ירא את ה' בני ומלך, עם שונים אל תתערב, “Fear the Lord my son and the king, do not associate with those who keep changing” (Proverbs 24,21).

In this verse Solomon warns man to fear the Lord, Hashem, first and foremost, and to fear the mortal king only as someone subordinate to Hashem. He applies the same term יראה, “fear, awe,” as applicable to man’s relations with higher authority be it celestial or terrestrial. The message is: “just as you must fear the Lord Who is everywhere at all times and you must abstain from sin because you know you are being watched although you cannot see the One Who watches you, so you must be in awe of the terrestrial king even when he is not present seeing he can decree death upon you even when he personally has not seen you sin.” It is simply not possible for a mortal king to be in all parts of his domain all the time. Instead of taking advantage of his temporary absence to violate his laws you must engrave in your heart the appropriate degree of awe and fear to help you not to transgress his laws. Simply remember that this is the way you relate to the supreme authority whom you cannot see but whose eye is upon you all the time. “Do not associate with the ones who keep changing” This is a warning not to display more fear for the visible terrestrial king (because he is visible) than for the invisible celestial king in the event the decrees of the celestial king and those of the terrestrial king are in conflict with one another. There are many people who are concerned first and foremost with what they perceive to be the danger from the local authority. They fear for their lives perceiving the power of terrestrial authority to be immediate and that of G’d to be relatively remote. Solomon warns against such perceptions and conduct based on such faulty perceptions. Seeing that G’d is not only the ultimate authority of the private citizen but also that of the terrestrial king it would be foolish to be more afraid of mortal kings than of immortal G’d. The reason that Solomon interposed the word בני, “my son,” between the word Hashem and the word king, is to emphasize the difference between the two although he had told you first to relate with “fear” to both of them. If not for this consideration, Solomon should have written: בני ירא את ה' ומלך, as he does in other similar instances when the verse commences with the word בני. The difference between G’d and a mortal king is as great as the difference between day and night. The basic message of our verse is that fear of the terrestrial authority in the guise of a king is something absolutely necessary as otherwise earth would be in a state of chaos, anarchy. This is also why our sages (Avot 3,2) have instructed us to pray for the well being of the government (any government) as without such a government, i.e. legally appointed authority, the world would revert to tohu vavohu and people would tear each other apart as a daily occurrence. Nonetheless, the even more important kind of fear without which the terrestrial universe would not endure is the fear vis-a-vis Hashem, the ultimate authority in the universe. The lives of all earthly kings are in His hands and terrestrial power is only delegated power. In order to remind us of all this, Solomon said in Kohelet 8,2: “I counsel you: ‘obey the king’s command and that in the manner of an oath to G’d.’” Concerning the whole subject of how to relate to imposed authority Solomon means that he views it as important to obey the king’s laws because a king is someone who perceives himself as duty bound to observe the KING’S command. When the terrestrial king fails to honour his king’s laws, i.e. no longer views himself as bound by G’d’s laws, his subjects’ obligation to obey him is no longer valid. Sinaitic law which we accepted by means of a solemn oath precedes and therefore overrides legislation by any terrestrial king. The Midrash (Vayikra Rabbah 33,6) understands the verse we quoted from Kohelet as follows: “I am obligated to obey the decrees of the Gentile nations who rule over me (Israel in the Diaspora) as far as their imposing taxes, head-duties, etc., is concerned. However, על דברת שבועת אלו-הים, concerning a matter which is an obligation by oath