MISHNAH: There are four brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters. If those married to the sisters died¹, [the sisters] have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If [the remaining brothers] jumped the gun and married, they must divorce them. Rebbi Eliezer said, the House of Shammai say, they shall keep them², but the House of Hillel say, they have to divorce.

footnotes: ¹ One possible explanation is that they died childless at the same time; then each of the sisters is a candidate for levirate for either one of the surviving brothers, i. e., each is a sister of a sister-in-law and potentially forbidden. ² According to him the House of Shammai must hold that candidacy has no other legal consequences (cf. Note 19). Therefore, if they married the sisters against the rules, no biblical precept has been violated. In contrast, cf. Halakhah 5.

HALAKHAH: “Four brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. If there were four brothers, two of whom are married to unrelatedwomen, would they not be subject to levirate? There is a difference, since here there is the prohibition of sisters. In that case, they should not need ḥalîṣah from them! Rebbi Mattaniah said, it is because of candidacy and the prohibition of sisters is not clear³.

footnotes: ³ It is not clear whether the fact that the sisters become candidates for levirate at the same time makes them forbidden; cf. Chapter 2, Notes 27–29.

⁶ There, we have stated: “If a brother gave qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir⁷, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If [one of the] brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife⁸. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to send away his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.⁹” It says only: If the sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him. But if his wife died, his sister-in-law is forbidden to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eliezer¹⁰. But the Sages say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said¹¹, the Sages hold that for anything induced by a cause, if the cause is removed the prohibition is removed. But for Rebbi Eliezer, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains.

footnotes: ⁶ Mishnah 4:10. ⁷ After the death of the brother, when the sister-in-law’s sister was prohibited to him since the widow is a candidate for levirate with any one of the brothers. ⁸ Since the candidacy obstacle to marriage was removed. The same holds if the widow dies. ⁹ Only if he is the only remaining brother. Then he is forbidden to marry his betrothed and has to divorce her. The widow becomes the sister of a woman divorced by him and cannot be married. ¹⁰ The source of the argument is Mishnah 13:6. In the tradition of the Babli, the author is R. Eleazar (ben Arakh, the Tanna). The Babli disagrees (41a) and holds that both opinions are compatible with the position of the Sages who in this case might agree with R. Eleazar that a woman whom a brother could not marry for one moment is permanently forbidden to him. ¹¹ In Chapter 1 (Note 71), this is a statement of R. Eleazar (the Amora) in the name of R. Abun. In the Babli, 27b, R. Joḥanan disagrees and holds that any sister-in-law who cannot be married in levirate at the moment of death of her husband can never be a party to levirate.

Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Here¹³, you say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him, and here¹⁴ with the woman who became a widow later, the sister who first became a widow should be permitted to the other brother by the rule spelled out by R. Joḥanan; see below. you say so? He said to him, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters¹⁵. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law¹⁶. Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The prohibition of sisters who are sisters-in-law cannot be compared to the prohibition of sisters who are not sisters-in-law. Rebbi Jeremiah said, explain it that the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time¹⁷. Rebbi Yose asked, did Rebbi Joḥanan say, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law if the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time? Only if they died one after the other. They wanted to say, what was the problem of Rebbi Joḥanan? If the second one died, why should the first one not be permitted to him? But if the first one died, the second should be forbidden to him. Rebbi Yudan said, both cases are the same problem for him. And candidacy counts for nothing since if there are three brothers,two of them paternal but not maternal halfbrothers, and two maternal but not paternal halfbrothers. If the paternal halfbrother died first¹⁸ and the second brother had no time to perform ḥalîṣah or levirate before he died, and she became eligible for his maternal halfbrother, may he not take her¹⁹ 74a, this position is ascribed to R. Aqiba, but not accepted by the other Sages.? This shows that candidacy is nothing, [otherwise] she should be forbidden as the maternal halfbrother’s wife.

footnotes: ¹³ Mishnah 4:10. ¹⁴ Mishnah 3:1. If one of the brothers performs ḥalîṣah ¹⁵ In the Babli, 27b, R. Joḥanan is quoted as saying that he does not know the author of Mishnah 3:1. This means he is unable to analyze the hidden premisses on which the ruling is based. ¹⁶ He spelled out that his criticism refers to Mishnah 3:1, not 4:10. ¹⁷ Cf. Note 1. In that case, we do not know which of the two brothers died first; there are no discernible first and second widows to apply the rule of Mishnah 4:10. A similar argument in the Babli, 28a. ¹⁸ Brother 2 is paternal halfbrother of brother 1 and maternal halfbrother of brother 3. There is no relationship between 1 and 3. If 1 dies childless, his widow becomes a candidate for levirate with 2. ¹⁹ If candidacy had given her some status comparable a wife of 2, she would be forbidden to 3. Since this case is never mentioned, one has to conclude that for 3 she is the widow of an unrelated man. In the Babli, Nedarim

What if there is a co-wife²³? Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Avina: It is an inference de minore ad majus. If the Sages gave a co-wife to the sister of a woman with whom one performed ḥalîṣah, which is rabbinic²⁴ is purely rabbinic. Therefore, the prohibition of the sister of a woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah and her co-wives is not biblical., here, where there is the prohibition of sisters²⁵. 18:18., not so much more? It is obvious that the rule of co-wives applies to his daughter²⁶. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Avina: One has stated there²⁷ referring to the case of Mishnah 3:1, partially quoted in Babli, 27a., “if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed; if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives were not freed.” But as you say, if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, so it should be that even if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives should be freed²⁸. But it must follow Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri, since Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, come and let us institute that the co-wife perform ḥalîṣah without being admitted to levirate²⁹. Did they institute that? Was it not stated: They did not manage to institute this before the time became unsuitable. But it must follow the House of Shammai³⁰ since the House of Shammai permit the co-wives to the brothers. Rebbi Phineas said to Rebbi Yose: If it follows the House of Shammai, even if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sistersshould not be freed³¹ of the sisters is worthless for the co-wives then ḥalîṣah of the co-wives should be worthless for the sisters since the House of Shammai validate a marriage of the sisters.! But we have stated: Rebbi Eliezer said, the House of Shammai say, they shall keep them, but the House of Hillel say, they have to divorce. There are two Tannaïm interpreting the House of Shammai, one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, the other one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were not freed.

