איש איש …אשד ישחט, any person who slaughters, etc. Why is the word איש repeated here? In Zevachim 108 they explain this in terms of Rabbi Shimon who claimed that if someone slaughters an animal (intended as a sacrifice) on behalf of a private individual he would be guilty of slaughtering sacred things outside the Temple precincts. They base this on the repeated mention of איש meaning איש לאיש. They do not explain it as meaning that if two people combined in that act that they would both be culpable for that sin. The reason is that the Torah phrased culpability by referring to האיש ההוא, i.e. a single individual. The Talmud also explains the restrictive word ההוא as excluding anyone who committed this act accidentally, erroneously or inadvertently. At the same time they explain the word as excluding two people who combined to slaughter the animal by saying the Torah did not write ההם, but ההוא. We find this somewhat difficult seeing that Torat Kohanim is on record as deriving this halachah from the words דם שפך and not from the word ההוא. One may answer that inasmuch as there are two separate restrictive expressions, i.e. ההוא as well as שפך (verse 4), Torat Kohanim derives from the one that when two people slaughter jointly that they are not culpable, and from the other that if the act did not occur intentionally and without outside coercion the perpetrator is not punishable.

אשד ישחט, who will slaughter, etc. Torat Kohanim phrases its comment thus: "From the mention of the words 'ox, sheep, and goat' I can only derive culpability for slaughtering four-legged mammals; whence do I know that slaughtering birds intended for the altar outside the precincts of the Temple or Tabernacle is also prohibited on pain of the karet penalty? Answer: from the words או אשר ישחט. I could have reasoned that if slaughtering the bird's neck, which is not the normal procedure is culpable, then someone who merely severed the bird's neck by pinching, i.e. מליקה i.e. the normal procedure, would certainly be culpable if he performed this act outside the precincts of the Temple, therefore the Torah had to tell us that he would only be culpable for שחיטה, slaughter, but not for מליקה, pinching." Thus far Torat Kohanim. From the above we learn that the word או serves to include culpability for slaughtering the bird in the wrong place whereas from the words אשר ישחט I derive that pinching is not culpable which I would otherwise have considered punishable due to the קל וחומר. How do I reconcile this with a Baraitha in Zevachim 107 where we are told by Rabbi Yishmael that he derives the culpability for slaughtering the bird from the expression אשר ישחט, whereas he derives the exclusion of culpability for pinching the bird's neck from the words זה הדבר (in verse 1) which I would have included on the basis of the קל וחומר had it not been for the words זה הדבר? Even Rabbi Akiva who disagrees with Rabbi Yishmael in Zevachim uses the extra words דם יחשב in order to derive the law that slaughtering sacrificial birds in the wrong place is culpable. He derives the exclusion of this culpability when the bird's neck is merely pinched from the expression אשר ישחט. We are forced to conclude that the author of Torat Kohanim was neither Rabbi Yishmael nor Rabbi Akiva. It is quite impossible to reconcile the view of Rabbi Yishmael with that of the author of Torat Kohanim, because the former uses the expression זה הדבר for an exegesis based on a גזרה שוה, comparing it to the same expression in Numbers 30,2, where the Torah speaks about who can cancel vows. On the other hand, the fact that Torat Kohanim does not record the exegetical comment of Rabbi Yishmael concerning the extraneous words דם יחשב, who includes culpability of someone who sprinkles the blood outside the precincts of the Tabernacle, it appears that the author of Torat Kohanim accepts the view of Rabbi Akiva. The exegetical use made by Torat Kohanim of the words או זבח in verse 8 i.e. that the blood is included in the prohibition and culpability of שחוטי חוץ makes it plain that Torat Kohanim does appear to accept the viewpoint of Rabbi Akiva as per the folio of the Talmud we quoted. From all this it emerges that the exegesis that the slaughtering of the bird is culpable when performed outside the courtyard of the Tabernacle is based on the words דם יחשב, whereas the exclusion of pinching the bird's neck as culpable is based on the words אשר ישחט. The question therefore arises why the author of Torat Kohanim derives two separate הלכות from the words אשר ישחט? Besides, why does the author of Torat Kohanim need the words דם יחשב in verse 4?

