If a bull gores three bulls on three consecutive days, and on the fourth day it gores a donkey, and on the fifth day it gores a camel, there is a doubt (safek): Do we consider the third bull together with the donkey and camel, thereby classifying the bull as a mu’ad for all types of animals (moad l'kol), or Do we group the three bulls together and exclude the donkey and camel, meaning it would not yet be a mu’ad for all? Similarly, if the bull initially gored a donkey and a camel on two consecutive days, and then, on three subsequent days, it gored three bulls, the same doubt arises: Should we group the donkey and camel with the bulls and classify the bull as a mu’ad for all, or Do we group the three bulls together and exclude the earlier incidents with the donkey and camel, meaning the bull is only a mu’ad for bulls? The same principle applies if the bull gores on three consecutive Sabbaths (Shabbatot), followed by incidents on a Sunday and Monday, or if it gores on a Thursday, Friday, and Shabbat, followed by incidents on two additional Shabbatot. In such cases, there is doubt as to whether the bull is a mu’ad for all days (moad l'kol), or only for Sabbaths. In any situation of doubt (safek): The default ruling is to assess damages as chatzi nezek (half-damages, the penalty for a tam—an ox that is not yet classified as a habitual damager). However, if the damaged party seizes payment for nezek shalem (full damages), we do not remove the payment from their possession.

If a bull hears the sound of a shofar and gores, then again hears the sound of a shofar and gores, and yet again hears the sound of a shofar and gores, the bull becomes a mu’ad for shofars (moad l'shofarot).

If a bull gores on the fifteenth day of one month, the sixteenth day of the next month, and the seventeenth day of the following month, it is not yet considered a mu’ad for "skipping" (dilug). This is because the skipping pattern is not fully established until it gores a fourth time in a skipped sequence—meaning it must gore on the eighteenth day of the fourth month. The first incident is not included as part of the skipping pattern. However, regarding the laws of niddah, this is not the case.

Regarding niddah, the rules are not the same as those for a goring bull. When a woman establishes a veset (pattern) of skipping intervals (veset shel dilug), if she sees menstrual blood three times in a skipped sequence—for example, on the fifteenth day of one month, the sixteenth day of the next month, and the seventeenth day of the following month—she has established a veset shel dilug. Thus, for the eighteenth day of the fourth month, she only needs to be concerned (vedeiya sha’atah, i.e., assumes impurity only at that time). However, there are those who disagree with this ruling, as will be explained in its proper place. Some interpret this skipping pattern differently: If she sees blood three times over three months in a skipping sequence of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth days of consecutive months (e.g., the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth of Tishrei, Marcheshvan, and Kislev), or three times over three subsequent months (e.g., the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth of Tevet, Shevat, and Adar), or over another three months (e.g., the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth of Nissan, Iyar, and Sivan), she has thereby established a veset shel dilug. This interpretation of the skipping sequence establishes her pattern in this way, as will also be explained further in its proper place.

This is the third Mishnah, and its purpose is to explain the third category of cases. It states: A privately-owned ox that gores an ox belonging to the Temple (kodesh), or an ox belonging to the Temple that gores another ox belonging to the Temple, or an ox belonging to the Temple that gores an ox belonging to a private individual—all are exempt from liability. This is derived from the verse, "the ox of his neighbor (re’ehu)," implying that liability applies only to privately-owned oxen, not oxen belonging to the Temple. An ox belonging to a Jew that gores the ox of a non-Jew is exempt from liability. An ox belonging to a non-Jew that gores the ox of a Jew, whether the ox is a tam (non-habitual damager) or a mu’ad (habitual damager), must pay full damages (nezek shalem). The Rambam explains: When a legal dispute arises between a Jew and a non-Jew, the nature of the judgment is as follows: If, according to their laws, the ruling would favor us, we judge them according to their own laws and say, "This is your law." If, according to our laws, the ruling would favor us, we judge them according to our own laws and say, "This is our law." Do not be surprised or troubled by this principle. It should not seem strange to you, just as the permissibility of slaughtering animals should not trouble you—even though the animals did not commit any sin. This is because one who does not possess human qualities (midot enoshiyot) is not considered part of humanity in the truest sense. Rather, their existence is solely for the benefit of humanity. The full discussion of this topic would require its own dedicated work.

The Meiri said: A bull owned by a Jew that gores a bull belonging to hekdesh (consecrated property), or vice versa (a bull of hekdesh that gores a bull of a Jew), is exempt. This is derived from the verse, "Re’ehu" ("his neighbor"), which applies only to property of one's peer, and not to hekdesh. You might ask: why does the Torah need to exclude hekdesh explicitly? After all, someone who benefits from hekdesh unlawfully (me'ilah) is already liable. On this, the Gedolei Provence (the great scholars of Provence) wrote that the exemption does not apply in cases of improper benefit (me'ilah) that serve no legitimate need. However, any obligations incurred by hekdesh—whether for damages or payments—may be paid from terumat halishkah (the funds of the Temple treasury), and certainly from hekdesh designated for the upkeep of the Temple (bedek habayit). For example, they hired artisans from the funds of hekdesh (e.g., the craftsmen of the Beit Avtinas). Similarly, damages caused by hekdesh property may be compensated. This principle applies: Whether the damage results in death or financial loss, and whether it involves sacrificial offerings (kodshei mizbeach) or property designated for the Temple's upkeep (kodshei bedek habayit). However, if the sanctity of the property has been redeemed (pidyon hekdesh), even though the animal is not considered owned by the individual (since it is used for burial, as explained elsewhere), it still falls under the category of "re’ehu" and is therefore liable for damages. In cases where such animals fall into a pit, the owner is exempt from liability, based on the interpretation of the verse, "the carcass will belong to him" (Shemot 21:34). This applies to property for which the carcass belongs to the owner, excluding hekdesh. This exclusion is derived from the redundancy of the verse regarding pits. It is unnecessary to specify that the owner must handle the carcass, as this principle is already taught elsewhere regarding oxen. Nevertheless, this exemption for hekdesh property does not apply universally to pits, as pits have additional leniencies—such as exemption from liability for damage to people and vessels.

If a bull owned by a Jew gores a bull owned by a Gentile, the Jew is exempt, based on the law of "re’ehu" (which applies only to one’s peers). However, if a bull owned by a Gentile gores a bull owned by a Jew, the Gentile must pay full damages, whether the bull is classified as tam (not habitually aggressive) or mu’ad (habitually aggressive). This ruling reflects a policy of imposing fines (kenas) to prevent Gentiles from becoming accustomed to causing damage, especially since they generally do not respect the property of others. his harsh ruling applies specifically to nations that are not bound by ethical and religious principles, as the Talmud states: "When the nations of the world failed to observe the seven Noahide commandments, their property was rendered permissible for seizure." However, if Gentiles adhere to the seven Noahide commandments, their legal standing is equal to that of Jews, and there is no favoritism in judgment. It goes without saying that this principle applies even more stringently to nations that uphold ethical and religious principles (umot hagederot), where fairness and reciprocity are upheld in judicial matters.

This is the explanation of the Mishnah and the legal principles it conveys. These teachings are elaborated further in the Gemora, where specific cases are discussed in detail.