footnotes: ²³ Since none of the sisters can be married (Mishnah 3:1), could any co-wife of one of them be married? ²⁴ The imputation of the status of divorcee to any woman having performed ḥalîṣah ²⁵ Lev ²⁶ Since this is a case of Mishnah 1:1, the sentence is superfluous. It is missing in ms. A. ²⁷ A baraita ²⁸ Since the House of Hillel hold that a woman forbidden for levirate gives the same status to her co-wives, it seems illogical to give the co-wives a status different from that of the sisters. ²⁹ Chapter 1, Notes 200–204. ³⁰ Same conclusion in Babli, 27a. ³¹ If ḥalîṣah

It was stated³³: “Abba Shaul says, the House of Hillel made this easy³⁴.” Is that a criticism? It is a praise, since people were saying, what is the prohibition here³⁵? It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon³³: “If they jumped the gun and married, they should keep them.” But that is only if they had intercourse at the same time³⁶. In the opinion of Abba Shaul it is permitted to have intercourse without asking. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon only if he transgressed and had intercourse. If the first [brother] married and had intercourse, he tells the second also to have intercourse. If that one did not have intercourse, the first [brother] is forbidden to have intercourse a second time³⁷; maybe one of them will die and it turns out that he had intercourse with the sister of his³⁸ sister-in-law. It was stated: If the second [brother] died, the first one had to divorce his wife with a bill of divorce and his brother’s wife by ḥalîṣah³⁹ without problems.. Even if the second one died? Does this not follow Rebbi Simeon? But Rebbi Simeon frees the second [sister] from ḥalîṣah and levirate⁴⁰! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I confirmed this: Any sister-in-law who was to be freed by ḥalîṣah will never be permitted without ḥalîṣah⁴¹ when they became widows, the intervening incomplete action by one of the brothers cannot remove that requirement..

footnotes: ³³ Tosephta 5:1, quoted in Babli 28a. ³⁴ In his opinion, the House of Hillel permit the sisters to the brothers without problems, not only if they married without asking; they are more lenient than the House of Shammai. ³⁵ If candidacy without “bespeaking” has no influence, there is no reason why the two brothers should not marry the two sisters in levirate since no biblical precept could be violated. ³³ Tosephta 5:1, quoted in Babli 28a. ³⁶ Since levirate is valid only through intercourse (Mishnah 6:1), and R. Simeon has doubts whether “bespeaking” makes the woman a wife (Halakhah 2:1), he will require to do away with “bespeaking” and marriage ceremony. If each brother has intercourse with the corresponding sister at the same time, they both become wives of the respective brothers and neither of them is an impediment to the other’s marriage. ³⁷ Which does not fulfill the biblical requirement to marry the widow of the childless brother. ³⁸ The one who from the start was a candidate to be taken by him in levirate. Then both of them are forbidden to him. ³⁹ The wife of the first brother becomes forbidden as the sister of a woman who is a candidate for levirate with him. This Tanna holds that since the levirate of the first sister was illegal, it does not exclude the second sister from becoming a candidate. The expression “his brother’s wife” means “his brother’s potential wife”. If the second brother had taken the second sister in levirate, the problems would have disappeared and when he died childless, his widow would be free of levirate or ḥalîṣah ⁴⁰ Mishnah 3:4. The second sister should be able to marry outside the family without any formality. ⁴¹ Since both sisters did require ḥalîṣah

If the first [sister] had a co-wife, one [of the brothers] performs ḥalîṣah, the co-wife is freed. If then he had intercourse with her⁴³., this is forbidden intercourse and the co-wife is not freed⁴⁴. If he performed ḥalîṣah and then had intercourse with her, as you look at it, either ḥalîṣah should free or intercourse should free⁴⁵ was valid, then the intercourse is sinful but otherwise without consequence; if ḥalîṣah was not valid, then the intercourse makes the sister a wife and the co-wife is automatically freed.! Rebbi Yudan said, I confirmed it following “If somebody married his sister-in-law and she turns out to be pregnant⁴⁶”, as you say there, the co-wife should not marry until she knows by which means she is permitted, whether through the fetus or through intercourse⁴⁷; so here also the co-wife should not marry until she knows by which means she is permitted, whether through ḥalîṣah or through intercourse⁴⁸.

footnotes: ⁴³ The sister who had ḥalîṣah ⁴⁴ Even for R. Simeon. ⁴⁵ If ḥalîṣah ⁴⁶ Cf. Mishnah 4:2. ⁴⁷ The same statement appears in Halakhah 4:1. The only parallel is in Tosephta 6:3: If somebody “bespeaks” his sister-in-law and she turns out to have been pregnant (from the deceased husband), her co-wife should not marry until it will be known that the fetus has developed into a viable child since no child frees unless it came into the air. That version must be Babylonian since it does not support R. Yudan. ⁴⁸ That would require the decision of a court of law.

If the first [sister] had a co-wife, he can marry the co-wife, keep his wife, but the second [sister] is forbidden to him⁴⁹. That is “the sister of the co-wife of one for whom he performed ḥalîah is permitted to a person.⁵⁰”.” Should the co-wife not be forbidden to him as co-wife of the sister⁵¹ of one for whom he performed ḥalîṣah? Rebbi Yudan said, if he wanted to have intercourse with the co-wife before he married⁵², would he not have been permitted? At the start, he is permitted; at the end, he is prohibited? If you say so, you are making a co-wife after death⁵³ and there can be no co-wife after death.

footnotes: ⁴⁹ This still refers to the case of the Mishnah where the first brother performed levirate with the first sister but the second brother did nothing with respect to the second sister. ⁵⁰ In Mishnah 4:7: “The relative of the co-wife of one for whom he performed ḥalîṣah ⁵¹ In ms. A: “relative”, cf. Note 50. ⁵² Take her in levirate. This would be the easiest solution since then the second sister is eliminated as co-wife of one married in levirate and the first sister is permitted to the remaining brother. ⁵³ By treating candidacy as equivalent of marriage, the co-wife of the second sister would become co-wife of the first, an impossible proposition.

