[The same laws apply] whether one took the vow on his own [volition] or another person states a vow for him and he answers Amen or says something which like Amen implies that he accepts the matter.¹ 2:1.

footnotes: ¹ See the parallels in Hilchot Sh'vuot

A person who takes an oath is not forbidden [to partake of] the entity which he forbade to himself until he makes a verbal statement to that effect² and his statements must match his intent, as we explained with regard to oaths.³ 2:10-12. The latter point is also implied by the prooftext cited above, for the term "expression" implies bringing out something which exists, i.e., revealing one's thoughts. Thus if a statement does not match one's thoughts, it is not an "expression" (Kiryat Sefer). If, by contrast, one intended to take a nazirite vow and instead, vowed to bring a sacrifice, [intended to vow to bring] a sacrifice and instead, took a nazirite [vow], [intended to take] an oath and instead, [took] a vow, [intended to take] a vow and instead, [took] an oath, intended to say "figs" and instead, said "grapes," both are permitted to him.⁴ There is no vow.

footnotes: ² I.e., mere thought is not sufficient. With regard to vows, Numbers 30:7 mentions "the expression of her lips," implying that one must express his intent verbally. ³ Hilchot Sh'vuot ⁴ The figs, because he did not make a statement concerning them and the grapes, because he did not intend to mention them.

When a person takes a vow dependent on the intent of others, it is like he took an oath dependent on the intent of others.⁵ 2:15. Similarly, if one takes a vow and retracts⁶ (Yoreh De'ah 210:3)]. immediately thereafter or someone rebuked him immediately thereafter and he accepted their statement, he is permitted [to use the article mentioned].⁷ 2:17-18. As mentioned there, the term "immediately thereafter" has a specific halachic definition: the time it takes a student to tell his teacher: Shalom Elecha Rabbi. Since he retracts in this short time, it is considered as if the vow was never made. The laws applying to all these matters with regard to vows are the same as those applying to oaths.⁸). See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 239:1).

footnotes: ⁵ See Hilchot Sh'vuot ⁶ He must state his retraction verbally. It is not sufficient for him to have this intent in his heart [Shulchan Aruch ⁷ See Hilchot Sh'vuot ⁸ For Numbers 30:3 associates the two together (Kessef Mishneh

[The following laws apply when] a person issued a stipulation before he made a vow, saying: "I am retracting from any vow that I will take from now until ten years in the future," "They are nullified," or other similar statements, and then took a vow: If he remembered the stipulation at the time he made the vow, the vow is effective, for by taking the vow, he nullified the stipulation.⁹ 23b). If, however, he did not remember the stipulation until after he made the vow, the vow is nullified¹⁰ explains this ruling as follows: Although Numbers 30:3 states: "He shall not desecrate his word," that applies only to a vow that has taken effect. In this instance, since he forgot his stipulation, it is as if he took the vow in error and it never took effect. even if [immediately after taking the vow], he brought the stipulation to mind and maintained it. Although he did not verbalize his retraction at the time [he made the vow], the retraction preceded the vow and he verbalized it beforehand.¹¹ There is an authority who rules stringently and says that he must remember the stipulation immediately thereafter taking the vow.¹² (Yoreh De'ah 211:2) mentions the Rambam's view, but also that of the other authority and states that we should give weight to that authority's view. The Ra'avad also differs with the Rambam and offers another interpretation, stating that the nullification is only effective when he willingly accepts the stipulation immediately after remembering it. As Nedarim, loc. cit., emphasizes, the most common application of this principle is the declaration customarily made after the release of vows on the day preceding Rosh HaShanah, when we nullify all the vows we will take in the year to come. This is also the source for the Kol Nidrei prayer recited at the beginning of Yom Kippur which nullifies all vows to be taken in the coming year. Note, however, the statement of Rama (Yoreh De'ah 211:1) that we do not rely on this stipulation without going to a sage for a formal annulment of a vow unless a great necessity was involved.

