MISHNAH: Rabban Gamliel says, there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce, no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, no copulation after copulation, and no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah¹. For the freeing of the widows, ḥalîṣah is still needed. Similarly, if one of the brothers “bespoke” one of the widows, any later “bespeaking” of any other widow is null and void. The parallel statement for ḥalîṣah is obvious since by biblical standards the act prohibits all widows for all brothers for all times.. But the Sages say, there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce and “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, but nothing after copulation or after ḥalîṣah² can be final..

footnotes: ¹ If the childless brother left two widows and either brother gave a bill of divorce to both of them, or two brothers each gave a bill of divorce to one of them, the second bill of divorce has no legal value; the giver of the bill may marry any of the relatives of the sister-in-law who received the invalid document.While a bill of divorce has no standing in levirate proceedings, it is an old rabbinic tradition that the delivery of a bill of divorce by one of the brothers prohibits all the widows from marrying any of the brothers as if it were a bill of ḥalîṣah ² The Sages hold that no act which is only rabbinically valid has the power to eliminate biblical requirements; only levirate or ḥalîṣah

HALAKHAH: “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as a wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. I might think that just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final; the verse says “her levir shall come upon her.” This directs the entire paragraph towards levirate. Cohabitation is final, “bespeaking” is not final. Then what is “bespeaking” good for? To forbid her to the brothers.

Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.

Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for qiddushin of a woman¹⁹. Just as qiddushin acquire completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.”

footnotes: ¹⁹ In both cases, the divorce document is meaningless and there is no relationship between the levir and the third widow. Cf. Tosephta 7:5 and Note 99.

Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. ⁴ 14a. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife⁵ but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.⁶ 25:9. The Babli points to another part of the same verse, “so it should be done”, so and not otherwise.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written⁷ 25:5.: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away⁸ 24:4, speaking about the divorced wife.”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “⁹ 24:1. he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have¹⁰ on the status of a married woman.?

footnotes: ⁴ The arguments of this paragraph (except the last one) are repeated in a few short lines in Babli Qiddushin ⁵ To marry another man. ⁶ Pulling off the levir’s shoe; Deut. ⁷ Deut. ⁸ Deut. ⁹ Deut. ¹⁰ There is no verse indicating any action of ḥalîṣah

Since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, does he say similarly that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Simeon says, there is nothing after copulation if it is primary¹¹. Therefore, if it is secondary, there is something afterwards. That must deal with copulation after a bill of divorce. For if it were copulation after “bespeaking”, what could you say? If “bespeaking” acquired, there is nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse will acquire and there is nothing after that. So we must speak about copulation after a bill of divorce¹² in addition to her bill of divorce.. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially¹³ is required after the bill of divorce; it is not a matter of doubt..

footnotes: ¹¹ Cf. Mishnah and Halakhah 7. ¹² If he gave a bill of divorce to one of the widows and afterwards had intercourse with the second, the second is his wife and the first, who is forbidden to him, needs ḥalîṣah ¹³ He is certain that ḥalîṣah

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following¹⁵: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’¹⁶ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce¹⁷, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third¹⁸. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that¹⁹. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially²⁰. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that¹⁹. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially²⁰. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired²¹. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second²². If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second²³ for herself..

footnotes: ¹⁵ Tosephta 7:3, Babli 51a. ¹⁶ If there were two widows, and he “bespoke” the first and gave a bill of divorce to the second, the first and the relatives of both of them are now forbidden to him. ¹⁷ If he gave a bill of divorce to the first and “bespoke” the second, the second also needs a bill of divorce. ¹⁸ The bill of divorce is not meaningless; the relatives of the third widow are forbidden to him. ¹⁹ In both cases, the divorce document is meaningless and there is no relationship between the levir and the third widow. Cf. Tosephta 7:5 and Note 99. ²⁰ This makes the intercourse with the second widow partially incestuous. ¹⁹ In both cases, the divorce document is meaningless and there is no relationship between the levir and the third widow. Cf. Tosephta 7:5 and Note 99. ²⁰ This makes the intercourse with the second widow partially incestuous. ²¹ Since the form of the legal action of “bespeaking” is not dependent on the person who acts. ²² The second brother cannot acquire anything since he was preempted by the first. ²³ If one levir gave bills of divorce to two sisters-in-law, neither of them goes free without ḥalîṣah

Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”²⁴. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”²⁵. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”²⁶. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.

footnotes: ²⁴ The second divorce is invalid and the levir may marry any relative of the second widow. ²⁵ Both widows and their relatives are forbidden to the levir. ²⁶ This is a theory not found elsewhere, that a divorce after (rabbinic) “bespeaking” should annul the consequences of “bespeaking” both for him, that all co-wives of the bespoken are no longer forbidden, and seemingly also for the other brothers,that the widows become permitted again for the “bespeaking” by another brother.Since practice does not follow Rabban Gamliel, no answer is given. For the Sages, the answer is given in the next Halakhah.

