MISHNAH: If a widow [married] to a High Priest, or a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah [married] to a simple priest, brought him slaves as paraphernalia or as mortmain¹) whose value was determined in the marriage contract (ketubah) as dos aestimata, upon marriage became the husband’s property. At the termination of the marriage their value was due back to the wife. Paraphernalia [from the Greek παράφερνα, Middle Latin paraphernalia(bona), as a legal term relevant here “bride’s goods beyond her dowry,” equivalent to Late Latin parapherna “bride’s property.” (For the etymology of מְלוֹג, Ashkenazic מְלוּג, cf. Note 45, also Chapter 4, Note 86). These goods are dos non aestimata, property not entered in the marriage contract, of which the husband has administration for the duration of the marriage. He must maintain the value of this property and is compensated by receiving its usufruct but has no property rights. Since in any irregular union (such as described in the Mishnah) the wife of a Cohen is barred from all sanctified food, her property is barred with her. But the property of a Cohen is entitled to share in his sanctified food (*Lev.*22:11). The expression צאן ברזל “iron flock” for “inalienable, private property” may also be compared to Latin peculium“private property” which is derived from pecus, -oris “cattle” but used as a legal term for property in general.: The slaves of separate property may not eat heave², the slaves of mortmain may eat heave. These are slaves of paraphernalia: If they died, they died as her property, if they increased, they increased as her property. Even though he is responsible for their upkeep, they may not eat heave. These are slaves of mortmain: If they died, they died as his property, if they increased, they increased as his property. Since he guarantees them, they may eat heave.

footnotes: ¹ Mortmain (“inalienable property”, ‘iron flock’, in German law eisern Vieh ² And all other sanctified food that may be eaten outside the Temple precinct.

HALAKHAH: “A widow [married] to a High Ptiest,” etc. From where that a priest who married a wife or bought slaves enables them to eat heave? The verse says “and if a priest buys a person as his money’s acquisition⁴ 22:11: “And if a priest buys a person as his money’s acquisition, he shall eat of it; and the one born in his house, they shall eat of his food.” The wife is acquired by the qiddushin money.,” etc. From where that if his wife bought slaves, and her slaves [bought] slaves, that they may eat heave? The verse says “and if a priest buys a person as his money’s acquisition,” etc. Also his acquisition which bought an acquisition enables him to eat⁵ 22:11. Up to here the text is a baraita; Babli 66a, Sifra Emor Parasha5(1).. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. “They shall eat⁴ 22:11: “And if a priest buys a person as his money’s acquisition, he shall eat of it; and the one born in his house, they shall eat of his food.” The wife is acquired by the qiddushin money.”, they shall enable to eat. The baraita speaks about a slave who acquired slaves within the power of his master. But if a slave acquired slaves on condition that his master have no power over them, they are his property⁶. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. If a slave acquired slaves on condition that his master have no power over them and he died, the first person who comes can grab them⁷. In that case, [that slave] is not his property’s property⁸.

footnotes: ⁴ Lev. ⁵ Note the incongruous plural in Lev. ⁴ Lev. ⁶ Anything a slave buys is his owner’s property. Usually, what he otherwise acquires is also his owner’s property. But if he received something as a gift (e. g., money to buy his freedom) with the express stipulation that his master shall have no claim to it, then it is the slave’s direct property. If the slave received other slaves as such a gift, these are not the master’s acquisition and are barred from eating sanctified food. ⁷ They are ownerless. Since a slave can become free only by an act of manumission, these slaves are not freed by the death of their master and can be taken by anybody. ⁸ The slave’s slave is not the slave’s master’s property.

Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat⁹ 5(6), this is a tannaitic argument of R. Simeon.. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat¹⁰. Rebbi Joḥanan says, because of a fine¹¹, the divorcee was acquired by the priest. Her property was acquired with her. Therefore, by biblical standards her slaves could eat but it is a traditional fine imposed on irregular marriages that they should not confer the same advantages as a regular one.. What is the difference between them? If an uncircumcised slave¹² 12:48); the rules are spelled out in Halakhah 8:1. buys slaves. If you say, it is a fine, here there is no fine¹³. If you say the one who may eat enables to eat, this one, since he is not able to eat, cannot enable to eat.

footnotes: ⁹ Cf. Note 4. They read יאכלו as יַאֲכִלוּ. In Sifra Emor Parashah ¹⁰ Since the divorcee becomes desecrated by her marriage to any priest, she never can herself eat heave nor cause her slaves to eat. ¹¹ By qiddushin ¹² He cannot eat sanctified food (Ex. ¹³ On condition that the slave remain uncircumcised in a way accepted in Jewish law.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold¹⁶ 41a, s. v. אשה, are of the opinion that the Babli concurs.. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold¹⁷. From your own they¹⁸ gave to you. It would be logical that one¹⁹ should not eat heave. But they said that he eats²⁰, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye”²¹ 21:26). Paraphernalia slaves are property of the wife but not the husband. This part of the baraita is quoted in the Babli. Baba Qama 89a. from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves²² holds that they are the husband’s property; therefore, he must have the absolute power to sell them, against R. Joḥanan. are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit²³, as we have stated²⁴ 4:4 (fol. 45b), as amoraic in the Babli, Baba Qama 11b. 33b; Baba Meṣi‘a 44b.: If somebody mortgages²⁵ a slave and later sold him, he is not sold²⁶; if he freed him, he is freed²⁷. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days”²⁸ 21:20. The exemption for the owner who hits his slave which provided that he is not prosecutable if the slave survives for two days is not available to either wife or husband. This baraita defines “owner” as a person who has both the right to and disposition of his property. This text is also in the Babli Baba Qama 89b. and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time²⁹? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: ³⁰ 10:1 (Notes 22–24), in a slightly different version Babli Giṭṭin41a. If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself³¹. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman³² should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel³³ Rosh (R. Asher ben Ieḥiel) in his commentary on this Yerushalmi (Yebamot 7 #1) holds that the husband is prevented even from leasing the property without his wife’s consent. Rif (R. Isaac Fasi), Giṭṭin #472 holds that the husband may not sell but may lease for a limited time.. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.

