אשם הוא, it is a guilt-offering. Rabbi Eliezer and the other rabbis disagree in Torat Kohanim whether the extraneous word הוא is intended to teach that if this offering was not slaughtered on the northern side of the altar that it is invalidated. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the word הוא means that if the guilt-offering was slaughtered while the priest entertained the wrong thoughts i.e. assumed that the animal in question was a different kind of offering, it is invalid. According to his reasoning, the words אשם הוא emphasise the need for the guilt-offering mentioned in verse 1 of our chapter to have been slaughtered for that purpose in order to be acceptable. We find in Zevachim 10 that Rabbi Yehoshua challenged Rabbi Eliezer's exegesis and that thereupon Rabbi Eliezer retracted and derived his ruling that the אשם must be slaughtered as such in order to be valid from the words כחטאת כאשם in verse 7 of our chapter. Considering this, we must ask what Rabbi Eliezer learns from the extraneous word הוא? Perhaps if the word הוא had not been written here I would have made the comparison made in Zevachim 11 between the guilt-offering and the sin-offering described in verse 7 as not applying to the need to perform סמיכה on the guilt-offering just as on the sin-offering, but I would have applied it to the need to slaughter either offering with the right intent in order for it to be acceptable. In order to prevent us from making such an error, the Torah wrote the word הוא next to the word אשם to inform us that this word tells us something about the אשם itself. The Torah wrote the words כחטאת כאשם in verse 7 in order to tell us that both these offerings require סמיכה as something mandatory. The other rabbis, the ones who disagreed with Rabbi Eliezer who used the word הוא to invalidate the guilt-offering unless it had been slaughtered on the northern side of the altar, understand that word to refer back to verse 2 where the principle of slaughtering the guilt-offering in the same place as the burnt-offering has first been mentioned. Repeating this by means of the word הוא indicates that the requirement is mandatory. Although one could challenge these rabbis with similar queries as the ones used by Rabbi Yehoshua to get Rabbi Eliezer to retract, the fact that they did not arrive at a new הלכה by dint of a סברה, a process of reasoning, but applied a rule applicable to other sacrifices also to the guilt-offering by their methodology, it is absolutely acceptable that the word הוא was intended by the Torah to make the site of the slaughtering mandatory. This is all the more so since in the case of the burnt-offering the Torah had spelled this law out in so many words. The contribution of those rabbis is that if we had only had verse 1 in our chapter, I would have reasoned that while it is a desired requirement, failure to slaughter the guilt-offering on the northern side of the altar would not have invalidated it.

וכל מנחה אשר תאפה בתנור, and every meal-offering which is baked in the oven, etc. The Torah mentions five separate categories of meal-offerings to exclude five matters. 1) The sons of Aaron do not divide the meal-offering according to the formula employed when animal offerings are shared out, i.e. that portions of one offering may be traded off against portions of another offering; rather every priest of the group performing service on that day receives his share of each of the meal-offerings presented on that day. 2) Bird-offerings are not shared out in the same way as the meal-offerings. One could have argued that the bird-offerings and the meal-offerings were both offerings presented by the poor and the very poor respectively. This factor does not have a bearing on the method employed in sharing out the meat of the bird-offerings, however. 3) The distribution of the meat of bird-offerings did not parallel that of the offerings consisting of four-legged animals, even though in both cases their blood is sprinkled on the altar. 4) The criteria applicable to the distribution of the parts of one kind of meal-offering are not identical to those of the sharing out of another kind of meal-offering, even though they all consist of flour of some kind. 5) Meal-offerings consisting of baked goods baked in one kind of pan or another kind are not shared out according to the same criteria as other meal-offerings prepared in a similar manner when these meal-offerings served different purposes.