In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, can there be invalid intercourse after invalid intercourse²⁷, or the intercourse of a nine-years-old after the intercourse of [another] nine-years-old²⁸, or invalid intercourse²⁹ after the intercourse of a nine-years-old, or intercourse of a nine-years-old after invalid intercourse? Do the Sages agree with Rabban Gamliel that there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” for one sister-in-law? How is that? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law, gave her a bill of divorce³⁰, and “bespoke” her again. If you say, there can be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she did not become free by that bill of divorce³¹.. If you say, there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she was freed by that bill of divorce³² since she was not married in levirate..

footnotes: ²⁷ For example, the intercourse with the second of three widows discussed above. The question is whether a second intercourse would be unquestionably incestuous. ²⁸ Cf. Chapter 3, Note 143. Both children between 9 and 13 years old are supposed to be levirs of the widow. ²⁹ By an adult. ³⁰ For the Sages, this makes the widow forever forbidden to all brothers. ³¹ She needs a divorce and ḥalîṣah ³² She still needs ḥalîṣah

³³ Rebbi Yudan asked: If somebody gave qiddushin to a woman “from now and after thirty days” and her sister became a candidate for levirate with him during these thirty days, is there even in this case no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking³⁴ are certainly stronger that rabbinic “bespeaking”, is his wife immune to the influence of her sister who became a candidate for levirate?? He said, Rabban Gamliel said only “after a bill of divorce and ‘bespeaking’ ”³⁵ as excluding further action. Therefore, the claim of her sister forbids the woman to her prospective husband. For the statement of R. Abbahu, cf. Chapter 3, Notes 102–105.. But what Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a hundred qiddushin are valid for her, does not follow Rabban Gamliel.

footnotes: ³³ A similar paragraph in Chapter 3, Notes 102–105. ³⁴ Since biblical qiddushin ³⁵ Rabban Gamliel did not mention qiddushin

MISHNAH: How³⁶ handled? This Mishnah is not a continuation of the previous one.? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law and gave her a bill of divorce, she needs ḥalîṣah from him³⁷ with her and may not take her in levirate.. If he “bespoke” and participated in ḥalîṣah, she needs a bill of divorce from him³⁸, it can be dissolved only by (rabbinic) divorce.. If he “bespoke” her and copulated, that is as it is commanded.

footnotes: ³⁶ How are the rules of ḥalîṣah ³⁷ Since he started to divorce her, she is forbidden to him. He must perform ḥalîṣah ³⁸ Since “bespeaking” is the formal equivalent of qiddushin

HALAKHAH: “How? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law,” etc. That means³⁹ after “bespeaking” and divorce. Since it excludes levirate, it shows that the bill of divorce invalidated both “bespeaking” and candidacy. that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired. If you would say that a bill of divorce does not free more than “bespeaking” had acquired, the levir could say: My bill of divorce shall not free more than my “bespeaking” had acquired⁴⁰. But then the bill of divorce did not even free what my “bespeaking” had acquired! “Cutting off⁴¹ 24:1; the divorcing husband has to write “a document of cutting off” all his ties with her. The Babli, 52b, notes that the rules of a purely rabbinic bill of divorce cannot well be grounded in biblical verses. The argument has to be classified as an intimation, rather than a proof..” That is no cutting off!

footnotes: ³⁹ The Mishnah which demands ḥalîṣah ⁴⁰ By excluding candidacy, he wants to reserve the right to levirate. This would prevent the widow from marrying outside the family. The entire proceeding is invalidated since a divorce is only valid if the divorcee has the unconditional right of remarriage. ⁴¹ Deut.

