R. Eliezer says: Honor of father and mother can be used as an opening (to absolve one of a vow) [i.e., saying to him: "Had you known that people would say to your parents: "Look at the growth that you have nurtured, how lightly your son treats vows (so that their honor is slighted), would you have vowed?"] And the sages forbid it, [fearing that he might lie, being ashamed to admit that he would not have vowed in consideration of their honor, so that the sage might absolve him of the vow in the absence of regret. For we are speaking of an instance where he does not regret having vowed in the first place.] R. Tzaddok said: Just as they open for him with the honor of his father and mother, let them open for him with honor of the L rd! If so, there can be no vows! [R. Eliezer is here being questioned, viz.: Just as we open with the honor of his father and mother and do not fear that he will lie, let them likewise open with the honor of the L rd, saying to him: "Had you known that you would be called evil before the L rd, would you have vowed?" And the sages who differ with R. Eliezer said to him: You do not hereby lend us support. For even R. Eliezer would agree that in such an instance he would certainly lie. For no man would be so arrogant as to say that he would not desist (from vowing) for the honor of the L rd. This is not similar to R. Shimon b. Gamliel's providing an opening for a certain man from (Proverbs 12:18): "One who blurts out (vows), as the piercings of a sword, etc." For there he speaks to him (i.e., provides an opening for him) from the verses, as we learned in our Mishnah (9:4), that he transgresses "You shall not hate," "You shall not take revenge," and "You shall not bear a grudge." But if he is confronted with "the honor of the L rd," he certainly will lie. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.] And the sages concede to R. Eliezer that in a matter between himself and his father and mother [as when he bevowed his father from his possessions] honor of parents can be used as an opening for him.

And R. Eliezer stated further [i.e., another lenient ruling in respect to vows]: Nolad ["what is born"] can be used as an opening [for vows, i.e., something which is not common, but which might arise and come to pass after the vow has been made. And if the vower had known at the time of the vow that it would come to pass, he would not have vowed.] And the sages forbid it. [For the reason that regret can be used as an opening is that it "uproots" the vow from its very inception; but this does not obtain with something which is not common. For not expecting it to occur, he would not have desisted from vowing because of the (mere) possibility of its occurrence.] How so? If he said: "Konam, that I shall derive no benefit from that man," and he became a scribe [a Torah scholar, needed by all], or he married off his son early, and he said; "Had I known that he would become a scribe or that he would marry off his son so soon, I would not have vowed" [This, in an instance where he vowed (not to benefit) for a certain time period, and he did not expect the son to be married and to have to attend the wedding within that time period.] (or if he said:) "Konam, that I shall not enter this house," and it was made into a synagogue, (and he said:) "Had I known that it would be made into a synagogue, I would not have vowed," R. Eliezer permits it (the absolution), and the sages forbid it. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.]

R. Meir says: There are things which are like nolad and which are not like nolad. [They seem to be like nolad, but really are not, and they can be used for openings.] And the sages do not concur with him. How so? If one said: "Konam, that I shall not marry that woman, for her father is bad," and they said to him: "He died," or "He repented." [And even though death is nolad, since he indicated at the time of his vow why he was vowing, it is as if he made his vow conditional, as if he had said: "so long as her father is alive." For this reason it is not nolad. But it is (also) not a bona fide condition, for which reason he requires absolution. In the Yerushalmi it is indicated that he does not require absolution., and Rambam rules accordingly.] If one said: Konam, that I shall not enter this house, for there is a vicious dog in it, or there is a snake in it, and they said to him: The dog died or the snake was killed — these are like nolad and not like nolad. And the sages do not concur with him.

And R. Meir said further: An opening is provided for one from what is written in the Torah. He is told: Had you known that you would be transgressing (Leviticus 19:18): "You shall not take revenge and you shall not bear a grudge," and (Ibid. 17): "You shall not hate your brother in your heart," and (Ibid. 18): "And you shall love your neighbor as yourself," and (Ibid. 25:36): "And your brother shall live with you" (for he might become poor and your vow would prevent you from assisting him) — (Had you known all this, would you have vowed?) — If he says: Had I known that this was so I would not have vowed, his vow is annulled [after the sages absolve him of it. And if one is bevowed benefit from his neighbor, when he is absolved of his vow, it must be absolved in his neighbor's presence, it being written (Exodus 4:19): "And the L rd said to Moses in Midyan: 'Go return, etc.'" The Holy One Blessed be He said to Moses: It is in Midyan that you made your vow. Go to Midyan and have your vow annulled. For Moses had sworn to his father-in-law that he would not leave Midyan without his permission, viz. (Ibid. 2:21): "And Moses vowed to stay with the man" — for which reason the Holy One Blessed be He required him to go to annul his vow before him.]