I have seen the following comment by Maimonides in chapter 18 of his treatise on Ma-asseh Hakorbanot. "When two people get hold of a knife and they perform ritual slaughter jointly they are free from punishment because the Torah wrote: אשר ישחט או אשר ישחט, i.e. one who slaughters not two who slaughter." Why did Maimonides have to look for a different expression in our verses and could not derive this הלכה from the existing exegesis either in the Talmud or Torat Kohanim ? Another difficulty in the statement by Maimonides is that the very words from the verse used by Maimonides for exonerating two people who slaughter jointly have already been used exegetically to derive the law about slaughtering birds, something which both Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva had agreed on in Zevachim 107? We have explained earlier that according to one of these Rabbis the word אשר ישחט is used to include culpabiity for slaughtering the bird, whereas according to the other Rabbi this word serves to exclude culpability if one merely pinched the neck of the bird in question. Maimonides accepts this latter ruling in chapter 19 of the treatise we mentioned earlier. We have still another difficulty with the exegesis of Maimonides' ruling in the matter of someone slaughtering on behalf of a private individual, i.e. איש. He derives this from the words דם יחשב לאיש ההוא דם שפך. This is how Maimonides explains his exegesis: "Although the person in question had not intended to slaughter these קדשים, sacrificial animals, for G'd as such, he will still be culpable because the Torah wrote: "it shall be accounted as blood (guilt) for that man, he has spilled blood." The latter words mean that though in his own mind this blood was similar to ordinary blood spilled on the ground and not blood intended for the altar at all he is guilty. Thus far Maimonides. The Talmud, on the other hand, uses the words איש איש as the basis for the culpability of someone who slaughters such an animal; furthermore, Torat Kohanim uses the words דם שפך as the exegetical base for excluding joint slaughter by two parties or people who slaughtered inadvertently or while under duress as we mentioned earlier. How can we use the same words exegetically to derive the prohibition of שחוטי חוץ? The last mentioned explanation is offered in the name of Rabbi Yossi who disagrees with Rabbi Shimon concerning the meaning of איש איש in Zevachim 108.

We must understand therefore that Maimonides chose to bring proof for his הלכה from the superfluous words דם שפך, as it is a stronger kind of proof than the exegesis based on the repetition of the word איש. Proof of this is found in Baba Metzia 31 where the repetition of the word העבט תעביטנו in Deut.15,8 is discussed. In that instance Rabbi Shimon took the view that the Torah employed normal human syntax and that the extra word was not intended for special exegetical purposes. Tossaphot write there that when there is evidence in the verse under discussion that the repetition is not justifiable in the context of that verse, we say that it has exegetical significance. When there is some justification for the repetition, however, we may choose not to look for further הלכות based on that word. Rabbi Shimon holds that in the case of Deut. 15,8 the words די מחסורו אשר יחסד לו, "in the amount that he is short," provide ample reason to rule that when the impoverished person does not want to turn his assets into cash and prefers to receive handouts, one need not assist such a person. This is what is meant by our "ignoring the repetition תעביטנו and declaring that the Torah uses ordinary human syntax." Considering this comment by Tossaphot, we can appreciate why the words איש איש are not as good an exegetical base as are the words דם שפך which are used by the Talmud as the exegetical basis according to Rabbi Yossi. Although the Talmud uses this exegetical basis only according to the view of Rabbi Yossi, we are entitled to assume that Rabbi Shimon feels the same way about it seeing we have no reason to assume that the two Rabbis disagree. While it is true that the Talmud (Zevachim 108) presents Rabbi Shimon as using the repetition by the Torah of the word איש איש as teaching that it is culpable to slaughter a mammal outside the precincts of the Temple if said animal was slated to be a sacrificial animal, this was only before Rabbi Shimon had heard of the exegetical value of the words דם יחשב לאיש ההוא דם שפך. This is presumably why Maimonides also quoted this latter exegesis as the basis for our הלכה.

[The author proceeds to deal with the first question he raised against Maimonides. I have decided to skip this. Ed.]

זבחי שלמים לה׳. "sacrifices of peace-offerings to G'd." Why did the Torah not content itself by writing וזבחו אותם, instead of repeating the words זבחי שלמים once more? Perhaps G'd wanted to demonstrate His fondness of the holy offerings brought by His people. He did so by emphasising that He considered these offerings as "peace-offerings," offerings by means of which Israel and G'd are perceived as dining at the same table, just like children at the table of their father. When the Torah writes שלמים לה׳ אותם, we may view the word אותם as referring to the previous subject בני ישראל which was mentioned at the beginning of our verse. The Torah describes how the soul of the Israelites leaves its mortal sheath, so to speak, in order to perform the service for its Maker, completely unaware of the "exaggerated" fondness displayed in return by G'd towards a soul so attuned to its G'd. All this is still insignificant compared to what we owe G'd in response to all He has done on our behalf already before we got around to acknowledging this by means of any peace-offerings.

ואליהם תאמר, "And to them you are to say, etc." According to Rabbi Yishmael in Zevachim 107 we are dealing here with an example of a phenomenon known as ערוב פרשיות, i.e. that the Torah writes a verse in a paragraph dealing with one subject whereas that verse really had its place in a different paragraph dealing with another subject matter. In our case our verse teaches that whereas so far the prohibition against שחוטי חוץ was presumed to apply only to the act of slaughtering outside and not to burning up the remains of the animals outside the sacred precincts, our verse comes to include also the burning up of the remains of such animals in all instances where these animals had been slated to be burned up on the altar. According to the first Mishnah in Zevachim chapter 13 if one slaughtered the sacrificial animal within the sacred precincts but burned the remains outside those precincts one is just as guilty as if one had slaughtered the animal outside the permitted perimeter. This prohibition applies even if the remains of that animal had not been meant to be burned up on the altar at all. Compare Rashi on the Mishnah.