Ḥalîṣah against the rules frees⁴² of a woman who was “bespoken” and did not yet receive her divorce document.. In which respect? That if an outsider comes and gives qiddushin to her co-wife, they will lay hold of her⁴³ “lay hold of” a woman if the marriage is valid and the woman is forbidden to any other man by the laws of adultery. In this case, it is not only valid but also legal.. If an outsider came and gave her⁴⁴ qiddushin, since the candidacy from the deceased was removed from her⁴⁵, the qiddushin will lay hold of her, or maybe, since she still needs a bill of divorce for her “bespeaking”, the qiddushin will not lay hold of her?

footnotes: ⁴² The ḥalîṣah ⁴³ She certainly is freed by her co-wife’s ḥalîṣah. Qiddushin ⁴⁴ The widow who was “bespoken” and performed ḥalîṣah. ⁴⁵ By biblical law, she is forbidden to all levirs.

Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, this means that there is an obligation first to give qiddushin and only after that to cohabit. Since here, where qiddushin are not written, you say “that is as it is commanded”, for a wife, where it is written, not so much more⁴⁶ since Deut. 22:13 prescribes that a man has to acquire a wife before cohabiting with her: “If a man acquires a wife and comes to her …” Even though in theory a marriage could be effected in criminal law and consummated in civil law by one act of cohabitation, this is frowned upon since the act is only valid if performed in the presence of two witnesses; the Babli agrees emphatically (52a).!

footnotes: ⁴⁶ This refers to the last statement of the Mishnah, that an orderly levirate is preceded by “bespeaking”. It is asserted that an orderly regular marriage is also preceded by qiddushin

MISHNAH: If he delivered a bill of divorce and then “bespoke”, she needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he delivered a bill of divorce and then cohabited, she needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he delivered a bill of divorce and then performed ḥalîṣah, after ḥalîṣah nothing more is needed.

HALAKHAH: “If he delivered a bill of divorce and then “bespoke”, etc. A bill of divorce for his “bespeaking” and ḥalîṣah for her candidacy⁴⁷ 25:5–9. Since “bespeaking” is rabbinic, the bill of divorce will be rabbinic (Babli 50b)..

footnotes: ⁴⁷ The bill of divorce is only enough to forbid the widow to himself and all brothers but it does not fulfill the requirements of Deut.

That means⁴⁸ that invalid intercourse does not free. Come and see, invalid ḥalîṣah⁴⁹ is one where levirate is impossible, as in the last case of the Mishnah. As the Mishnah notes, a ḥalîṣah is always final. frees but invalid intercourse does not free! Since the purpose of ḥalîṣah is invalidation, it frees. Intercourse, whose purpose is not invalidation, does not free. It should not free for leniency but might free for restriction. In which respect? If somebody came and gave qiddushin to the co-wife, these should lay hold on her. Rebbi Yudan said, I explained it. Any sister-in-law who is not totally outside remains inside until she leaves for the outside⁵⁰.

footnotes: ⁴⁸ This refers to the statement that intercourse after divorce is invalid; it is incestuous. The sister-in-law may not become his wife. Therefore, a co-wife is not freed to marry outside the family. ⁴⁹ An invalid ḥalîṣah ⁵⁰ Since a widow under the obligation of levirate in unable to contract another marriage before the candidacy for levirate is lifted for her, no widow can remarry outside the family as long as not all required ceremonies have been performed.

MISHNAH: If he performed ḥalîṣah, “bespoke” her, gave a bill of divorce, and cohabited⁵¹, no transaction is legal between the levir and the widow. “Bespeaking” and the bill of divorce become nonexistent, and the inter course incestuous., or cohabited, “bespoke”, gave a bill of divorce, and performed ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah⁵² are nonexistent. He married and then divorced the sister-in-law.. There is no difference between one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law⁵³.

footnotes: ⁵¹ After ḥalîṣah ⁵² In this case, “bespeaking” and ḥalîṣah ⁵³ This really is an introduction to the following Mishnaiot.

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood⁵⁴ is invalid; it is as if it had never happened. But illicit sex always has consequences, whether in connection with levirate or not. The statement is in Tosephta 7:5.. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow⁵⁵ rabbinically is considered an equivalent of divorce, the widow of a childless man is always forbidden to marry a Cohen unless she is married in levirate.? But she is disabled from eating heave⁵⁶. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave⁵⁷? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah⁵⁸. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her⁵⁹ sexual relation with a Cohen desecrates her; cf. Chapter 1, Note 239..

footnotes: ⁵⁴ A secondḥalîṣah ⁵⁵ Since ḥalîṣah ⁵⁶ If she is the childless daughter of a Cohen; cf. Chapter 4, Note 206. ⁵⁷ The argument is predicated on the arguments in Chapter 1, Notes 80–88, where it is held that probably for R. Joḥanan sexual contact of a levir with the widowed sister-in-law is never punishable. If it is not punishable, it cannot exclude the childless widow from returning to her priestly family. ⁵⁸ Chapter 1, Note 80. ⁵⁹ Once she is considered a divorcee in relation to a Cohen, any