footnotes: ⁹ For by taking the vow, he is indicating that he no longer desires to uphold the stipulation (see Nedarim ¹⁰ Kiryat Sefer ¹¹ Our translation and bracketed additions are made on the basis of the gloss of the Radbaz. ¹² Otherwise, according to that view, the vow takes effect and the fact that he remembers the stipulation afterwards is not significant. The Shulchan Aruch

[The following rules apply when] one made a stipulation [similar to that mentioned above]¹³ (Yoreh De'ah 211:3)]. for a year or for ten years and afterwards took a vow, remembering at the time that he took the vow that he had made a stipulation, but forgetting the subject of that stipulation or what it involved. If [when taking the vow], he said:¹⁴ "I am acting according to my original intention,"¹⁵ his vow is not effective, for he has nullified it. If he does not make such a statement, he has nullified the stipulation and upheld the vow, for, at the time he took the vow, he remembered that there was a stipulation and, nevertheless, took the vow.¹⁶

footnotes: ¹³ In this instance, he did not nullify all vows that he would make in the future, only those of a certain type, e.g., not to drink wine or eat meat [Shulchan Aruch ¹⁴ In one of his response, the Radbaz states that this intent need not be verbalized. It is sufficient that he have the intent at heart. ¹⁵ I.e., his intent is that if his original statement is discovered to run contrary to his vow, he desires to follow his original statement. ¹⁶ I.e., he was aware of the possibility that his vow could run contrary to his original statement and took it nonetheless.

There are some of the Geonim who maintain that all of these statements are applicable only with regard to vows and not to oaths,¹⁷ 12:2.) The Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 3:1) would appear to support this approach. but there is an authority who maintains that the laws pertaining to vows and oaths are the same in this regard. Thus one may issue a stipulation nullifying an oath [beforehand] in the same manner as was stated with regard to vows.¹⁸ prayer mention oaths as well as vows. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 211:4) adds that the nullification of vows in this manner is possible only when one takes a vow on his own initiative, but not when he agrees to a vow proposed by a colleague, for the colleague does not have that person's original stipulation in mind. Thus by agreeing to his colleague's statement, he implies that he is not concerned with his original stipulation.

footnotes: ¹⁷ For oaths have a more severe dimension, since God's name must be invoked. (See Hilchot Sh'vuot ¹⁸ The Radbaz maintains that the Rambam follows this view as evidenced by the fact that he does not include this in the list of matters in which oaths differ from vows (Chapter 3, Halachah 1). The text for the nullification of vows rite recited on the day preceding Rosh HaShanah and the Kol Nidrei

[When a person takes] a vow whose object is not clear,¹⁹ 18b). we rule stringently.²⁰). The rationale is that if this was not his intent, he should have remained silent (Radbaz). See also Chapter 9, Halachah 4. If he interprets them, there is room for both leniency and stringency. What does this imply? If one says: "Let this produce be considered as salted meat and as wine poured as a libation for me," we ask him what his intent was. If he explained himself, saying "My intent was that salted meat refers to sacrificial meat²¹ and wine poured as a libation refers to libations poured on the Temple altar," he is forbidden [to partake of the produce].²² If, however, he says: "My intent was a sacrifice offered to a false deity²³ and wine poured as a libation to it," he is permitted.²⁴ If he took the vow without a specific intent, he is forbidden.

footnotes: ¹⁹ I.e., he does not know with regard to which prohibition he associated his vow (Rashi, Nedarim ²⁰ We say that he associated the vow with an object that causes entities to be forbidden (ibid. ²¹ For it was necessary to salt all the sacrifices (Leviticus 2:13 . ²² For when one equates produce with a sacrifice the vow is binding (Chapter 1, Halachot 7, 9). ²³ For the gentiles would also salt their offerings. ²⁴ For there is no way, he can cause an article to be forbidden as a sacrifice to a false deity through his vow. Hence, when he mentions such an object as the basis of a vow, the vow is not effective (Chapter 1, Halachot 8, 9).