מבית ישראל, from the house of Israel, etc. The Torah had to write the words "from the house of Israel" and could not content itself with writing the pronoun ואליהם at the beginning of this verse which would have created the impression that it referred to the matters discussed earlier in the paragraph. The word איש איש would have referred to two people who commit a sin jointly such as slaughtering an animal intended for the altar outside the sacred perimeter as we have already discussed. The Torah was afraid that an exegete would use the repetition of the word איש to include Gentiles. The Talmud in Menachot 73 when explaining the word איש איש in Leviticus 22,18 uses the repetition to mean that free-willed offerings by Gentiles are acceptable for the altar of the Temple. In order to prevent us from interpreting the additional word איש in our context in a similar manner the Torah had to add the words מבית ישראל. Burnt-offerings and peace-offerings are acceptable only from Israelites. This in turns leads us to interpret the other meanings we have attributed to the extra word איש in our chapter. Once the Torah was worried about our misinterpreting the word איש איש, so that it had to add the words מבית ישראל, the Torah next had to worry that the words מבית ישראל would lead us to interpret that even proselytes could not offer burnt-offerings and peace-offerings. This is why the Torah had to add the words: "and from amongst the proselyte who lives amongst you."

At this point there was a need to write all these words of an inclusive nature. Were it not for these additional examples of inclusive letters, etc. we would be tempted to interpret that the Torah did not include anything which was not spelled out specifically. This is true even according to Rabbi Yossi who holds that the Torah used the ordinary human syntax. Perhaps Rabbi Yossi Haglili holds that the principle of the Torah using ordinary human syntax applies only when there is some evidence that the Torah does not want us to use a specific extraneous word exegetically. [The Talmud in Baba Metzia 31 deals with numerous phenomena of the Torah repeating a word, such as :,שלח תשלח, הוכח תוכיח, הקם תקים, עזוב תעזוב and others. In all these instances the extra word is used exegetically, no one claiming that the Torah uses ordinary human syntax. Ed.] Although the Talmud queries the right of Rabbi Yossi Haglili who fails to use the extra word איש exegetically in one context to use it exegetically in other contexts, this would hold true were it not for the fact that the Talmud found an alternate expression to arrive at the same הלכה by using the word דם שפך exegetically instead of the extra word איש. Whenever the result of interpreting the extra word איש is not in conflict with known הלכות, we do not resort to the principle that "the Torah merely used ordinary human syntax." Tossaphot on Baba Metzia 31 point out that it is unreasonable to suppose that the rabbis were unable to find some exegetical use for the repetition of the word איש in every case where it appears, or for that matter, for any of the many examples where the Torah repeats a word, albeit in a slightly modified form. While it is true that Tossaphot there address the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the same applies to the opinion expressed by Rabbi Yossi Haglili. The main thrust of the argument of those who hold that the Torah uses ordinary human syntax is that we fall back on that principle only where exegetical use of the word would bring us into conflict with accepted הלכות. It can be demonstrated that even Rabbi Shimon frequently accepts that principle although he does use repetitions exegetically.

ואיש איש מבית ישראל אשר יאכל, "And any person from the house of Israel who will eat, etc." Torat Kohanim explains the repetition of the word איש in these words: "The word ישראל refers to the Israelites; the word גר refers to a proselyte; the letter ה before the word גר refers to the wife of the proselyte; the word בתוכם refers to women and slaves. In view of this, why did the Torah have to repeat the word איש? Rabbi Eleazar ben Rabbi Shimon answers that it is meant to include a baby of a Jewish mother fathered by a stranger or a slave." We need to know why the Torah had to write so many words to include all these details just as the Baraitha in Sukkah 28 asked concerning the word האזרח including the wives, etc. In that instance we find the following discussion [concerning who has to observe the commandment of fasting on the Day of Atonement, (Leviticus 23,27) a positive commandment applicable only at a certain time, something not normally applicable to women, Ed.]. "Rabbi Yehudah said in the name of Rav that the Torah compared men and women as being equal when it comes to the penalties for violations of Torah laws. As a result, the question arises why the Torah had to write words such as האזרח to restrict the law to adult males, or the words איש או אשה in Numbers 5,6 where clearly we speak of violation of a negative commandment, something that applies to women even if the Torah did not write the word אשה?" The answer given there is that the Torah included the application of the law even to the additional time before nightfall. Without the extra word I might have assumed that seeing neither men nor women are culpable for failure to observe that part of the fast, women would not even be obligated to observe it; therefore the Torah had to write a word indicating that observance is obligatory for women also. Using the approach underlying the discussion in the Talmud, we are entitled to ask here also why the Torah needed to write anything to include women? Who would have thought that women are relieved of the prohibition to eat blood? It is a negative commandment and it goes without saying that women are culpable if they violate it! Besides, why would we have made a difference between a baby born by a proselyte and one born by a natural-born Jewess that the Torah had to write something special to include such a woman? Furthermore, whom did the author of Torat Kohanim refer to when he spoke about a baby fathered by a proselyte so that the Torah had to specifically include such a child in its legislation by writing איש איש? If such a child reverts to paganism when he grows up, clearly the legislation does not apply to him. If, on the other hand, he grows up as a Jew, why would we need a word in the Torah in order to let us know that this legislation applies to him? In view of the fact that Torat Kohanim describes the child as an Israelite, it is clear that the assumption is that the child remained Jewish willingly. There is no reason why he should be inferior to a proselyte who was not even born as a Jew!