vis-a-vis G’d, I am not required to obey the king’s laws.” This is why we find that Chananyah, Mishael, and Azaryah said to Nevuchadnezzar (Daniel 3,16) “behold we are not concerned about this matter; behold there is a G’d Whom we worship — He is able to save us.” The verse had commenced with: “Shadrach, Mishach, and Abed Nego” (the Chaldaen names of Chanayah, Mishael and Azaryah) answered the king: O Nevuchadnezzar, we are not concerned, etc.” Why would the three men have been described first as answering the “king”, when in the same breath they address him by his title, i.e. as Nevuchadnezzar? Surely either one of these descriptions is enough! The fact is that they meant: “you are indeed the king over us concerning matters of taxes, etc.” But when you presume to command us to worship idols you are overstepping your authority seeing we cannot violate an oath we have taken hundreds of years before you ever were king, i.e. the oath we took at Mount Sinai.” This is the meaning of ועל דברת שבועת אלו-הים in the verse from Proverbs which we quoted at the outset. It is a well known fact that the whole subject matter of an oath is related to fear of and reverence for the Lord. Man is not supposed to utter the name of the Lord even in an oath which testifies to the truth, much less so in an oath in which he perjures himself by using the name of the Lord. It happened once (Bamidbar Rabbah 22,1) during the reign of King Yannai, that this king who had ten thousand towns under his control lost them all (they were destroyed) due to an oath which was true. How was this possible? A person would say to his friend: “I swear by G’d that I will go to a certain place and eat such and such.” The people in these towns were in the habit of confirming all their intentions by using such a formula involving the name of the Lord. Although these people all lived up to the undertakings they had made, their towns were ruined as they should not have involved the name of the Lord unnecessarily. If this is what happens to people to swear truthfully, we can imagine what must be in store for people who swear falsely. The story teaches how very careful we must be not to render a needless oath. There is no sin as great as that of swearing falsely or merely using the name of the Lord in an unnecessary oath. Seeing that the Torah describes man’s nature as evil from birth (Genesis 8,21) and as a result he tends to be angry a lot, his anger often causes him to swear oaths about what he will not do. The Torah, in its customary manner of providing the remedy before the disease has struck, here introduces the legislation of oaths and vows and how such can be annulled by either one expert or three ordinary adults.

'וידבר משה אל ראשי המטות לבני ישראל לאמור: זה הדבר אשר צוה ה', “Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes of the Children of Israel to say: ‘this is the thing that Lord has said.’” According to the plain meaning of the text the words לבני ישראל mean that the leaders of the tribes are to convey this legislation to the Children of Israel. However, our sages in Nedarim 78 explained that the dual wording “the heads of the tribes”, followed by “the Children of Israel,” implies that either a single expert or a quorum of three ordinary men are authorized to annul vows under certain conditions. The reason this portion has been recorded immediately after the chapter dealing with the mussaf offerings on the festivals is that at the conclusion of that chapter (verse 39) the Torah had mentioned the vows that are generally brought as gifts to the Lord on most of these festivals when the owner of the animals vowed is in Jerusalem on his pilgrimage. This is also the reason why in our verse the Torah adds אשר צוה ה', “which the Lord has commanded;” the Torah reminds us that apart from vows which are made in honor of Hashem there are also others of a more profane nature; one must fulfill all one’s undertakings regardless whether this is an undertaking (vow) made to G’d or to man. Another reason for these additional words “which the Lord has commanded,” is that just as sanctifying the Holidays requires calendar expertise so dissolving a vow also requires expertise if it is performed by a single individual.