Similar principles apply when one says: "This produce is considered as cherem (a dedication offering) for me." If [his intent was] a dedication offering for the upkeep of the Temple, he is forbidden [to partake of the produce].²⁵ If [his intent] was a dedication offering for the priests, he is permitted, because [these offerings] become [the priests'] personal possessions and are not forbidden [to others].²⁶ If [he took the vow] without a specific intent, he is forbidden.

footnotes: ²⁵ For in such an instance, the articles dedicated to the upkeep of the Temple become consecrated and forbidden for ordinary use until they are redeemed. ²⁶ Hence an entity that is made equivalent to them is likewise not forbidden.

[If he states:] "May they be considered like the tithes for me," [we investigate his intent. If his intent was] the tithe taken from animals, [it becomes] forbidden, because these are sacrifices that he consecrates through his actions, as we explained.²⁷ [If his intent was] the tithe taken from grain, it is permitted.²⁸ 18b). If [he took the vow] without a specific intent, he is forbidden.

footnotes: ²⁷ Chapter 1, Halachah 13. ²⁸ For the tithe taken from grain is not forbidden to be eaten by ordinary people. Moreover, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir who rules that ordinary people may not partake of these tithes, they are not forbidden due to a vow. Instead, it was forbidden to partake of the grain before they were separated and once, they were separated, they remain forbidden (Ritba, Nedarim

[If he states:] "May they be considered like terumah for me," [we investigate his intent. If his intent was] the money donated for the sacrificial offerings,²⁹ in Hebrew. See Hilchot Shekalim, ch. 2, which describes how these funds were collected and used. it is forbidden. If his intent was terumah [separated from] the grain heap, it is permitted.³⁰ If [he took the vow] without a specific intent, he is forbidden. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

footnotes: ²⁹ Terumat halishkah ³⁰ See Chapter 1, Halachah 11.

When does the above³¹ apply? In a place where the terms used have these two possible meanings. In a place where the term cherem without any further definition is used only to refer to the dedication offerings for the upkeep of the Temple,³² 18b explains that in the Galilee, it was not common for priests to live. Hence, when a person uses the term cherem there, his intent is a dedication offering for the upkeep of the Temple. if he says: "[This produce is considered] as cherem for me," he is forbidden [to partake of the produce].³³ Similarly, if their custom was to use the term cherem without any further definition to refer only to dedication offerings given the priests, he is permitted. Similar concepts apply in all analogous situations, for with regard to vows, we follow the connotations understood by the people in that place in that era.³⁴

footnotes: ³¹ That we explore the person's intention. ³² Nedarim ³³ For we assume that his intent was a dedication offering to the Temple, even if he says that his intent was an offering to the priests. ³⁴ See Chapter 9, Halachah 1.

[The ensuing rules apply] in all situations analogous to those exemplified: i.e., situations when a person takes a vow which appears to everyone to involve a prohibition, but he says: "My intent was for this and this specific instance,"³⁵ for example, he takes a vow based on a cherem,³⁶." but [afterwards] said: "My intent was a sea cherem, i.e., a fishing net,"³⁷ 2:8), the Rambam cites Chabakuk 1:15 which employs such a term. he took a vow based on an offering, but said: "My intent was an offering brought to the king," He told a colleague: "Myself is like a sacrifice for you," and then explained: "My intent was only to forbid him from [benefiting from] a bone³⁸ means "myself," but it can also mean "my bone." Initially, it was thought that the person's intent was that he forbade his colleague from benefiting from his self. He clarified, however, that his intent was "his bone." that I set aside so that I could take a vow as a lark," he took a vow that his wife could not benefit from him and then explained that his intent was his first wife whom he had divorced. [In all the above situations,] if the person who took the vow was a Torah scholar, he is permitted and he need not ask a sage [for the vow to be released].³⁹ If the one who took the vow is a common person, we make it appear to him that it is a vow, yet we give him an opportunity to ask for its release from another vantage point and then release the vow.⁴⁰ Whether he is a Torah scholar or a common person, we rebuke him and teach him not to conduct himself in this manner with regard to vows and not to take vows as a lark or a caper.