The author of Korban Aharon writes that the correct wording in the Baraitha quoting Rabbi Eleazar ben Rabbi Shimon should be: מן הגוי ומן העבד. The lesson would be that although the father of such a child is or was a pagan or a slave who had not been forbidden to eat blood, the child is forbidden to eat blood as he is considered part of the people his mother belongs to. The child of any union between a male Gentile and female Jewess is considered Jewish as we know from Yevamot 23, where the Talmud bases this on Deut. 7,3-4 the word בנך referring to a grandchild whose father was a Gentile. Thus far Korban Aharon. I find it difficult to accept a distinction between the son of such a mixed union who has decided to opt out of Judaism and one who has not. Once the Torah designated such a son as Jewish he is Jewish in the full sense of the word. If the Torah spoke of a son who did not want to remain Jewish, he has thrown off all of Torah! The Torah certainly does not address such a person! If we are able to impose Torah law on such a youngster we are obligated to do so just as we do with any natural-born Israelite who defies Torah law. If he is not under our control, what point is there in the Torah writing laws concerning such a person?

I believe that in order to understand what motivated the comments of Torat Kohanim and Korban Aharon it would help if we first examined the reason underlying the prohibition to eat blood which is the subject of our paragraph. Our sages have enlightened us in describing the souls of all Israelites as of a quality which is unmatched, when they interpreted Deut. 32,9 כי חלק ה׳ עמו, to mean that "His people are part of G'd Himself." They also added that although we live our lives in the "lower" world, physically distant from the "higher" celestial regions, we nonetheless retain a חוט של חסד, an umbilical cord of love which ties us to the celestial regions as demonstrated by the words יעקב חבל נחלתו, that "Jacob is the "rope" of His inheritance" (ibid.). The "soul" of an animal, on the other hand, is rooted in the "lower" world. It is related only to the spiritual forces of the lowest order, the קליפת נוגה. Whenever man -knowing it is forbidden-consumes the life-blood of an animal i.e. blood whose loss would result in the death of that animal (as opposed to blood of the capillaries), such eating is punishable by כרת, the premature death and/or extinction of the Jew eating such blood. The reason is very simple. By eating such blood and absorbing a lower category of animal soul thus diluting the "higher" soul G'd has equipped him with, one demonstrates his contempt for higher spiritual values, denying his דבקות, attachment, to one's celestial origin. The Torah writes: "I will set My face against the person (soul) who eats the blood and will cut him off from amongst his people." The Torah refers to what we have called the חוט החסד, the "thread (or rope) of love" which connects the Jewish soul to its celestial origin. All Jewish souls have a common celestial origin near the throne of G'd; this is why the Torah spoke of מקרב עמה, "from the midst of his people."

Furthermore, it is a well known fact that though the Jewish people share a common root, they are different individually in their relative spiritual levels. This is the mystical dimension of Kohelet 5,7: כי גבוה מעל גבוה שומר וגבוהים עליהם, "for there is One higher than the high Who watches and there are high ones above them." Seeing this is so, one might reason that in view of the fact that this animal which is ritually fit to be eaten cannot therefore have a ritually impure "soul," (life-force) and that imbibing its soul could not be damaging to our souls. I would have reasoned that if consumption of blood is capable of contaminating Jewish souls at all, it can have such an effect only on the most superior of souls, i.e. that of the males. It would follow that the penalty decreed by the Torah is restricted to Jewish males. This is why the Torah had to write words which make it plain that women are no less culpable for infraction of this prohibition than are men. Once the Torah had to write words or letters to include people whom we would not normally have included in that legislation, it had to spell out all the ones included or I would have reasoned that the respective inclusion applied only to the particular "lower" category of person singled out by special reference. The Torah therefore had to demonstrate that though Jewish souls are not all of the same calibre, all are holy enough to jeopardise their holiness if the bodies they inhabit consume animal blood.

You may also choose to pursue a different approach to our problem. You may argue that consumption of animal blood, i.e. the "soul" of such an animal could prove damaging only to the lowest categories of Jewish souls, and that therefore only those kinds of Jews should be prohibited from eating animal blood. A superior soul would be able to resist the subversive influence of such an animal's "soul" although it might not be totally immune to it. Such potential damage would certainly not be sufficient to rate the harsh כרת penalty. The Torah therefore carefully phrased the legislation in such a way that we cannot arrive at such faulty conclusions. By writing a series of expressions each one designed to include more and more categories of people in this legislation the Torah makes it clear that it applies to both people equipped with superior souls and those whose souls are on a lower level.