If there were five brothers of whom three married three sisters and died⁵⁵: Rav said, each one [of the remaining brothers] performs ḥalîṣah for one of them, and the third [sister] performs ḥalîṣah with whom she wants⁵⁶ is acquisition, i. e., it is as if the brother had married the sister-in-law and immediately divorced her. The third sister should be freed automatically were it not for the argument that no obligation of ḥalîṣah can vanish into thin air.. Samuel says, each one [of the remaining brothers] performs ḥalîṣah for one of them, and the third performs ḥalîṣah with both of them⁵⁷ is freeing; the third sister has to obtain ḥalîṣah from both brothers since she is equally forbidden to both of them. The Babli (26b, 51b, 53a) states that an impossible ḥalîṣah, like that of the third sister, necessitates ḥalîṣah from all brothers. This is not found in the Yerushalmi.. Rav said that ḥalîṣah is acquisition. Samuel said that ḥalîṣah is freeing. Rebbi Ze‘ira said that ḥalîṣah is acquisition. Rebbi Hila said that ḥalîṣah is freeing. ⁵⁸ The words of the rabbis mean that ḥalîṣah is freeing. Simeon bar Abba asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the difference between having ḥalîṣah and divorcing? He said to him: You think that ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, but it is only freeing. The brothers are not guilty for her under the category of “wife of the one acting in ḥalîṣah” but they are guilty under the category of “wife of the deceased”. Levi said, candidacy is acquisition and each [sister] has to perform ḥalîṣah with both [brothers]⁵⁹.

footnotes: ⁵⁵ All childless. The text here and the parallel one in the Babli, 26b, are totally incompatible (as noted by Rashba, חידוּשי יבמוֹת, מוֹסד הרב קוק, ירוּשלים תשמט, ע׳ קסז) since the Babli attributes to Rav the statement given here to Samuel and then bases everything on candidacy which has been proven to be irrelevant (Note 19). ⁵⁶ As explained here, Rav holds that ḥalîṣah ⁵⁷ Samuel holds that ḥalîṣah ⁵⁸ This paragraph was explained in Chapter 1, Notes 89–91. ⁵⁹ Levi holds that each sister became a forbidden quasi-wife of each of the surviving brothers at the death of each husband and therefore needs freeing from each of them. This statement is not discussed since its premiss had been rejected.

⁶³ A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: ⁶⁴“If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.⁶⁵. Therefore, it seems that ḥalîṣah turns the widow into an ex-wife.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her⁶⁶. The question raised by the text is not answered since the prohibition is clearly rabbinic and independent of the nature of ḥalîṣah.. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: ⁶⁷. If ḥalîṣah were acquisition, she would be freed without ceremony.“If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together⁶⁸? Explain it, after her⁶⁹ death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains⁷⁰. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: ⁷¹“Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him⁷² and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah⁷³ to both of them and in addition a rabbinic bill of divorce for the rabbinic betrothal to the first widow.. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]⁶². But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: ⁷⁴“If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: ⁷⁵. 21:14) reads: “A widow, a divorcee, a harlot, and a desecrated one he shall not acquire …”. Since marriage is formulated in terms of acquisition, if ḥalîṣah were acquisition, the widow of the High Priest’s brother either should be free without ḥalîṣah or never could be freed.“If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? ⁷⁶ if the first widow did. If the first was married in levirate, the second goes free without ceremony.“Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

footnotes: ⁶³ This paragraph is missing in ms. A and in the text reproduced by Rashba (Note 55). ⁶⁴ Mishnah 4:7. ⁶⁵ All relatives of his wife forbidden to a husband are forbidden to the levir who performs ḥalîṣah ⁶⁶ This sentence is unintelligible and none of the commentators has an acceptable explanation. The only sensible way is to translate שכבר נראה not in the singular, “since he already is available”, but “since they (both brothers) are available” and neither has an advantage over the other as participant in ḥalîṣah ⁶⁷ Mishnah 4:8. The widow is biblically permitted to her levir but rabbinically forbidden; therefore, she needs ḥalîṣah ⁶⁸ Since everybody knows that one cannot be married to two sisters simultaneously. ⁶⁹ If the first sister died, the second one is permited. Then one does not understand why she cannot have levirate. ⁷⁰ If the first widow was alive when the second husband died, the second widow cannot have levirate. If then the first widow died, the situation is not changed for R. Eleazar. ⁷¹ Mishnah 3:5. ⁷² The House of Shammai hold that “bespeaking” acquires like a betrothal; parallel the opinion of R. Eleazar ben Arakh (Halakhah 5, cf. Halakhah 1). Therefore, the first widow is his wife; the second is forbidden to him biblically and leaves the family without formality. ⁷³ The House of Hillel hold that “bespeaking” is purely rabbinical and that the only legal consequence of “bespeaking” is to forbid the sister-in-law to the other brothers. Therefore, now the “bespoken” and the new widow have conflicting claims on him; he has to give ḥalîṣah ⁶² It is clear that one must read פטור instead of קיניין. The next sentence is missing in ms. L; it is clear that the scribe of ms. L already had the error before him since ms. A also reproduces it. The sentence in brackets is only in ms. A, it is missing in ms. L since its scribe left out a sentence from קיניין to קיניין. It is unlikely that the insertion in A is a deliberate correction. ⁷⁴ Mishnah 4:9, explained in Notes 7–9. ⁷⁵ Mishnah 6:4. The High Priest may marry only a virgin. The verse (Lev ⁷⁶ Mishnah 3:4. The second widow has to have ḥalîṣah

MISHNAH: If one of them was forbidden to one of them by an incest prohibition, that one is forbidden for him but her sister is permitted to him⁷⁷. Both are forbidden to the second [brother]. In case of a commandment prohibition or a holiness prohibition, they have ḥalîṣah but not levirate⁷⁸ is necessary.. If one of [the sisters] was forbidden to that one [brother] by an incest prohition and the other [sister] was forbidden to the [other brother] by an incest prohition, the one who is forbidden for one might be permitted to the other and vice-versa. That is what they said, “Her sister who is her sister-in-law can have ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate.”

footnotes: ⁷⁷ Since one of the sisters is not available to him, the other is not the sister of a candidate for levirate. If they both become candidates at the same time (or at least before the other brother had married one in levirate), they both are sisters of a candidate and therefore forbidden to the second brother. ⁷⁸ Mishnah 3:4. Since a marriage would not be void, ḥalîṣah

HALAKHAH: “If one of them was forbidden,” etc. If a man raped a woman and she had a daughter who married one of his brothers while [the daughter’s] half-sister from another man is married to a second brother: When they died without children, his daughter is forbidden to him but her sister is permitted to him⁷⁹. This exemplifies: “Her sister who is her sister-in-law can be married in levirate⁸⁰.”

footnotes: ⁷⁹ Since she is not his wife’s daughter. ⁸⁰ That case never can happen if he is married to the mother of the girl (Babli 28b). All these rules are valid only for cases which probably never occur.