footnotes: ³⁵ I.e., a situation where the basis for the vow is a permitted entity and hence, the vow does not take effect. ³⁶ I.e., he said: "Let this produce be like a cherem ³⁷ In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim ³⁸ The Hebrew word atzmi ³⁹ His word can be accepted when he says: "This was my intent." Hence, the vow is not effective at all. With regard to the release of vows, see Chapter 4, Halachah 5. ⁴⁰ I.e., as stated in the following halachah, this is a safeguard to insure that the common people treat vows with the earnestness required.

Similarly, when a person tells his wife: "You are considered as my mother to me," or he says: "Let this produce be considered as pig meat for me," the vow is not effective, as we explained.⁴¹ If the person who took the vow was a Torah scholar, he is permitted and he need not ask a sage [for the vow to be released].⁴² 205:1) who states that in the present age, we consider everyone as a common person with regard to such matters. If the one who took the vow is a common person, he must ask a sage [for the vow to be released]. We make it appear to him that his wife is forbidden to him and that the produce is forbidden,⁴³) states that the person is required to approach a sage only with regard to vows involving his wife, but not with regard to those involving other matters. but we give him an opportunity to ask for its release from another vantage point and then release the vow in order that people not act frivolously with regard to vows.⁴⁴

footnotes: ⁴¹ Chapter 1, Halachah 30. ⁴² For we assume he knows that the vow is of no consequence. Note the Rama (Yoreh De'ah ⁴³ The Rama (loc. cit. ⁴⁴ If the common person was allowed not to pay heed to his vow, he might take leniency with regard to other vows in the future, including some which would be halachically binding.

Although declaring property ownerless is not a vow,⁴⁵ 273:1). According to Rabbinic decree, the laws are more stringent with regard to landed property, but this is law in all other instances. Ketzot HaChoshen discusses whether declaring an object ownerless is merely a retraction of one's own ownership over or does it involve transferring ownership to the person who will ultimately acquire it. The Jerusalem Talmud (Pe'ah 6:1) explains that the declaration of property as ownerless is derived from the laws of the Sabbatical Year. In the Sabbatical year, this is done by Divine decree and here, by contrast, man declares the property ownerless. it resembles a vow, for the person is forbidden to retract. What is meant by declaring property ownerless? A person says: "This property is free for everyone"⁴⁶ 7a). See the following halachah. to acquire. It applies to both movable property and landed property. What is the law [applying to property] declared ownerless? Whoever comes first and acquires it,⁴⁷) as stated in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 2:1. See Halachah 19. becomes the owner. He acquires it as his own and it becomes his. Even the person who declared the property ownerless has the same rights as others with regard to it. If he comes first and acquires it, it becomes his.⁴⁸ 5:27 which states that in this way, a person frees himself from the obligation to tithe the crops of his field.

footnotes: ⁴⁵ This implies that he does not have the potential to retract merely by making a statement (Radbaz, Ketzot HaChoshen ⁴⁶ Both the rich and the poor (Nedarim ⁴⁷ Through a formal act of acquisition (kinyan ⁴⁸ I.e., it is not like consecrated property for him (Radbaz).See Hilchot Matanot Aniyim

When a person declares his property ownerless [so that it can be acquired by] the poor, but not by the rich, it is not ownerless.⁴⁹). He must declare it ownerless for everyone like the produce of the Sabbatical year. When a person declares his servants ownerless, those past majority acquire themselves.⁵⁰ 8:13). With regard to those below majority, whoever comes first and takes hold of them acquires them as is the law with regard to other movable property.⁵¹

footnotes: ⁴⁹ This is one of the indications that this declaration is not a vow. For were it a vow, it could be given to the poor alone (Jerusalem Talmud, loc. cit. ⁵⁰ I.e., are set free. Since they are released from their owner's property, they are free to be acquired by anyone and so they acquire themselves. Nevertheless, although the servant becomes his own man at this time, before he becomes a full-fledged member of the Jewish people, he must be given a bill of freedom (Hilchot Avadim ⁵¹ Since they are below majority, they do not have an independent financial capacity and hence, cannot acquire themselves. Therefore any other person can acquire them.