Here is a list of different levels of sanctity. The highest level belongs to the Israelite males; the second highest level belongs to their wives seeing that a female soul is not on the same level of spirituality as is that of a male; the next lower level is the son of a union between a natural born Jewish father and a proselyte. Next in line of sanctity from birth is the son of a proselyte married to a natural-born Jewish woman. Next in line is the female proselyte, daughter of either of the two last mentioned unions. Below this is the son of a union between a male proselyte and a female proselyte. Next in line of sanctity from birth is the daughter born from a union between a male and a female proselyte. Finally, there is the level of the proselyte himself. All of the above-mentioned levels are alluded to in the Torah at some point or other. The first and highest category of sanctity from birth is spelled out in the Baraitha of Torat Kohanim when they interpret the word ישראל in our verse as a reference to a male, natural-born, Israelite. Proselytes are mentioned twice in that paragraph when the words הגר הגר are understood as referring to two separate types of proselytes. You will also find that in Sukkah 28 they interpret the letter ה of the word האזרח as including the wives of the proselytes. This teaches us that the letter ה in the word הגר is to be understood as a רבוי, an additional dimension of the word גר. This means that the words הגר הגר in our verse really include four different kinds of combinations of proselytes. You therefore have a total of 4 extra words or letters each including additional categories of proselytes. Perhaps the wording of the author of our paragraph in Torat Kohanim who wrote גר אלו גרים, instead of זה גר as we would have expected, reflects that what he had in mind are two different categories of proselytes as opposed to a multiplicity of proselytes all of the same category, whereas the letter ה in front of the first גר refers to the wives of the proselytes. When the author of Torat Kohanim went on to write that the word בתוכם refers to the wives and slaves, he meant natural-born Jewish wives and slaves whose status in Jewish halachah is the same as that of women. Do not query the need for these people to have been especially included in the legislation seeing we could have included them by applying a קל וחומר from the application of the legislation to proselytes, i.e. if even proselytes are included what possible reason could there be for not including natural-born Jewish women? After all, natural-born Jewish women possess souls that are intrinsically less holy than those of their husbands, and if so what need was there for the Torah to mention them as being included in the group of people to whom the כרת penalty applies if even their husbands are so vulnerable that they are liable to the כרת penalty if they eat blood? Remember that if it had not been for the inclusive word בתוכם which we used to include women in the prohibition to eat blood and the resultant penalty, we would not have used the letter ה in the word הגר to include two categories of proselytes as we have described. Altogether we are faced with six different "inclusive" words or letters. The Torah wrote איש איש i.e. 2 more "inclusive" words which the author of Torat Kohanim uses to include the child born of an Israelite woman from a union with either a proselyte of a slave i.e. a child containing Jewish seed albeit seed from a Jew who was not a natural-born Jew. This is why the Torah wrote the additional words מן הגר, "originating in a proselyte." The intention of the verse was to refer to a proselyte who had married a natural-born Jewess or vice versa. These last named two categories are derived from the words איש איש.

Do not raise the objection that there was no need to write extra words or letters to include all these different levels of proselytes and the offspring of their unions seeing that even a total proselyte, i.e. one in whose veins not a drop of "Jewish" blood flows is subject to this legislation? If it had not been for the extra word איש which tells us that the proselytes mentioned in this verse were second generation proselytes, i.e. those whose father or mother or both had already been Jewish at the time they were conceived, I would not have known all this. Having written the extra word איש enabled the Torah to describe that there are different levels of proselytes, the most spiritually endowed being the ones in whose veins there flows some blood of a natural-born Jew. These are followed by the proselytes in which no such blood of natural-born Jews flows at all. You may ask whence do we know that a female child whose father was a proselyte and whose mother was a natural-born Jewess is subject to this legislation? Answer: if even a proselyte in whose veins no Jewish blood flows at all is included in the above legislation there was no need to add further רבויים, letters of an inclusive nature, to add such people to the groups of people covered by our verse.

בנפש האכלת, against the person (soul) eating, etc. Torat Kohanim understands the word בנפש in the singular as teaching that G'd does not punish a community who collectively consume blood with the כרת penalty, as the sin does not have the power to destroy the holiness of a group of people.

מקרב עמה, from amongst his people. According to Torat Kohanim the purpose is ועמה שלום, "and his people will be at peace." I am not sure what this is supposed to mean. If the people are guilty of that penalty because they are each responsible for the proper conduct of a fellow Jew, why should they not be punished? If, on the other hand, the Torah does not speak of people whose culpability originates in the הלכה of ערב, i.e. that each Jew is a sort of guarantor vis-a vis-G'd of a fellow Jew's behaviour, such as in instances when the sin was committed accidentally or unbeknown to the fellow Jew, why would the Torah have to even hint that such people are free from this penalty or any penalty at all? I believe that what Torat Kohanim had in mind was that when you cut off diseased branches from a tree you thereby improve what remains of the tree. The words מקרב עמה, from the midst of his people, mean that G'd decided to cut off this branch in order for the diseased branch not to infect the rest of the tree so that the tree itself remains healthy, שלם.