“If one of them was forbidden,” etc. If one of them raped a woman and she had a daughter, [the woman] in turn was raped by his brother and also had a daughter and both [daughters] married [these]brothers who were paternal but not maternal halfbrothers: Each one of them is forbidden his own daughter but permitted her sister. That exemplifies: The one forbidden for one is permitted to the other and vice-versa⁸⁰.

footnotes: ⁸⁰ That case never can happen if he is married to the mother of the girl (Babli 28b). All these rules are valid only for cases which probably never occur.

MISHNAH: ⁷⁶ if the first widow did. If the first was married in levirate, the second goes free without ceremony. Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter: These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate, but Rebbi Simeon frees them⁸¹. According to the Babli, 28b–29a, R. Simeon reads Lev. 18:18: “Do not take a wife together with her sister to tie into one bundle” that the common candidacy of a woman and her sister destroys both candidacies so that even the one who was widowed first would be freed by her sister. This is not the position of the Yerushalmi which holds that the candidacy of the first widow excludes the second from candidacy, as explained in the Halakhah.. If one of them was forbidden to one of them by an incest prohibition, that one is forbidden for him but her sister is permitted to him⁷⁷. In case of a commandment prohibition or a holiness prohibition, they have ḥalîṣah but not levirate⁷⁸ is necessary.. But Rebbi Simeon frees them⁸².

footnotes: ⁷⁶ Mishnah 3:4. The second widow has to have ḥalîṣah ⁸¹ If both women become widows before one of them is married in levirate or performs ḥalîṣah ⁷⁷ Since one of the sisters is not available to him, the other is not the sister of a candidate for levirate. If they both become candidates at the same time (or at least before the other brother had married one in levirate), they both are sisters of a candidate and therefore forbidden to the second brother. ⁷⁸ Mishnah 3:4. Since a marriage would not be void, ḥalîṣah ⁸² This sentence is not in the Mishnah of the Babli; the Babli holds that in this case, R. Simeon agrees with the majority.

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters,” etc. Ulla bar Ismael said, so explained Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah⁸³.: Rebbi Simeon frees the second one from ḥalîṣah and levirate⁸¹. According to the Babli, 28b–29a, R. Simeon reads Lev. 18:18: “Do not take a wife together with her sister to tie into one bundle” that the common candidacy of a woman and her sister destroys both candidacies so that even the one who was widowed first would be freed by her sister. This is not the position of the Yerushalmi which holds that the candidacy of the first widow excludes the second from candidacy, as explained in the Halakhah.. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the group asked, would anybody think that a man could acquire two sisters together⁸⁴ mentioned in the Mishnah is only rabbinic (a view also held in the Babli, 28b/29a). Since nobody assumes that anyone might contract incestuous marriages, that rabbinic institution seems superfluous.? Rebbi Ḥanina said before Rebbi Mana and disagreed: Why does Rebbi Simeon free the second one from ḥalîṣah and levirate? He said to him, because nobody thinks that a man could acquire two sisters together. There they said, the words of Rebbi Simeon imply that no candidacy can come after another candidacy⁸⁵. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Only if he sinned and had intercourse⁸⁶. What is the difference? If somebody from the market gave qiddushin to the second sister. Following the rabbis, perfect qiddushin⁸⁷. Following Rebbi Eleazar, suspended qiddushin. When he⁸⁸ has intercourse with the first, the qiddushin become valid for the second. If he had intercourse with the second, following the rabbis it is an incestuous act. Following Rebbi Eleazar, it is not an incestuous act⁸⁹. If the first one died, following the rabbis the second is permitted to him⁹⁰.

footnotes: ⁸³ In the Babli, he and the elder R. Ḥiyya are given as the source of reliable baraitot ⁸¹ If both women become widows before one of them is married in levirate or performs ḥalîṣah ⁸⁴ They held that any ḥalîṣah ⁸⁵ This statement, attributed to Babylonian sources, is not found in the Babli. Here it is referred to as “the opinion of the rabbis” in the interpretation of R. Simeon. ⁸⁶ R. Eleazar holds that R. Simeon considers candidacy only as tentative (cf. Chapter 2, Note 47). Therefore, the second widow is freed only if the first becomes unquestionably the wife of the third brother; this she can become only by having intercourse which under the circumstances is sinful. ⁸⁷ Since the second widow leaves the family without ceremony. ⁸⁸ The third brother. ⁸⁹ At least not an act which certainly would be incestuous. ⁹⁰ To the third brother, but only in the case of two sisters.

If the first [sister] had a co-wife, he can marry the co-wife, keep his wife, but the second [sister] is forbidden to him⁴⁹. That is “the sister of the co-wife of one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah is permitted to a person.⁵⁰”.” Should the co-wife not be forbidden to him as co-wife of a relative of one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah? Rebbi Yudan said, if he wanted to have intercourse with the co-wife before he married⁵², would he not have been permitted? At the start, he is permitted; at the end, he is prohibited? If you say so, you are creating a co-wife after death⁵³ and there can be no co-wife after death.

footnotes: ⁴⁹ This still refers to the case of the Mishnah where the first brother performed levirate with the first sister but the second brother did nothing with respect to the second sister. ⁵⁰ In Mishnah 4:7: “The relative of the co-wife of one for whom he performed ḥalîṣah ⁵² Take her in levirate. This would be the easiest solution since then the second sister is eliminated as co-wife of one married in levirate and the first sister is permitted to the remaining brother. ⁵³ By treating candidacy as equivalent of marriage, the co-wife of the second sister would become co-wife of the first, an impossible proposition.

