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Mishneh Torah, Oaths Chapter 7

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הַתּוֹבֵעַ חֲבֵרוֹ בְּמָמוֹן שֶׁאִם הוֹדָה בּוֹ יִהְיֶה חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם וְכָפַר וְנִשְׁבַּע. אוֹ שֶׁהִשְׁבִּיעוֹ הַתּוֹבֵעַ וְכָפַר. הֲרֵי זֶה הַנִּתְבָּע הוּא חַיָּב בִּשְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא עָנָה אָמֵן. שֶּׁבִּשְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן אֶחָד הַנִּשְׁבָּע מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ וְאֶחָד שֶׁהִשְׁבִּיעוֹ אַחֵר וְכָפַר אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא עָנָה אָמֵן חַיָּב. שֶׁכְּפִירָתוֹ אַחַר שֶׁהִשְׁבִּיעוֹ הַתּוֹבֵעַ כַּעֲנִיַּת אָמֵן:

Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007

When a person issues a financial claim against a colleague which would require the latter to pay were he to admit [liability]¹, a financial claim, for which one is liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon and k'nas, a fine, for which one is not liable, as stated in the following halachah. and [the colleague] denies [his obligation] and takes an oath or the plaintiff administers an oath to him and he denies [any obligation]. [If he is lying,] the defendant is liable for an oath concerning a sh'vuat hapikadon.² [The above applies] even if [the defendant] does not respond Amen.³ as stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 1. Nevertheless, a sh'vuat hapikadon is a unique instance, as the Rambam continues to explain. For with regard to a sh'vuat hapikadon, one is liable whether he took the oath on his own initiative or another person administered the oath to him and he denied [any obligation], even though he did not respond Amen. For denying the claim after the plaintiff administered the oath is equivalent to responding Amen.⁴

footnotes: ¹ The qualifications the Rambam mentions here make a distinction between mammon ² The term literally means "an oath concerning an entrusted object." Its meaning in a halachic context is explained in this and the subsequent halachot.If one takes such an oath falsely, he is liable to pay an additional fifth of the principal and bring a guilt offering as stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 9. ³ With regard to other oaths, it is necessary for the person to answer Amen ⁴ If, however, he remains silent in response to the oath administered by the plaintiff, he is not liable even if he had denied his claim beforehand (Radbaz).

תְּבָעוֹ בְּמָמוֹן שֶׁאִם יוֹדֶה לוֹ וְיֹאמַר כֵּן הַדָּבָר לֹא יִהְיֶה חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם. כְּגוֹן שֶׁתְּבָעוֹ בִּקְנָס שֶׁאֵין אָדָם מְשַׁלֵּם קְנָס עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ. וְכָפַר וְנִשְׁבַּע. הֲרֵי זֶה פָּטוּר מִשְּׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן וְחַיָּב מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי:

Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007

[This does not apply] when [the plaintiff] lodges a claim which if acknowledged by the defendant, i.e., if he would admit that it is true, would not require him to make payment, e.g., he lodged a claim concerning a k'nas.⁵ 2:8, the Rambam defines a fine as an instance where a person pays more or less than the monetary value of the damage he caused. For a person is not required to pay a k'nas based on his own admission.⁶ 1:5. See also Chapter 8, Halachot 1-3, for illustrations of this concept. [In such an instance,] if a person denied [an obligation], he is exempt from a sh'vuat hapikadon, but liable for a sh'vuat bitui.⁷

footnotes: ⁵ A fine. In Hilchot Nizkei Mammon ⁶ See Hilchot Genevah ⁷ For he is taking a false oath regarding his past activity.

וְכֵן אִם תְּבָעוֹ בְּקַרְקַע אוֹ בְּעֶבֶד אוֹ בִּשְׁטָר וְכָפַר וְנִשְׁבַּע פָּטוּר מִשְּׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן וְחַיָּב בִּשְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי שֶׁהֲרֵי נִשְׁבַּע עַל שֶׁקֶר:

Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007

Similarly, if [the plaintiff] lodged a claim concerning landed property, a servant, or a promissory note, and [the defendant] denied [the claim] and took an oath, he is exempt from a sh'vuat hapikadon, but liable for a sh'vuat bitui, for he took a false oath.

