorced, she is not trustworthy;” would I say it is the same here? There is a difference for witnesses of death since if he comes he disproves [the testimony]⁴. Then she should be trustworthy to say: “my levir died”! That is impossible since we have stated⁵: “A woman is not trustworthy if she says ‘my levir died’ to remarry, or ‘my sister died’ to enter her house⁶.” Rebbi Abba said, she is trustworthy for her husband whom she married out of her free will; she is not trustworthy about her levir on whom she was thrown against her will. Rebbi Hoshaia asked, think of it, then she should not be trustworthy if she was forced to marry him⁷!

footnotes: ³ Mishnah Ketubot ⁴ But if the husband comes and claims that he did not divorce her, it is his word against hers; she is not automatically proven to be a liar. ⁵ Mishnah 15:10. There is no relaxation of standards of proof before a court except in the case of testimony about a husband’s death. ⁶ To marry her brother-in-law. ⁷ If she was married off by her father while she was underage. There is no mention in the Mishnah of a restriction on women marrying on their own. No answer is given to the question.

Not only according to the current Mishnah that a single witness can permit her⁸, but even according to the earlier Mishnah that a single witness cannot permit her, she permits herself. What is the difference between herself and a single witness? A single witness is suspected to want to cause trouble to her; she is not suspected to want to cause trouble to herself⁹.

footnotes: ⁸ Mishnaiot 16:7–8, a change in practice dated to the times of Trajan or Hadrian. In order to minimize the cases in which a woman is prevented from remarrying if the documentation of her husband’s death cannot be completed, the standards of proof have been extremely relaxed. ⁹ Since Mishnah 10:1 requires her to satisfy herself that her husband is really dead. The Babli agrees, 93b.

Is a single witness trustworthy in wartime? Let us hear from the following: A person was living in the times of Rebbi. They asked him about X; he said, he died. They asked him about Y; he said, he died. They asked him, are they all dead? He answered, if they were alive would they not have come¹⁰? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The case came before Rebbi and he said, the ones married should stay married, the ones not married should not marry¹¹. Rebbi Ayvo bar Naggari said, it happened in wartime. That implies that a single witness is trustworthy in wartime¹², in Wilna ed. 32b–33a; Meïri, ed. Albeck, p. 436) to follow the Yerushalmi..

footnotes: ¹⁰ It seems that they were local residents. ¹¹ Those who remarried based on the unsupported testimony of one witness may remain married; those who want a ruling of the court in that matter will not get one. ¹² If the wife accepts his testimony. In the Babli, 115a, there is an inconclusive discussion which may be interpreted (cf. RIF, Nimmuqe Yosef

What is the difference whether peace is in the world or war is in the world? If war is in the world, she might think that he died although he is not dead¹³. So far if war was in the North and she came from the North, in the South and she came from the South. If there was war in the North and she came from the South; she says I am coming from the North, but I am arguing that you came from the South¹⁴. If she says, I am coming from the South, it is because she thinks to free herself¹⁵. If she says, he died on his bed, I am arguing that he went to war; it is because she thinks to free herself¹⁶.

footnotes: ¹³ If most of individuals in his group are known to have been killed. But her husband may have escaped or been taken prisoner. The same argument in the Babli, 114b. ¹⁴ The court will argue that she has no knowledge of what really happened. ¹⁵ She might lie to the court to make it appear that her husband never was near a dangerous place. ¹⁶ The Babli, 114b, accepts the testimony that the husband died in his bed even in a time of war.

What is a quarrel¹⁷? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi. “You never gave me qiddušin, you did not divorce me, I never was your wife,” that is not a quarrel¹⁸. “You gave me qiddušin, you divorced me, but you never paid me what is owed me under my ketubah,” that is a quarrel¹⁹. When Rebbi Abba said this before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, he said to him, my son, even if she clearly requests to be divorced.

footnotes: ¹⁷ This wording shows that the reading in the Mishnah before the authors of the Yerushalmi was not אֵין שָׁלוֹם בֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ וְשָׁלוֹם בָּעוֹלָם but קְטָטָה בֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ וְשָׁלוֹם בָּעוֹלָם as in the Babli. ¹⁸ If everybody knows that she is married to him, that is talk which is not serious. ¹⁹ In the opinion of the Babli, 116a, she is disqualified from testifying about her husband’s death only if the rabbinic court, which she pretends handled her divorce, denies the divorce ever took place. It is possible to read such an interpretation into the wording of the Yerushalmi.

“Rebbi Jehudah says, she is never believed unless she comes crying with torn clothes.” They objected to Rebbi Jehudah: Think of it, if one came crying, the other did not cry. To this one you forbid, to that one you permit²⁰. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Think of it, maybe her son went overseas and died there, she remembers that and cries²¹.

footnotes: ²⁰ In the language of the Babli, 116b, the well-coached one will be permitted to remarry, the simple-minded one will be prevented. ²¹ There are many causes that might induce a woman to cry, not necessarily her husband’s death.

MISHNAH: The House of Hillel say, we heard only about one who came from the grain harvest²², and as it happened. The House of Shammai said to them, it makes no difference whether she comes from the grain harvest, or from the olive harvest, or from the grape harvest, or from another district. The Sages spoke about the grain harvest only because what happened. The House of Hillel reversed themselves and taught following the House of Shammai.” It seems that the rule that the woman is permitted to testify on her own behalf was promulgated first in a case when the husband died of a heat stroke on the field and was immediately buried in place. {The cause of death was accepted as reasonable and the details of her testimony were subject to possible verification.} The House of Hillel restricts the precedent to exactly the circumstances of the first case.. The House of Shammai said to them, it makes no difference whether she comes from the grain harvest, or from the olive harvest, or from overseas. The Sages spoke about the grain harvest only because of what happened. The House of Hillel reversed themselves and taught following the House of Shammai.

footnotes: ²² The Mishnah is shortened in the Yerushalmi. In the Babli and the independent Mishnah mss. the text reads: “The House of Hillel say, we heard only about one who came from the harvest,in the same district

HALAKHAH: “The House of Hillel say, we heard only,” etc. ²³ is quoted in the Babli, 116b. The House of Shammai said to them: Is there not harvest the entire year? How is that? At the end of barley harvest starts wheat harvest. At the end of wheat harvest starts grape harvest. At the end of grape harvest starts olive harvest. That means, there is some harvest the year round. They accepted this argument. And why the grain harvest? Rebbi Mana said, because there accidents are frequent, for the sun only hits a person’s head at grain harvest time. That is what is written²⁴: “The child grew and some day it went to his father, to the harvesters. He said to his father, ‘my head, my head’; who said to the servant, ‘carry him to his mother’. He carried him and brought him to his mother where he sat on her knees until noontime, when he died.” But the rabbis say, because snakes are abundant. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said²⁵. 140:8. Usually, one would translate: “On the day of weaponry;” cf. Note 27., “You shielded my head at the day of kissing,” at the day summer and winter are kissing²⁶. Another explanation: “At the day of weaponry,” that is Gog’s weaponry²⁷. 39, explained as prologue to the appearance of the Messiah, a descendant of David.. Another explanation, on a day when two worlds kiss one another, when this world leaves and the future world enters²⁸.

footnotes: ²³ A similar baraita ²⁴ 2K.:18–20. He diagnoses the illness of the Sunamite’s child as a sun stroke. This is accepted by most modern commentators. ²⁵ Ps ²⁶ There are no other sources in talmudic literature that would declare the autumn equinox a dangerous day. ²⁷ Ez ²⁸ The day of death.