איש כי ידור נדר לה', “when a man vows a vow unto the Lord;” according to the plain meaning of these words the expression “a vow unto the Lord,” does not mean that the person making such a vow or swearing such an oath had to use the name of the Lord when making his undertaking, but it means that even if he merely says “I vow to do a certain thing,” or “I vow not to do a certain thing,” such statements are binding and anyone violating them is committing a major sin unless said vow or oath had been legally annulled or dissolved. In order to make this point plain, the Torah did not write in connection with swearing an oath: או השבע שבועה לה', but merely או השבע שבועה, deliberately refraining from bringing the name “Hashem” into the example described. If you were to ask why the word 'לה is written in connection with נדר at all, the reason is to teach that if one makes a vow concerning matters which belong to G’d anyway, that legally speaking such a vow is valid and failing to fulfill it is a sin. For example: if someone were to declare that “eating unleavened bread on the night of the Passover is forbidden for me by reason of this vow,” although he is in no position to cancel G’d’s commandments and we might have thought that his words had no legal standing at all, the Torah reminds you that it has. Unless such a person will have such a vow annulled he is punishable if he honors it. This is also why our sages say on that same folio in Nedarim that the words נדר לה' teach that regardless of whether such a vow involves a commandment or something merely permitted but not mandatory, it is legally valid. The difference between a “vow” and an “oath” may be understood as follows: An oath involving a Biblical commandment is legally completely ineffective (though use of the Lord’s name in it is a cardinal sin regardless). If someone swears not to honour a certain law of the Torah, say that he swears not to lay phylacteries, he will receive 39 lashes in respect of a useless oath. The legal difference between these two similar sounding undertakings is that in an undertaking known as “vow,” the person undertaking it puts a certain object (in our example unleavened bread) out of bounds for himself. This is legally possible. In the example of the oath not to lay phylacteries, he does not place an object out of bounds but he places himself out of bounds concerning such objects. Seeing that as a Jew his obligation to lay phylacteries has preceded his present oath, i.e. his person has been predestined to lay phylacteries by a covenant dating back to Sinai, he cannot now arbitrarily cancel that covenant. Maimonides Hilchot Nedarim 3,7 points out that the difference between vows on the one hand and oaths on the other is reflected in the wording of the Torah in Leviticus 5,4 where the Torah writes: נפש כי תשבע לבטא בשפתים להרע או להיטיב, “a person who swears an oath with the lips to either deny himself something or to indulge in something, etc.” Maimonides understands the word להרע as referring to the person himself, i.e. intransitively [quite extraordinary grammatically, Ed.], whereas the expression להיטיב is also understood intransitively i.e. that he wants to indulge himself and confirms his intention by means of a vow. In the first instance, a suitable example would be that he plans to deny himself food or drink on a certain day, or he wishes to indulge in certain foods or drink on that day i.e. something which he is at liberty to do, but is not obliged to do. When the Torah discusses a vow rather than an oath, the wording is ככל היוצא מפיו יעשה he must act in accordance with everything that has come out of his mouth (verse 3 in our chapter here). In other words, the vow is valid regardless of whether it pertained to something mandatory or to something only permissible but not mandatory.

This also explains the choice of the word איש with which the Torah describes the person initiating the vow, whereas in Leviticus such a person is describes as נפש “a person,“ i.e. it is immaterial if he is a grown up or a minor. When, in our situation, the person who made the vow is a male 12 years and over or a female 11 years and over they were examined as to whether they understand what is implied by their making such a vow. If they are shown to be mentally mature, their vows are valid, if not, their vows are not valid. If either of them has reached biological maturity, usually 13 years of age in the case of a boy and 12 years of age in the case of a girl, their vows are valid without mental examination. The same applies if such biological minors made over property to the Temple treasury (Maimonides Hilchot Nedarim 11,1). If they can be seen to know the full impact of what they are doing they need only be 12 or 11 years old respectively to be legally liable for their words. This ruling is known as Halachah leMoshe miSinai, i.e. as Sinaitic in origin, not spelled out in detail in the written Torah, and the logic for this distinction not having being revealed to us. In the Talmud Temurah 2, the basis for this ruling is attributed to Leviticus 27,2 where the Torah writes איש כי יפליא נדר, וג'. The apparently