Although these five exclusions all concern different kinds of meal-offerings, the exegesis from which we derived these halachic differences is based on what is called אם אינו ענין, i.e. that if the Torah records certain information which is superfluous in its context, such information may be applied to supplement information lacking in a different context. I have seen that Maimonides in chapter 10, ruling 15 of his Ma-asseh Hakorbanot explains the exclusions in our two verses along different lines (other than Torat Kohanim which is similar to our author). He bases his exegesis on the fact that the Torah did not include the five kinds of meal-offerings mentioned here in the section dealing with מנחת סלת in 6,7-11 but records it in a different context. This is remarkable seeing that in the case of the meal-offerings which are baked as well as in the meal-offering consisting of fine flour mixed with oil and frankincense the Torah speaks of the offering belonging to the officiating priest. Maimonides reasons that we could have made a case for sharing out the meal-offering consisting of fine flour according to the same criteria as those applicable to some other meal-offering but we do not do so. It is clear from Maimonides' reasoning that he employs the words לכל בני אהרון "to all the priests" in 7,10 as the basis for his exegesis. This is not what we learned in the Baraitha (Torat Kohanim ).

Maimonides also stresses the fact that the laws of the meal-offering do not all appear in a single paragraph. This teaches that unless the Torah had separated the laws of one kind of meal-offering (the מנחת סלת) which was not baked from the five categories mentioned in our chapter all of which are baked, we could not have used these verses exegetically and we would not have arrived at the conclusions derived by Torat Kohanim. Perhaps Maimonides thought that the fact that the Torah artificially separated the legislation pertaining to the offering of the meal-offerings is proof that it did not want us to assume that the formula of trading off by the priest of parts of one meal-offering against parts of another type of meal-offering is acceptable. Having arrived at this principle, it is applied to all the meal-offerings. You may find proof in the fact that in the case of מנחת מרחשת and מנחת מחבת the Torah does not mention a word about all the priests sharing in it equally. All that is mentioned is that priests not officiating on that day are not entitled to share in it. [the Torah phrases it positively, saying: "it belongs to the priest who offers it which means to the group of priests officiating on that day. Ed.] Whence does Maimonides know then that a meal-offering offered in a pan may not be traded off against a meal-offering offered in a stewing-pan seeing not a word is said about how these meal-offerings are to be shared out? Actually, the five exclusions we cited earlier as the basis of our exegesis are only of the type known as אסמכתא, a "lean-to." This type of exegesis is not binding but serves as a reminder of halachot with which we are already familiar. The principal exegetical tool is the fact that the Torah saw fit not to record all six examples of meal-offerings in the same paragraph.

We are now left with the problem of why the Torah gave many details repeatedly when all it had to write was that "every meal-offering belongs to the officiating priest, and is to be shared by all the priests officiating on that day." Perhaps -in view of the fact that the Torah already entered into details of different kinds of baked meal-offerings- the Torah was afraid that we would apply totally different criteria to the מנחת סלת and others which were not baked. We find, for instance, in Menachot 63 that the Talmud explains the words וכל נעשה במרחשת ועל מחבת in 7,9 to mean that these meal-offerings and the rules pertaining to them are governed by the type of container they are offered up in and not so much by their composition. The practical significance of this becomes evident when a person vows to bring a meal-offering and he merely identifies the kind of meal-offering he undertakes to bring by naming the vessel it is to be brought in. For instance, he said: "I am obligated to a certain kind of baking pan" [one of the ones which existed in the Temple. Ed]. According to the school of Hillel such a vow is valid seeing the kind of pan he mentioned is a sacred vessel and can be used for the meal-offering and the Torah wrote: "anything prepared in either of these kinds of pans, etc." According to the school of Shammai it is doubtful what this person had in mind. His "offering" would need to remain untouched until the coming of Elijah the prpohet who would resolve our doubts about its validity. Rabbi Yossi the son of Rabbi Yehudah holds that all these meal-offerings are separate categories. Therefore, one may not bring less than a minimal quantity of a meal-offering על המחבת and add to it less than a minimal quantity of a meal-offering במרחשת in order to combine these quantities into a single meal-offering of minimal acceptable quantity. The words אשר תאפה תנור, teach that one cannot combine part of a meal-offering baked on a griddle with part of a meal-offering baked in an oven. The only extraneous words which have not yet been explained exegetically are the ones in verse 10 seeing what is written there is also a duplication.