MISHNAH: The House of Shammai say, she should remarry and collect her ketubah²⁹. The House of Hillel say, she should remarry but not collect her ketubah. The House of Shammai said to them, you permitted the stringent incest prohibition³⁰, should you not permit the lenient money matters? The House of Hillel said to them, we find that the brothers cannot access the inheritance on her testimony³¹. The House of Shammai said, we can infer that from the text of her ketubah document in which he writes³² Chapter 4.: “If you would be married to another man you shall take the amount I wrote for you.” The House of Hillel reversed themselves and taught following the House of Shammai.

footnotes: ²⁹ Since the husband is declared dead, she collects the widow’s portion. ³⁰ Adultery, which is considered incest. If the husband were alive, her second marriage would be adulterous. ³¹ Nowhere do we find that the requirement of proof either by two witnesses or by certified document is abrogated in money matters. The leniency of informal proof applies only to the case of a woman who otherwise would have to stay unmarried for the rest of her life. ³² I. e., he is required by rabbinical decree to write this sentence in her marriage document; if the sentence is missing it nevertheless is implied and enforced by the court; cf. Ketubot

HALAKHAH: “The House of Shammai say, she should remarry,” etc. May the daughters claim upkeep based on her word³³ requires that “the sons will inherit and the daughters will be supported”. Since her testimony activates the ketubah, the daughters should be able to claim support (and a dowry in case they marry). But since the claim of the daughters is made dependent on that of the sons, and the sons cannot claim the inheritance on basis of her testimony, the daughters should be unable to claim support. The question is not answered (which in praxi means that the daughters cannot collect.) The problem is not treated in the Babli.?

footnotes: ³³ As will be explained later in the Halakhah, the standard text of the ketubah

The House of Shammai insist on interpretation of the ketubah. As the House of Shammai explain, we can infer that from the text of her ketubah document in which he writes³² Chapter 4.: “If you would be married to another man you shall take the amount I wrote for you.” The House of Hillel reversed themselves and taught following the House of Shammai. The House of Hillel insist on interpretation of the ketubah. ³⁴ 4:9; a slightly different language in Babli Baba Meṣ‘ia 104a. In a slightly different arrangement the rest of the Halakhah is also in Ketubot 4:8. Hillel the Elder explained it, using the vernacular. In Alexandria they were writing that a man there became betrothed to a woman³⁵, by a gift but exclusively by contract.. Another man abducted her from a public place³⁶. When this came before the Sages, they intended to declare [the children] as bastards³⁷ make the girl a married woman in all aspects of criminal law. If somebody abducts a betrothed girl he commits adultery and the children are bastards.. Hillel the Elder told them, bring your mothers’ ketubah. They brough their mothers’ ketubah. They found written there: “When you enter my house you shall be my wife according to the laws of Moses and the Jews³⁸ and the girl was free to marry any man..”

footnotes: ³² I. e., he is required by rabbinical decree to write this sentence in her marriage document; if the sentence is missing it nevertheless is implied and enforced by the court; cf. Ketubot ³⁴ Tosephta Ketubot ³⁵ In contrast to the usage in Judea, they did not execute the betrothal, qiddušin ³⁶ And immediately marry her. ³⁷ Since qiddušin ³⁸ This language makes the validity of the betrothal dependent on the fact of marriage, of the bride entering the groom’s house. If the prospective bride was abducted before entering the groom’s house, there were no qiddušin

Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah insisted on interpreting the ketubah. ³⁹ 4:8. This Mishnah is rejected in Ketubot 4:8. The Babli, Ketubot 49a/b accepts the Mishnah but holds that a father who does not support his children has to be shamed in public.“Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah explained: ‘The sons shall inherit and the daughters shall be supported.’⁴⁰, incorporated in the text by reference even if not written. Since the sons can only inherit after their father’s death, so the daughters can claim support only after their father’s death.”

footnotes: ³⁹ MishnahKetubot ⁴⁰ A condition of the ketubah

Rebbi Meїr insists on interpreting the contract text. As Rebbi Meїr said⁴¹ 4:10. Essentially this text, but without attribution, is Mishnah Baba Meṣi‘a 9:3., if somebody accepts a field as a contractor⁴², one estimates how much it is expected to yield and give to [the owner]. Because the standard contract reads: “If I let it lie fallow and do not work on it, I shall pay as if from the best.”

footnotes: ⁴¹ Tosephta Ketubot ⁴² He either works as a sharecropper or he leases the field for a fixed sum of money. In either case the contractor is required to keep the field in good condition so that at the expiration of the contract the owner can continue working the field as before without additional expense.

Rebbi Jehudah insists on interpreting the contract text. ⁴³ 4:11; a similar text Sifra Meṣora‘ Parašah 4(16). The Babli, Baba Meṣi‘a 104a, presents a problem. The text of the editio princeps formulates the statement that he is responsible for “any other obligations that come to you from earlier times” as part of the ketubah document; this is R. Jehudah’s reason to require that the husband pay for all obligatory sacrifices due from his wife, even if the obligation predates the marriage. Rashi ad loc. changes the text to conform to the Sifra text; the changed text is that of the Munich ms. and all other Ashkenazic surviving mss. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: A person brings for his wife any sacrifice she is obligated for⁴⁴ 14:12. The majority hold that the husband has to pay only for his children and slaves. R. Jehudah holds that a wealthy husband has to pay for his wife’s sacrifices in the way prescribed for wealthy people even if the wife has no money of her own. But he does not have to pay for her voluntary sacrifices., even if she ate suet or desecrated the Sabbath. Also, Rebbi Jehudah says, once he divorces her, he is no longer obligated for her, for she writes to him⁴⁵. “any other obligations that come to you from earlier times.”

footnotes: ⁴³ Tosephta Ketubot ⁴⁴ Mishnah Nega‘im ⁴⁵ In the receipt she gives for full payment of her ketubah