וְלָמָּה נִפְטָר מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן וַהֲרֵי זֶה אִלּוּ הוֹדָה חַיָּב הָיָה וּמְשַׁלֵּם מַה שֶּׁכָּפַר. לְפִי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא ה כא) "בְּפִקָּדוֹן אוֹ בִתְשׂוּמֶת יָד אוֹ בְּגֵזֶל אוֹ עָשַׁק אֶת עֲמִיתוֹ" (ויקרא ה כב) "אוֹ מָצָא אֲבֵדָה" הַכּל מִטַּלְטְלִין שֶׁאִם יוֹדֶה בָּהֶן יוֹצִיא מָמוֹן מִתַּחַת יָדוֹ. וְיָצְאוּ קַרְקָעוֹת שֶׁאֵין מִטַּלְטְלִין וַהֲרֵי הֵן לִפְנֵי בַּעֲלֵיהֶן וּבְחֶזְקָתָן. וְיָצְאוּ עֲבָדִים שֶׁהֻקְּשׁוּ לְקַרְקָעוֹת. וְיָצְאוּ שְׁטָרוֹת שֶׁאֵין גּוּפָן מָמוֹן:

Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007

Why is one [who took an oath concerning such claims] exempt from [the obligations of a false] sh'vuat hapikadon? Behold, were he to have acknowledged [his obligation], he would have been held liable and [required] to pay what he denied. Because [Leviticus 5:21-22] states: "Concerning an entrusted object, a [financial] deposit, a robbery; he oppressed his colleague, or discovered a lost object." All of this concerns movable property which if he would admit his liability he would have to make financial restitution from his own domain. This excludes landed property for it is not movable property. For landed property is always revealed before its owner⁸ and is always in their possession.⁹ 5:1; Hilchot Gezeilah 8:14; 9:1. [Similarly,] it excludes servants, for an equation is established between servants and landed property.¹⁰ And it excludes promissory notes, for their actual substance is not of financial value.¹¹).

footnotes: ⁸ In contrast to movable property which can be concealed. ⁹ In contrast to movable property where possession may determine ownership in a situation of doubt, with regard to landed property, a person must display proof of ownership. See also Hilchot To'en V'Nit'an ¹⁰ See Hilchot To'en V'Nit'an, loc. cit. ¹¹ Instead, they only serve as proof of an obligation (ibid.

אֶחָד הַנִּשְׁבָּע אַחַר שֶׁתְּבָעוֹ בַּעַל הַמָּמוֹן. אוֹ הַנִּשְׁבָּע מֵעַצְמוֹ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא תְּבָעוֹ. כֵּיצַד. כְּגוֹן שֶׁקָּדַם וְאָמַר לָמָּה אַתָּה הוֹלֵךְ אַחֲרַי כְּלוּם יֵשׁ לְךָ בְּיָדִי מָמוֹן שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי מָמוֹן. הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב בִּשְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן הוֹאִיל וְכָפַר וְנִשְׁבַּע וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא תְּבָעוֹ זֶה:

Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007

[The above laws apply] whether one took an oath after the plaintiff lodged a claim against him or whether he took it on his own initiative even though a claim was not lodged against him.¹² to the prooftext explains that since the verse speaks of "deny his [obligation to] a colleague," he is liable whether his colleague demands an oath of him or not. What his implied? He took the initiative and said: "Why are you following me? Do I have any money belonging to you? I am taking an oath that I am not in possession of any of your money." Since he denied [an obligation] and took an oath, [he is liable,] even though [the plaintiff] did not lodge a claim against him.

footnotes: ¹² Note the contrast to an oath concerning testimony (Chapter 9, Halachah 6-7). The gloss of the Torah Temimah

אֶחָד הַנִּשְׁבָּע לְבַעַל הַמָּמוֹן עַצְמוֹ אוֹ לִשְׁלוּחוֹ הַבָּא בְּהַרְשָׁאָתוֹ. שֶׁשְּׁלוּחוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם כְּמוֹתוֹ:

Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007

[One is liable] whether he took an oath to the person to whom he owes the money or to his agent who was given power of attorney. For a person's agent is equivalent to his own self.¹³ 3:5, 7. See the Lechem Mishneh who emphasizes that the principal must have given the agent power of attorney to require an oath of the defendant. If, however, he merely gave the agent the authority to prosecute the claim, he may not require him to take an oath.

footnotes: ¹³ See Hilchot Shluchim

וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּב בִּשְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן עַד שֶׁיַּשְׁבִּיעוֹ בְּלָשׁוֹן שֶׁהוּא מַכִּירָהּ:

Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007

One is not liable for a sh'vuat hapikadon unless he requires him to take an oath in a language that he understands.¹⁴ 33a derives this from the exegesis of Leviticus 5:1.

footnotes: ¹⁴ For an oath can be taken in any language. Sotah

הַנִּשְׁבָּע שְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן בְּמֵזִיד אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּשְׁבַּע לַשֶּׁקֶר וְהִתְרוּ בּוֹ עֵדִים בִּשְׁעַת שְׁבוּעָתוֹ אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה אֶלָּא מֵבִיא אֲשָׁמוֹ בִּלְבַד. שֶׁהֲרֵי הַכָּתוּב מוֹצִיאוֹ מִכְּלַל חַיָּבֵי מַלְקוֹת וְחִיְּבוֹ אָשָׁם בֵּין בְּזָדוֹן בֵּין בִּשְׁגָגָה כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ:

Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007

When a person consciously takes a sh'vuat hapikadon, even though he takes a false oath and is warned by witnesses at the time he takes the oath, he is not liable for lashes, but instead must merely bring a guilt offering. For the Torah excluded him from those who are liable for lashes¹⁵. and obligated him to bring a guilt offering whether he transgressed willfully or inadvertently, as we explained.¹⁶

footnotes: ¹⁵ Neither is one who takes such a false oath liable for lashes for taking a false sh'vuat bitui ¹⁶ See Chapter 1, Halachah 9, which explains that one is liable for a sacrifice whether he transgressed willingly or inadvertently. As mentioned in the notes to Chapter 1, Halachah 8, one is not liable for lashes either because the transgression does not involve a deed, or because financial compensation must be given and a person is not held liable both for financial restitution and lashes.

כָּפַר וְנִשְׁבַּע אַרְבַּע אוֹ חָמֵשׁ פְּעָמִים. אוֹ שֶׁהִשְׁבִּיעוֹ הַתּוֹבֵעַ אַרְבַּע וְחָמֵשׁ פְּעָמִים וְהוּא כּוֹפֵר עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאַחַת בֵּין בְּבֵית דִּין בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא בְּבֵית דִּין הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב קָרְבַּן אָשָׁם עַל כָּל שְׁבוּעָה וּשְׁבוּעָה. שֶׁאִלּוּ הוֹדָה אַחַר שֶׁכָּפַר הָיָה חַיָּב לְשַׁלֵּם אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁכָּפַר בְּבֵית דִּין וְנִמְצָא פּוֹטֵר עַצְמוֹ בְּכָל כְּפִירָה וּכְפִירָה מִן הַתַּשְׁלוּמִין. לְפִיכָךְ חַיָּב עַל כָּל שְׁבוּעָה וּשְׁבוּעָה:

Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007

If one denied [an obligation] and took an oath [concerning it] four or five times or the plaintiff administered an oath to him four or fives times and he denied each one of them, he is liable for a guilt offering for each individual oath.¹⁷ [This applies] whether this took place in a court or outside the court. [The rationale is that] were he to have admitted his obligation after making his denial, he would be liable to make restitution even though he made the denial in a court. Thus with each denial, he is making himself exempt from payment. Hence, he is liable for each individual oath.

footnotes: ¹⁷ Note the contrast to an oath concerning testimony, as stated in Chapter 10, Halachah 18. He is also liable to pay an additional fifth of the principal for each false oath, as stated in Halachah 15.