The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There⁹¹, he says, “he marries in levirate the one he wants and performs ḥalîṣah with the other,” and here, he says so? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, when I was still there⁹², I learned the reason: There, the candidacy for two brothers-in-law does not interfere and one candidacy can be added to another, but here it is candidacy for one levir and no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”⁹³. Rebbi Mattania said, are not sisters different from unrelated women? If you want a difficulty, find it in what Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of RavSheshet: They stated there that Rebbi Simeon forbade both of them⁹⁴. The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There he says, both are forbidden, and here⁹¹ you says, both are permitted⁹⁵.

footnotes: ⁹¹ Mishnah 3:10 where R. Simeon completely disregards “bespeaking” while here he even considers candidacy as obstacle. ⁹² In Babylonia. In the Babli, 31b, this argument is labelled rabbinic, not biblical. ⁹³ A comparison with the earlier quote (Note 85) shows that candidacy and “bespeaking” are put on one and the same level. ⁹⁴ Halakhah 2:2, Note 47. In that case, Rebbi Simeon accepts “bespeaking” as marriage. ⁹¹ Mishnah 3:10 where R. Simeon completely disregards “bespeaking” while here he even considers candidacy as obstacle. ⁹⁵ No answer is given since the earlier explanation of R. Ze‘ira is also valid here.

MISHNAH: Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters and the third is a bachelor. One of the sisters’ husbands died; the bachelor “bespoke” her; then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him⁷² and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce⁶¹. It is found in ms. A. From Halakhah 3:4 it is clear that the word was omitted from the Mishnah by a scribal error (cf. א. שכטר, המשנה בבבלי וּבירושלמי, מוֹסד הרב קוּק, י-ם תשיט) and was wrongly eliminated from the text., and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah⁷³ to both of them and in addition a rabbinic bill of divorce for the rabbinic betrothal to the first widow.. That is what people say, he is unlucky with his wife and with his brother’s wife⁹⁶.

footnotes: ⁷² The House of Shammai hold that “bespeaking” acquires like a betrothal; parallel the opinion of R. Eleazar ben Arakh (Halakhah 5, cf. Halakhah 1). Therefore, the first widow is his wife; the second is forbidden to him biblically and leaves the family without formality. ⁶¹ The word is missing in the Mishnah and is deleted in ms. L by the corrector; therefore it is missing in the editio princeps ⁷³ The House of Hillel hold that “bespeaking” is purely rabbinical and that the only legal consequence of “bespeaking” is to forbid the sister-in-law to the other brothers. Therefore, now the “bespoken” and the new widow have conflicting claims on him; he has to give ḥalîṣah ⁹⁶ A popular saying about somebody who loses everything without having done anything wrong.

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. Do the House of Shammai follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh⁹⁷, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely? If they would follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, in case he had divorced the “bespoken” widow, she would not need ḥalîṣah! But Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar⁹⁸, the House of Shammai agree that if he divorced the “bespoken”, she needs ḥalîṣah! It must be they follow Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. If they would follow Rebbi Simeon, in any case, if “bespeaking” acquires, nothing follows it⁹⁹; there is no question that the sister is free without ceremony.. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, why “his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”¹⁰⁰? Maybe “bespeaking” for the House of Shammai is like candidacy for Rebbi Simeon in the interpretation of the rabbis there. As the rabbis there¹⁰¹ say, “bespeaking” acquires and leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, [candidacy] acquires and leaves a remainder. Rebbi Simeon says, no candidacy can come after a candidacy, so the House of Shammai say here, no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”.

footnotes: ⁹⁷ The positions of Rebbis Eleazar ben Arakh and Simeon are explained in Halakhah 2:1, Notes 10–13; their agreement is asserted in the Babli, 29b. ⁹⁸ The Amora, who lived about 150 years after the disappearance of the House of Shammai. His opinion is in the Babli, 29a. ⁹⁹ She is his wife as if there were qiddushin ¹⁰⁰ They would have to agree to the position of the House of Hillel. ¹⁰¹ In Chapter 2, Note 47 ff.

Rebbi Yudan asked: If somebody gave qiddushin to a woman “from now and after thirty days”¹⁰² 3:1. If somebody gives something of value to a woman and says, “be betrothed to me after thirty days”, if another man comes in the meantime and gives her qiddushin, she is the wife of the second man and after 30 days, when she should become the wife of the first, she already is married and betrothal with a married man is void. But if the first had said, “from now after thirty days”, he reserved his rights to her from the moment of the transaction but she becomes his wife in civil and criminal law only after 30 days. If anybody else gives her qiddushin in that period, she is tentatively betrothed to both of them and both have to divorce her. and her sister became a candidate for levirate with him during these thirty days, is even in this “his wife with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”¹⁰³? He said, the House of Shammai said that only after candidacy and “bespeaking”. But that what Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a hundred qiddushin are valid for her¹⁰⁴ 60a, Yerushalmi Qiddušin fol. 63c, 3:1. It is a little difficult to accomodate 100 qiddushin. The general idea is that the first man says, from now in 30 days, the next day another says, from now in 29 days, etc., does not follow the House of Shammai¹⁰⁵, suffices to make the woman a wife in relation to female competitors, they should hold that qiddushin “from now to 30 days” also are enough to eliminate male competitors..

footnotes: ¹⁰² Mishnah Qiddušin ¹⁰³ Following the House of Shammai. ¹⁰⁴ Babli Qiddušin ¹⁰⁵ Since the House of Shammai hold that “bespeaking”, which is a very weak imitation of qiddushin

MISHNAH: Of three brothers, two are married to two sisters and one to an unrelated woman. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the husband of the unrelated married his widow, and died. [The dead brother’s] second [wife] leaves as his wife’s sister, the first one as her co-wife. If he had “bespoken” her, the unrelated woman performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.

HALAKHAH: “Of three brothers, two are married to two sisters,” etc. Both the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon will agree in this case. For the rabbis, the part of the co-wife parallel to that which “bespeaking” acquired [in the widow] is forbidden. Also, the part of the co-wife parallel to that which “bespeaking” did not acquire [in the widow] is [still] forbidden¹⁰⁶. These Mishnaiot require the third brother to be married.. Therefore, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. Following Rebbi Simeon, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are permitted¹⁰⁷. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first is forbidden but the second permitted. Because of the doubt, she¹⁰⁸. {The Mishnah in the Babli switches the places of “first” and “second” in the Mishnah; students of the Babli consider this paragraph corrupt.} performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁶ Since no woman can be the wife of two men; since she cannot have partial levirate, she cannot have levirate at all.In this Mishnah and the next, the only question is why the unrelated woman has to perform ḥalîṣah ¹⁰⁷ To marry outside the family without formalities. ¹⁰⁸ The first, unrelated, wife is forbidden for outsiders without ḥalîṣah

MISHNAH: Of three brothers, two are married to two sisters and one to an unrelated woman. The husband of the unrelated died, one of the sisters’ husbands married his widow, and died. His first [wife] leaves as his wife’s sister, the second one as her co-wife. If he had “bespoken” her, the unrelated woman performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.