Rebbi Yose insists on interpreting the contract text. Rebbi Yose explained: In a place where one treats the ketubah as a loan⁴⁷ is treated as a mortgage on the groom’s real estate from the moment it is signed and due at the dissolution of the marriage, it relegates all mortgages executed during the marriage to secondary status. Any real estate sold by the husband after he signed the ketubah is potentially subject to foreclosure by the wife if there is not enough real estate left in the husband’s possession to satisfy her claim. Therefore, care must be taken in establishing the value of the ketubah in order to protect the innocent buyer. The value of the ketubah is the sum of three parts. (1) The basic sum of 200 zuz (defined in Mishnah Peah 8:8 as an amount which disqualifies its owner from public charity), (2) the voluntary amount added by the groom to that sum, and (3) the value of the dowry. It is stated here that the value of the dowry may be collected by foreclosure only if its value is correctly stated in the ketubah document. In places where the value of the dowry is routinely doubled, the document cannot be used against third parties for more than half the stated value. A parallel text in Babli Baba Meṣi‘a 104b and in Tosephta Ketubot 4:13; in the latter text (all sources) in the name of R. Yose the Galilean., she collects the entire amount. Where one doubles, she collects only half the amount. Rebbi Eleazar [the caper grower] said, nobody is permitted to buy domesticated or wild animals or birds unless he has food prepared for them⁴⁸, this is also declared to be the interpretation of a document but the document is not indicated.. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa insists on interpreting the contract text, since Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa said, a person lending money to another person should not take pledges from him for more than the value of the loan since he writes for him: “It will be paid by the property that came to my hand that I shall acquire corresponding to this [sum].”⁴⁹, the text is slightly different: “He who takes a pledge from his debtor shall take it only in court; he may not enter the debtor’s house to take the pledge.” The parallels in Babli Baba Meṣi‘a 104a and Tosephta Ketubot 4:12 follow the text given here. The text in Ketubot seems to require that the value of the pledge should be determined by an official of the court. The second clause in that text is a biblical verse (Deut. 24:10).

footnotes: ⁴⁷ If the ketubah ⁴⁸ In Ketubot ⁴⁹ In Ketubot

Rav Huna insists on interpreting the contract text. Rav Huna explained: “The sons shall inherit but the daughters must be fed⁵⁰ 4:6..” Since the sons inherit movables⁵¹, the daughters also are fed from movables. Samuel said, the daughters are not fed from movables. A Mishnah supports Samuel: “The female children you shall have from me shall dwell in my house and be supported from my property.⁵² 4:11. This is one of the conditions stipulated in the marriage contract which does not have to be written down because the court will enforce it based on the existence of a ketubah alone. The obligation to support the daughters continues “until they are taken in marriage”.” It was stated on this⁵³ 51a, this is stated in the name of the later Amora Rava and is undisputed. Rava himself rules in a practical case that if there was no real estate, the daughters must be fed in payment for the housekeeping duties they fulfill. {All these rules on the meaning of the ketubah contract are rabbinical and dependent on the circumstances. When the Jews lost their real estate after the Arab conquest of Iraq in the Eighth Century, the Geonim, the rabbinical authorities of that time, eliminated any mention of real estate in the rules of the ketubah.}: From real estate but not from movables. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said: Rav Huna follows Rebbi and Samuel follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated⁵⁴ 51a, Tosephta Ketubot 4:18. The version of the Babli is the most elaborate; probably it is the latest version taking into account the objections that may be raised against the Yerushalmi version. The Tosephta version differs in language from both Talmudim; S. Lieberman (Tosephta kiFshuṭah, part 6, vol. 1 (New York 1967) p. 254 shows that the Tosephta is compatible with the Babli version.: “One uses both guaranteed property⁵⁵ 3:8, Note 121. and non-guaranteed property⁵⁶ for the support of the wife and the daughters, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, guaranteed property may be taken by sons from sons⁵⁷, by daughters from daughters⁵⁸, Yerushalmi 6:6, fol. 30d; Babli 68a). If there are ndaughters, for the first one has to reserve 1/10 of the capital, for the second 1/10of the remaining ⁹/10, etc. By the formula of the geometric progression, in all 1 - (⁹/10) of the inheritance has to be set aside for the daughters. The younger daughters may claim an equal share with the oldest one in the distribution of dowry., by sons from daughters59, and by daughters from sons⁶⁰. But non-guaranteed property may be taken by sons from daughters⁶¹ but not by daughters from sons.” They said, Rav Huna reversed himself⁶². They said, that was well done, ketubah is a biblical commandment⁶³ but support of the daughters is from their words⁶⁴ text decreed by Simeon ben Sheṭaḥ in Hasmonean times which may show demotic Egyptian and Roman influences.. May their words uproot a biblical commandment? It must be that they differ about the money contained in their mother’s ketubah⁶⁵ decree required that each set of full brothers first recover the full amount of their mother’s ketubah before the rest was divided among all sons.. But is the money contained in their mother’s ketubah not also real estate⁶⁶ must be satisfied by distribution of real estate (cf. Note 53).?

footnotes: ⁵⁰ Mishnah Ketubot ⁵¹ Since the entire inheritance goes to the sons, it seems logical that the daughters should have a lien on the entire inheritance. ⁵² Mishnah Ketubot ⁵³ In the Babli, Ketubot ⁵⁴ Babli Ketubot ⁵⁵ “Property under threat of alienation”. Real estate is always sold with a warranty that if the buyer loses the property (it is alienated) because of a pre-existing lien or mortgage, the seller will indemnify the buyer. Cf. Peah ⁵⁶ Movables. ⁵⁷ The court will adjudicate claims of unequal distribution of property between the heirs. (If there are no sons, the daughters legally have the status of sons.) ⁵⁸ The daughters have a claim to a dowry which is fixed at 10% of the inheritance (Ketubot ⁶⁰ If the inheritance is small, the daughters my apply to the court to reserve the entire inheritance for them. If the inheritance is large, the daughters may sue to invalidate any sale of real estate by the brothers which reduces the amount of capital available for their support. {This shows that the brothers have a monetary interest in marrying off their underage sisters.} ⁶¹ If they took from the inheritance. ⁶² The silence of the Babli in this matter supports this claim in the Yerushalmi. ⁶³ This is the position of the Yerushalmi (for the marriage of a virgin), opposed by the Babli; cf. Chapter 7, Note 63. ⁶⁴ It is part of the rabbinic ketubah ⁶⁵ If there were sons of different mothers who predeceased the father, the original ketubah ⁶⁶ Since the entire ketubah