Perhaps Rabbi Yossi son of Rabbi Yehudah who holds that the words מאפה תנור mean two types of meal-offerings derived his ruling from the fact that the Torah employed the word כל both in verse 9 and in verse 10. As a result we have a double duplication. First of all there was no need for the extra verse; secondly, if you already had the extra verse, the word כל did not need to appear in both verses. This is why Rabbi Yossi is careful to mention the source of his ruling, i.e. וכל מנחה,…וכל נעשה במרחשת, ובל מנחה בלולה. He adds: "Just as the word וכל in verse 10 clearly refers to two separate meal-offerings, i.e. one containing a great deal of oil and one a dry one, so the word וכל in the previous verse also refers to two different categories of meal-offering. It follows from the above that if the Torah had only written the words מנחה בלולה, or כל מנחה חרבה, I would not have had an exegetical tool with which to derive the various halachot we have derived from the repeated use by the Torah of the word וכל. In fact, one could have argued that if the Torah had written כל מנחה חרבה this would furnish proof that the word כל applied to a single kind of meal-offering, [in spite of the Torah using the word כל meaning each or every. Ed.] and that when the Torah spoke about this kind of meal-offering without using the word כל such as in Leviticus 2,4: מנחה מאפה תנור (Leviticus 2,4), it also referred to only a single category of offering. The Torah had to write all the verses which appear to contain some duplication in order to teach us the various halachot we just described.

ונפש אשר תאכל בשר וטומאתו עליו, And a person who eats of sacrificial meat….while he is ritually unclean, etc. Both this and the following verse are interpreted by Torat Kohanim as speaking of personal ritual impurity [as opposed to the meat having become impure, as suggested by the masculine pronoun עליו which does not fit the subject נפש which is feminine. Ed.]. Zevachim 43 states that any verse which has not been interpreted by Rabbi Yitzchak son of Avdimi in this fashion cannot be interpreted in this way. Rabbi Yitzchak son of Avdimi had stated that only if a verse commences with a subject which is feminine and concludes with a subject which is feminine and in between we encounter a masculine pronoun may we interpret that the masculine pronoun refers to the original subject and not to the object which is masculine. Rashi explains that seeing that the verse following displays the same pattern and it is clear in that verse that the person who is the subject of the word ואכל, "and he eats," is a human being, verse 20 must be understood in the same sense. Rashi's words help us understand why the word וטומאתו "while he is impure," do not have to refer to the word בשר, which is the only masculine noun in that verse seeing that we thought that the laws about the meat being impure had already been concluded as Rashi explained in his commentary in Zevachim 43 where the verse is examined.

Torat Kohanim also cites a gezeyrah shavah comparing the word טומאתו, mentioned here with the word טומאתו mentioned in Numbers 19,13. However, I have decided to concentrate on the reason the Torah saw fit to contravene the rules of grammar in our two verses. If the Torah had simply written the word וטומאתה in verse 20 instead of writing וטומאתו, we would not have had to resort to the exegetical use of the gezeyrah shavah in Numbers 19,13 at all. Also, why did the Torah not write verse 21 in a more straighforward manner?

I believe that when the Torah wrote וטומאתו עליו in verse 20, it wanted to teach us something different altogether. The words refer to someone who had already undergone the purification process of seven days for someone who has become impure through contact with the dead, but had not yet experienced sunset on his seventh day; alternatively, it may refer to a person impure through contact with some kind of four-legged creeping animal who has not yet undergone ritual immersion. It is important to appreciate that such residual impurity as we have just mentioned is not so serious that it affects the soul of the person concerned. It is more like a veil of impurity which envelops only the outside of the body of a person. This is the reason why ritual immersion is sufficient to remove the last vestiges of such impurity although for the previous seven days such a ritual immersion would have been quite ineffective seeing the impurity had penetrated also the inside of the body. When the Torah wrote והנפש אשר תאכל…וטומאתו עליו, it informed us that not only is someone guilty of the Karet penalty when the impurity he is suffering from is עליה, envelops his soul, but even if the impurity has already been reduced to a state where it is only עליו on the outside of his body, the same penalty still applies if he eats sacrificial meat before having become totally pure. Similar considerations apply to someone who has not yet shed the relatively lighter impurity absorbed through his having contacted a dead creeping animal.