An opening is provided for a man with his wife's kethubah [i.e., with the payment of the kethubah, if he vowed to divorce her.] And it happened with one who bevowed enjoyment from his wife, and her kethubah was four hundred dinars, that he came before R. Akiva, who ruled that he must give her her kethubah, whereupon he said: "My master, my father left eight hundred dinars. My brother took four hundred, and I, four hundred. Is it not enough that she take two hundred, and I, two hundred!" R. Akiva replied: "Even if you had to sell the hair of your head, you would have to give her (the amount of) her kethubah." The man: "Had I known this, I would not have vowed in the first place!" and R. Akiva absolved him of his vow.

An opening may be provided with festivals and with Sabbaths. [If one vowed to fast or not to eat meat for a certain period of time, he is asked: "Had you considered the Sabbaths and festivals falling in this time period, would you have vowed?" (And this is not "opening with the honor of the L rd")]. In the beginning they said: Those days [for which an opening of regret was found are permitted, the sage having absolved him in that regard], and all the other days [for which there was no regret [remain] forbidden — until R. Akiva came and said that a vow which is partially annulled is completely annulled [even though he did not find an opening for the entire vow. For he vowed ab initio only with the understanding that the entire vow be fulfilled, so that partial regret is an opening for the whole.]

How so? If he said: "Konam, that I shall not benefit from all of you," if he were absolved from one of them, he is absolved from all." (If he said:) "I shall not benefit from this one and from this one" [i.e., if he forbade the first one to himself with "Konam," and he said about the second: "Let him be like the first," and about the third: "Let him be like the second," and so with all], if he is absolved of the first, he is absolved of all, [all being dependent upon the first.]; if he is absolved of the last, the last is permitted and all of the others are forbidden. If he were absolved of the middle one, those from it downwards (i.e., after it) are permitted; those from it upwards (i.e., before it) are forbidden. (If he said:) "I shall not benefit from this one, korban, and from this one, korban," an opening is required for each one. [This Mishnah is in accordance with R. Shimon, who says in respect to the oath (in denial) of (having received) a pledge, if five claimed (pledges) from him, and he denied and swore, and then confessed, he is not liable to bring an offering for each one unless he swore to each one; and here, too, he must say: "from this one, korban, and from this one, korban." But the sages say (in respect to a pledge): If he said: "Shevuah (an oath) that I owe neither you, nor you, nor you," he is liable for each one. And here, too, (in respect to vows), if he said: "not from this one, or from this one, or from this one," even if he did not state "Korban" in respect to each, each is considered a vow in itself, and this is the halachah.]

(If one said:) "Konam, that I shall not taste wine, for wine is bad for the stomach," and they said to him: "Isn't old wine good for the stomach?" then he is permitted (to drink) old wine. And not only is old wine alone permitted him, but all wine. [This is so only when he says: "Had I known this, I would not have vowed at all," or: "I would have permitted old wine and forbidden new wine." But if he said: "Had I known, I would have said: "All wine is forbidden to me except old wine," then only old wine is permitted to him, and all other wine, forbidden.] (If one said:) "Konam, that I shall not taste onion, for onion is bad for the heart," and they said to him: "Isn't wild onion good for the heart?" then he is permitted to eat wild onion. And not only is wild onion alone permitted him, but all onions. There was such an episode, and R. Meir permitted all onions.

An opening is provided for a man with his own honor and with the honor of his children [if he vowed to divorce his wife.] They say to him: "If you knew that tomorrow they would say about you: 'This is the kind of man he is — he divorces his wives,' and about your daughters: 'They are divorce-daughters!' 'What did their mother "see" to be divorced' [if there were not something indecent about her! thus casting a blemish upon his children. And we do not fear that he might be lying, that perhaps he really does not regret it, but is ashamed to say that he is not concerned for the honor of his children.] If he says: "Had I known this, I would not have vowed, he is absolved of his vow.

(If one said:) "Konam, that I shall not marry that ugly woman," and she were found to be beautiful — "swarthy," and she were found to be fair — "short," and she were found to be tall — he is permitted to (marry) her. Not that she was ugly and became beautiful; swarthy, and became fair; short, and became tall — but because the vow was a mistake [from the very beginning, the woman being fair at the time of the vow, and no absolution by a sage being required.] And it once happened that a man bevowed himself benefit from his sister's daughter. After she had been brought into R. Yehudah's house and beautified, R. Yishmael asked him: "My son, was it one such as she from whom you bevowed yourself?" He answered: "No," and R. Yishmael permitted her. At that time, R. Yishmael cried and said; "The daughters of Israel are beautiful, but poverty has disfigured them!" And when R. Yishmael died, the daughters of Israel raised a lament, saying: "Cry, daughters of Israel, over R. Yishmael" — as they did when Saul died, viz. (II Samuel 1:24): "O daughters of Israel, cry over Saul!" [The gemara explains that something is lacking, and that this is what is meant: "R. Yishmael says: Even if she were ugly and became beautiful; swarthy, and became fair. And it once happened that a man bevowed himself, etc." For the first tanna permits it only if the vow were mistaken from the very beginning, as when she was beautiful to begin with. And R. Yishmael holds that even if she became beautiful only after the vow, it is permitted. For since she can be beautified, she was not ugly to begin with. The halachah is not in accordance with R. Yishmael.