⁶⁷ 8:2–3. The Tosephta contains additional statements, found in the parallel in the Babli, Baba Meṣi‘a 28b–29a.“If somebody who works his wife’s property⁶⁸ has the intention of divorcing her and goes and takes from the ground, he is quick and is rewarded. If somebody who works the property of prisoners⁶⁹ heard that they prepare to return, goes and takes from the ground, he is quick and is rewarded. These are properties of prisoners: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas, he heard that they died, and he went to work the inheritance⁷⁰. But property of abandoning persons one takes out of their hands. These are properties of abandoning persons: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas, he did not hear that they died, but he went to work the inheritance⁷¹. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I heard that there is no difference between prisoners and abandoning persons⁷². But property of broken persons one takes out of their hands. These are properties of smashed⁷³ 10:14. persons: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas, and his whereabouts are not known.” Samuel says, the prisoner is one who left involuntarily. If he had left voluntarily he would have given him instructions⁷⁴. The abandoning person is one who left voluntarily. You should know that he had the intention of keeping [the relative] off his property since he left voluntarily and did not give him instructions⁷⁵. Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: Movables do not fall under the rules of smashed people⁷⁶. RebbiJacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav Jehudah: Standing grain ready to be harvested and grapes ready to be harvested are movables⁷⁷ 43a, theparallel statement is attributed to the Tanna R. Meїr; the anonymous majority declares any ripe crop to be under the laws of real estate until harvested. That means that the editors of the Babli rejected the attribution of the statement to Samuel, their highest authority in civil law.. Rav Sheshet asked: Those date palms of Babylonia which do not need grafting⁷⁸, is it not reasonable that we should treat them like standing grain ready to be harvested and grapes ready to be harvested⁷⁹?

footnotes: ⁶⁷ Tosephta Ketubot ⁶⁸ His wife’s paraphernalia property of which he receives the usufruct as payment for his investment in and work on the fields. If he divorces his wife before harvest, he loses all rights to the crop. He therefore has an incentive to harvest as early as possible. ⁶⁹ Not only kidnap victims but a large class described in the next sentence. Both Talmudim, by endorsing Samuel’s definition, take position against the very wide definition of this Tosephta. ⁷⁰ He had a reason to work the fields to keep them producing; he is rewarded by the possibility of acquiring the yield even if he has to return the real estate. ⁷¹ He started to work the field without authorization; if the owner returns before the harvest, he loses his investment. (In the Tosephta he may claim to be rewarded for his investment in money and time by being made a sharecropper. The Babli explains that this applies only if the farmer is appointed by the court to take care of his relative’s property. There is no hint of this in the Yerushalmi.) ⁷² He disagrees with the anonymous Tanna and assigns the yield to the person working the field. ⁷³ The Babli refers to Hos. ⁷⁴ The relative who went to work the field may reasonably assume that he would have been appointed to care for the property if the kidnap victim had had time to communicate with him. Therefore, the courts will assign the yield to him. ⁷⁵ Samuel disagrees with Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel and refuses the harvest to the relative working the field. ⁷⁶ The absent person cannot reclaim usufruct the unauthorized relative had from his movables. ⁷⁷ In the Babli, Šebuot ⁷⁸ There, palm trees are so abundant that it is not necessary to take male flowers and hang them into the crowns of female trees. That means that the trees do not need hard work. ⁷⁹ No answer is given. The problem is not treated in the Babli since it precludes the basis of the question.

MISHNAH: Everybody is accepted to be a witness for her⁸⁰ except⁸¹ her mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her co-wife, her levir’s wife, and her husband’s daughter⁸². What is the difference between a bill of divorce and death⁸³ 2:8 that the women who are not empowered to testify to the husband’s death are empowered to deliver her bill of divorce and to testify to its validity.? The document is the proof. If one witness says that he died and she remarried, then another comes and says that he is not dead, she shall not leave⁸⁴. If one witness says that he died but two say that he did not die, even if she remarried she must leave. If two say that he died but one said that he did not die, even if she has not yet remarried she may remarry⁸⁵ 19:15), the word of a single witness is disregarded..

footnotes: ⁸⁰ As explained in Mishnah 16:8, even slaves and in certain cases people who attest to hearsay are empowered to declare that the husband died and that the woman is a widow free to remarry. ⁸¹ It is assumed that these hate her and that they might give wrong information in order to forbid her to her husband. ⁸² From another wife. ⁸³ It is stated in Mishnah Giṭṭin ⁸⁴ Once she has remarried, her marriage can be invalidated only by the (biblically valid) testimony of two independent credible witnesses. But if she has not yet remarried, it is the word of one against the other and she should not remarry until the situation is clear. ⁸⁵ Since the testimony of two witnesses is valid by biblical standards (Deut.

HALAKHAH: “Everybody is accepted to be a witness for her,” etc. It was stated⁸⁶: “Just as they cannot be trusted for her, so she cannot be trusted about them.” Her mother-in-law’s son is like her mother-in-law’s daughter. Her husband’s son is like her husband’s daughter. Her co-wife, even if remarried⁸⁷. Her levir’s wife, even [if she is] her own sister⁸⁸. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says that they did not treat the males as they treat the females, as we have stated there: “because a woman is not trusted if she says, my levir died, that she should be free to remarry, nor that her sister died, to enter her house.⁸⁹” Because she has no children. But if she has children, she is trustworthy.

footnotes: ⁸⁶ Tosephta 14:1. The Babli, 117a, agrees implicitly since it states that it is not necessary to note that the daughter-in-law cannot be trusted since the mother-in-law is on the list. ⁸⁷ She no longer has any interest in her former husband’s marriage. ⁸⁸ Who can never be married in levirate. ⁸⁹ Mishnah 12. The Mishnah continues: “Nor can a man be trusted to say ‘my brother died’ in order to marry his wife, nor ‘my wife died’, in order to marry her sister.” That means that the levir can be trusted if he says that his brother died if the latter had children. But the statement of the Mishnah, that the levir’s wife is excluded from testimony, is absolute and not dependent on her being a candidate for levirate.

Does the document prove? Do we not have to believe what she says? If she did not say ‘it was written in my presence, it was signed in my presence’, would you permit her to remarry⁹¹ 1:1 states that abill of divorce brought from far away is accepted by the local court only if the person delivering the bill testifies that it was executed in his presence and, therefore, he can be queried about the details of the execution. Without such testimony, the woman to whom the bill is addressed cannot be declared to be a divorcee free to remarry.? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that parallels what Rebbi Abun said⁹² 1:1., one does not suspect him to vilify her in the eyes of Heaven; he is suspect to vilify her in the eyes of the court⁹³. Since he knows that if he were to come [and object, his objection] would not be accepted⁹⁴ 2:8. Since the Babli accepts Rava’s argument, it concurs that a bill of divorce duly accepted in a second court cannot be attacked by the husband., he has [the bill of divorce] signed by witnesses in good standing. And here, since she knows that her word does not count for the other woman, she will be truthful.