Why then does the Torah use the masculine form ואכל in the middle of verse 21, when the correct term would have been ואכלה seeing that I could not have mistaken its meaning and it would have been so much simpler to have a uniform text in both of these verses? I believe that the reason the Torah chose to write נפש כי תגע, a feminine way of describing the contact instead of writing איש כי יגע the parallel masculine form, is to inform us that such contact with the source of impurity had to be intentional not merely accidental in order for the person to become culpable of the penalty mentioned. The word נפש alludes to such an intentional act. This is also the reason why the Torah chose the word נפש instead of איש in verse 20. The word איש would not have conveyed the fact that the act was committed intentionally. Keeping in mind the thought that the word נפש alludes to the awareness of the sinner of what he is doing will help us understand the recurrent use of the word נפש in chapter four and five which deals with inadvertently committed sins. This word explains the need for the sinner to offer sin-offerings or guilt-offerings in those situations. Had the sinner been totally unaware of committing a wrong the Torah would not have required these offerings from him so that he could atone for his mistakes. We may summarise that the word נפש indicates that the person who committed the trespass cannot claim unawareness of doing something wrong. In our two verses here the word נפש implies that the guilty party was aware of touching something he should not have touched (verse21) or he was aware that he ate something he should not have eaten (verse 20). We cannot therefore question why the Torah used a masculine term in the middle of both verses as there was no need to depart from the norm in describing the perpetrator of the sin as being a male. The reason the Torah wrote ונכרתה הנפש ההיא, "this soul will be exterminated," is to teach us that G'd will not only punish the body of the sinner by premature death or something like it, but that He will also punish his soul by death.

In addition to the approach of our sages in the Talmud, we may find still another reason to justify the repetition of our verses by referring to the Mishnah in Zevachim 106. We learn there that a person who is ritually impure and eats sacrfificial meat is guilty regardless of whether that meat had already been defiled or not. Rabbi Yossi Haglili disagrees saying that if said meat had already been defiled, the person who ate it is not guilty. In discussing this problem on folio 108, the Talmud concludes that if the person became defiled before the meat became defiled there is a concensus that the person who ate from that meat is guilty. The disagreement between the majority opinion and Rabbi Yossi Haglili concerns only a situation when the meat became defiled before the person eating it became impure. This is why the Torah had to write two verses The first verse i.e. והנפש אשר תאכל describes a situation in which a person who is ritually unclean ate sacrificial meat of a peace-offering which was ritually pure; the second verse which writes ואכל מבשר זבח השלמים, speaks of a ritually impure person who ate sacrificial meat which had already become defiled. Perhaps the reason the Torah described the meat in the first verse as תאכל בשר מזבח שלמים, meat of a peace-offering, is that the meat in question had not yet become defiled; in the following verse the Torah changed this description by writing מבשר זבח שלמים, meaning the meat was of a category which qualifies as a meat-offering, but it had been defiled in the meantime and does no longer qualify for being eaten. It is no longer בשר שלמים. The letter מ in the word מבשר indicates that it is no longer wholly a meat-offering, זבח שלמים. The letter מ is therefore not exegetically available for some other למוד, halachah, to be derived from it.

מן הבהמה, from the beast, etc. This apparently superfluous word is interpreted by Torat Kohanim as including the fat of animals each one of which would have been suitable as a sacrifice, and which have been crossbred, such as the product of a billy-goat mating with a ewe or vice versa; the fat of animals which are the product of such crossbreeding is unfit to eat on pain of the Karet penalty. The apparently extraneous word כל in the sequence כל חלב refers to an animal called כוי which is the product of a male goat mating with a gazelle. In my book פרי תואר in which I have commented on the טור יורה דעה טז you will find more about this subject.