superfluous and unusual word יפליא is regarded as the basis for a biological minor being held liable for vows he pronounced under the circumstances discussed earlier. Seeing that, as we explained, the vow is applicable equally to matters which are permissible and matters which are mandatory, when a person vowed not to eat on the Sabbath (by declaring the food as out of bounds to him on that day) he will have to fast as penance for having violated the commandment to “enjoy” the Sabbath, i.e. by means of eating more frequently and better quality food on it than on weekdays. The same does not apply when the same person used the formula of an oath to deny himself food on the Sabbath, as, seeing such an oath would be legally invalid, keeping it has no consequences regarding atoning for his conduct by fasting afterwards as a sign of penance. If someone vowed that food is out of bounds to him on a weekday he does not have to fast as penance if he observed his vow as there is no commandment to eat on those days. If he vowed that food is out of bounds for him on Chanukah or New Moon, days which have the status of a holiday by rabbinical decree only, he needs to fast for having violated the proper observance of such a day, seeing that his vow was valid and as a result he violated a rabbinical decree. Some halachic authorities hold that in the examples quoted last the person who made the vow may defer observing it until after the New Moon, (assuming he had specified a certain day of the week for his vow, being unaware at that time that that day would coincide with New Moon). There are opinions that the status of New Moon as a quasi holiday is Biblical rather than rabbinical and therefore the same rule applies as if he had vowed that food is out of bounds for him on the Sabbath. Regarding the validity of vows when they conflict with Sabbath legislation, for instance, some authorities hold that this is restricted only to vows whose fulfillment involves passivity, such as abstaining from food on the Sabbath, not when fulfillment involves an activity which violates the Sabbath (Radbaz 5 on Maimonides Nedarim 3,9). This is reflected in Taanit 12 that if a person vows to fast (place food outside his domain) every Monday and Thursday of the year and it happens that on one or more of these days there occurs a festival listed in the Megillat Taanit as such, if he made the vow before the Rabbis instituted this festival his vow overrides it. If the Rabbis had decreed such a festival prior to his having made his private vow, the rabbinical decree overrides, i.e. automatically invalidates the vow of the private individual. Although this ruling appears to contradict what we said previously regarding Biblical laws which certainly preceded any vow made by an individual, the reason for the ruling in Taanit is that the sages saw the need to reinforce their decrees and to lend it weight precisely because people might say that such laws are “only” rabbinical and carry less authority. (Maimonides concurs in Hilchot Nedarim 3,9).

Some authorities understand the expression ידחה in the Talmud which we translated as “postponing applicability of one’s vow,” to mean that such a person should consult with a scholar or Bet Din to have his vow set aside altogether seeing he had based it on a mistaken premise (Nachmanides end of chapter 9 of Nedarim). If a person employed the formula usually used to pronounce an oath in order to make a vow, or vice versa, the sages in the Jerusalem Talmud are divided in their opinions as to the respective validity of such undertakings when they conflict with other existing commitments which this person is bound by. The sages there rule that the most stringent interpretation of either oath or vow is applied in such cases simultaneously. Let us turn to a practical example of what we just said: If someone utters an oath or vow concerning something he was obligated to either do or refrain from doing (as the case may be) he is treated as if he had sworn an oath to cancel a decree from the Torah as being applicable to him. As a result he is subject to the penalty of receiving 39 lashes. This penalty is applied even if the prohibition violated was only rabbinical such as drinking wine which was left uncovered so that a Gentile may have touched it while no Jew was watching. Another example would be if someone had vowed to eat the product of a grapevine to which another species of fruit had been grafted in the Diaspora by Gentiles (compare Maimonides Hilchot Maachalot Assurot 10,8). A third example is eating a mixture of fowl and milk, something forbidden “only” by rabbinical decree (Maimonides Hilchot Maachalot Assurot 9,4). Consider further that it is forbidden to climb a tree on New Year’s Day to fulfill the commandment of blowing the shofar when the only shofar available is located on such tree. The Rabbis forbade climbing trees on Sabbaths or Holidays (Rosh Hashanah 32). This poses the problem of fulfillment of a Biblical commandment which preceded a rabbinical decree not being possible without violating such rabbinical decree. This brings us to our verse above. When we read in verse 3 of