If one injures his neighbor, he is liable for five things: nezek (injury), tza'ar (distress), ripui (healing), sheveth (layoff), and shame (bosheth). "Nezek" — How (is it assessed)? If he blinded his eye, or cut off his hand, or broke his leg, he (the injured one) is perceived as a bondsman being sold in the marketplace, and it is estimated how much he would have been worth (without the injury) and how much he is worth (with it). [For if he had to, he could sell himself as a Hebrew bondsman, so that the one who injured him caused him to lose this amount.] "Tza'ar" — If he burned him with a spit or with a nail, even on his fingernail, a place where no wound is made, it is estimated how much such a man would ask for (in payment) to be thus afflicted. [The more "delicate" he is, the greater his distress and his pain.] "Ripui" — If he struck him, he must heal him. If growths [white blisters] developed — If because of the wound, he is liable; if not because of the wound, he is exempt. If it healed and returned; healed and returned, he must heal it. If it healed entirely, he need not heal it. "Sheveth" — We perceive him as a watcher of gourds, for he has already received payment for his hand or foot. [All the days of his illness we perceive him as a watcher of gourds, and we give him his daily pay. For he is not fit for any other labor, even if he were not ill. For his hand or foot were cut off, and he has already been compensated for this.] "Bosheth" — all according to the shamer [(The "lesser" the shamer the greater the shame)] and the one shamed. [The greater he is, the greater the shame.] If one shamed a naked man, a blind man, or a sleeping man, he is liable. And if a sleeping man shamed (someone), he is not liable. If one fell from a roof and caused injury and shamed, he is liable for the injury and not liable for the shame, it being written (Deuteronomy 25:11): "And she send forth her hand and seize his privy parts" — One is not liable for shaming unless he has intent (to shame). [All five are derived from verses: Nezek — (Exodus 21:24): "An eye for an eye." This cannot mean an eye, literally, for it is written (Numbers 35:31): "And you shall not take kofer ('ransom') for the soul of a murderer." For the soul of a murderer you do not take ransom, but you do take ransom for organ prominences (which do not grow back). For if one blinded his neighbor's eye, he gives him the value of his eye. And this is the intent of "An eye for an eye." Tza'ar is derived from (Ibid. 25): "A wound for a wound." This is a superfluous verse to make him liable for tza'ar even where there is (payment for) nezek — that it not be said that he has acquired (payment for) his hand and he must have it amputated in any event; but we say that he could have had it amputated medicinally and this one cut it off with iron and caused him tza'ar, for which reason he pays tza'ar. Ripui and sheveth — (Ibid. 19): "Only his sheveth shall he give and heal shall he heal." And this, only when the sickness is caused by the wound. But if the injured one were derelict and failed to heed the doctor's instructions, the mazik need not pay the sheveth and ripui incurred thereby. Bosheth — (Ibid. 11): "Then you shall cut off her hand" — monetary compensation. And by Torah law "no law in the world" can be adjudicated by any judges except ordained judges in Eretz Yisrael, it being written (Exodus 22:8): "Until elohim shall come the matter of both," and only judges ordained in Eretz Yisrael are called "elohim." (Litigations involving) loans, buying and selling, penalties, admissions, and denials, however, are adjudicated outside of Eretz Yisrael as if the judges were the messengers of the beth-din in Eretz Yisrael and acted in their behalf. And this, only with common occurrences entailing monetary loss, such as a beast causing damage through shen and regel (muadim), or a man injuring a beast. But (litigations involving) a beast injuring a man or one man injuring another are not adjudicated outside of Eretz Yisrael at all. Rather, the one causing the injury or the damage is ostracized until he goes up (for judgment) to Eretz Yisrael with the party to the dispute or agree to a compromise close to that deemed just by the judge. But nothing determinate is ruled upon there. And this applies to all of the penalty payments indicated in Scripture and in the entire Talmud. They may not be imposed by judges outside of Eretz Yisrael. But the one liable for them is ostracized, as we have explained.]

This is a stringency of man over shor, that man pays nezek, tza'ar, ripui, sheveth, and bosheth, and he compensates for miscarriage, and shor pays only nezek, [it being written (Leviticus 24:19): "…a man upon his neighbor" — a man upon his neighbor, and not an ox upon his (i.e., the owner's) neighbor.], and (shor) is exempt from compensation for miscarriage, [it being written (Exodus 21:22): "If men fight, etc." — men, and not oxen.]