כל אוכל חלב, anyone eating such fat, etc. The word כל is interpreted by Torat Kohanim as including the fat of animals which are not intended to become sacrificial offerings. We should not err and conclude from the words אשר יקריב ממנו אשה לה׳ that only חלב of such sacrificial animals is prohibited; therefore the Torah adds the word כל אוכל חלב. Seeing this inclusive word is not required to warn those who would eat it, it may be applied to the parts of the animal subject to being eaten.

It seems rather difficult to understand why I would have made such an error and would have thought that without the word כל the Torah's injunction would have applied only to בשר קדשים, sacrificial animals. After all, the Torah mentioned specifically that the fat of a נבלה an animal which died by causes other than ritual slaughter may be used for the performance of all kinds of work but may not be eaten (24)? Besides, since when are the remnants of sacrificial animals permitted for use by non-priests? Does the Talmud not state specifically in Pessachim 82 that if an animal intended as a sacrifice was found to be treyfah after it has been slaughtered, such an animal has to be removed to a place called בית השרפה, to be burned there? We derive this from Leviticus 6,23 בקדש באש תשרף. This teaches that all sacrificial animals which have become unfit for the altar have to be destroyed. In view of this the words וחלב נבלה וחלב טרפה in verse 24 must refer to animals not intended as sacrificial offerings. Why then did the Torah have to write the words כל אוכל חלב to prevent me from making an error as to the prohibition of חלב applying to ordinary animals? We believe the main point Torat Kohanim wanted to make with its למוד from the words כל אוכל חלב is that the penalty of Karet applies both to someone who partakes of fat from sacrificial animals and to someone who partakes from the fat of ordinary animals. If not for the words כל חלב, I would have assumed that the prohibition is an ordinary negative commandment punishable by 39 מלקות lashes.

כל חלב שור וכשב ועז לא תאכלו "You shall not eat any fat of ox, sheep or goat. Torat Kohanim on this verse comments that the list of these animals is intended to exclude the prohibition of חלב from animals not suitable for consumption by Jews, בהמות טמאות, as well as free-roaming animals and fowl. In Chulin 116 Rabbi Mori is reported as having asked Rabbi Zvid if the fat-tail אליה of the sheep was considered חלב and therefore prohibited. Rabbi Zvid answered: "because of people who ask questions such as you have just asked the Torah wrote the verse כל חלב שור וכשב ועז לא תאכלו, to make clear that the term חלב applies only to the kind of fat which these three categories of animals have in common." How could Rabbi Zvid give such an answer seeing we have already used the animals mentioned in that verse for a different למוד, namely to exclude three other categories of animals? If the Torah had not written verse 23 to exclude the three categories of animals mentioned by Torat Kohanim, we would have learned a קל וחומר, i.e. used logic to arrive at the opposite conclusion as explained by Torat Kohanim on that verse. Perhaps we could have derived the exclusion of those three categories of animals from the words אשר יקריב ממנה אשה לשם. These words would already have excluded both fowl (of which only two species may be used as an offering) and impure animals which are totally unfit as offerings, as well as free-roaming animals which are not suitable as offerings for different considerations although they may be consumed by Jews if ritually slaughtered, etc. Alternatively, once the Torah had specifically excluded impure animals and free-roaming beasts, the Torah made it plain that the קל וחומר which was based on the comparison with the prohibition to eat blood which applies to all of the three categories of animals alike although certain other disqualifications do not apply to it, is not to be applied here. You will find that Rashi's commentary on the Mishnah in Chulin 117 follows a similar path. It is important to take a good look at the next verse.