footnotes: ¹⁶ Tosaphot in Giṭṭin ¹⁷ If the wife is not from a priestly family, then her slaves can eat only because he made her his wife. He cannot sell them since nobody can sell what is not his; Tosephta 9:1. ¹⁸ The developers of rabbinic doctrine. ¹⁹ A paraphernalia slave who is not property of a Cohen. ²⁰ As if he were the property of a Cohen. ²¹ If a slave loses a body part through his owner’s fault, he gains his freedom (Ex. ²² This baraita ²³ The Babli agrees without a dissenting opinion. ²⁴ Quoted as tannaitic text also in Giṭṭin ²⁵ Greek ὑποθήκη “mortgage”. ²⁶ The creditor can foreclose on the slave in the hands of the buyer. ²⁷ The creditor has to sue the borrower for damages; he cannot put his hand on the ex-slave. ²⁸ Ex. ²⁹ “Selling temporarily” is not selling the property but leasing the use of the property for a limited period. ³⁰ Ševi‘it ³¹ The buyer has to insure himself against the possibility that the creditor or the wife at the dissolution of her marriage will foreclose the property and he will have to sue the seller for restitution of the sale price. ³² Without a male protector. Then the law has to protect her. ³³ Since the wife has a lien on the mortmain slaves, the husband cannot alienate them without her consent, just as he cannot alienate real estate put up as collateral for her ketubah.

³⁴ 79b, this is a baraita. Since first generation Amoraim disagree over the rule, it seems that the Yerushalmi also presents this as a baraita. The offspring of a paraphernalia animal belongs to the husband, that of a paraphernalia slave girl belongs to the wife. Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua said, the offspring of a paraphernalia animal is like that of a paraphernalia slave girl³⁵. Rebbi Eleazar said to the colleagues, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan follows Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. Rav and Samuel, Rav follows the rabbis, but Samuel follows Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua³⁶. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you who says, they belong to the wife, should the first-born not take a double portion³⁷ 21:17, reading פי שנים as “double”, not “2/3”.) However, the first-born takes a double portion only from what is available at the father’s death. For example, property leased to others is available, debts collectable are not available (since the payor may default. Most modern authorities hold that sovereign debt is available.) In the Babli, Baba Batra 123b, an anonymous baraita is quoted which in a different form is a Tosephta, Bekhorot 6:16, that the first-born gets a double interest in the calf of a cow who was pregnant at the father’s death. This must mean that the calf is increase of the value of the stock, of which the first-born gets adouble portion, not yield after the father’s death, of which he would get only a simple portion. It does not make any sense that Rav denies the young of the animal to the wife when he gives the first-born a double portion.? Think of it, if she brought them when they were small and they grew up, are they not the wife’s, and you agree with me that the first-born takes a double portion³⁸!

footnotes: ³⁴ In the Babli, Ketubot ³⁵ In the Babli, the formulation is: “the offspring of a paraphernalia slave girl is like that of a paraphernalia animal.” In the Babli, the child of the slave girl belongs to the husband; in the Yerushalmi, everything belongs to the wife.In the Babli, the straight argument of Ḥanania is that the husband has the usufruct. In the Babli, the argument of the rabbis is that if the slave girl dies, the wife is left with nothing but if an animal dies, she is left with the value of the hide. There is no reason to transfer the argument of the Babli to the Yerushalmi. From the next paragraph it seems rather that the rabbis hold that the wife’s slaves belong to her father’s household and have to be treated as family heirlooms, and any increase in their number is increase of the value of the stock (which is the wife’s), not yield (which is the husband’s). ³⁶ In the Babli (Note 34) only Samuel’s opinion (opposite in meaning to his position here) is noted, without opposition. ³⁷ The first-born takes a double portion of the inheritance (Deut. ³⁸ Here everybody agrees that this represents increase in the stock, not yield.

It was stated³⁹: If she brought them when they were small, she takes them when they are lads. If she brought him two vessels⁴⁰. If one of them was worth the value of her marriage contract, she takes it for her marriage contract⁴¹ in this connection denotes the entire value of the marriage contract, the statutory ketubah sum, the value of mortmain property, and the additional fee he agreed to pay in case of a dissolution of the marriage. For this reason the translation does not simply state “ketubah”. We are dealing with a state of rampant inflation, as it was recorded during the military anarchy of the Roman empire, where the sum stated in the contract would have lost most of its buying power over time.. If one and a half was the value of her marriage contract, [disagreement of] Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman bar Jacob. One of them said, he pays for the second vessel and takes it; the other one says, she pays for the second vessel and takes it⁴². Rebbi Abba bar Cahana said before Rebbi Immi, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yasa⁴³: Even if one was worth one and a half times the value of her marriage contract, she pays for the second vessel and takes it, because it is unthinkable that others should use her vessels. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: A baraita says so: If she brought them for their monetary value, she takes them for their monetary value⁴⁴.