our chapter here about someone who “swears an oath to establish a prohibition upon himself, that he shall not desecrate his word,” our sages in Sifri 153 state that this refers to something which was permitted to the individual swearing the oath prior to his swearing this oath. If he had sworn an oath intending to permit something for himself which was forbidden to him by Jewish law, the oath most certainly is invalid and the Torah’s warning not to desecrate his personal word does not apply. If someone overhears a second person swearing an oath or making a vow or inviting bystanders to join him and he wishes same to apply to himself also, he only has to say אמן in answer to what he heard the first party say. If the party who said אמן violates said oath or vow he is as guilty as if he himself had formulated it in the first place. Not only that, but even if the person formulating the vow or oath was a minor or a Gentile, the word אמן by the Jew who overheard him obligates him to fulfill the terms of such a vow or oath (Maimonides Hilchot Shevuot 2, 1-2). The above does not only apply to the word אמן, but to other words having a similar meaning such as the word כן, “yes., or if he said: “this oath obligates me.” If the part formulating the oath had not used the tetragrammaton as the deity he swears by but one of the better known substitutes of the tetragrammaton such as “the one who is known as bestowing grace,” or: “the One who is merciful,” and certainly other names of G’d such as elohim, adonay, etc., the oath is valid. Even if the party formulating the oath had merely said: “cursed be anyone who does such and such a thing,” this is considered a form of oath and expressing agreement with the party who said this makes one a party to such a curse. In other words, extreme caution is advised so as to avoid being implicated and obligated by an oath or vow initiated by a third party. If someone intended that certain foods or drinks should be forbidden for him as if he had uttered an oath concerning them, this has no legal implication as long as he had not uttered the relevant words. This is why he Torah, when introducing the subject of oaths in Leviticus 5,4 uses the expression לבטא בשפתים “to give expression with one’s lips.” Resolutions which are made only with the heart are not legally binding. The same rule applies if someone unconsciously verbalizes an oath he had no intention of swearing. Seeing it does not reflect what was in his heart it has no legal validity An example would be that a person wanted to vow not to accept invitations to eat at the house of a certain person called Reuven. When he verbalized this vow he said “Shimon” instead of “Reuven.” Seeing this was a slip of the tongue, his vow is disregarded. Similarly, when someone meant to deny himself wheat bread on oath but mentioned barley by mistake he is allowed to eat both kinds of bread seeing the oath is not valid as what he said did not correspond to what he had in mind. What applies to oaths also applies to vows, i.e. heart and mouth must be in tandem. However, this rule does not apply if one had said אמן confirming someone else’s vow or oath. If that third party comes to a judge claiming he had made a slip of the tongue and what he said was not what he meant, the person who said אמן cannot be absolved from his oath as what he had said אמן to had corresponded to what he thought he said אמן to. If he violates the oath he heard the other party utter he will receive 39 lashes though the original party is not liable to punishment for violating it. If someone who has uttered a legally valid vow wishes to retract as he had second thoughts he may do so only during the few moments it takes to say the words שלום עליך רבי, “welcome to you my teacher.” If, during this period of time, he says “this is not an oath,” or words to that effect but brief, his oath is completely invalidated as it is the same as if he had erred in the formula of the oath when he uttered it. Maimonides confirms this in Hilchot Shevuot chapter 2.

A Midrashic approach based on Tanchuma Mattot 1. On the words: איש כי ידור נדר לה' the Midrash quotes G’d as saying to the Israelites: ‘be careful before making a vow not to violate it, as if someone violates a vow he will eventually violate his oaths also.’ If that were to happen he is as if he had denied G’d and all aspects of the Jewish religion and there is no forgiveness for this as the Torah has told us in Exodus 20,7 that G’d will not completely exonerate anyone who has used His name in vain. We have another verse on this subject in Jeremiah 4,2: “and swear ‘as the Lord lives;’” G’d said to the people: “do not think that it is permissible to utter such a kind of oath as the prophet quotes.” There is a general prohibition of swearing an oath involving the name of G’d unless the people doing so possess the following characteristics: described in Deut. 10,20 as: “you shall revere the Lord your G’d to serve Him and to cling to Him--and to swear in His name.” Only when you have fulfilled the conditions set out in the first half of this verse are you allowed to swear an oath using the name of the Lord.

