.“Therefore, they should use it for public necessities”: Look closely at the Rosh, Chapter 9 of Bava Kamma, #2, where he wrote, "and we are dealing here with an existing robbed item", and he wrote accordingly, in short, in Piskei HaRosh there. And also the Yam Shel Shlomo there, #3, look closely there. And the Bach expressed amazement at the Tur (and the Author [of the Shulchan Arukh]), who kept shut and did not mention this, and he reconciled that he must have sufficed with what he wrote earlier on the topic of a famous robber; look closely there. And look closely at the Responsa of the Shivat Tziyon, #112 [Rav Shmuel Landau, 1750-1834, Prague], who wrote that the reconciliation of the Bach is farfetched, but it seems that the Tur and the Author [of the Shulchan Arukh] reasoned that the decree that they should not accept it from them is only if [the robber] knows whom they robbed and wishes to return it personally to the one they robbed. But if they don’t know whom they robbed, and they are legally required to use it for public necessities, this decree not to accept it is irrelevant. The reason for this is as the Shakh [Rav Shabsai Cohen, 1622-1663, Lithuania] wrote (Yoreh De'ah 161:13), in the name of the Rivash (Rav Yitzhak bar Sheshet Perfet, 1326-1408, Barcelona), that a robber is obligated to return the robbed object; it’s just that they decreed that the person who was robbed should not accept it, but should forgive them. However, in a case where the robber does not know whom they robbed, and there is no robbed person before us, who could offer that forgiveness? As long as the person who was robbed did not forgive the robber, the robber is still obligated to return it. Look closely there. This requires more study.