The Fourth Oration - Bildad's First Speech

The Shuite debater chooses a different approach, one he claims to have received as a tradition from his forefathers (Ch.8:8).

Like Eliphaz, he too believes in Providence and freedom of choice, and like him he *presents a stubborn shoulder (Zechariah 9:29)*to the opinion of the astrologers. But since, in his reply to Eliphaz, Job had made no mention of these speculative matters, Bildad too ignores them and presents just a single reasoned argument against those who deny Providence, when he asks: Would God pervert judgment? Or would the Almighty pervert justice? (Job 8:3). What he meant by this is as follows: One of the necessary attributes of the Deity is that no perfection should be wanting in Him nor any shortcoming present in Him. Now, it would certainly be a shortcoming were any injustice or *perversion of judgment (Habakkuk 1:4)*to emanate from Him, and so such wrongs could not originate in Him.

Job had taken this to be axiomatic and had based his theses upon it; the new disputant [Bildad] acknowledged it too. However, Job had considered these matters from the viewpoint of 'individual' law,¹ and so had reasoned as follows: • For God to do any injustice is prohibited by His essential quality. • However, the governance of individuals is patently not ordered according to law and justice, for we observe that it does not distinguish between the righteous and the wicked, all things come alike to all; *as is the good person so is the sinner (Ecclesiastes 9:2)*subject to the accidents of time and its vagaries. • And since it is an injustice for the righteous to suffer undeservedly, this governance cannot emanate from God, for far be it from God to do wrong, or for the Almighty to be unjust (Job 34:10). Therefore Job had concluded that this governance emanates from a blind and undiscerning ruler—the Cosmos—which makes no distinction between the one who serves God and the one who does not.

footnotes: ¹ Those laws of Nature that pertain to individual entities, as distinct from those that pertain to the universe as a whole (universal or general law).

However, from considerations of primary universal law, Bildad draws just the opposite conclusion, for according to his reasoning: • Just as injustice must be precluded from God for it is a shortcoming, so must omnipotence be attributed to Him for it is a perfection. • Now, by saying that God has delegated the governance of the world to a blind ruler who does not discriminate between good and bad, we could indeed mitigate what happens to individuals by reason of this misrule, arguing that these things do not emanate from God but from those agents of the Cosmos which control individual governance. • However, in terms of primary universal law we could not justify what He has done. For we would ask whether this delegation of governance to the Cosmos was not of itself an injustice on His part. There are only two possible ways out of this. The first is to posit that He is incapable of exercising judgment or of administering individual governance and that is way He has delegated them to the Cosmos. But this cannot be, for the Deity must be Omnipotent. Bildad expresses this rhetorically by asking, 'Would God—who is Omnipotent and Supreme—'pervert judgment?'.

The second way is to assert that He has abandoned the lower beings and no longer wishes to take care of them, either out of disgust or jealousy (Guide for the Perplexed, Part 3: Chapter 16). But this would be unjust and prompts Bildad to ask: 'Would the Almighty pervert justice?'

Bildad argues that all this constitutes a conclusive proof that the governance of individuals emanates from Providence and that the misrule we infer from the suffering of the righteous is a misunderstanding on our part. For in truth, everything is ordered by Him in justice and with judgment; for He is a faithful God and there is no injustice (Deuteronomy 32:4).

This being so, why indeed does God allow bad things to happen to good people? In answering this, Bildad adopts a different approach. According to his philosophy, God afflicts a righteous person without his having first sinned, only so that He can subsequently benefit him, by repaying him with good in exchange for the bad, many times over. The afflictions are part of a system of compensation and exchange, a quid pro quo whereby present adversity brings future bounty (Ch.8:6-7).²

footnotes: ² This is the view that Maimonides attributes to Bildad, noting that 'this opinion concerning Providence is widespread'. However, elsewhere (Guide III,24), he adds the rider that 'this principle is not mentioned in Scripture in plain language'. Even where the literal meaning appears to convey this, as in the verse 'Who fed you in the wilderness with manna…to test you, and in the end to make you prosper' (Deuteronomy 8:16), Maimonides explains the text differently.

In the sayings of the wise, man is often likened to a plant. Taking up this metaphor, Bildad explains that the system of exchange he has proposed can be compared to the way Nature acts with regard to different plants. If a gardener uproots a plant that is growing in a rocky, dry and desolate site and replants it in a fresh and fertile plot, the uprooting obviously does it no harm. On the contrary, it is for its good so that it will grow as a noble vine (Jeremiah 2:21). However not every plant can take this sort of treatment. Plants which need lots of water to grow, and which are by their nature tender and soft, will not take root again after being transplanted but instead will wither quicker than any other plant (Job 8:12).

Providence works in the same way with mankind. A wicked person who is accustomed to pleasures and luxuries would not survive transplantation and so is just taken from the world before his time. Thus, no good comes to the wicked nor does he live very long. However, though a righteous person may be uprooted and transplanted many times over, being dispossessed and suffering physical pain, this is ultimately for his own good, in order to set him *in a firm place (Isaiah 22:23).**For he will yet bring forth fruit in old age; (Psalms 92:15)**For he will yet bring forth fruit in old age; (Psalms 92:15)*and the Lord's purpose prospering in his hand (Isaiah 53:10).(Ch.8:11-20).

Accordingly, Bildad recommends to Job that *he should hold fast, (Daniel 11:1) place his trust in God (Psalms 21:8)*and plead with Him (2 Kings 1:13). For then in place of his suffering *his portion will rejoice (Isaiah 61:7)*and in the end he will flourish tremendously (Job 8:7).(Ch.8:17, 8:21-22).³

footnotes: ³ Malbim's introduction to Bildad's speech is more reminiscent of the ideas of some of the later Stoics, e.g. Seneca On Providence, than of the Talmudic tradition or Kabbalah with whom Malbim identifies Bildad.

Bildad rejects Job's argument that God has delegated the governance of individuals to the Cosmos —

— by arguing that this would be a breach of universal law and God could not be guilty of such an iniquity. On the contrary, there is personal Providence and it rules justly.

Job's children had sinned and despite Job's expiation on their behalf, they had been justly punished. But as regards truly righteous persons such as Job himself, Bildad expounds the idea that they are made to suffer presently in order that they might benefit later.

Bildad explains that the belief in ultimate compensation for unwarranted suffering is an ancient tradition

Bildad elaborates his theory that compensation and retribution will ultimately be made for the unwarranted suffering of the good and for the equally unwarranted prosperity of the wicked. He illustrates this idea with a metaphor in which the different types of people are compared to different species of plants.

Bildad appeals to Job to accept this and to maintain his faith and hope in God.