When a person declares landed property ownerless, whoever comes first and manifests his ownership⁵², e.g., locking a door or erecting a fence. over it acquires it. According to Scriptural Law, even when a person declares his property ownerless in the presence of one person, it becomes ownerless and one is not required to tithe its produce,⁵³ 273:7) states that even when one declares property ownerless without anyone else being present, the declaration is binding according to Scriptural Law. as will be explained in its place.⁵⁴ 2:11; Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 5:27. Tithes are only required to be given from crops that one grew as one's own, not those acquired from ownerless property. According to Rabbinic decree, however, [property] is not ownerless until one declares as such in the presence of three people so that one can acquire it and two can act as witnesses. Should one say: "This is ownerless and this," there is an unresolved doubt whether the second entity is ownerless.⁵⁵ 7b raises the question, but does not resolve it. Hence, if the original owner desires to retain possession, we do not expropriate it from him (Sefer Meirat Einayim 273:12). If he said: "...and this is like this" or "...and also this," he has associated the second entity [with the first], and it is definitely ownerless.

footnotes: ⁵² Through a formal kinyan ⁵³ Rabbenu Asher and the Rama (Choshen Mishpat ⁵⁴ See Hilchot Terumah ⁵⁵ Nedarim

When a person declares his field ownerless and no one else acquires it,⁵⁶). during the first three days, he may retract.⁵⁷ After these three days, he may not retract unless he comes first and acquires it.⁵⁸ 273:13). He is like one acquiring ownerless property.⁵⁹). [There is no difference] between him and another person.

footnotes: ⁵⁶ If, however, another person acquires, it becomes that person's property. The original owner may not retract his declaration (Kessef Mishneh ⁵⁷ According to Scriptural Law and even according to Rabbinic Law with regard to other property, when one declares his property ownerless, the declaration takes effect from the first day and he is forbidden to retract, as stated in Halachah 14. Nevertheless, if he does retract, the retraction is binding. ⁵⁸ Our Sages, however, ordained this ruling as a safeguard against people declaring their fields ownerless and then retaking possession of them and in this way, freeing themselves from the responsibility of separating the tithes (Radbaz, Sefer Meirat Einayim ⁵⁹ And thus he is not liable to separate the tithes (Kessef Mishneh

When a person says: "This field is declared ownerless for one day," "...for one week," "...for one month," "...for one year," or "...for one seven-year cycle," he may retract before he or another person acquires it.⁶⁰ Once it is acquired, whether by the person himself or by someone else, he may not retract. Why does he have the right to retract before it was acquired? Because this is an uncommon matter. [Generally,] a person will not declare [property] ownerless for a limited time.

footnotes: ⁶⁰ I.e., even after three days pass. Since he is not intending to give up ownership entirely, even during the time he is willing to give up ownership, he still has a connection to the article and thus may withdraw his declaration (Radbaz).

When a person comes and watches over ownerless property, looking at it so that another person will not take it, he does not acquire it by looking at it. Instead, he must lift it up if it were movable property⁶¹ of hagba'ah. Similarly, other kinyanim are also effective. or manifest ownership over it if it were landed property,⁶² of chazzakah. as purchasers acquire property.⁶³ 1:3, 3:1.

footnotes: ⁶¹ Performing the kinyan ⁶² Performing the kinyan ⁶³ See Hilchot Mechirah