footnotes: ³⁹ Tosephta 9:1. The Tosephta deals with mortmain slaves and states that the wife has the right at the dissolution of the marriage to take the offspring of her slaves, even if their value today is greater than the value at which they were recorded in the marriage contract. She will have to indemnify her ex-husband for the difference in value but, since they are family heirlooms, he has no right to retain them against her will. This right extends to inanimate objects. ⁴⁰ As mortmain property. ⁴¹ Ketubah ⁴² They are not mentioned in the Babli, 66b/67a. There, Rav Jehudah holds that the wife always has the right to take her dowry back and pay the difference but Rebbi Ammi (Immi) holds that it is the husband’s choice what to give her, in contrast to the position he is quoted for in the Yerushalmi. In the final decision after a lenghty discussion, the Babli sides with the Yerushalmi. ⁴³ The colleague of R. Immi in their separate place of study in Tiberias. ⁴⁴ Tosephta 9:1. Therefore, in times of inflation it is preferable to specify the property, not the monetary value, in marriage contracts.

Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada asked Rebbi Mana: What is the etymology of “mĕlōg slaves”? He said to him, as you say: strip off, strip off⁴⁵ 45(2) the etymology appears in the name of R. Simeon ben Laqish and it is explained that Hagar was a paraphernalia personal slave of Sarah whom Abraham had to feed but could not get services from. In the interpretation of Arukh, the simile here is the other way: since the husband has the usufruct of the property he is like somebody who strips the feathers off a chicken but cannot eat the meat. The root מלג means “strip off (feathers, hair, etc.)” in Syriac. Ostensibly the word is Accadic mulūgu“paraphernalia”, which appears in the same meaning as an Eastern Semitic loanword mlg in Ugaritic (Canaanite); languages long dead by Talmudic times. The relation between Arabic ملج מַלַגַ “to drink from the breast (baby)”, to Greek ἀμέλγω, Latin mulgeo, “to milk”, is not clear. But possibly the notion of “milking” associated with property of one kind contrasted with the notion of “flock” associated with another goes back to ancient images from times when property mainly consisted of livestock.!

footnotes: ⁴⁵ In Gen. rabba

⁴⁶ 2:4. It is not totally clear what mortmain conditions for a shepherd are; cf. the extensive discussion in S. Lieberman, תוספתא כפשוטה בבא קמא-בבא מציעא New York 1988, pp 217–219. The Yerushalmi Baba Meṣi‘a 5:7, quoting Tosephta Bekhorot 5:1,14, explains: “What is a mortmain flock? If [the owner] had 100 sheep and said [to the shepherd]: these are stipulated to be worth 100 gold denars, their lambs, their milk, and their shearings are yours, if they die, you are responsible, and for each one you give me a tetradrachma at the end, it is forbidden.” It is forbidden to the shepherd to receive a flock under these conditions from a Jew since most owners will structure the contract so they will make money, which turns the final payment (which accompanies the return of the flock to the owner) into a money-making proposition which looks like interest since the shepherd pays for the use of the flock which he received on credit. It is forbidden to pay interest to Jews. The same kind of contract is permitted with Gentiles. There, we have stated: “If somebody receives [a flock] under mortmain conditions from a Gentile, the young are free, the young’s young are obligated.”⁴⁷ 5:7 (fol. 10b). Rebbi Jeremiah asked: There you say, the young are for the first, and here you say, the young are for the second⁴⁸, lambs are exempt because they belong to the Gentile even though the entire flock is the shepherd’s responsibility whereas the Mishnah here states that mortmain lambs belong to the husband who also carries the same responsibility as the shepherd.! Rebbi Yosa said, there, because the property rights are with the first, the young belong to the first. But here, because the property rights are with the second, the young belong to the second⁴⁹.

footnotes: ⁴⁶ Mishnah Bekhorot ⁴⁷ The parallel text is in Baba Meṣi‘a ⁴⁸ In the Mishnah in Bekhorot ⁴⁹ The contract of the shepherd specifies that the flock must be returned intact at a specified time; the interest of the Gentile is there all the time. In the case of marriage, if the wife predeceases her husband, he inherits from her; his obligation to return the dowry is conditional.

MISHNAH: If a daughter of an Israel married a Cohen and brought him paraphernalia or mortmain slaves, they may eat heave. But if a daughter of a Cohen married an Israel and brought him paraphernalia or mortmain slaves, they may not eat⁵⁰ 18:11); this includes his wife and her circumcised slaves. But the daughter of a Cohen who marries outside the clan is barred from eating heave (Lev. 22:12) and so are her slaves..

footnotes: ⁵⁰ Heave may be eaten by “every pure person in [the Cohen’s] household” (Num.

MISHNAH: If a daughter of an Israel married a Cohen who then died and left her pregnant, her slaves⁵¹ may not eat heave because of the share of the fetus. A fetus disqualifies⁵² but cannot enable to eat, the words of Rebbi Yose. They said to him, after you testified before us about the daughter of an Israel [married] to a Cohen, even if a daughter of a Cohen [was married] to a Cohen who died and left her pregnant, her slaves may not eat heave because of the share of the fetus⁵³.

footnotes: ⁵¹ Mortmain slaves who become the property of her child once he will be born. ⁵² A widowed, pregnant, otherwise childless daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel is precluded from returning to “her father’s house” because of the fetus who, once born, will not be a Cohen. ⁵³ Even if she has other children, the fetus will be co-heir of the mortmain slaves and, since he is not a person, cannot have a “house” in which they eat heave.