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already⁶⁰ “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law⁶¹ of one widow all actions with regard to the other are also as if nonexistent.”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her⁶² by one of the brothers will be illegal but valid.? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law⁶³, their rules are quite different. After ḥalîṣah, any “bespeaking” is impossible; an action of “bespeaking” is null and void but the same action with the intent of qiddushin in valid. The same position is taken in the Babli, 52b.. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated⁶⁴: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention⁶⁵ as closely as possible.. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional⁶⁶, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce⁶⁷ frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult⁶⁸, and divorce are not applicable to minors. acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional⁶⁹ is enacted by both parties; it cannot happen without conscious participation of both parties..

footnotes: ⁶⁰ Mishnah 1. ⁶¹ From Mishnah 1 it is not clear that after ḥalîṣah ⁶² Since it was established in Chapter 1 that the widow is at most forbidden by a simple prohibition, not threatened by divine extirpation, it is clear that qiddushin ⁶³ While “bespeaking” has the external form of qiddushin ⁶⁴ A different but parallel formulation in Babli, 19b. ⁶⁵ For them, “bespeaking” follows the rules of qiddushin ⁶⁶ Mishnah 6:1. ⁶⁷ The divorce document for “bespeaking”, which cannot exist without the groom’s initiative, can be delivered without getting the widow’s attention. Nothing is implied for divorce of an original marriage. ⁶⁸ But not of a minor. Since a minor can act in practice but not in law, “bespeaking”, qiddushin ⁶⁹ Ḥalîṣah

MISHNAH: How? If he “bespoke” both of them, they need two bills of divorce and a ḥalîṣah ⁷⁰ with one of them.. If he “bespoke” one and copulated with the other, they need two bills of divorce and a ḥalîṣah⁷¹. If he “bespoke” one and gave a bill of divorce to the other, [the first one] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah⁷².. If he “bespoke” one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, the first one needs a bill of divorce⁷³..

footnotes: ⁷⁰ By “bespeaking” one of them, he forbade the co-wife for himself (and the other brothers). By “bespeaking” both, he forbade both for himself and has to perform ḥalîṣah ⁷¹ The intercourse was illegal, he may not keep his wife and has to divorce her. The first one needs a rabbinic divorce for her rabbinic “bespeaking”. ⁷² Giving a bill of divorce to a sister-in-law forbids her and her co-wives to himself. Therefore, he is forbidden to marry the one he “bespoke” and has to free her by both a divorce and ḥalîṣah ⁷³ She became forbidden to him by the other’s ḥalîṣah

MISHNAH: If there are bills of divorce for both of them, they need a ḥalîṣah⁷⁴. If there is a bill of divorce to one and he copulated with the other, [the latter] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah⁷⁵. If he gave a bill of divorce to one and “bespoke” the other, [the second one] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah⁷¹. If he gave a bill of divorce to one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, nothing follows after ḥalîṣah.

footnotes: ⁷⁴ As if no divorce had happened. However, both are forbidden to him and to any Cohen. ⁷⁵ See Note 72. The case is repeated to show that the order in which the acts follow one another is irrelevant. ⁷¹ The intercourse was illegal, he may not keep his wife and has to divorce her. The first one needs a rabbinic divorce for her rabbinic “bespeaking”.

HALAKHAH: “How? If he ‘bespoke’,” etc. ⁷⁶ In the opinion of Rebbi, what about his “bespeaking”, may a nine-year-old “bespeak”? The intercourse of an adult is final; his “bespeaking” partially acquires. The intercourse of a minor is final⁷⁷; does his “bespeaking” partially acquire? What is the difference between his intercourse and his “bespeaking”⁷⁸? But some want to formulate: What is the difference between “bespeaking” of an adult and “bespeaking” of a minor? Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult⁷⁹. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing⁸⁰. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional⁸¹. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult⁸² of the minor. She remains forbidden for everyone, levir or unrelated, until she is freed after the minor grows up.. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional⁸³.