HALAKHAH: “Of three brothers, two are married to two sisters,” etc. Both the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon will agree in this case.

MISHNAH: Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and one to an unrelated woman. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the husband of the unrelated married his widow, the wife of the secondbrother died and then the husband of the unrelated died. She¹¹⁰. 18:18). The reason is that when her first husband died, she was forbidden to the second brother as sister of his wife and, as will be explained later, any brother who cannot “build his brother’s house” at the first opportunity can never build after that. is permanently forbidden to him¹¹¹ since she was forbidden one moment.

footnotes: ¹¹⁰ The widow of the first brother is forbidden to the second even though in general the deceased wife’s sister is permitted to her husband (Lev ¹¹¹ The only surviving brother.

HALAKHAH: “Of three brothers,” etc. Rebbi Avina said, that is what Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The prohibition of sisters who are sisters-in-law does not compare with the prohibition of sisters who not are sisters-in-law¹¹².

footnotes: ¹¹² These are always permitted to the widower of the sister.

MISHNAH: Of three brothers, two are married to two sisters and one to an unrelated woman. If one of the sisters’ husbands divorced his wife, when the one married to an unrelated woman died and the divorcer married her¹¹³ and then died, that is what they said: Of all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or turned out to be she-rams, the co-wives are permitted¹¹⁴.

footnotes: ¹¹³ The unrelated woman, now his brother’s widow. ¹¹⁴ If at the moment of the husband’s death there is no impediment to levirate, anything that happened before is unimportant. Cf. Chapter 1, Note 115.In the Babli and most Mishnah mss., the text is short “if they died or were divorced” as in the quote in the Halakhah.

HALAKHAH: “Of three brothers,” etc. Rebbi Ḥaggai said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, not only if he divorced and after that married, but even if he married and after that divorced¹¹⁵. That is what we had stated: “Of all of these, if they died or were divorced, their co-wives are permitted.¹¹⁶”

footnotes: ¹¹⁵ The Babli, 30a/b, considers this only as a possibilty, to be disregarded. That Talmud requires that the two women never were potential co-wives, i. e., if the first brother divorced his wife only after the third brother had died and the unrelated woman was a potential co-wife of the first’s wife, she is permanently forbidden to the second brother. ¹¹⁶ A shortened version, possibly due to Babylonian influence, cf. Note 114.

Rebbi Yudan said, even Rebbi Eliezer¹¹⁷ agrees. Rebbi Yose said, that is correct. Because, if somebody had children but they died before he died, is his widow not a candidate for levirate? There, if he had children at the moment of death. Here, if they were co-wives after his death¹¹⁸. 25:5: “one of them died while he left no child.” Only the status at the moment of death counts; the prior history is irrelevant..

footnotes: ¹¹⁷ Who holds in Halakhah 1 (Note 10) that a prohibition remains even if its cause has disappeared. ¹¹⁸ Only the status at the moment of the husband’s death counts in matters of levirate. Everybody reads in Deut

MISHNAH: In all cases¹¹⁹ in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin¹²⁰ have two parts: Delivery of a gift to the prospective bride and a declaration by the groom that the gift is intended to make the woman his bride. If a person stands in the public domain, it is assumed that any object within a circle of radius of 4 cubits with her in the center is acquired by that person upon expression of her will to receive that object. If now both stand in the public domain exactly 8 cubits apart and he throws the gift to her in the presence of two witnesses and it lands in the middle, it is impossible to determine up to the last micron whether most of it landed within her domain. {If both stand on his property, the gift must be properly delivered; if on her property, her property will acquire for her if she wants it. If they are more than 8 cubits apart and the gift is not completely inside her circle of acquisition, there are no qiddushin.} In the Tosephta, 5:7, qiddushin are questionable because it was not established that the gift had the monetary value of at least a peruṭa.. What is a questionable divorce? If [the divorce document] was written in his handwriting but without witnesses, or there are witnesses but no date, or there is a date but only one witness, these are questionable divorces¹²¹.

footnotes: ¹¹⁹ If the relationship with any one of the 15 categories of prohibited women enumerated in Mishnah 1:1 was predicated on a marriage whose validity or dissolution was questionable, the co-wife cannot automatically be freed since the relationship might be nonexistent but she cannot have levirate since the relationship might be valid. ¹²⁰ Qiddushin ¹²¹ These are all cases of illegal divorces which can be validated only in urgent cases (if the woman remarried on the basis of the document and is now pregnant.)

HALAKHAH: ¹²² 9:2.“In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate,” etc. There really is no questionable divorce here¹²³ 9:2 (fol. 50b) reads: “There really is no questionable divorce but a real divorce.” See the next paragraph.. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. And here, if he threw the divorce document to her¹²⁴. 24:1. This is a condition which cannot be waived. and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that is a questionable divorce.

footnotes: ¹²² The entire Halakhah is copied in Giṭṭin ¹²³ As noted, the divorce documents are formally defective but can be validated in hardship cases. Therefore, if the forbidden woman has remarried based on such a document and now has children from another man, there is no reason why Mishnah 8 should not be invoked by the former co-wife. Therefore, for matters of levirate such a divorce is valid under all circumstances. The corresponding text in Giṭṭin ¹²⁴ A divorce document can be valid by biblical standards only when delivered to the woman (or her duly appointed representative), Deut

Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ḥalaphta from Haifa¹²⁵ 86 b, the statement appears in very abbreviated form.: Any who were married on the basis of such a document should not leave¹²⁶ in order not to give a bad reputation to her children. His daughter who was married outside on the basis of such a document should not leave in order to damage her co-wife to her father¹²⁷ as possible co-wife of his daughter.. Her co-wife who was married outside on the basis of such a document has to leave¹²⁸ is null and void.. His daughter who married his brother on the basis of such a document has to leave¹²⁹. Her co-wife who was married to his brother on the basis of such a document, or even to her father, should not leave¹²⁷ as possible co-wife of his daughter..