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Eleazar said, so is the Mishnah: Her slaves⁵⁴ may eat, his slaves⁵⁵ may not eat. For if it were not so, she would eat⁵⁶ but her slaves would not eat! Rebbi Josia in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it is from this, she also should not eat⁵⁷. Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Not that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees, he only said, for if it were not so, she would eat but her slaves would not eat. There came a case before Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. ⁵⁸ 7, Note 137. He said, go out and look how the public behaves. Rebbi Abin said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, not only this practice, but in any practical question which is weak in court and you do not know how to decide, go out and see how the public acts, and act accordingly. And we see that they do not eat. Rebbi Yose said, this means that [the fetus] does not disable anybody able to eat and does not enable anybody unable to eat⁵⁹.

footnotes: ⁵⁴ Paraphernalia slaves. The Tosephta, 9:1, disagrees except if she has other children (since otherwise if for any reason the pregnancy did not result in a viable baby she had left the priestly clan at her husband’s death). The Babli, 67a, formulates: “Paraphernalia slaves eat if and only if she eats.” ⁵⁵ Mortmain slaves. ⁵⁶ Since the Mishnah mentions only her slaves but not herself. The childless widow of a Cohen reverts to her status before marriage with regard to heave. On the other hand, the Mishnah does not state that the rule applies only to a widow without other children. If she has children from the Cohen then certainly she remains part of his house and eats heave. There is no reason why the paraphernalia slaves should not eat because of her status. ⁵⁷ One could find an argument that if the fetus disables her slaves it must disable her also. ⁵⁸ This text, position, and argument is from Peah ⁵⁹ This disproves R. Joḥanan’s attempted argument. Since the Mishnah does not mention her but mentions her mortmain slaves, the fetus does not disable her but cannot enable her slaves whose enabler has died and was not yet replaced.

Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose stated in the name of his father: If there was a daughter, she enables to eat⁶⁰ 27:6–11), a daughter inherits only in the absence of sons, but the standard marriage contract assures the upkeep of unmarried daughters as a lien on the estate (Mishnah Ketubot 4:11). This means that the claim of the daughter to be fed as a member of the priestly clan is prior to and independent of any claim of the male heirs; since she is fed, the slaves who secure her claim also may eat. But if there are no male heirs, the daughters are heirs according to biblical standards. If the fetus is male, he becomes the sole heir. If female, she becomes a co-heir and the slaves cannot eat because of her part. If there are male heirs, a female fetus has no influence since the marriage contract stipulates only support for living daughters.. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because she is able to take her upkeep away from them. Is a wife not also able to take her upkeep away from them⁶¹ or staying in her house and being supported by the estate (Mishnah Ketubot 4:12).? She might request her ketubah be paid or lose her ketubah⁶². This is difficult! The ketubah is a biblical institution⁶³22:16. The rabbinic document is reported to be an institution of Simeon ben Šetaḥ, cf. Ketubot, Yerushalmi 8:11 (fol. 32c), Babli 82b. The opinion that the origin of the ketubah of a virgin (not the details of the text) is rabbinic is found only in the Babli, attributed to R. Jehudah (Ketubot 56a, 10a)., the upkeep of the daughters is rabbinical; do their institutions uproot a word of the Torah? It follows him who said that they accepted tithes voluntarily⁶⁴ 7:1, Note 11..

footnotes: ⁶⁰ Tosephta 9:1; Babli 67a. In both sources it is emphasized that only a daughter lets mortmain slaves eat during the pregnancy of her mother but not sons. As R. Moses Margalit points out, the thrust of the argument of the Babli (not its details) must be understood also in the Yerushalmi that a daughter enables only in the presence of a son. By biblical rules (Num. ⁶¹ The widow has a choice of either claiming her ketubah ⁶² By any of the transactions mentioned in Mishnah Ketubot. ⁶³ At least for a virgin bride, Ex. ⁶⁴ The laws connected with the distribution of land alter the first conquest became moot with the Babylonian exile. They were voluntarily reintroduced in the times of Ezra; cf. Ševi‘it

We find that Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose disagrees with his father⁶⁵ ⁶⁶, Halakhah 7:1, explained there in Notes 52–57. since Rebbi Simon said in the name of Hilfai: Rebbi, Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose and Ben Qappara voted on the airspace of Ascalon and declared it pure from the testimony of Rebbi Phineas ben Yaïr who said, we were descending to the Saracen [market] at Ascalon where we bought wheat, returned to our town, immersed ourselves and ate our heave. The next day they wanted to vote to free it from tithes but Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose removed his hand.⁶⁷ He was leaning on Ben Qappara. He said to him, my son, why did you not say to me: did you not remove your hand? I would have told you that yesterday I was he who declared it impure, I am he who declared it pure. But now I am saying, maybe it was conquered within the meaning of the Torah, how can I free it from the meaning of the Torah? ⁶⁸ When is it impure because of territory of Gentiles? But we found that he stated in the name of his father that they accepted tithes voluntarily⁶⁹! And he said, it is correct that if tithes are from their words and the food of the daughters is of their words that their words may uproot their words⁷⁰.

footnotes: ⁶⁵ Conjectural reading required by the context. ⁶⁶ This paragraph is from Ševi‘it ⁶⁷ He declined to vote positively. ⁶⁸ The following sentence was copied in error; it belongs to the next item in Ševi‘it. ⁶⁹ In the previous paragraph it was shown that R. Yose must hold that all rules of heave are rabbinical since biblical heave would require that every farmer till his ancestral soil given to the family by Joshua. In the present paragraph, R. Ismael holds that the rules are biblical. ⁷⁰ In rabbinic institutions it is of the essence that the originators can settle the order of precedence.

