"Someone who does not acknowledge the Oral Torah, etc." This is the opinion of our Rabbi (Rabbeinu), and similarly it is explained in the Mishnah in Sanhedrin, Chapter Hanachakim.

"And we do not elevate him, and he is like any other, etc." In a Baraita in the tractate Avodah Zarah, page 26, it discusses Epicureans, apostates, and those who pervert to idolatry—concerning them, we bring them down and do not elevate them. This means we do not rescue those who fall into the pit of apostasy, where they deliver the permitted (things) and consume the forbidden. However, out of necessity to save life, it is permitted, but it is prohibited to support their actions. This is stated similarly by our Rabbi in Chapter Four of the Laws of Murder and Preservation of Life. Regarding the statement "and we do not elevate him," the Gemara posed a challenge: now we are engaged in a matter that requires resolution. It was resolved that if there was a ladder in the pit, one should remove it, and if he says, "I want it for my sister," one should respond firmly. Further resolutions were offered in subtle ways, as stated there.

"In what case are these matters said regarding a person who denies the Oral Torah, etc." This is the opinion of our Rabbi (Rambam), and similarly stated in the explanation of the Mishnah in Chapter 1 of Chullin.

"But an apostate elder mentioned in the Torah is a sage among the sages, etc." This is explicitly stated in Sanhedrin, Chapter Hanechnakin (Sanhedrin 47a), as will be explained shortly.

"And what is meant by 'he has received tradition' and judges"? This refers to one who has received tradition and says, "Thus have I received it," or one who judges according to one of the methods by which the Torah is expounded.

"And what is meant by 'he confesses and has a share in the World to Come'?" In Chapter Negaim (Sanhedrin 43a), we learned that anyone sentenced to death is told to confess, because anyone who confesses has a share in the World to Come. Our Rabbi (Rambam) wrote concerning the apostate elder that if he confesses, he has a share in the World to Come, unlike one who does not acknowledge the Oral Torah, for such a person does not have a share in the World to Come.

Even though he judges and they judge, he receives and they receive, etc." There in Sanhedrin (page 88a), Rav Kahana said, "He is not executed until he says, 'This is how it appears to me,' and they say, 'It is based on tradition.'" Rabbi Elazar said, "Even if he says it is based on tradition, and they say, 'This is how it appears to us,' he is executed, so that disputes do not increase among Israel." I reconciled this with the statement of Rav Kahana through a logical argument, and the halacha follows Rabbi Elazar. This is what Rabbi Moses Maimonides (Rambam) wrote: "Even though he judges and they judge, meaning he says it appears to me this way and they say it appears to us this way, he receives and they receive," meaning he says it based on tradition and they say it based on tradition. This is contrary to Rav Kahana's view. Consequently, it implies that if he received and they judged, he would be sentenced as an apostate elder. In Chapter Four, Rabbi Moses Maimonides (Rambam) wrote this explanation specifically, while here he presented the general principle without concern for its particulars.

"And if the court wishes to waive their honor, etc." There, Rabbi Yashiyah said: "There are three cases that were minor to me from the people of Jerusalem: A rebellious son whose parents wanted to waive his rebellion, we waive it; a stubborn and rebellious elder whose parents wanted the court to waive his punishment, we waive it." When I came to my colleagues in the south regarding two matters, they agreed with me on the case of a rebellious elder but did not agree with me, so as not to increase disputes among Israel.

(5-7) An elder who defies the court is not liable to death unless he is, etc. A Baraita there (Sanhedrin 86b): "When it will be too difficult for you" – the verse speaks of one distinguished in the court. And our Rabbi wrote in the commentary on the Mishnah that this means someone for whom only the difficult and wondrous matter is elusive, but a student who has not yet reached the level of issuing rulings, everything is wondrous to him.