A kabbalistic approach: the word ידור in the line איש כי ידור נדר is related to דירה, “dwelling.” The word לה' means that the vow is directed to the Lord Who is the דירתו של עולם, “the dwelling of the universe,” the G’d Who created His world and the seven celestial regions emanating from there. Anyone fulfilling his vows is as if he thereby confirms his belief in this dwelling of the Lord in those regions, whereas anyone defaulting on his vows is as if he denied such beliefs. The former is assured that his soul will return to that dwelling, whereas the ones failing to honour their vows will be removed from those domains permanently The word נדר alludes to a certain thing and its opposite, i.e. the establishment of a dwelling or the uprooting of it. [According to Rabbi Chavell the dagesh in the letter ד permits it to be read as if the word were ינדור, derived from בינה. If one employs one’s בינה one establishes a claim to a permanent dwelling in the celestial spheres for oneself, i.e. within these seven celestial regions. If one fails to so one achieves the reverse.] The same is true of people who honour their oaths or violate them. If they honour them they enter the domain of these seven celestial dwellings; if not, they forfeit that entitlement. The word שבועה is a clear allusion to these seven regions.

It is well to note how Moses phrased this legislation when he commenced with זה הדבר אשר צוה ה'. He continues with איש כי ידור נדר לה', instead of merely saying איש כי ידור נדר אליו, repeating the word לה' unnecessarily. Moses had to repeat that word to allude to the power of the vow which is greater, i.e. above that of the שבועה, oath, a word limited to “seven” as it is derived from the word שבעה, seven, and subject to its limitations. Seeing that the vow possesses such a superior power it applies even to mandatory commandments and when one pronounces such a vow the wording of which overrides such a commandment this is not as if one had not said anything at all as is the case when one pronounces an oath the wording of which overrides such a commandment. The whole Torah legislation, i.e. the מצות, are products of the regions within these seven celestial regions They represent the seven different types of voices (sounds) the Israelites heard during the giving of the Torah as we explained in our commentary on Exodus 20,1. [Compare our translation ibid. Ed.] This also accounts for the fact that the preposition used by the Torah for the word שבועה, oath, is invariably the preposition ב, such as אשר נשבעת להם בך, (Exodus 32,13); בי נשבעתי (Genesis 22,16) or ובשמו תשבע (Deut. 6,13). נשבע ה' בימינו (Isaiah 62,8) “The Lord swore by His right hand,” Seeing that we learned in Nazir 3 that if someone says ימין [i.e. “by my right”] this is a form of oath, the idea of “swearing an oath” is associated with the party declaring it is a partner of the concept of the seven, שבעה, celestial regions and what they represent. The word נדר, vow, on the other hand, is always associated with the preposition ל, pointing at something above the object or party referred to by the one making the vow. We have Psalms 132,2 נדר לאביר יעקב, or here איש כי ידור נדר לה', or in Psalms 24,1: לה' הארץ ומלואה. When you appreciate what we have just pointed out you will understand the meaning of Sifri Mattot 153 that whereas when someone renders an oath he swears by the person of the king, when he vows a vow he swears by the life of the king. The essence of the king is his life, in the case of the Lord, His eternal life. The Sifri there points to Elisha saying to Elijah “by the life of the Lord and the life of your soul, I will not abandon you,” as an indication that the expression בחיי is the ultimate statement of this sort (Kings II 2,7).