footnotes: ¹²⁵ The place name is corrupt in most sources. In the Babli, Giṭṭin ¹²⁶ Her marriage based on the flawed document should not be terminated to avoid tainting her children from the second husband as bastards. ¹²⁷ If his daughter was married to his brother and divorced by one of these questionable documents, if later her ex-husband dies childless, her co-wife is permitted to her father in levirate. If the rabbinical establishment would force the termination of a second marriage, the co-wife would have to perform ḥalîṣah ¹²⁸ If his daughter was married to his brother and divorced by one of these questionable documents, if later her ex-husband dies childless, her former co-wife is permitted to her father and any outside marriage she contracts without ḥalîṣah ¹²⁹ If his daughter was married to his brother and divorced by one of these questionable documents, if later her ex-husband dies childless, any marriage of this daughter to one of the other paternal uncles is incestuous. ¹²⁷ If his daughter was married to his brother and divorced by one of these questionable documents, if later her ex-husband dies childless, her co-wife is permitted to her father in levirate. If the rabbinical establishment would force the termination of a second marriage, the co-wife would have to perform ḥalîṣah

It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents¹³⁰ 176a. can be collected only from unincumbered property¹³¹, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect¹³². Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed, he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership¹³³. 5:21) of Hebrew תְשׂוּמֶת יָד, derived from the verb κοινωνέω, one of whose meanings is “to act in partnership”. In talmudic literature, the word always has a pejorative meaning, “a criminal conspiracy”. The lender and the borrower might conspire to defraud an earlier mortgage holder by predating the document. A sale of real estate cannot invalidate mortgage liens executed before the time of the sale. The lender and the borrower might also conspire to defraud any buyer of unincumbered real estate by pretending that the later loan predates the earlier sale. Since they would not find witnesses in good standing to sign a predated document (and to testify before a court), they take their chance with an undated bill in the borrower’s hand.. Rebbi Abun said, because it is invalid. So far, if the old man took the loan and [later] the old man mortgaged¹³⁴ should have validated the document in this exceptional case just as the defective divorce document is validated in an exceptional case.. But if the old man took the loan and [later] the son mortgaged, can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun said, and was it not stated¹³⁵ 176a. This is all part of R. Abun’s argument.: The same holds for bills of divorce. Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here¹³⁶, because it is invalid.

footnotes: ¹³⁰ A bill of debt executed in the manner of any of the three types of bills of divorce declared questionable in the Mishnah. In talmudic practice, mortgages were usually not executed for specified pieces of real estate but were liens on all real estate of the debtor (in his possession at the date of the document) to be satisfied in the order of execution (except for the money due to a wife at the dissolution of a marriage by divorce or death of the husband, which always takes precedence). Therefore, the date of a bill of debt determines its rank as a mortgage.The problem is touched on very lightly in Babli, Baba Batra ¹³¹ Real estate acquired after any other bill of debt was executed. ¹³² No mortgage can be foreclosed unless the document and its signatures have been found to be genuine by a competent court. ¹³³ Greek κοινωνία, used by LXX as translation (Lev ¹³⁴ There might be a conspiracy if the borrower and the writer of the bill of debt are one and the same person. But if the borrower was the parent and the writer an heir, the baraita ¹³⁵ Quoted in slightly different form in Babli, Baba Batra ¹³⁶ In the case of a bill of debt.

MISHNAH: Three brothers are married to three unrelated women. If one of them died, his second brother “bespeaks” her and then dies, these¹³⁷. perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate, as it is said: “Her levir shall come to her¹³⁸. 25:5. The Mishnah in the Babli and most Mishnah mss. also quote the beginning of the verse: “If brothers live together and one of them dies, …”,” if on her is the candidacy from one brother but not from two. Rebbi Simeon says, he takes in levirate the one he prefers and performs ḥalîṣah with the other¹³⁹ with the other..

footnotes: ¹³⁷ The two widows who now are candidates for levirate with the third brother. If the second brother had not “bespoken” the first widow, he would have been free to marry both of the widows. Now that the first widow is quasi-married to the second brother, she cannot be married by the third brother; therefore the quasi-co-wife also is barred. But since the first widow is only partially forbidden, both require ḥalîṣah ¹³⁸ Deut ¹³⁹ Rebbi Simeon holds that bespeaking either acquires completely or not at all (Halakhah 2:1). If it acquires completely, both widows are widows of the second brother, and the influence of the first is eliminated; the third may marry one in levirate and then the other would be freed without ceremony. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the two women are widows of different brothers and both are permitted to the third in levirate. Because of the doubt, the third can marry only one of the widows and has to perform ḥalîṣah

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers married to three women,” etc. Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate¹⁴⁰? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead¹³⁷.. One understands that he has to perform ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” because the wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Why can the other one not be married in levirate? Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, of any one you cannot marry in levirate, you cannot marry the co-wife in levirate¹⁴¹. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar formulated this, he formulated what he had heard from me¹⁴². Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “¹⁴³ A boy at least nine years and one day old who had intercourse with his sister-in-law¹⁴⁴ and when he grew up he married another wife; if he never had intercourse with the first again after he became an adult¹⁴⁵, the second [wife] may perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate¹⁴⁶. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate¹⁴⁷! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis¹⁴⁸. Rebbi Abun bar Bisna in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, but only if first he¹⁴⁹ of one of the widows frees the other; the marriage of the second has no influence on the status of the first. married in levirate and then performed ḥalîṣah. But if he performed ḥalîṣah first, it is forbidden; perhaps “bespeaking” acquired and she was freed by her co-wife’s ḥalîṣah.