כי נפש הבשר בדם היא, for the life-force of all flesh is in its blood; why is the fact that the life-force is in the blood repeated twice in this verse? According to what I have written earlier this verse explains why the soul of the person eating blood is destroyed. The reason is that the blood contains the נפש, the essence of the animal it comes from. Consuming that life-force results in the soul- i.e. life-force of the person who consumed it becoming diluted with this spiritually inferior life-force. We still need to investigate why the Torah chose the expression נפש הבשר, "life-force of the flesh," instead of writing "the life-force is within the blood?" I believe G'd was anxious to answer a potential questioner that if the imbibing of the animal is so detrimental to the soul of a Jew, why did He not forbid the consumption of the flesh (meat) also? After all, the flesh too contained the life-force of the animal so that eating it would also cause irreparable harm to a Jewish soul? The Torah therefore repeats that it is only the blood in the flesh which contains the essence of the animal not the flesh itself. The essence of the animal is found in its blood, and not in the flesh. This is the meaning of נפש הבשר בדם היא. G'd did not make a human being in such a fashion. In the case of man, the life-force is not only in the blood but also in the flesh and the bones. Our sages refer to this life-force as הבלה, a certain moisture which survives in the bones of the righteous for many years after they have died. This is why they do not rot away. On the other hand, the wicked who are compared to animals are those who will not be resurrected when the time comes seeing that all their bones have dried out and have rotted away completely so that not an iota of their one-time life-force still exists.

ואני נתתיו לכם, "As for Me, I have given to you, etc." The Torah is telling us that the proof of the fact that the blood of the animal contains its "soul," its life-force, is that G'd allowed us to offer up the blood of the animal on the altar as a means to obtain atonement for our inadvertent trespasses. The process may be called נפש תחת נפש, G'd accepts one "soul" in lieu of another soul, i.e. the soul (life-force) of the sinner.

The verse also intends to warn us not to kill animals without an ulterior purpose. We are only allowed to take the life of an animal (the ones which are fit for consumption by Jews) to help us atone for our sins. The sequence of the words נתתיו לכם על המזבח are intended to demonstrate that the "gift" G'd has made us of the domesticated animals on earth carries with it some restrictions. We are not absolute owners of these animals to do with them whatever we please; rather they should serve to help us recapture our standing with the Almighty in the event that we became guilty of certain sins. We are taught in Sanhedrin 2 that if a domestic animal is guilty of an offence for which the Torah decreed that said animal has to die, such as initiating sexual intercourse with a human being, it is judged by a tribunal of no fewer than 23 judges, the same number required to judge a human being, someone who has killed a human being. It is not permitted to slaughter such an animal except when one wants to consume its meat. In Deut. 12,20 the Torah is on record as permitting man to indulge his craving for meat. In other words, the Torah had to write a special verse in order to permit us to eat meat which was not intended as sacrificial meat.

אשד יצוד ציד חיה או עוף, who hunts any beast or fowl, etc. We need to analyse why the Torah had to write this whole introduction instead of merely writing that if someone slaughters or otherwise kills a free-roaming animal or fowl he has to cover its blood with earth. Furthermore, if it is a decree without the Torah revealing its rationale, why does the Torah not merely write יכסהו, "he shall cover its blood with dust," instead of writing וכסהו, which implies that he had to fulfil another commandment prior to covering the blood of the creature in question.

I believe that by writing the words אשר יצוד the Torah intended to forbid the hunting of any species that are impure, i.e. whose meat is forbidden for Jews to eat although it may be used in another context. I have discussed this in my book פרי תואר item 117 in accordance with the view of Maimonides in his treatise Maachalot Assurot chapter 8 where he writes that permission to hunt is dependent on one's intention to hunt those free-roaming animals which we are allowed to eat. The fact that amongst the herd of animals one hunts there are some which do not qualify as food for Jews does not pose an halachic problem to the hunter in such an instance. This is the true meaning of the expression כי יצוד אשר יאכל, i.e. the activity of hunting is permissible only when its object is to provide you with permissible food. The Torah continues with וכסהו, [the emphasis being on the conjunctive letter ו Ed.] to draw our attention to the preceding מצוה, namely not to engage in hunting animals for sport but only for food. The Torah writes that the permission to eat, i.e. אשר יאכל, is contingent on the covering of the blood of such animal by earth once it has been spilled i.e. ושפך את דמו. In Deut. 12,24 the Torah warns that blood of free-roaming animals must not be consumed either. This teaches that already in our verse the Torah was concerned with our not eating the blood even of free-roaming animals or fowl by writing כי נפש כל בשד, that the life-force of all flesh, not only that of pure domestic animals, is situated in its blood. As a result of what we have just described you find three distinct commandments in our verse. 1) Not to hunt impure animals for one's pleasure; 2) Not to eat the blood of either חיה or עוף; 3) To cover the blood of such animals instead of pouring it down the sink, etc.

I believe we can also detect in the expression ושפך וכסהו an allusion to the need to cover only some of the blood with earth whereas the rest may be poured down the sink, compare Chulin 88.

דמו בנפשו, its blood is bound up with its essence. The meaning of this expression is that the blood is equivalent to its life-force [the life-force being something abstract. Ed.]. Here the Torah has provided us with the reason why we have to cover i.e. "bury" the blood of the above-named categories of animals. Seeing that the blood is its life-force, it is a matter of showing some respect for that life-force. The Torah also commanded that the remains of a human being be buried only as a demonstration of respect for the life (or life-force) of a human being.