"And he disputes with the court about a matter for which intentional transgression incurs karet (spiritual excision) and unintentional transgression incurs a sin offering, or regarding tefillin." There (Sanhedrin 87a), it is taught: "An elder who defies the court is only liable for a matter where intentional transgression incurs karet and unintentional transgression incurs a sin offering; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says, 'For a matter whose fundamental aspect is from the Torah, but its explanation is from the Scribes.' Rabbi Shimon says, 'Even for a minor detail of the Scribes.'" And our Rabbi (Rambam) ruled according to Rabbi Meir because there is a Baraita (teaching) there that states: "When it will be too difficult for you" - the verse speaks of the one distinguished in the court. 'From you' refers to a counselor, meaning someone who disputes the intercalation of the year, which is called a secret and counsel, as it says: 'From you will come a schemer against the Lord, a counselor of wickedness.'" "A matter" - this is a law, meaning a law transmitted to Moses at Sinai. "Between blood and blood" - between the blood of menstruation, childbirth, or abnormal discharge. "Between judgment and judgment" - between cases of capital punishment, monetary cases, or cases of lashes. "Between plague and plague" - between plagues of humans, houses, or garments. "Matters" - these are valuations, dedications, and consecrations. "Disputes" - these are the drinking of the sotah (suspected adulteress), the decapitation of the calf, and the purification of the leper. "Within your gates" - this refers to the gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the corners of the field. And it is taught there: Rav Huna bar Chinana said to Rava, "Explain this Mishnah according to Rabbi Meir." Rava said to Rav Papa, "Go explain it to him." And he explained that from all the matters mentioned in the Baraita, there emerges a matter for which intentional transgression incurs karet and unintentional transgression incurs a sin offering. And as explained in the words of our Rabbi (Rambam) in the following chapter, the Baraita and its interpretation, and since we see that these later Amoraim strive to establish the Baraita according to Rabbi Meir, it is evident that we rule according to him, that one is only liable for a matter for which intentional transgression incurs karet and unintentional transgression incurs a sin offering. And later in the Gemara (Sanhedrin 88b) it says: Rabbi Elazar said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya, 'One is only liable for a matter whose fundamental aspect is from the Torah and its explanation is from the Scribes, and it can be added to, and if one adds, he diminishes.' And we have nothing but tefillin according to Rabbi Yehuda. Rashi explained, 'And it can be added to based on what the Sages explained, and if one adds, he diminishes and invalidates the original with his addition. And we have nothing but tefillin, whose fundamental aspect is from the Torah and its explanation is from the Scribes, that they are four compartments, and one can add five or more, and if he adds, he diminishes, as he violates "You shall not add" and does not fulfill the commandment.' Thus far his words. And now, since our Rabbi rules according to Rabbi Meir, that one is only liable for a matter for which intentional transgression incurs karet and unintentional transgression incurs a sin offering, he should not have written 'or regarding tefillin,' since tefillin do not result in a matter for which intentional transgression incurs karet and unintentional transgression incurs a sin offering, one does not become a rebellious elder (zaken mamre) when disputing about them. And indeed, the Raavad (Rabbi Avraham ben David) criticized him in the following chapter, where he wrote, 'Except for the commandment of tefillin alone, etc.' The Raavad said: 'This is an error, for according to Rabbi Meir, we require a matter for which intentional transgression incurs karet and unintentional transgression incurs a sin offering, and for tefillin, one is exempt. According to Rabbi Yehuda, one is liable for tefillin.' Thus far his words. And it appears to me that our Rabbi (Rambam) holds that Rabbi Elazar, citing Rabbi Oshaya, came to explain the matter of Rabbi Yehuda. And this is what he says: Even though Rabbi Yehuda mentioned only a matter whose fundamental aspect is from the Torah and its explanation from the Scribes, one must also consider another condition, that it has the potential for addition, and if one adds, it diminishes. According to these conditions, it turns out that there is no matter for which a rebellious elder (zaken mamre) would be liable except for tefillin. For there is no matter where these conditions converge except for tefillin, according to Rabbi Yehuda. In other words, Rabbi Oshaya's statement explains Rabbi Yehuda's matter, and since he came to explain Rabbi Yehuda's words, it implies that we follow his view. Additionally, we have a rule that between Rabbi Meir (R.M.) and Rabbi Yehuda (R.Y.), the law follows Rabbi Yehuda. And to reject Rabbi Meir's view is impossible because the later Amoraim strive to establish the Baraita according to him, as I wrote. Therefore, we hold according to both that in a matter for which intentional transgression incurs karet and unintentional transgression incurs a sin offering, or in the case of tefillin, one becomes a rebellious elder. I will explain and reconcile the rest of the Raavad's (Rabbi Avraham ben David) words in that criticism in the next chapter with the help of Heaven. And the RaMHa (Rabbi Meir HaLevi Abulafia) challenged our Rabbi's words, asking what his position is. If he holds like Rabbi Meir, then he should not obligate for tefillin, and if he holds like the anonymous Mishnah which obligates for tefillin, then that is certainly not like Rabbi Meir. And they answered him that Rabbi Yehuda adds to Rabbi Meir's words to obligate even for a matter that does not incur karet and a sin offering if there is Torah and 'they will teach you.' The ruling to act according to his instruction is found in the Mishnah there (Sanhedrin 86b): He is not...

And to instruct to act according to his ruling. In the Mishnah there (Sanhedrin 86b): He is not liable until he instructs to act, as it is stated, 'And the man who will act presumptuously.'

And what is written, 'or he acts according to his instruction,' is from a Baraita there, which I will explain at the end of this chapter with the help of the Almighty.