footnotes: ⁹¹ Mishnah Giṭṭin ⁹² In Halakhah Giṭṭin ⁹³ If the husband would trick the messenger into delivering an invalid bill of divorce and the court would declare the woman free to remarry on that basis, the only consequence would be that the children of the divorcee from a second husband would be bastards in the eyes of Heaven. Since the divorce, once approved by a competent court, cannot be reversed, the second marriage will always be legitimate in the eyes of the public and the children will be legitimate and able to marry in the congregation. But the court has to be able to cross-examine him before it accepts the document to be sure that the husband had the bill signed by witnesses in good standing. ⁹⁴ In the Babli, this is the argument of Rava (cf. Chapter 1, Note 19). Another opinion there holds that the excluded women may deliver a bill of divorce only locally since then their testimony is not needed, as the testimony is not directly mentioned in Mishnah Giṭṭin

“If one witness says,” etc. “If one witness says that he died and she remarried, then another comes and says that he is not dead, she shall not leave.” Because he said that after she had remarried. Therefore if [the second witness came] before she remarried, if she remarried she has to leave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Menaḥem ben Rebbi Yose⁹⁶. But the words of the Sages [are], whether he testified after she remarried or before she remarried, she should not remarry⁹⁷, but if she remarried she shall not leave. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said in the name of Rav, if she was married by the testimony of two witnesses, even if he returns, one says to him, “you are not he.⁹⁸” Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac asked, think of it, if he is a famous person like Immi? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, is there nobody who would look like Rebbi Immi⁹⁹? There came a case before the rabbis there. They said to him, “you are not he.” Abba bar Abba¹⁰⁰ got up and whispered in his¹⁰¹ ear saying, by your life, give her a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rav’s students got up and beat him. Somebody said, the whip is burning and the footstool is burning¹⁰². Samuel said, I was there, no whip was burning and no footstool was burning, but my father was hit¹⁰³ and got up¹⁰⁴. There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said to him¹⁰⁵, yes, it is sure that she is permitted to you but you should know that the child of this man is a bastard before Heaven. Rebbi Ze‘ira was praising him because he made the situation clear.

footnotes: ⁹⁶ Tosephta 14:1. ⁹⁷ Since a woman remarrying on the testimony of a single witness does so at her own peril as explained in Halakhah 10:1. ⁹⁸ In this version, the court tells the returning husband that they do not know him. In the earlier version (Chapter 10, Note 129) the wife tells the returning husband that she does not know him. ⁹⁹ The rule of Rav was also accepted in Galilee, with misgivings. ¹⁰⁰ Samuel’s father. The story implies that Abba bar Abba did outlive Rav since “the students of Rav” only appear in cases after Rav’s death. ¹⁰¹ The second husband, who had married her on the testimony of two credible witnesses with the agreement of the court. ¹⁰² It is difficult to understand what this means; probably one should translate אמר as third person plural: They (Rav’s students) said that Abba bar Abba should be whipped with a burning whip kneeling on a burning footstool because he denied the validity of their teacher’s decision. ¹⁰³ In the tumult. ¹⁰⁴ He left without insisting that the matter of applying Rav’s teaching should come to a vote. The Babli knows nothing of Rav’s ruling nor of Abba bar Abba’s opposition. ¹⁰⁵ A man went overseas with his two wives; the wives return without the husband.

MISHNAH: One [wife] says¹⁰⁵, he died, the other one says, he did not die. The one who said that he died can remarry and collect her ketubah; the one who said that he did not die cannot remarry¹⁰⁶ is due only at the dissolution of the marriage. nor collect her ketubah. If one said that he died, while the other one¹⁰⁷ said he was killed; Rebbi Meïr says, since they contradict one another, they¹⁰⁸ cannot remarry. Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁵ A man went overseas with his two wives; the wives return without the husband. ¹⁰⁶ According to her own statement, a second marriage would be adulterous. The ketubah ¹⁰⁷ According to the understanding of the Halakhah, this refers to two unrelated women who testify about their common husband who has disappeared. ¹⁰⁸ The wives who contradict one another.

HALAKHAH: “A woman who went overseas with her husband,”¹⁰⁹ etc. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Rebbi Meïr agrees in the first case¹¹⁰. It was found stated: That is also in dispute. What is the difference between the second and the first cases? In the first case, did they not consider her word as nonexistent for her companion¹¹¹? Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses¹¹². What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion¹¹¹? Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it¹¹³.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁹ A misquote from Mishnah 7. ¹¹⁰ Of two co-wives giving conflicting testimony. ¹¹¹ Nothing a wife says has any legal consequences for her co-wife. (The Babli, 118a, quotes R. Joḥanan as holding that a quarrel whether the husband is dead or not is not a contradiction. That opinion is characterized as difficult to understand. The simple solution offered here is not mentioned; this implies that it is rejected.) ¹¹² Witnesses who contradict one another in details that have no essential bearing on the case before the court are nevertheless legally contradicting one another, making their testimony worthless. In the Babli, 118a, R. Eleazar and R. Joḥanan reject any distinction by R. Jehudah and R. Simeon between women and witnesses. ¹¹¹ Nothing a wife says has any legal consequences for her co-wife. (The Babli, 118a, quotes R. Joḥanan as holding that a quarrel whether the husband is dead or not is not a contradiction. That opinion is characterized as difficult to understand. The simple solution offered here is not mentioned; this implies that it is rejected.) ¹¹³ A frequent complaint of R. Joḥanan, that R. Eleazar should have formulated his statement for the permanent record as stating: R. Joḥanan says.…

¹¹⁵ 3:7, Sanhedrin 5:2. There, we have stated¹¹⁶ 3:7.: “If two groups of witnesses testified about him, one group testifying that he vowed two periods of nezirut¹¹⁷ 6:1–21. If the person making the vow does not indicate the duration of the vow, it is for a period of 30 days (Mishnah Nazir3:1)., the other group testifying that he vowed five periods of nezirut.¹¹⁸ the House of Hillel say, two is included in a totality of five, he must be a nazir for two periods.”” Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, that he has to be a nazir for two periods¹¹⁹ and the other group confirm this but add that he also vowed third, fourth, and fifth periods, then the testimony for the first two periods is concurrent and valid according to everybody. The Babli agrees, Nazir 20a/b, in the names of Rav and the Galileans.. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut¹²⁰. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five.

footnotes: ¹¹⁵ From here to the end of the Halakhah, the text is also in Nazir ¹¹⁶ Mishnah Nazir ¹¹⁷ The vow to abstain from grape products, from impurity of the dead, and from hair cutting, Num. ¹¹⁸ “The House of Shammai say, this is conflicting testimony, there is no nezirut, ¹¹⁹ What Rav calls detail, R. Joḥanan calls counting. Rav holds that the Houses of Shammai and Hillel disagree if one group of witnesses say that he vowed two periods and the other group say five periods. But if the first group testify that he vowed a first and a second time separate 30-day periods of nezirut, ¹²⁰ R. Joḥanan holds that the testimony of 5 contradicts the testimony of 2 and the House of Hillel will agree that both testimonies are invalid. He holds that the House of Hillel consider a testimony on (1,2) to be contained in the testimony about (1,2,3,4,5), but the House of Shammai see the testimonies as contradicting one another.