The reason the Torah did not use the same syntax when it described the free-roaming animals as it did when it referred to the pure domesticated mammals where the Torah described the blood as דמו בנפשו, may be because the "pure" domesticated animal possesses a "soul," something which has been placed in its blood, whereas in the case of free-roaming animals or fowl the blood itself is in lieu of the "soul" G'd provided for the "pure" domesticated animals. This explains why such free-roaming animals and fowls are not suitable as sacrifices on the altar to achieve atonement for their owners with the exception of the pigeon and the turtle-dove. Even in the case of the latter, their blood is not sprinkled on the altar, seeing it does not represent the "soul" of the bird but its blood, i.e "soul" equivalent has been removed when the priest pinched the neck of the pigeon instead of slaughtering it.

כי נפש כל בשד דמו היא, for the life-force of all flesh is its blood. The Torah explains that the reason it forbade us to eat the blood of such animals is not that it is used to attain atonement for our own souls, i.e. the life we had forfeited by our sin, in which case there would have been a reason to distinguish between the blood of those animals which are fit as a sacrifice and those which are not. Rather, the reason is that we are not to consume the essence of such an animal.

כל אוכליו יכדת, anyone eating it will be cut off. I have explained already why this penalty is appropriate. The reason the Torah writes the word אוכליו in the plural whereas the penalty יכרת is in the singular is to alert us to the effect of the penalty. כרת means the withdrawal of the life-sustaining connection with the soul's celestial root. Seeing that all the Jewish souls have a common root, any reference to that root is in the singular. The reason the Torah describes the people consuming such blood as אוכליו, i.e. in the plural is, that there are many who derive some satisfaction of what a single person eats. The source of physical vitality attached to the celestial root contains a variety of preparatory steps to enable it to be absorbed successfully by bodies which have become fused with a soul. Although the body is essentially a material phenomenon G'd has created a force called נפש whose nature it is to develop liaison with material forces and which develops an urge to participate in the experiences a body finds pleasant. G'd created this force so that the soul would be able to function harmoniously within the body. The corresponding force, i.e. a somewhat diluted version of the purely spiritual soul, נשמה, is known as רוח, spirit; it is called thus because just as the wind is a phenomenon on earth but remains intangible, so this phenomenon we call רוח, spirit, performs both a physical and a spiritual function. When man eats, i.e. when the body eats, these other parts of the human personality also receive their sustenance from the food absorbed first by the body. This is why the Torah speaks about multiple אוכליו, "beings which eat of the blood." We may perceive of the following as all partaking of the nourishment a human being absorbs in ascending order. The body, the animalistic life-force נפש; the רוח, and finally the נשמה. As to the element subject to the כרת penalty, this is applied only to the חוט החסד, the "umbilical cord of love" connecting the נשמה to its celestial root. When this cord is severed from its root all other parts of the spiritual side of man will dry up and wither automatically..

We may also understand the verse on the basis of Torat Kohanim which explained on the word בנפש in verse 10 that the penalty applies to an individual eating and not to a community eating blood as the animalistic life-force contained in the blood is not powerful enough to destroy the fabric of the collective souls of such a community. This is alluded to here when the Torah refers to a number of people who eat but to the destruction of only a single soul.

I have tried to understand why G'd commanded that the blood of free-roaming animals or fowl has to be buried whereas the blood of pure domestic animals which have not been offered as a sacrifice does not need to be covered with earth. It is understandable that when the blood has been offered on the altar that no further procedure is needed; however, seeing that even when the Temple was standing most animals which were slaughtered were not offered as sacrifices, why did the blood of such animals not enjoy burial? Seeing we have explained that the "soul" of such a בהמה טהורה is superior to the life-force G'd supplied to free-roaming animals and fowl, why do we appear to discriminate against the בהמה טהורה by pouring away its life-blood instead of according it the honour of burial? Our question is reinforced by the fact that G'd rejected all free-roaming animals and almost all birds as unfit to serve as a sacrifice?

When we consider that I have explained that the blood of the free-roaming beast is itself its "soul" i.e. its life-force, as distinct from the pure domestic animal whose life-force is separate from its blood though carried by its blood, it emerges that G'd commanded only blood which is at the same time the essence of the vitality of the creature to be buried. Any blood which does not represent the essence of the creature does not need to be accorded such a symbolic funeral. Although the blood of the pure domestic animal contains its life-force, its "soul," the fact remains that its blood and its "soul" are not identical. Covering of the blood is required only for the מורגש, the tangibly peceptible, not for the היולי, that which is perceived only in the abstract, in its potential.