⁷⁰“If there are males they enable to eat, females do not enable to eat.” ⁷¹ If there are males, they enable to eat since there is one doubt, whether he is male or female⁷² 67a) points out, there are two doubts, whether the pregnancy leads to a live birth or not and if there is a live birth whether it will be a male or a female. If there is no live birth, the males are the heirs and the slaves may eat because of them. If the baby is female, again the existing males are the heirs. The Yerushalmi probably holds that the miscarriages and female births just about equal the male births so that there are equal probabilities that the existing males are all heirs and the slaves may or may not eat because of them.. A doubt in biblical matters forces restriction¹ 3a.⁷⁴. Females⁷⁵ do not enable to eat since there are two doubts⁷⁶, whether he is male or female, (after she was betrothed or maybe before she was betrothed.)⁷⁷, cf., e.g., Mishnah Ketubot 1:6–7. A doubt regarding their words forces leniency⁷³ 3a.. However you take it, if he is male, everything is his⁷⁸. Female, she takes her part with them⁷⁹.

footnotes: ⁷⁰ In rabbinic institutions it is of the essence that the originators can settle the order of precedence. ⁷¹ The following text does not make much sense. The discussion in the Babli, 67a/b, is too hypothetical to be of much help here. ⁷² As Rashi (Ketubot ¹ A generally accepted principle, Babli Beṣah ⁷⁴ If heave were a biblical precept, the slaves could not eat if there was a male heir; if heave is rabbinic, they are enabled by him. ⁷⁵ The deceased had only daughters, no son. ⁷⁶ There is only one doubt but it has two sides, both of which support the position of R. Simeon. ⁷⁷ The text in parentheses makes no sense here; it belongs to another category of doubts, discussed at length in Tractate Ketubot ⁷³ A generally accepted principle, Babli Beṣah ⁷⁸ Then the slaves are disabled since before the birth they have no master who might enable them. ⁷⁹ This parallels the case of boys. In this case there is a doubt concerning the applicability of biblical law which requires restrictive interpretation.

MISHNAH: The fetus⁸⁰, the levir⁸¹ 5:3., the betrothal⁸², the deaf-and-dumb⁸³, and the male nine years and one day old⁸⁴ disable but do not enable to eat. If there was a doubt whether or not he had reached nine years and one dayt⁸⁵; whether or not he had grown two pubic hairs⁸⁶; when the house fell on him and his brother’s daughter and it is not known who of them died first, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate⁸⁷ and levirate. If she died first, the co-wife is permitted to the levirs..

footnotes: ⁸⁰ As explained in the previous Mishnah. ⁸¹ The (not priestly) childless widow of a Cohen who waits for the levir is prevented from eating heave, Mishnah Ketubot ⁸² The daughter of a Cohen betrothed to a non-Cohen is disabled. ⁸³ Since the deaf-and-dumb cannot legally acquire, his marriage is only of rabbinic validity. ⁸⁴ Who had intercourse with a woman, cf. Chapter 5, Note 79. If he is a Cohen and marries the woman rabbinically, he cannot enable her to eat heave until he grows two pubic hairs. ⁸⁵ If he did not reach the age of nine years and one day, his intercourse is inoperative and he did not disable a priest’s daughter. If he did reach that age, she is disabled. ⁸⁶ If he had not grown two pubic hairs his betrothal is not valid by biblical standards. If he is an Israel betrothed to the daughter of a Cohen she is not disabled. If he had grown two pubic hair his betrothal is valid by biblical standards and his betrothed is disabled. If the male is a Cohen and his wife an Israel, she can start eating heave only after he reaches adulthood (in the opinion of the Babli, once he had intercourse with her after growing two pubic hairs.) ⁸⁷ If he died first, the niece who was his wife frees the co-wife from the obligation of ḥalîṣah

HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable⁸⁸, pp. 83–85) shows that the question is restricted to the fetus.. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat⁸⁹ this is an argument of R. Simeon, S. Lieberman (l. c.) concludes that the objection of R. Simeon is a rhetorical device.. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat⁹⁰ 5(4), quoted in Babli 69b; the scenario is elaborated in Mishnah 7. According to Halakhah 6, Gentile or slave disable the woman partner from the priesthood; whether the child is a bastard is a matter of dispute (in Galilee, not in Babylonia). One has to assume that the desecrated mother of the disabled child has died. Since the verses Lev. 22:11,12 speak only of “born in the house” and “descendants” without qualifications, the child from an improper union is as good as one from a proper union for the rules of eating heave. The biological fathers do not disable since they cannot be legal fathers; the child is the child of his mother and God alone, cf. Peah 1:1, Note 116, Babli Niddah 31a.! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house⁹¹ 22:11. The simple meaning of the text is that slaves of a Cohen may eat heave, whether they are born in the house or bought by the master. The expression “born in the house” is extended here to disqualified children of the house.”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, ⁹² 6(1) on *Lev.*22:12, speaking about the issueless daughter of a Cohen returning to her father’s house to eat sanctified food. The text is also quoted in Babli 67b. since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that⁹³ interprets the biblical verse as implying the status of the fetus as described in the sentence; he should have said “the verse considers …”. The formulation as given is appropriate for the version of Ze‘ira/the rabbis who refer to rabbinic rules; “they” are the men of the Great Assembly who voluntarily reintroduced the rules of heave and tithes. means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira⁹⁴ 2:1, Note 54. said, there⁹⁵ they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth⁹⁶, Chapters 6,7. Mishnah Terumot 7:2 states that the daughter of a Cohen never loses her priestly status, even if she is disabled from eating heave, to the effect that she never pays the fine.. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth⁹⁷ 6:2. This proves that the rule cannot be biblical; the reference to the verse is not a proof.?