Rav said, if testimony was contradicted in its essence, the testimony is not void¹²³. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradicted in itself, the testimony is void in the opinion of everybody¹²⁴. If testimony was contradicted in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void¹²⁵. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted¹²⁶ but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony¹²⁷ 19:18: “The judges have to investigate thoroughly”., the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void¹²⁸. These say, he counted into his bosom, the others say he counted into his money-belt; everybody agrees that is contradicting testimony after the main testimony, and the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void¹²⁹30b,41a). (In civil cases, a single witness also cannot testify but he can be used to ascertain circumstances.). Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void¹²⁵. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses¹¹². What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion¹¹¹? (Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it¹¹³.)¹³⁰ A Mishnah disagrees with Rav¹³¹ 5:2.: “Both in investigations¹³² and in cross examinations¹³³, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”¹³⁴ 16:20. In criminal cases, proof beyond any reasonable doubt is required..

footnotes: ¹²³ The court may try to piece together an account of what really happened. ¹²⁴ Both the testimony and the opposing testimony are eliminated from the record. ¹²⁵ The example given below is concurrent testimony how the murder was committed but conflicting testimony as to the direction of escape of the murderer, which is testimony to what happened after the criminal act was committed. ¹²⁶ In some case before the court one needs to establish the fact that one party counted a certain amount of money. ¹²⁷ For R. Joḥanan, concurrent testimony by several witnesses is biblical testimony binding on the court only if it holds up under cross examination; Deut. ¹²⁸ In the first case, there was no testimony. If both witnesses had testified in a coherent way, the fact would have been established by two independent witnesses and would be testimony by biblical standards which is binding on the court. In the second case, Rav holds that both testimonies are binding by biblical standards and can be used to establish any fact that is uncontested between the two groups; in that example that one of the parties counted money. ¹²⁹ In criminal cases, the testimony of a single witness has no standing; if the two testimonies do not combine in a meaningful way, there is no testimony (this example is quoted by Rav Ḥisda in the Babli, Sanhedrin ¹²⁵ The example given below is concurrent testimony how the murder was committed but conflicting testimony as to the direction of escape of the murderer, which is testimony to what happened after the criminal act was committed. ¹¹² Witnesses who contradict one another in details that have no essential bearing on the case before the court are nevertheless legally contradicting one another, making their testimony worthless. In the Babli, 118a, R. Eleazar and R. Joḥanan reject any distinction by R. Jehudah and R. Simeon between women and witnesses. ¹¹¹ Nothing a wife says has any legal consequences for her co-wife. (The Babli, 118a, quotes R. Joḥanan as holding that a quarrel whether the husband is dead or not is not a contradiction. That opinion is characterized as difficult to understand. The simple solution offered here is not mentioned; this implies that it is rejected.) ¹¹³ A frequent complaint of R. Joḥanan, that R. Eleazar should have formulated his statement for the permanent record as stating: R. Joḥanan says.… ¹³⁰ The text in parenthesis is from ms. A only; probably it is copied from above by an unthinking scribe. ¹³¹ Mishnah Sanhedrin ¹³² The procedures before a Talmudic court are inquisitory. In a first stage the witnesses are queried about the alleged crime. ¹³³ These are questions about matters of secondary importance put to each witness in the absence of the other to ferret out any prior understanding between the witnesses, which would invalidate the testimony, or inconsistencies in detail which would impair its standing. ¹³⁴ Deut.

MISHNAH: One witness said that he died, another witness said that he did not die; a woman said that he died, another woman said that he did not die; she may not remarry¹³⁹.

footnotes: ¹³⁹ Two witnesses testify to opposite facts and the court sees no reason to believe the one more than the other. In that case there is no testimony and the wife of the disappeared husband cannot remarry.

HALAKHAH: “if she says ‘my husband died’,” etc¹⁰⁹. Gidul bar Miniamin in the name of Rav: Anywhere they accepted the testimony of a woman parallel to that of a man, a man can contradict a woman and a woman can contradict a man. Then one should state: “A witness says that he died, and a woman says that he did not die; a woman said that he died and a witness said that he did not die.” In the House of Rebbi they stated it this way. It was stated¹³⁶31b, 47b) against the reading of the Yerushalmi here and in Soṭah 6:4, 9:7. in the name of Rebbi Neḥemiah: One follows the majority of the testimonies. How is that? Two women against one woman they considered as if there were two witnesses against one witness¹³⁷. What you say refers to a woman and women. But if there were a hundred women against one [male] witness, they are like one witness¹³⁸ biblical commandment) are like testimony split 50–50. This is accepted by Maimonides (Gerušin 12:20). Anywhere the text uses “witness” instead of “man” it means a male of impeccable standing. The reading of the editio princeps, כעד אינון, is supported by R. Nissim Gerondi (Commentary to RIF Ketubot, §206): כעידי אינון..

footnotes: ¹⁰⁹ A misquote from Mishnah 7. ¹³⁶ Tosephta 14:1; formulation as in ms. A and the Babli (88b, 117b; Soṭah ¹³⁷ Two concurring witnesses have biblical status. One witness contradicting two witnesses has no standing, assuming that all are of the same reliability. ¹³⁸ The Babli presents two opinions. Everybody holds that in the weight of testimony there is no difference between 2 and 100 witnesses. The first opinion holds that if the women came first, the single male witness has no standing. The other holds that any number of women against a male whose credibility is unimpaired (i. e., he never was found in violation of any

MISHNAH: If a woman went overseas with her husband and she returns and says “my husband died”, she can remarry and collect her ketubah, but her co-wife remains forbidden¹⁴⁰. If she was the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen¹⁴¹, she should eat heave, the words of Rebbi Tarphon. Rebbi Aqiba says, in this way one does not remove her from sin unless she be forbidden to remarry¹⁴² and forbidden to eat heave¹⁴³.

footnotes: ¹⁴⁰ Since the testimony of a wife cannot be trusted in matters of her co-wife. ¹⁴¹ And she has no son on whose behalf she remains in the priestly clan and continues to eat heave. ¹⁴² Since perhaps her co-wife is ready to put herself in a perilous position in order to damage her co-wife. ¹⁴³ Since perhaps the testimony of her co-wife was true.