footnotes: ⁷⁶ This is a direct continuation of the previous paragraph. ⁷⁷ It is not really final since a minor cannot acquire. However, since the sister-in-law becomes a wife of the levir by the fact of cohabitation irrespective of any thought process, the only way she might be freed from the underage levir is by divorce, which requires an adult partner. So, while she becomes the wife of the levir to the effect that adultery on her part will be a capital crime only through intercourse after he will have reached the age of 13 years and one day, in all other aspects she is his wife from the day of her first copulation. ⁷⁸ The answer is too simple to need spelling out: Intercourse is an act of reality which is in the power of the minor; “bespeaking” is a legal act outside the power of a minor. ⁷⁹ In the Babli, 96a, this is generally accepted. “Bespeaking” which does not lead to marriage has to be dissolved by divorce, which is outside the power of a minor. ⁸⁰ The last two sentences have no parallel in the Babli. ⁸¹ The mind of neither party has to be engaged in this activity; therefore, it is applicable to a minor. ⁸² This is R. Meïr’s opinion in the Babli, 96a. The divorce of a “bespoken” woman is insufficient to free her for outside marriage; so is the ḥalîṣah ⁸³ Probably addition by the scribe from the preceding paragraph.

MISHNAH: If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them⁸⁴, performed ḥaliṣah and “bespoke”⁸⁵ is void; the second widow is not forbidden for a Cohen nor are her close relatives forbidden to the levir., gave a divorce document and copulated⁷¹, or copulated with both of them⁸⁶, or copulated and “bespoke”⁸⁷, gave a divorce document and performed ḥaliṣah⁸⁸, nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, whether there are two sisters-in-law and one levir or two levirs with one sister-in-law⁸⁹.

footnotes: ⁸⁴ This Mishnah deals with the case of one levir and two sisters-in-law. It is understood that in any group, the first action refers to the first widow, the second to the second, but not both to one woman sequentially. ⁸⁵ The second ḥaliṣah ⁷¹ The intercourse was illegal, he may not keep his wife and has to divorce her. The first one needs a rabbinic divorce for her rabbinic “bespeaking”. ⁸⁶ He is married to the first; the relationship with the second was incestuous and no marital relationship was established with her. ⁸⁷ The act of “bespeaking” is legally nonexistent. ⁸⁸ Case already treated in Mishnah 5:3. ⁸⁹ The second case is treated at the beginning of the next Mishnah in a repetetive manner.

MISHNAH: If he performed ḥaliṣah and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and copulated, or copulated and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and performed ḥaliṣah, nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, whether at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end⁹⁰ removes the widow from the family for good, no action of any levir after ḥaliṣah can establish a marriage relationship or dissolve one. “In the middle” is only possible if there are more than two widows or levirs.. But in the case of copulation, nothing comes after it when it is at the start⁹¹’⁹². 25:5.. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, nothing comes after copulation or ḥalîṣah, whether at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end⁹³ when it is incestuous. Ḥaliṣah after intercourse is meaningless; the marriage can be dissolved only by a regular divorce..

footnotes: ⁹⁰ Since ḥalîṣah ⁹¹ Since the widow is married to the levir. ⁹² The anonymous majority holds that the intercourse required by the verse is one with an otherwise unencumbered widow. But if the widow has any claim or prohibition concerning another levir on her, they deny that any intercourse can have the status of fulfillment of the requirement of Deut ⁹³ For him, the first intercourse always has biblical status except if it comes after ḥaliṣah

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There⁹⁶, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free⁹⁷., as a “fence around the law”. There is no indication that the Yerushalmi considers any statement about the consequences of “bespeaking” or divorce as being about “fences around the law”.. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same⁹⁸. As it was stated⁹⁹: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them¹⁰⁰.”

footnotes: ⁹⁶ In Babylonia. The statement is in the Babli, 111a. This is the simple understanding one has of the Mishnah since copulation is improper if it does not occur at the beginning. ⁹⁷ No reason is given for the distinction. The Babli gives reasons why there should be a difference, viz ⁹⁸ The name tradition is uncertain. Ms. A reads: ר׳ נחמיה ור׳ שנ׳ע ור׳ שמוא׳. The Babli (51a) has:רבן גמליאל ובית שמי וּבן עזאי ורבי נחמיה. Rabban Gamliel’s opinion is stated in Mishnah 1. R. Simeon holds that maybe “bespeaking” acquires completely; this would imply that in the case of the Tosephta, the intercourse of the second does not free the first widow. Similarly, for the House of Shammai, “bespeaking” acquires by biblical standards. The relevant statement of R. Ismael is not recorded. ⁹⁹ Tosephta 7:5. ¹⁰⁰ Since the intercourse is invalid; the second widow is his wife but he must divorce her.