And he disagrees with them while they are sitting in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. A Baraita there (Sanhedrin 87a) states: 'And you shall go up to the place'—this teaches that the place causes [the judgment to be binding]. This excludes [the scenario] where he found them outside their place and rebelled against them. Explicitly, it is taught in the first chapter (14a): If the rebellious elder found the court in Beit Pagi, which is a place within the walls of Jerusalem, and rebelled against them, one might think that his rebellion is considered valid rebellion. Therefore, it says 'and you shall arise and go up to the place,' teaching that the place causes [the judgment to be binding]. Rashi and Tosafot explain that Beit Pagi is not specific, but rather any place outside the Chamber of Hewn Stone is not their designated place.

But if he was a student, etc. This is from the Mishnah in the chapter 'Those Who Are Strangled' (Sanhedrin 86b).

And what he wrote, as it is stated 'if a matter is too difficult for you to judge,' etc., until 'it teaches that the place causes him to be liable for death.' This has already been explained from what I wrote above.

And all of these and similar cases where they are [compliant]: The rest of the laws and details that have not been explained here are explained there [in the Talmud].

And how do they judge a rebellious elder etc., until 'He is exempt.' Mishnah in Sanhedrin there. However...

"In what context does 'if they heard and accepted it from them, it is better' apply? It is written in the Mishnah: 'If they heard, they say to them,' and when interpreting the matter, it seems that this refers to a case where the same court that heard the case ruled accordingly. According to the words of our Rabbi (Rambam), it appears that he explains it thus: if a rebellious elder heard and accepted to act according to the rulings of that court, they say to him: 'Your reasoning is sound.'"

When he instructs to act or has acted, etc. Mishnah there, as I have written above, he is not liable until he instructs to act. And in the Baraita (Sanhedrin 88a) it teaches: 'The Sages taught: He is not liable until he acts according to his instruction, or he instructs others and they act according to his instruction.' The Gemara challenges this: Granted, if he instructs others and they act according to his instruction, from the outset (k'lomar), meaning before he comes to the court sitting in the Lishkat Hagazit, he is not considered a liable person (bar k'tila). But now, if he acts according to his instruction, from the outset he is considered a liable person. Where do we see this? In the case of forbidden foods (chalav v'dam), from the outset he is not considered a liable person. But now, in the case of capital crimes (hayavei mitat beit din), from the outset he is considered a liable person. From the outset, he requires prior warning; now, he does not require prior warning. He is an inciter who does not require prior warning, meaning if he was inciting and justifying a reason to permit, this language does not constitute incitement. What can we say in his favor? From the outset, he also applies the penalty without prior warning. If he claims justification, we accept it from him; now, if he claims justification, we do not accept it from him, since he heard from the court's mouth not to act, and he acted against their ruling.

They conclude his judgment to death in the Supreme Court of his city. In the first chapter of Sanhedrin (page 16a), we learn that we do not judge a false prophet except in the Supreme Court of Jerusalem. The Gemara states: 'What is the comparison? As Rabbi Yehuda bar Chanina taught: The intentional act (hazdah) [that leads to death] applies similarly whether there [in Jerusalem] at seventy-one [judges], so too here [in other places] in the Supreme Court [of a city].' Now, regarding 'hazdah,' it is as written in the context of 'k'tila,' which means it is explicitly stated that 'k'tila' [capital punishment] is in the context of seventy-one [judges]. It is impossible [for it] to be actual 'k'tila,' as it is explicitly taught that it applies only in the Great Court [of Jerusalem], as I will write shortly. Rather, it refers to the final decision of his judgment, which is in the context of seventy-one. This is also implied from Rashi's commentary. This is what Rabbeinu wrote: 'They conclude his judgment to death in the Supreme Court of his city.'

They do not execute him in the court of his city, etc. Mishnah in the chapter of the stoned (Sanhedrin page 89): They do not execute him either in the court of his city or in the court of Yavneh, but rather they bring him up to the Great Court in Jerusalem and keep him until the pilgrimage festival, and they execute him during the festival, as it is stated, 'And all the people shall hear and fear.' Rabbi Akiva says: We do not delay the judgment of this one; rather, we execute him immediately, and we write and send [notices] to all places, 'So-and-so has been sentenced to death by the court.' And Rabbeinu explains: 'Not in the court of Yavneh'—meaning if the Great Court has gone outside Jerusalem.

And what is meant by 'until the pilgrimage festival, they keep him.' Rabbi Akiva ruled regarding Rabbi Yehuda that the halacha follows Rabbi Akiva over his colleague.

And four require proclamation: the rebellious elder, witnesses, etc. A baraita states there. And be aware that these four proclamations are not equal: for the rebellious elder, they keep him until the pilgrimage festival, as Rabbi Akiva explained nearby. The other three, they execute them immediately, and their proclamation is that they send out notices everywhere stating, 'So-and-so is liable to death by the court.' This is also written by Rabbi Akiva in the conclusion of the laws regarding the rebellious son and in Chapter 18 of the Laws of Testimony concerning conspiring witnesses. This is because since we do not find Rabbi Akiva dissenting except regarding the rebellious elder, it implies that he does not agree with Rabbi Yehuda's opinion. I have already written this there.