HALAKHAH: She is suspected to cause trouble to herself in order to cause trouble to her co-wife¹⁴⁴. Then she should not be trustworthy even for herself! Since she knows that her word does not count for the other woman, she will be truthful¹⁴⁵. Then she should be trustworthy even for her co-wife! ¹⁴⁶ She is suspected to cause trouble to herself in order to cause trouble to her co-wife.

footnotes: ¹⁴⁴ She is ready to forbid herself to her husband if it causes her co-wife to be equally forbidden. ¹⁴⁵ Cf. Halakhah 4, Note 94. ¹⁴⁶ Ms. A has an addition: . אָמַר רִבִּי הִילָא חֲזוֹר לְקִילקוּל הָרִאשׁוֹן חֲשׁוּדָה הִיא“Rebbi Ila said, go back to the first trouble; she is suspected …”.

MISHNAH: If a woman went overseas with her husband and she returns and says “my husband died and then my father-in-law died”, she can remarry and collect her ketubah, but her mother-in-law remains forbidden¹⁴⁷. If she was the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen, she should eat heave, the words of Rebbi Tarphon. Rebbi Aqiba says, in this way one does not remove her from sin unless she be forbidden to remarry and forbidden to eat heave.

footnotes: ¹⁴⁷ This is a complete parallel to the preceding Mishnah and shows that the same rules apply to all women who cannot be trusted with the testimony about a husband’s death.

HALAKHAH: “If he was betrothed to one.¹⁴⁸” Should she not be trusted to say “my father-in-law died”? Did we not hold that just as they are not trusted about her so she is not trusted about them⁸⁶? Rebbi Ḥanina said, explain it if her father-in-law was there and she described the circumstances¹⁴⁹.

footnotes: ¹⁴⁸ Wrong quote, belonging to the next Mishnah. ⁸⁶ Tosephta 14:1. The Babli, 117a, agrees implicitly since it states that it is not necessary to note that the daughter-in-law cannot be trusted since the mother-in-law is on the list. ¹⁴⁹ Even if anything she says can be checked and nothing would have to be feared by accepting her testimony, she is not admitted to testify about the status of her mother-in-law.

MISHNAH: If he became betrothed to one of five women but it cannot be ascertained to which of them he became betrothed, and each one says he became betrothed to me, he gives a bill of divorce to each of them, puts up the amount of one ketubah between them and removes himself, the words of Rebbi Tarphon¹⁵⁰. Rebbi Aqiba says, in this way one does not remove him from sin unless he gives a bill of divorce and pays the ketubah to each of them¹⁵¹. He robbed one of five people, it is not known which of them he robbed and each one says “I was robbed”, he puts up the amount of the robbery between them and removes himself, the words of Rebbi Tarphon¹⁵⁰. Rebbi Aqiba says, in this way one does not remove him from sin unless he pays the amount of the robbery to each of them¹⁵¹.

footnotes: ¹⁵⁰ Since in order to collect the money, the claimant would have to prove in court that she was betrothed (or, in the case discussed in Mishnah 10, that he was robbed). The circumstances of the case are that the proof is impossible. On the other hand, his admission that he became betrothed to one woman, or that he robbed a person, makes him liable to pay. ¹⁵¹ There is a moral obligation even if the court cannot enforce it. The Tosephta, 15:2, quoted in the Babli, 118b, has R. Simeon ben Eleazar state that R. Aqiba agrees with R. Tarphon in the case of betrothal or an acquisition but disagrees in the case of a consummated marriage and robbery. ¹⁵⁰ Since in order to collect the money, the claimant would have to prove in court that she was betrothed (or, in the case discussed in Mishnah 10, that he was robbed). The circumstances of the case are that the proof is impossible. On the other hand, his admission that he became betrothed to one woman, or that he robbed a person, makes him liable to pay. ¹⁵¹ There is a moral obligation even if the court cannot enforce it. The Tosephta, 15:2, quoted in the Babli, 118b, has R. Simeon ben Eleazar state that R. Aqiba agrees with R. Tarphon in the case of betrothal or an acquisition but disagrees in the case of a consummated marriage and robbery.

HALAKHAH: [(He robbed one of five people). Rebbi Abun said, the Mishnah deals with the case that she was betrothed by a document. But if he was betrothed by money, everybody agrees that he gives a bill of divorce and pays the ketubah to each of them.]¹⁵² Ha‘ittur, the document of betrothal would count as proof of a ketubah. Since each woman claims to have had such a document but lost it, they cannot enforce a claim and the two have to fight about one ketubah. If the betrothal was by money’s worth, in the opinion of the Yerushalmi the divorcee can claim the basic amount of the ketubah even if the marriage was not consummated (Ketubot 5:1). Since in that case there was no negligence on the part of the woman, he has to pay. (The Babli would hold that one does not follow the Mishnah and in practice no ketubah is due until the marriage is consummated.)

footnotes: ¹⁵² This text is only in ms. A; it is genuine since it is quoted by the twelfth Century author R. Isaac ben Abba Mari in Sefer Ha‘ittur (ed. R. Meїr Jonah, vol. 1, 79b, Notes 121,122). In a parallel (anonymous) discussion, the Babli (118b) states that R. Aqiba insists on multiple ketubah payments only if the betrothal was by copulation (before witnesses, cf. Chapter 5, Note 46), which is a biblically valid betrothal but rabbinically forbidden. According to that opinion, R. Aqiba declares the additional payments to be a fine; this seems to contradict the language of the Mishnah.In the interpretation of the Sefer

“He robbed one of five people.” Rebbi Assi said, there is a Mishnah which follows Rebbi Aqiba against Rebbi Tarphon. As we have stated there¹⁶⁶ 3:3; Tosephta Yebamot 14:2.: “If he said to two people, I robbed a mina from one of you but I do not know who of you it was; I received a deposit of a mina from the father of one of you but I do not know who of you it was; he gives to each of them a mina because he confessed himself.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This is everybody’s opinion. One says, to be clean before Heaven¹⁶⁷ 37a.. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: Here, if witnesses know; there, if no witnesses know¹⁶⁸ refers to a case where there are witnesses to the robbery but they cannot identify the victim, but in Baba Meṣi‘a there are no witnesses at all. In the interpretation of R. Moses Margalit (פני משה), the Mishnah Baba Meṣi‘a refers to a case where there are witnesses to the robbery but they cannot identify the victim, but in Yebamot there are no witnesses at all. In the latter interpretation, the fact that the robber confessed makes him liable to pay every claim as a matter of law, not of ethics. The first interpretation is more acceptable.. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Here if they are silent; there if they are talking¹⁶⁹, there are no claimants (they are silent), in Baba Meṣi‘a there are no claimants (they talk). R. Ṭarphon must agree in the second case that he pays since if he does not want to pay he would have to swear that he owes nothing; since he does not know whether he owes, he cannot swear.. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Here if he swore; there if he did not swear¹⁷⁰. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he swore, he should have appointed an officer of the court and hand it over to him¹⁷¹ 9:7).. Rebbi Joḥanan seems to say, a court which determined that one was a robber, not a court which determined that one was robbed¹⁷². Rav said, a court which determined that one was robbed, not a court which determined that one was a robber¹⁷³. The strength of Rav is from the following, that Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, a court which determined that one was robbed, not a court which determined that one was a robber¹⁷⁴ in favor of a baraita (found in shortened form in Tosephta Yebamot 14:2) in the name of R. Simeon ben Eleazar, which reduces the disagreement of R. Aqiba with R. Tarphon to the case (a) of a consummated marriage and (b) of a witnessed robbery.. Otherwise he should have kept silent. Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say, he should have kept silent and not confessed¹⁷⁵. Rebbi Yose wanted to say, he should have kept silent and not have sworn¹⁷⁶. Rebbi Yudan said, even following those who say that there is no difference between keeping silent and talking in matters of a robbery, for a deposit they agree that he who keeps silent is rewarded¹⁷⁷ and he who talks loses. He who keeps silent is rewarded from the following: “Two people deposited with the same person, one a mina and one 200 [tetradrachmas]. This one says, the 200 belong to me, and that one says, the 200 belong to me. He gives each one a mina and the rest shall lie with him until Elijah comes.” He who talks loses, from this: “If he said to two people, I robbed¹⁷⁸ a mina from one of you but I do not know which one of you.”