מן הבהמה, from the beasts; Torat Kohanim derives from this expression also that animals not intended to serve as sacrifices due to a physical blemish are nevertheless included in the legislation forbidding the consumption of their חלב, the fat parts offered on the altar, if they had been used as sacrifices. Although the Torah had already specifically prohibited the חלב of animals which have not been slaughtered ritually or of animals which were found defective after slaughtering (although these animals too were unfit for the altar and I could have used that fact to apply the legislation to said חולין בעלי מומין), this would not have been conclusive. According to Maimonides there is no biblical prohibition against a treyfah animal being offered on the altar (Issurey Mizbeach chapter 2). This prohibition is based only on Maleachi 1,8 that "G'd would reject an offering which does not reflect our high regard for Him seeing we would not dare offer something inferior to our governor." Accordingly, a special verse was needed to include treyfah animals. It is true that Torat Kohanim on the same two words in Leviticus 1,2 mentions the exclusion of treyfah animals; however, this is only an אסמכתא a "lean to;" it is not the kind of exegesis which is binding as has been explained in that connection by the author of Kesef Mishneh. At any rate, seeing that a נבלה is prohibited as an offering by a biblical injunction because the Torah wrote the word ושחט, "he must slaughter the animal," in connection with every sacrifice, why was there a need to use the words מן הבהמה to include the categories mentioned by Torat Kohanim? We have to answer again that what Torat Kohanim had in mind was that the same penalty Karet which applies to someone who partakes of the fat of the sacrificial animal also applies to someone eating the fat parts of an ordinary animal which had become unfit as a sacrifice.

אשר יקריב ממנה אשה לשם, from which he will offer a sacrifice to the Lord; Torat Kohanim, which zeroes in on the apparently extraneous words אשר יקריב, concludes that the Torah refers to the type of חלב which is suitable for burning up on the altar; it excludes the kind of חלב of the walls of the animal's cavities and fat on the ribs which is not suitable for the altar. According to this reasoning which uses the words כל חלב שור וכשב ועז to exclude application of the prohibition to eat the fat of impure animals and the like, the words אשר יקריב were not needed, and they were therefore available to exclude such fats as is on the ribs of the animal from the application of the prohibition to eat חלב.

From where does Rabbi Zvid who used the words שור וכשב ועז to permit eating of the fat on the אליה, the fat part of the tail of the sheep, derive permission to eat also from the fat on the ribs, etc.? At the same time we may ask where the sage who derives permission to eat the fat of the אליה from the words שור וכשב ועז, finds a source for permitting consumption of such fat as that on the ribs, etc.? We may have to conclude that Rabbi Zvid holds that the words אשר יקריב exclude not only such animals as impure beasts, free-roaming animals and fowl from the prohibition of חלב, but also exempt fat on such parts of the animal as the ribs from the application of this law. The reasoning is simply that not only any animal but any part of an animal not burned up on the altar is excluded from this injunction. The author of Torat Kohanim also arrives at the same exclusion using the words שור וכשב ועז as excluding also the אליה from this injunction. If the verse had wanted to exclude only impure animals, birds and wild-roaming animals, it would have had to mention only שור וכשב. As soon as we would exempt even a single type of animal from the prohibition of eating חלב though the prohibition of eating of its blood still applied to it, the whole basis for the קל וחומר which Torat Kohanim wanted to refute by the Torah's use of the extraneous words מן הבהמה had already disappeared. We would have excluded such animals as חיה ועוף automatically. If the Torah nonetheless wrote extra words, such words may be used exegetically, i.e. to exclude the fat on the ribs. The three words שור כשב and עז would between them have excluded only the fat of the אליה from the prohibition of eating חלב.

Why then did Rabbi Zvid disagree with the author of Torat Kohanim who derived the exclusion of the fat of impure animals, free-roaming animals, and birds from the words שור וכשב ועז? The author concludes that the principal exclusion of such animals as the impure, the free-roaming ones, and the birds is derived from the words שור וכשב ועז. He does not therefore accept the view of Rashi on the Mishnah in Chulin 117 which he quoted earlier.