הָיוּ חֲמִשָּׁה תּוֹבְעִין אוֹתוֹ וְאוֹמְרִין לוֹ תֵּן לָנוּ פִּקָּדוֹן שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָנוּ בְּיָדְךָ. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לָכֶם בְּיָדִי אֵינוֹ חַיָּב אֶלָּא קָרְבָּן אֶחָד. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי לֹא לְךָ וְלֹא לְךָ וְלֹא לְךָ חַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאַחַת:

Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007

If five different people were lodging claims against him and telling him: "Give us the entrusted article of ours that you have in your possession," and he responds: "[I am taking] an oath that I do not have anything of yours in my possession," [should his oath be false,] he is liable for only one sacrifice.¹⁸ [If he answers: "I am taking] an oath that I don't have anything of yours, or of yours,... or of yours, in my possession," he is liable for each [statement].¹⁹

footnotes: ¹⁸ Since his response included all of them in one statement, it is considered only as one oath. ¹⁹ Since he addressed each one individually, each statement is considered as an independent oath.

אָמַר לוֹ חֲבֵרוֹ תֵּן לִי פִּקָּדוֹן וּתְשׂוּמֶת יָד גֵּזֶל וַאֲבֵדָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּיָדְךָ. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֵינוֹ חַיָּב אֶלָּא אַחַת. וַאֲפִלּוּ הָיָה לוֹ פְּרוּטָה אַחַת מִכֻּלָּן הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ מִצְטָרְפִין וְחַיָּב:

Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007

If his colleague told him: "Give me the entrusted object, [financial] deposit, stolen object, and lost object [of mine], that you have in your possession," and he responds: "[I am taking] an oath that I do not have anything of yours in my possession," [should his oath be false,] he is liable for only one [sacrifice].²⁰ Even if the total of all the claims is [merely] a p'rutah, they are all included together and he is liable.²¹, they are not significant individually. Nevertheless, since he included them in one statement, the sum is totaled as one and he is liable.

footnotes: ²⁰ Since his response included all of these items in one statement, it is considered only as one oath. ²¹ In this instance, were they to have been considered individually, he would be exempt, for since each of the claims are less than a p'rutah

שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי פִּקָּדוֹן תְּשׂוּמֶת יָד גֵּזֶל וַאֲבֵדָה חַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאַחַת:

Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007

[If he answers: "I am taking] an oath that I don't have an entrusted object, [financial] deposit, stolen object, and lost object of yours in my possession," he is liable for each [statement].²².

footnotes: ²² Since he mentioned each item individually, each statement is considered as an independent oath and it is necessary that each claim concern the worth of a p'rutah

תֵּן לִי חִטִּים וּשְׂעוֹרִים וְכֻסְּמִין שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּיָדְךָ. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֵינוֹ חַיָּב אֶלָּא אַחַת. שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי חִטִּים וּשְׂעוֹרִין וְכֻסְּמִין חַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאַחַת:

Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007

[If the plaintiff says:] "Give me the wheat, barley, and buckwheat of mine that you have in your possession," and [the defendant responds]: "[I am taking] an oath that I do not have anything of yours in my possession," [should his oath be false,] he is liable for only one [sacrifice].²³ [If he answers: "I am taking] an oath that I don't have any wheat, barley, and buckwheat of yours in my possession," he is liable for each [statement].

footnotes: ²³ Although they are different species of grain, since he included them all in one statement, he is liable only once. Even though buckwheat is a subspecies of wheat, since it is mentioned individually, he is liable for it individually (Radbaz).

הָיוּ חֲמִשָּׁה תּוֹבְעִין אוֹתוֹ וְאוֹמְרִין לוֹ תֵּן לָנוּ פִּקָּדוֹן גֵּזֶל וַאֲבֵדָה וּתְשׂוּמֶת יָד שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָנוּ בְּיָדְךָ. וְאָמַר לָאֶחָד מֵהֶן שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי פִּקָּדוֹן וְגֵזֶל וַאֲבֵדָה וּתְשׂוּמֶת יָד וְלֹא לְךָ וְלֹא לְךָ וְלֹא לְךָ הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב עַל כָּל טַעֲנָה וְטַעֲנָה לְכָל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד וְנִמְצָא זֶה חַיָּב עֶשְׂרִים אָשָׁם:

Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007

If five different people were lodging claims against him and telling him: "Give us the entrusted article, [financial] deposit, stolen object, and lost object [of mine], that you have in your possession," and he responds to one of them: "[I am taking] an oath that I don't have an entrusted object, stolen object, lost object, and [financial] deposit of yours, or of yours,... or of yours in my possession," he is liable for each claim [made] by each individual. Thus he is liable for 20 guilt offerings.²⁴

footnotes: ²⁴ I.e., this combines the principles stated in Halachot 10 and 12.