I wish to pursue the thought of why G'd decided to create the categories of the pure domestic animals as being so essentially different from the free-roaming beasts, animals which at first glance appear to have so much in common. We will understand the reason better if we first appreciate the factors which enable G'd's various creatures to fulfil their overall purpose and function on earth. Inasmuch as G'd is the source of all life in its various forms, He has made sure that all His creatures are equipped with the wherewithal to function in nature. He made all living creatures as composites of four basic raw materials, i.e. fire, air (spirit), water, and dust. The origin of these four raw materials is something that has not been made accessible to us, it is (at least partially) spiritual in nature and is described in kabbalistic literature as the "four legs of the throne of the Almighty," Ezekiel describes four carriers of this throne as creatures with the faces of four different animals including man in the opening chapter of his book as carriers of G'd's throne. There are also four angels who correspond to this basic "foursome" of creation, i.e. Gabriel, Rafael, Michael, and Nuriel. These three "foursomes" may be perceived as providing providing the background to the creation of a physical universe, the gradual reduction of pure spirit to something material. Each "foursome" is a preparatory level to a lower level of spirituality, something closer to the physical material world. The "foursome" described as part of G'd's throne in Ezekiel are the four categories of creatures which form the basis of life on earth. The face of אדם refers to the human species; the face of the ox refers to the pure domestic animals; the face of the lion refers to the free-roaming beasts on earth; and, finally, the face of the eagle refers to the fowl. Just as there are four categories of life on earth [living creatures containing blood Ed.] so there are four categories of inert beings, i.e. fire, wind, water, and dust. All creatures are composites of these four elements. Even amongst the intangible souls or life-forces G'd has created we find "foursomes." The highest of these are the celestial lights G'd has created which are almost part of the essence of G'd Himself. In every single sphere of creation we find the active, the dispenser, the male on one hand, and the passive, the recipient, the female. In the final analysis even the most inert component of our physical universe is the recipient of celestial input, i.e. from the region of the throne of G'd.

Let us now examine the nature of the celestial influences the foursomes in our world are exposed to. Inasmuch as the face of one of the foursomes in Ezekiel's vision is that of the ox, i.e. a pure domestic animal, it is reasonable to suppose that the pure domestic animals in our universe i.e. its counterpart in our regions, receive their spiritual input via their celestial counterpart. However, the face of the lion represents an impure free-roaming animal. It is reasonable therefore to assume that all free-roaming animals (including the pure ones) receive the kind of spiritual input from the celestial regions associated with their counterpart the lion and what it represents. They are therefore deprived of primary positive spiritual input. The same applies to the fowl, seeing that the face of the eagle in Ezekiel's vision is also that of an impure category of bird. We need to examine why the counterpart of these "faces on the throne of G'd" have not been granted positive spiritual input as did the pure domestic animals which are recipients of spiritual input from the ox in Ezekiel's vision? Furthermore what is the source of the criteria which enabled some free-roaming beasts such as the gazelle, etc. to be considered pure beasts, fit for consumption by Jews?

Remember that there are levels of perceptions which the recipient's mind is incapable of perceiving even if the source from which such perceptive powers emanate makes an effort to transmit such receptive power. Torah scholars are well aware of the fact that there are gradations of such perceptive powers and some of them are endowed with greater such powers than others. [I believe we can best describe what the author is trying to tell us when we imagine the receiver of a person equipped to handle a minimum of 5000 volt being bombarded from a transmitter which sends out impulses of 1000 volt maximum. The receiver in the hands of the person described would not be able to handle such transmissions. I shall continue to paraphrase the comments of our author as I feel that rendering them literally would not result in the reader's enlightenment. Ed.] The lion and eagle in our world are to be perceived as possessing such receivers having made efforts to exceed the natural receptive powers granted to them. As a result, the impulses emitted from their celestial counterparts are largely wasted on them and they are forced to stay outside the garden that G'd had intended for them to be part of seeing they have not achieved the spiritual goals they were meant to achieve. As a result of being under-achievers in G'd's overall scheme for His universe, He commanded the Israelites to keep a distance from such animals so as not to absorb any of their failings. We know from Deut. 4,11 that in order to remain both spiritually and physically alive one needs to maintain a close affinity to G'd and His commandments. We know from Job 14,4 that it is reserved for G'd alone to know by what devious paths purity can develop out of something that started with an impure base. If the original bird in Ezekiel's vision was the eagle, symbol of an impure bird, and so was the eagle in our world, this does not mean that amongst all the fowl some will not evolve which bear the mark of purity, such as the pigeons amongst the domesticated birds or the chickens, geese, turkeys, etc.. The same holds true for the free-roaming mammals. Although their archtype is the lion, this did not prevent certain categories evolving into pure free-roaming beasts such as the hart, the gazelle, and the roebuck. Due to their being cut off, or better, having caused themselves to be cut off from their celestial counterpart and not having received the required positive spiritual input from the source of their part of the celestial "foursome," the only level of "soul" these animals possess is their blood itself.

וכל נפש אשר תאכל גבלה, and every person eating an animal which died of natural causes, etc. The reason the paragraph commences with the letter ו before כל is to remind us that all the rules which apply to the eight different categories of Israelites and proselytes we listed in the last paragraph (verse 10) apply here also. The Torah here mentioned two categories, i.e. אזרח וגר, natural-born Jew and proselyte, to tell us that these are respective "headings" for the various categories of natural-born Jews and proselytes.