זאת התורה לעולה למנחה ולחטאח, This is the law of the burnt-offering, of the meal-offering and of the sin-offering. It is not clear what this verse wants to tell us. In Torat Kohanim we read that just as the details of the consecration rites of the Tabernacle which are discussed in the next chapter have all been handed down at Mount Sinai, so the details of permanent offerings have also been handed down at Mount Sinai. Seeing that the consecration rites consisted of public offerings, how do we know that the legislation concerning private offerings was also handed down from Sinai in all its details? Answer: This is why the Torah included the guilt-offering in our verse, an offering which is always a private offering. I have already said repeatedly such as at the beginning of Parshat Mishpatim what I have to contribute on the subject (compare page 689). Torat Kohanim as well as Zevachim 97 also derive from this verse that all the meat-offerings need to be slaughtered with a knife, same as the burnt-offering. It also teaches that all public peace-offerings are to be consumed by the male priests just like the meal-offerings. A more homiletical message contained in this verse may be the thought expressed by Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish in Menachot 110 that anyone studying the laws of the burnt-offering is as if he had actually offered such a sacrifice. I plan to follow the same approach.

Let me first preface my remarks by recalling that numerous Kabbalists who have engaged in a study of these matters have said that the principal purpose of Torah and its study is to recapture sparks of sanctity which have "fallen" and as a result are being held captive. We are dealing with two separate aspects of fallen sparks of sanctity here. One refers to the sparks of sanctity which descended into the world of chaos for reasons which are well known. The term "sparks" of sanctity is enough for these students of Kabbalah to know what we are talking about. The second aspect of that term is that it refers to souls which are being oppressed by cruel humans ever since the time Adam sinned in גן עדן. At that time Adam provided the negative elements in our world with a great deal of spiritual loot. The only way such souls can be rescued from the clutches of the spiritually negative forces which hold them captive is the study of Torah in such a way that Torah becomes the mainstay of our lives. Torah is the only effective antidote to the forces of Samael (the evil urge) as we know from Kidushin 30: "If Samael attacks you drag him to the hall of Torah study. If he had been as hard as stone before you dragged him to the house of Torah study you will find that he melts; if he had been as tough as iron he will explode."

In our verse the Torah has revealed the marvellous properties of our Torah. When the Torah writes: "This is the Torah," this is an introduction to the description of its powers. The Torah continues: לעולה, to tell us that by means of Torah study the Jewish people can elevate themselves to be the vehicle of G'd's Presence. The Torah goes on to say למנחה. This word may be translated in several ways all of which are correct. The word reflects the concept of מנוחה, rest; it reflects the concept נחת, calm, tranquillity; it also reflects the concept of הנחה, deposit, repose. This latter meaning is most likely the principal meaning of the word מנחה. In Chulin 91 the stones upon which Jacob placed his head when he went to sleep after having been surprised by an early sunset, are described as having merged in order that the righteous Jacob should be able to use all of them as his pillow, for his repose. In his commentary on Genesis 2,2 Rashi writes בא שבת בא מנוחה, "the arrival of the Sabbath brings with it a sense of repose." This is because the righteous, the foundation of the world, uses the Sabbath as his pillow (allegorically speaking). This is also the mystical dimension of Song of Songs 2,6: שמאלו תחת לראשי וימינו תחבקני. "His left hand is under my head and His right arm embraces me."