footnotes: ⁸⁸ The wording is correct in Tosephta 9:3: “For if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to enable it also should not be action to disable.” S. Lieberman (Tosephta ki-fshutah Yebamot ⁸⁹ See above, Notes 9–10. Since in Sifra ⁹⁰ This is a quote from Sifra Emor Pereq ⁹¹ Lev. ⁹² Sifra Emor Pereq ⁹³ The language is not quite appropriate; it is influenced by the context of the quote at the end of the paragraph. R. Yose notes that the Tanna of Sifra ⁹⁴ Cf. Berakhot ⁹⁵ In Babylonia. No parallel to this statement is found. ⁹⁶ If a person who is not enabled to eat heave transgresses and eats it, in general he is liable to pay for the amount he took plus a 25% fine to the priesthood; cf. Terumot ⁹⁷ Since even the marriage of the daughter of an Israel to a Cohen does not free her from the fine incurred before her marriage, Mishnah Terumot

“The deaf-and-dumb disables.” Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “The wife of the deaf-and-dumb or the insane immerses herself from her husband’s bosom and eats⁹⁸ 15:18) but is not disabled from eating heave. This contradicts the Mishnah.”? Rebbi Abba Mari and Rebbi Mattaniah, one said, a disqualified deaf-and-dumb⁹⁹, the other said, a deaf-and-dumb levir¹⁰⁰.

footnotes: ⁹⁸ In Tosephta 9:4: “The sane daughter of a Cohen married to an insane Israel …” Since marriages of the deaf-and-dumb or the insane are not valid, the woman does not lose her priestly status. She has to immerse herself after intercourse with her husband (Lev. ⁹⁹ A person whose intercourse would disable the woman even if he were hearing. ¹⁰⁰ He disqualifies as levir, whose standing is not different from a hearing man; cf. Chapter 6, Note 35.

“Whether he had reached nine years and one day or not”, he is as if he were nine years and one day old to disable⁸⁵; “whether he had grown two pubic hairs or not”, he is as if he had grown two pubic hairs to make her eat¹¹⁰¹.

footnotes: ⁸⁵ If he did not reach the age of nine years and one day, his intercourse is inoperative and he did not disable a priest’s daughter. If he did reach that age, she is disabled. ¹ If he had not grown two pubic hairs his betrothal is not valid by biblical standards. If he is an Israel betrothed to the daughter of a Cohen she is not disabled. If he had grown two pubic hair his betrothal is valid by biblical standards and his betrothed is disabled. If the male is a Cohen and his wife an Israel, she can start eating heave only after he reaches adulthood (in the opinion of the Babli, once he had intercourse with her after growing two pubic hairs.) ¹⁰¹ The Yerushalmi states here that a young man whose vows are valid can marry by biblical standards, an open question in the Babli. Cf. Mishnah Terumot 1:3, Note 105; Babli Niddah 46b.

“When the house fell on him and his brother’s daughter and it is not known who of them died first, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” Why do we come here to state doubts? Since we had stated [the rules for] co-wives, we now state for doubts concerning co-wives.

MISHNAH: The rapist, the seducer, and the insane¹⁰² do neither disable nor enable to eat, but if they are unable to marry in Israel they disable. How is that? If an Israel came upon the daughter of a Cohen, she may eat heave, if she became pregnant she may not eat. If the fetus was cut into pieces in her body¹⁰³ she may eat. If a Cohen came upon the daughter of an Israel, she may not eat heave, if she became pregnant she may not eat, if she gave birth she may eat¹⁰⁴. It turns out that the son’s power is greater than the father’s.

footnotes: ¹⁰² Even if he is married to her since the insane cannot enter into any contract, not even a marriage. ¹⁰³ In that case, she did not give birth. If she has a child from a non-Cohen, the child prevents her from eating heave. ¹⁰⁴ The relationship of the child to his father does not depend on the marital status of the mother; cf. Mishnah 2:5.

HALAKHAH: “The rapist, the seducer,” etc. This means that rape does not disable an unmarried priestly woman¹⁰⁴.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁴ The relationship of the child to his father does not depend on the marital status of the mother; cf. Mishnah 2:5.