טָעַן שֶׁאָבַד הַפִּקָּדוֹן אוֹ כָּפַר בּוֹ וְנִשְׁבַּע וְאַחַר כָּךְ הוֹדָה. וְחָזַר וְטָעַן שֶׁאָבַד וְנִשְׁבַּע וְחָזַר וְהוֹדָה. מְשַׁלֵּם הַקֶּרֶן הָרִאשׁוֹן וְחֹמֶשׁ אֶחָד עַל כָּל שְׁבוּעָה וּשְׁבוּעָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא ה כד) "וַחֲמִשִׁתָיו". הַתּוֹרָה רִבְּתָה חֳמָשִׁין הַרְבֵּה עַל קֶרֶן אֶחָד. כֵּיצַד. הָיָה הַקֶּרֶן אַרְבָּעָה וְכָפַר וְנִשְׁבַּע וְהוֹדָה וְחָזַר וְטָעַן שֶׁאָבַד וְנִשְׁבַּע וְחָזַר וְהוֹדָה וְחָזַר וְטָעַן שֶׁאָבַד וְנִשְׁבַּע וְהוֹדָה מְשַׁלֵּם שִׁבְעָה. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007

If [the defendant] claims that he lost an entrusted object or denies [receiving it], he took an oath, and afterwards admitted [that it was in his possession], and then claimed that it was lost, took an oath, and then admitted [that it was in his possession], he must pay the principal and an additional fifth for each oath that he took.²⁵ [This is derived from Leviticus 5:24 which literally translates as] "its fifths,"²⁶ rather than chamishoto. [implying that] the Torah took into account several fifths for [one sum of] principal. What is implied? The principal was [worth] four [zuz]. One denied [receiving an entrusted article], took an oath, and then admitted [that he possessed it]. Afterwards, he claimed that it was lost, took an oath and then made a second admission, and then claimed that it was lost, took an oath and then made an admission another time. He is required to pay seven [zuz].²⁷ 7:12 which explains that if he already was held liable by a court for the additional fifth, it becomes considered as part of the principal. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

footnotes: ²⁵ Similarly, he is liable for a guilt offering for each oath as stated in Halachah 9. ²⁶ It says chamishitav ²⁷ This figure can be explained as follows: The principal is four. He must pay an additional three, for each fifth is one fifth of the new total and not one fifth of the original principal (Chapter 11, Halachah 20). He is not, however, required to pay more than one for the second and third oaths, for one is required to pay one fifth of the principal and not a fifth of the fifths (Radbaz). Note, however, Hilchot Gezelah

פָּחוֹת מִפְּרוּטָה אֵינוֹ מָמוֹן לְפִיכָךְ הַתּוֹבֵעַ חֲבֵרוֹ בְּפָחוֹת מִפְּרוּטָה אוֹ בְּפָחוֹת מִשְּׁוֵה פְּרוּטָה וְכָפַר וְנִשְׁבַּע פָּטוּר מִשְּׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן וְחַיָּב בִּשְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי:

Mishneh Torah, trans. by Eliyahu Touger. Jerusalem, Moznaim Pub. c1986-c2007

A value less than a p'rutah is not considered as financially significant.²⁸ 3:1 and Hilchot Sanhedrin 20:11. In Hilchot Shekalim 1:3, the Rambam defines a p'rutah as half a barleycorn of silver. Shiurei Torah defines this as 1/40th of a gram of silver. Hence, if a person lodges a claim against a colleague for less than a p'rutah or for articles worth less than a p'rutah and [the defendant] denied the obligation and took an oath, he is exempt with regard to a sh'vuat hapikadon²⁹ derives this from the exegesis of Leviticus 5:26. and liable for a sh'vuat bitui.³⁰

footnotes: ²⁸ This principle is also reflected in Hilchot To'en V'Nit'an ²⁹ For such an oath concerns a financially significant claim and this does not. The Sifra ³⁰ For he took a false oath, as in Halachot 2-3.

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