ולתטאת ולאשם, and for the sin-offering and the guilt-offering. These words clarify two separate aspects of the descent of the sparks of sanctity into the nether regions which we referred to earlier. The sparks of sanctity which descended at the time the world was still in chaos, Tohu Vavohu [before the period which commenced with G'd creating light at the beginning of the Torah's report in Genesis 1,3 Ed.], are here referred to as לחטאת, i.e. "the Torah of the sin-offering," whereas the sparks of sanctity which descended into the realm of Satan after Adam sinned are referred to as לאשם, i.e. "the Torah of the guilt-offering." The Torah had to inform us of this division in order for us to appreciate that not only can it help us locate and isolate i.e. identify these sparks of sanctity in an environment inherently hostile to sanctity, but Torah can also be the instrument of rescuing these sparks of sanctity from their exile. The Torah alludes to this when it writes: ולמלואים, i.e. "to make them fill their original places." The word למלואים refers to the original place assigned to the sparks of sanctity which descended into chaos before G'd created order in the physical universe. The words ולזבח השלמים refer to the sparks of sanctity which descended into the clutches of the spiritually negative forces rampant in our world after Adam's sin. The expression זבח in this connection reminds us of Psalms 50,23: זובח תודה יכבדני אראנו בישע אלוקים, "he who offers a thank-offering honours Me….and I will show him salvation." Sanhedrin 43 comments on this verse that the person the Psalmist refers to sacrifices his evil urge. Slaughtering, זובח, means vanquishing that which one slaughters. By vanquishing one's evil urge one can again isolate the realm of good which had been inextricably fused with the forces of evil while that soul had been in the clutches of Satan, i.e. of the evil urge. This is a tremendous spiritual accomplishment as commented upon by David in Psalms 109,22 who viewed himself as לבי חלל בקרבי, "my heart was slain inside of me." David refered to having killed the evil urge within him. This is a very great spiritual accomplishment but it cannot be achieved except through Torah as we mentioned when we quoted the Talmud in Kidushin 30. The Talmud there also quotes G'd as saying: "whereas I have created the evil urge within you I have also given you a remedy to overcome it, i.e. the Torah."

Another homiletical message is contained in the words ולזבח השלמים which tell us that the whole purpose of identifying and isolating these lost sparks of sanctity is to do so by means of the זבח, the sacrifice; Isaiah 34,6 speaks of כי זבח לה׳ בבצרה, "for the Lord holds a sacrifice in Bozrah;" our sages comment on these words that in the future G'd will slaughter Satan. The meaning of the word "slaughter" [when applied to a spiritual being such as Satan. Ed.] is that G'd will deprive Satan of the component which enables it to live, i.e. the spark of sanctity. This then will be the peace-offering שלמים alluded to in our verse which is a reference to the "happy ending" of human history. Our verse tells us that even the slaughtering of Satan will be accomplished by means of preoccupation with the Torah. Torah. It is the merit acquired by the righteous through preoccupation with Torah which will bring all this about. Our sages in Sukkah 52 alluded to this when they described the slaughter of Samael as being carried out jointly by G'd and the righteous, each one holding the knife from one end. This is meant to teach us that it is within the power of the righteous to contribute their share in the elimination of Samael-Satan. We have already stated that the words זאת התורה are to remind the reader of all the marvellous things which can be accomplished by means of the Torah. לעולה למנחה; these words allude to the elevation of the שכינה and its unification with the essence of G'd. The words לחטאת ולאשם allude to the respective identification and isolation of the sparks of sanctity which are the essential part of the living universe. The words ולמלואים ולזבח השלמים describe the unification of the sparks of sanctity which had gone astray with their erstwhile source, and the slaughtering of the evil source which enabled such a going astray of sanctity to have occurred in the first place. This will also deny that source the basis for any future existence. The word שלמים, perfection, completion, alludes to the fact that when that stage will have been reached all the challenges life on earth presents will have been met successfully. This is the time when G'd will be proclaimed king in this world for ever more and He and His name will be One.

אשר צוה ה׳ את משה, which G'd commanded Moses, etc.; the Torah here reverts to the cause for all this, i.e. the Torah, as had been mentioned by the words וזאת התורה. It is as if the Torah had written in verse 37: "This is the Torah which G'd commanded Moses, etc." ביום צוותו את בני ישראל, on the day He commanded the children of Israel, etc. This ordinance was commanded to them at Mount Sinai seeing G'd said: "in the desert of Sinai." The Torah added: להקריב את קרבניהם, "to offer up their sacrifices." This is an allusion to what I have written previously that all particles of sanctity which exist are an integral part of Israel and that Israel will be able to reunite all these various "sparks" of sanctity by means of the Torah.