If one strikes his father or his mother without making a wound, and if one wounds his friend on Yom Kippur, he is liable for all (five payments). [And even though throughout the entire Torah, if one commits a transgression entailing stripes and monetary payment, he receives stripes and does not pay, here (on Yom Kippur), he pays and does not receive stripes, Scripture having explicitly stipulated monetary payment and not stripes for wounding one's neighbor, viz. (Deuteronomy 19:21): "a hand for a hand" — monetary payment. Let us analyze this. It is written (Leviticus 24:19): "As he did, so shall it be done to him." Why, then, need it be written: "a hand for a hand"? To include wounding one's neighbor on Yom Kippur as paying and not receiving stripes.] R. Yehudah says: There is no bosheth (payment) to bondsmen, [it being written (Deuteronomy 25:11): "If men fight together, a man and his brother" — one who is subsumed in "brotherhood," to exclude a bondsman, who is not. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.]

A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor — their encounter is evil: If one injures them, he is liable; if they injure others, they are exempt. A bondsman and a woman — their encounter is evil. If one injures them, he is liable; if they injure others, they are exempt, [having nothing to pay.] But they pay afterwards, (i.e.,) if the woman is divorced and the bondsman freed [and they acquired property], they are liable to pay. [For they were liable in the beginning, but just lacked the money to pay with. For the melog (usufruct) property of the woman is bound to the husband for fruits and inheritance.]

One who strikes his father and mother and causes a wound, and one who wounds his neighbor on Shabbath is exempt from all (five payments), for he is subject to the death penalty. [For even though he "razes" (by wounding), he "repairs" vis-à-vis his (evil) inclination), his wrath abating and his anger being assuaged thereby.] And one who injures his Canaanite bondsman is exempt from all (five payments).

If one strikes his neighbor with his fist, he gives him a sela [for bosheth]. R. Yehudah says in the name of R. Yossi Haglili: A maneh. [The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yehudah.] If he slaps him [on his cheek, the bosheth being greater], he gives him two hundred zuz. If he strikes him with the back of his hand, he gives him four hundred zuz. If he pulled his ear [(Another version: if he struck it)], or tore his hair, or struck him with his spittle, or removed his cloak, or uncovered a woman's hair in the marketplace, he gives four hundred zuz. This is the rule: All according to his distinction. [All of the aforementioned payments are only for one of special distinction. But, for a common person, the amount is less.] R. Akiva said: Even the poor in Israel are perceived as if they had lost their property, for they are children of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. [R. Akiva differs with the preceding tanna, holding that these penalty payments are the same for all, whether distinguished or common. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Akiva.] A man once uncovered a woman's head in the marketplace, and she came before R. Akiva, who ruled that he give her four hundred zuz — whereupon he said: "Master, give me some time." He gave him time. [This, with respect to bosheth, where there is no monetary loss. But with nezek, where there is, time is not given.] He (the man) waited for her [until he saw her] standing at the entrance of her courtyard, whereupon he broke a pitcher containing an issar's worth of oil before her. She, thereupon, uncovered her head, "palmed" the oil, and anointed her hair. He assigned witnesses to her, came to R. Akiva, and said to him: "Master, shall I give four hundred zuz to one such as this!" [who cheapened herself for an issar's worth of oil, revealing thereby her indifference to bosheth] He responded: "You have said nothing. One who injures himself, though he is not permitted to do so, is not liable; others who injure him are liable. And one who cuts down his plants, though he is not permitted to do so, is not liable; others who cut down his plants are liable.

Even though he gives him (bosheth payment), he is not forgiven until he asks pardon, viz. (Genesis 20:7): "And now, return the wife of this man (Abraham), etc." And whence is it derived that one should not be cruel, but pardon? From (Ibid. 17): "And Abraham prayed to G d (that Avimelech be forgiven), and G d healed Avimelech, etc." If one says (to another): Blind my eye, cut off my hand, break my leg (and the other does so), he is liable. (If he asks:) "On condition that I not be liable?" [and the first responds: "Yes," in spite of this,] he is liable. [For there is a "Yes" which is like a "No." The "Yes" in this instance is to be understood as a "questioning" one; for men are not apt to "waive" bodily pain.] (If one says to another:) Tear my clothing, break my pitcher (and the other does so), he is liable. (If he asks:) "On condition that I not be liable?" [Even if the first responds: "No"], he is not liable. [For his "No" is like a "Yes," as if he said to him: "Did I not tell you, on condition that you not be liable?" Therefore, he is not liable, men being wont to "waive" property damage.] (If one says to another: "Do thus to that man," (and the other asks:) "On condition that I not be liable?" he is liable both for (injury to) his body and (damage to) his property.