footnotes: ¹⁴⁰ Since the verse also speak of the levir in the singular, one might infer that the laws of levirate apply only to a single levir. But this is certainly not the case. ¹³⁷ The two widows who now are candidates for levirate with the third brother. If the second brother had not “bespoken” the first widow, he would have been free to marry both of the widows. Now that the first widow is quasi-married to the second brother, she cannot be married by the third brother; therefore the quasi-co-wife also is barred. But since the first widow is only partially forbidden, both require ḥalîṣah ¹⁴¹ Also quoted in Chapter 1, cf. Note 116. ¹⁴² Cf. Berakhot 2, Note 53. ¹⁴³ Mishnah 10:9.The sex act of a minor less than 9 years old has no legal consequences. If the boy is at 9 years and one day old, his sex act counts (if a married woman sleeps with him, she is criminally liable for adultery but he is not responsible since he is a minor.) A minor cannot acquire in general; therefore, his sex act corresponds to “bespeaking” for adults and the disagreement between the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon about the legal consequences of “bespeaking” extends to those of the sex act by a minor close to puberty. ¹⁴⁴ Widow of an older brother who had died childless. ¹⁴⁵ For the rabbis, she is partially his wife; for R. Simeon, she either is his wife or she is not his wife. ¹⁴⁶ With a third brother, if the second brother also dies childless. ¹⁴⁷ In Mishnah 3:10, neither woman can be married. In Mishnah 10:9, one of them can be married even though the legal situation is the same! ¹⁴⁸ In both Mishnaiot, R. Simeon holds that the third brother may marry one of the widows without restriction. In Mishnah 3:10, the anonymous Tanna is Rebbi Meïr; in Mishnah 10:9 he is another Tanna who admits the possibility that only one of the widows may be a candidate for levirate. In Tosephta 5:7, R. Yose (ben Ḥalaphta) holds that in the situation of Mishnah 3:10, the second widow may be married, parallel to the opinion of the Tanna of 10:9. ¹⁴⁹ The third brother. In the Tosephta, this is a tannaitic statement attributed to R. Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon, following his father’s doctrine. The ḥalîṣah

MISHNAH: Two brothers are married to two sisters. If one of them died and then the wife of the other died, she¹⁵⁰. 25:5 both the death of one and the marriage of the other are mentioned.) is eternally forbidden to him since she was forbidden one moment.

footnotes: ¹⁵⁰ The wife of the first brother who had died childless. Since at the time of death of the first the wife of the second was alive, there could not have been any levirate. If levirate is forbidden at the time of death of the husband, it is permanently forbidden (since in Deut

HALAKHAH: “Two brothers married to two sisters,” etc. Rebbi Avina said, that is what Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yose, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The prohibition of sisters who are sisters-in-law does not compare with the prohibition of sisters who not are sisters-in-law¹¹².

footnotes: ¹¹² These are always permitted to the widower of the sister.

MISHNAH: If two men gave qiddushin to two women and when they entered the bridal chamber¹⁵¹ they switched each of them to the other¹⁵², they are guilty of [adultery with] a married woman. If they were brothers, they also are guilty because of [the prohibition of] the brother’s wife. If they were sisters, they are guilty also because of [the prohibition of] “a woman in addition to her sister”. If they were menstruating, they are guilty also because of [the prohibition of] menstruating women¹⁵³. And all of these one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not able yet to have children one returns them at once. If they were from priestly families they are disabled for heave¹⁵⁴. 22:13 states that the daughter of a Cohen married to a non-Cohen who becomes a widow may return to her family to eat from holy food only is she is “as in her maidenhood”, that she could be married by a Cohen. But a woman who had illicit sex, even as a rape victim, is forbidden to a Cohen..

footnotes: ¹⁵¹ The act of marriage itself which was preceded by a public ceremony and which validates the marriage in terms of civil law. The meaning of “bridal canopy” given today to the word חוּפָּה is comparatively recent, not older than about 1000 years. In terms of criminal law, the couple are married from the time of qiddushin; therefore, the marriage with the wrong wife constitutes adultery. ¹⁵² Inadvertently, maybe because they never had seen their brides beforehand. ¹⁵³ It is possible to commit 4 deadly sins in one act; this would require 8 purification offerings per pair. ¹⁵⁴ Lev

HALAKHAH: If he had intercourse with the second he is two times guilty, for the brother’s wife and for “a woman in addition to her sister”¹⁵⁵.

footnotes: ¹⁵⁵ The formulation is elliptic. It is asserted (1) that entering the bridal chamber is not sinful, only the intercourse is; (2) that prohibited acts can be added together. The Babli has great difficulties with multiple guilt for one act; that problem is not mentioned in the Yerushalmi except for procedural problems in criminal law.

Rebbi Ḥiyya stated¹⁵⁶: Sometimes four times, sometimes eight times, sometimes twelve times, sometimes sixteen times¹⁵⁷. They are guilty under the heading of adultery with a married woman, each couple for two. If they were brothers, under the heading of “brother’s wife”, each couple for four. If they were sisters, under the heading of “a wife together with her sister”, each couple six. If they were menstruating, under the heading of “menstruating”, each couple eight. If the men are minors and the women adults, they are free¹⁵⁸. If the men are adults and the women minors, they are obligated two by two because of menstruation¹⁵⁹. If their father married them off, for all eight. If one of the men was an adult and the other a minor, the one who had intercourse with the minor is guilty as wife of the adult but the one who had intercourse with the adult is free as wife of the minor.

footnotes: ¹⁵⁶ Tosephta 5:8–9, in a slightly different wording. A very short quote of the Tosephta in Babli, 33b. ¹⁵⁷ Since four persons are involved, each transgression implies punishment for four people. The total number of crimes (or purification sacrifices) must be a multiple of four. ¹⁵⁸ The minors cannot legally marry; it is impossible to commit adultery with their wives. ¹⁵⁹ Since a minor girl cannot legally marry except if given in marriage by her father, in the absence of a father the only inadvertent crime possible is that of intercourse with a menstruating woman. But if the father married the girls off, they are legally married and all four sins are possible.

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: A rape victim does not have to wait three months¹⁶⁰. But did we not state: “One separates them for three month to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have children one returns them at once.” That is different, it is for the benefit of the child¹⁶¹.

footnotes: ¹⁶⁰ That statement is tannaitic in the Babli, 35a, and ascribed to the Tanna R. Yose. R. Jehudah is reported to require separation of a raped wife from her husband for three months. R. Yose, in the interpretation of Abbai, is confident that the rape victim will know how to rid herself of the unwanted semen. That argument seems so obvious to the Yerushalmi that it is not necessary to mention it. ¹⁶¹ If the woman is pregnant from the unintended adultery, the child is a bastard and permitted to marry another bastard. If she were allowed immediately to return to her husband, any child would be a possible bastard and forbidden to marry either a regular person or a bastard.

“If they were from priestly families they are disabled for heave.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that rape disables in priestly families like adultery¹⁶². 21:7 is either a libertine or a woman “subject to illegitimate sexual relations” without any consideration of intent. While a non-priestly husband keeps his raped wife, the Cohen is forced to divorce her, even against his will..

footnotes: ¹⁶² Mishnah 6:5 quotes the opinion of the anonymous majority that the “harlot” forbidden to a Cohen in Lev