This supports what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated⁹⁸ 15:18) but is not disabled from eating heave. This contradicts the Mishnah.: The wife of the deaf-and-dumb or the insane immerses herself from her husband’s bosom and eats, against Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, also if an unmarried man had intercourse with an unmarried woman not for the purpose of marriage it is copulation of harlotry¹⁰⁵ 51a, Temurah 30a..

footnotes: ⁹⁸ In Tosephta 9:4: “The sane daughter of a Cohen married to an insane Israel …” Since marriages of the deaf-and-dumb or the insane are not valid, the woman does not lose her priestly status. She has to immerse herself after intercourse with her husband (Lev. ¹⁰⁵ Cf. Chapter 6, Note 108. The woman would be disabled from marrying into the priesthood. Quoted in Babli 61b, 59b; Sanhedrin

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Jeremiah: A woman who has been raped does not have to wait three months¹⁰⁶. Rebbi Jonah said this before Rebbi Yose¹⁰⁷. He said to him, do not accept that from here, they were lenient for eating heave. If a daughter of a Cohen was married to an Israel, her husband went overseas, and she received notice that he died, does she not immediately eat heave¹⁰⁸. 22:13. But even though the husband left more than three months before his death, the widow must wait three months before remarrying. The argument is rejected in the Babli, 69b.? But because of a fetus she has to wait three months.

footnotes: ¹⁰⁶ Cf. Chapter 4, Note 166. ¹⁰⁷ He wanted to prove the statement of R. Abba from the Mishnah since a Cohen’s daughter who was raped continuous to eat heave until it is ascertained that she is pregnant; the Mishnah does not say that for three months after the rape she could not eat heave. ¹⁰⁸ If she has no child, Lev

“If they are unable to marry in Israel they disable.” These are¹¹¹8:1, Niddah 6:1.: “A child of nine years and one day¹¹², an Ammonite, Moabite, or Egyptian¹¹³ 4:4 notes that modern Ammonites, Moabites, and Egyptians are no longer the peoples living in these places at the time of the Exodus; therefore, the prohibitions ofDeut. 23:4–9 are no longer operative. All arguments based on these rules are theoretical exercises of retrospection. proselyte, or a bastard, desecrated, Gibeonite¹¹⁴, Samaritan¹¹⁵, and Gentile who had intercourse with the daughter of an Israel, a Cohen, or a Levite, disqualified her for the priesthood. Rebbi Yose said, everybody’s intercourse disqualifies whose descendant would be disqualified; his intercourse does not disqualify those whose descendant would not be disqualified. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in all cases, if his daughter is permitted to you, so is his widow¹¹⁶; if his daughter is not permitted to you, neither is his widow.” In what do they differ? Rebbi Joḥanan says, an Ammonite or Moabite proselyte¹¹⁷ Deut. 249.). The same argument in Babli 69a. is between them. For him who says, everybody’s intercourse disqualifies whose descendant would be disqualified, here since his descendant¹¹⁸ would be disqualified, his intercourse disqualifies. For him who says, if you may marry his daughter you may marry his widow, here since you may marry his daughter you may marry his widow. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of [the rabbis], Rebbi Abba, both say: Regarding the daughter of an Ammonite or Moabite proselyte or the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian¹¹⁹. 23:9; Mishnah 8:3., even though his daughter is permitted to you, his widow is forbidden to you. Rebbi Zakkai: Rebbi Alexander sent to ask [about] the daughter of an Ammonite proselyte and the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian. Rebbi Yose said to him, did you not hear that Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of the rabbis, Rebbi Abba, both say: Regarding the daughter of an Ammonite proselyte or the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian, even though his daughter is permitted to you, his widow is forbidden to you. And everybody’s intercourse disqualifies whose descendant would be disqualified. Do we not need it when her mother was from Israel? That you should not say that since her mother was desecrated so her daughter was desecrated. In addition, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed, the daughter of an Ammonite proselyte or the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian¹²⁰, Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are acceptable, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they are disqualified. Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, they disagree about the old women¹²¹: Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are acceptable¹²², Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they are disqualified.

footnotes: ¹¹¹ Babli 68a, Tosephta Yebamot ¹¹² Mishnah 4. ¹¹³ Mishnah Yadaim ¹¹⁴ Cf. Chapter 2, Note 72. ¹¹⁵ Their problems are discussed in the next Halakhah. ¹¹⁶ For a Cohen, not necessarily for anybody else. ¹¹⁷ A female Moabite or Ammonite was never prohibited from marrying a Jew (Mishnah 8:3; Sifry ¹¹⁸ If he is a male (Mishnah 8:3). ¹¹⁹ Any third generation Egyptian, male or female, is permitted; Deut ¹²⁰ From a Jewish mother. ¹²¹ The mother, the wife of an Ammonite or second generation Egyptian. ¹²² He follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. Rebbi Alexander’s question is not answered since it is moot anyhow.

MISHNAH: A slave disables because of intercourse¹²³ but not because of descendants. How is this? A daughter of an Israel [married] to a Cohen [or] the daughter of a Cohen [married] to an Israel had a son from him. The son went and was pressed on a slave girl who had a son from him; the latter is a slave¹²⁴. If his father’s mother was a daughter of an Israel [married] to a Cohen, she cannot eat heave¹²⁵, the daughter of a Cohen [married] to an Israel may eat heave¹²⁶.

footnotes: ¹²³ Since a free woman cannot marry a slave, her intercourse with him is a form of prostitution. ¹²⁴ He has no legal relationship with his father. ¹²⁵ If her husband and all her descendants except that slave had died, she has no descendants in the priesthood and is barred from heave. ¹²⁶ If her husband and all her descendants except that slave had died, she has no descendants outside the priesthood and may eat heave.