footnotes: ¹⁶⁶ Mishnah Baba Meṣi‘a ¹⁶⁷ Since one understands from the Mishnah that the person was not sued but made the statement on his own initiative, one tells him that while the court could not force him to pay more than one mina and let the parties involved fight about the distribution, to assuage his conscience he has to give to each of the parties the amount they might be entitled to. The Babli concurs, Baba Meṣi‘a ¹⁶⁸ The expression כאן … כאן makes it difficult to know to which statement one refers. In the interpretation of R. David Fränkel (קרבן העדה), the Mishnah Yebamot ¹⁶⁹ In Yebamot ¹⁷⁰ If he swore falsely that he did no rob anything. R. Tarphon will agree that he has to satisfy each individual claim against him. ¹⁷¹ He immediately could have deposited the money claimed with the court and let the claimants go to court to get the money (Mishnah Baba Qama ¹⁷² The remedy of R. Joḥanan works only if the robber can choose the court to which he confesses before he is sued and where he deposits the amount he owes. ¹⁷³ If the court has to be the one to which the victims apply, the robber cannot forestall suits against himself and cannot free himself of responsibility by delivering restitution to a court convenient to himself. ¹⁷⁴ The opinion of R. Simeon ben Eleazar is not recorded elsewhere. The Babli, 118b, throws out the Mishnah Yebamot ¹⁷⁵ Then he would not have to pay. ¹⁷⁶ He would have to pay only once. ¹⁷⁷ The root of מתגר is Aramaic אגר “reward”. ¹⁷⁸ Obviously, the proof is not from this but from the second half of the Mishnah quoted: “I received a deposit of a mina from the father of one of you but I do not know which one of you it was …”.

MISHNAH: A woman went overseas with her husband and her son¹⁷⁹; if she returns and says, “my husband died and after that my sondied,” she is to be believed¹⁸⁰. “My son died and after that my husband died,” she is not believed but one takes her words into account and she performs ḥalîṣah but is excluded from levirate¹⁸¹.. “I had a son overseas,” she says¹⁸⁰, “my son died and after him my husband,” she is believed¹⁸¹.; “my husband died and after that my son,” she is not believed but one takes her words into account and she performs ḥalîṣah but is excluded from levirate¹⁸². “A levir was given to me overseas;¹⁸⁷” if she said “my husband died and after that my levir” [or] “my levir died and after that my husband”, she is to be believed. If she, her husband¹⁸⁸, and her levir went overseas, if she said “my husband died and after that my levir” [or] “my levir died and after that my husband”, she is not to be believed, since no woman is believed if she says “my levir died” that she might marry [outside the family] nor “my sister died” that she might enter his house. Also the husband is not to be believed if he says “my brother died” that he might marry his wife in levirate, nor “my wife died” that he might marry her sister¹⁸⁹.

footnotes: ¹⁷⁹ If at the moment of her departure the husband had died, she would have been free to marry outside the family. She then returns alone. ¹⁸⁰ Her testimony does not change her prior status. ¹⁸¹ Assuming the son was an only child, the husband would have died without issue and she would be required to be married in levirate. She is not believed to have changed her known status (in the absence of documentary proof). But since she forbade herself any marriage other than to the levir, she has to be freed by ḥalîṣah ¹⁸⁰ Her testimony does not change her prior status. ¹⁸¹ Assuming the son was an only child, the husband would have died without issue and she would be required to be married in levirate. She is not believed to have changed her known status (in the absence of documentary proof). But since she forbade herself any marriage other than to the levir, she has to be freed by ḥalîṣah ¹⁸² Since she declares herself forbidden for levirate, the levir cannot force her into marriage. ¹⁸⁷ Her father-in-law had a son unknown at the place of her previous residence. She left when it was assumed that there was no possible levirate because there was no levir even though her husband was childless. ¹⁸⁸ Who was childless. ¹⁸⁹ Cf. Notes 6, 89.

HALAKHAH: “I had a son overseas.” Rebbi Ḥanania asked before Rebbi Hila: Who is the one who stated that one takes her words into account and she performs ḥalîṣah? Rebbi Tarphon, but not Rebbi Aqibah¹⁸³.! He said to him, it is the opinion of everybody and even Rebbi Aqiba agrees to it. What is the difference betweeen this statement and the first one¹⁸⁴? There, you say that she is not to be believed. But here, you say that she is believed! (When she left as included¹⁸⁶. When she left with her son, she was not a member of the set of women potentially obligated for levirate. in the permission of levirate. But)¹⁸⁵ where you say that she is not believed, when she left and was not included in the permission of levirate.

footnotes: ¹⁸³ This refers to their disagreement in Halakhah 6, where R. Aqiba puts on her the disabilities she is under if her words are true and those she would be under if her words were not true. It would be expected that he holds the same in this case.In both sources, the name is spelled עקיבא; this babylonism must have been in the common Vorlage ¹⁸⁴ Why are the cases switched, she is believed if she says that the husband died before the son in the first case but disbelieved for the same statement in the second. ¹⁸⁶ כלל is what in modern mathematics is called a set ¹⁸⁵ This sentence is missing in ms. A; the ms. probably is correct since the introduction “she is believed if …” is missing.

¹⁹⁰ Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says that they did not treat the males as they treat the females, as we have stated there: “because she is not trusted if she says, my levir died, that she should be free to remarry, nor that her sister died, to enter her house.” Because she has no children. But if she has children, she is trustworthy.

footnotes: ¹⁹⁰ This is from Halakhah 4, Note 89.