HALAKHAH: “A slave disables because of intercourse,” etc. From where that the intercourse with a slave disables? Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “If a Cohen’s daughter becomes a widow or a divorcee without issue,¹²⁷ 22:13. “If a Cohen’s daughter becomes a widow or a divorcee without issue, when she returns to her father’s house as in her youth, she shall eat from her father’s food.”” from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. Rebbi Jeremiah objected: But if a widow whored she has no widowhood or divorce and she returns¹²⁸! Rebbi Yose did not say so, but [he held] that the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is reversed. In Giṭṭin he says, why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: Because if a Gentile or a slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard¹²⁹ 1:5, the statement is by R. Joḥanan in the name of R. Eleazar (the Tanna), in Qiddushin 3:14 it is an anonymous baraita. In the Babli, 45a, the statement is by R. Joḥanan and R. Eleazar (the Amora); a parallel statement in the name of Rebbi. There is no doubt in the Yerushalmi that the original Samaritans were Jews. They consider the children of a Jewish mother from a Gentile as Jewish, as is accepted as practice, under Babylonian influence, in the next Halakhah and as already was decided in Halakhah 4:15.. In Qiddushin one says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Here he says it in his own name but there he says it in the name of Rebbi Ismael! For also according to the words of the Sages the child is a bastard. Rebbi Ḥizqiah did not say so, but: the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is reversed. In Giṭṭin he says, why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: Because if a Gentile or slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. In Qiddushin one says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Here he says, from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return¹³⁰. Rebbi Mattaniah said, I went to Seḥora and heard: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Ismael the sons of Jesua: “If a Cohen’s daughter becomes a widow or a divorcee without issue,¹²⁷ 22:13. “If a Cohen’s daughter becomes a widow or a divorcee without issue, when she returns to her father’s house as in her youth, she shall eat from her father’s food.”” from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. And I said, that is correct, there is no bastard, following Rebbi Joshua¹³¹, for a bastard is only from a woman which is for him under an incest prohibition and for whom one is punished by divine extirpation.

footnotes: ¹²⁷ Lev. ¹²⁸ If she is not married she cannot become a widow or be divorced. The objection is too stupid to deserve an answer since it is only required that she could have a marriage relationship, not that she actually must have had one. ¹²⁹ In our text, Giṭṭin ¹³⁰ This implies that the child of a Gentile or a slave is not a bastard since the only person to be affected is the mother who cannot return to her priestly status if she was the daughter of a Cohen. ¹²⁷ Lev. ¹³¹ It really is following R. Simeon from Timna (Mishnah 4:14), but the more liberal R. Joshua will certainly agree that there is no hint of bastardy attached to the child. If the child is a girl, she will be disqualified from the priesthood, cf. Halakhah 4:15.

MISHNAH: A bastard disables and enables to eat. How is this? A daughter of an Israel [married] to a Cohen [or] the daughter of a Cohen [married] to an Israel had a daughter from him. If the daughter went and married a slave or a Gentile and had a son from him, that is a bastard¹³². If his mother’s mother was a daughter of an Israel [married] to a Cohen, she can eat heave¹³³, the daughter of a Cohen [married] to an Israel cannot eat heave¹³⁴.

footnotes: ¹³² In practice, he is an unblemished Jew. ¹³³ .If the grandmother’s husband and her daughter had died, the grandson is descended from a Cohen and keeps his grandmother in the priestly clan. ¹³⁴ If the grandmother’s husband and her daughter had died, the grandson is descended from an Israel and keeps his grandmother out of the priestly clan.

HALAKHAH: “A bastard disables,” etc. Does that not disagree with Rav, since Rav said that if a Gentile or a slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is acceptable. Explain it that the Gentile disables and the slave disables¹³⁵ 23:18..

footnotes: ¹³⁵ While the Mishnah speaks of a bastard, the interpretation following the current practice is that both the daughter and the grandchild become disabled for the priesthood; cf. Halakhah 4:15. The Babli, 70a, simply states that the Mishnah either follows R. Aqiba or that Rebbi holds that the grandchild is a bastard by rabbinic standards since there is a general biblical prohibition of sexual relations with a person whom one could not marry, Deut.

MISHNAH: Sometimes the High Priest disables. How is this? A Cohen’s daughter was married to an Israel and had a daughter from him. The daughter went and was married to a Cohen and had a son from him. The latter possibly is a High Priest serving on top of the altar. He enables his mother to eat and disables his mother’s mother¹³⁶. The latter says, not like my son the High Priest who disables me from heave¹³⁷.

footnotes: ¹³⁶ If he is the only surviving descendent, he keeps his grandmother out and his mother in the clan of priests. ¹³⁷ This seems to have been a proverb describing a paradoxical situation.

HALAKHAH: “The High Priest,” etc. Bar Kappara stated: A one-day-old disables and enables to eat¹³⁸.

footnotes: ¹³⁸ For the situation described in the Mishnah, it is not necessary that the grandson be an adult admitted to the Temple service.

So is the Mishnah: “Not like my son the High Priest who disables me from heave.¹³⁹” A Cohen’s daughter was married to an Israel and had a daughter from him; an Israel’s daughter was married to a Cohen and had a son from him. The two married and had a son. The latter possibly is a High Priest serving on top of the altar. He enables his mother to eat and disables his mother’s mother¹⁴⁰. The latter says, not like my son the High Priest who disables me from heave.

footnotes: ¹³⁹ The text has some slight copying errors. ¹⁴⁰ To get the maximum effect from the rearrangement of the Mishnah, it should read “He enables his paternal grandmother {who was born Israel} and disables his maternal grandmother {who was born priestly}.” It simply means that only the husband’s affiliation counts.