לא יחל דברו, “he must not desecrate his word.” The word is derived from חול, not to profane his word. Our sages explain this wording to mean that whereas the person who made the vow must not “profane,” it, others (three laymen or an expert) may do so (Chagigah 10). The annulment of a vow is possible if the person regrets what he vowed because he had not realised its full implications. He tells the court that had he known at the time he made the vow what he knows at that moment he would never have made the vow in the first place (compare Maimonides Hilchot Shevuot 6,5). Having said this the lay judges or the expert will release him from his vow. The legal basis for this is that the vow is presumed to have been erroneous from the start and hence never valid. A person is not permitted to cancel his own oath, his own vow, or even the vow of his wife on his own (without recourse to such a tribunal). The reason the husband cannot release his wife from her vows is that legally she is considered as part of him, i.e. אשתו כגופו. The inability of the husband to cancel his wife’s vow applies only when the husband was acting as the solitary expert. A husband is allowed to be part of a quorum of three people who listen to the wife state that had she known what her vow entailed she would never have made the vow in the first place. No one, even a “so-called” expert, may annul a vow single-handedly if there is a scholar of greater reputation available locally. Neither may a scholar take such a decision in the presence of his teacher (even if he has surpassed the teacher in knowledge), unless his teacher has specifically given him permission to do so (Maimondes Hilchot Shevuot 6,3).

ככל היוצא מפיו יעשה, “in accordance with whatever has come out of his mouth he shall do.” Nedarim 3 queries the need for this sentence seeing the Torah had already written that the person concerned must not profane his word. Answer: the Torah here teaches that a formula for vows which does not correspond exactly to the standard formula, i.e. “I vow to do such and such” is nonetheless binding on the party announcing an undertaking. The same applies to oaths. The Talmud elaborates; “if someone in the habit of mispronouncing a certain word due to a hare-lip lived in a town where they pronounce the word שבועה as מומתא and similar situations, then not only is the word מומתא accepted as binding for him, but even the normal distortion of that word which one could expect from a person with a speech defect is also binding upon him. The general rule is that in determining the validity of a vow or oath we are guided by the intention of the one making it not by the standard phonetic formula. All of this we derive from the additional words ככל היוצא מפיו יעשה. What matters is that he had resolved in his heart to do the thing he vowed, or to fail to do the thing he forbade himself on oath. This is so even if the name of the Lord or a substitute had not been uttered. If the person concerned violated his undertaking he is guilty of perjury. All of this is in order to lend additional weight to the seriousness of the sin of perjury, not honoring one’s undertaking. Nonetheless, there is a difference between not honoring an oath in which the name of the Lord had not been mentioned in that the guilty party does not receive 39 lashes and does not have to bring the sacrifice stipulated by the Torah for his sin (Maimonides Hilchot Shevuot 2,4).

Our sages in Chagigah 10 state that the whole legislation of annulling an oath or vow is “suspended in thin air,” i.e. is not anchored in definitive language in the written Torah. It is all based on our oral tradition This is the reason that the rabbis accepted the principle that both oath and vow are subject to retroactive annulment if the party concerned expresses regret. The reason that the Torah (oral) provided an escape hatch not found in the written Torah is that there are circumstances in life when a person is under severe emotional strain as a result of which he says things which he normally would not have said. The oral Torah makes allowance for this; the written Torah does not, as if it had the incidence of carelessly uttered oaths and vows would multiply. Not only that, if the party was aware that such vows could be annulled, he would add a rider while making a vow due to his anger that the procedure of annulling a vow should not apply to his vow. If he were to do this it would be impossible to release him from his foolish utterance unless he had first expressed regret at having added such a rider to his vow. Only after the scholar had released him from the rider he had added, would he then be able to turn to the same or some other scholar explaining that he was also sorry he had made the actual vow seeing he had not been aware of all that this entailed at the time he made the vow. The exception to all this is if the vow was made in public. Maimonides Hilchot Shevuot 6,8 states that anyone swearing an oath in public can never be absolved from his oath. The definition of “in public” is in the presence of three people. This definition of the word רבים as “public,” is derived from the legislation of the זבה, a woman afflicted with involuntary vaginal discharge of blood. The Torah in Leviticus 15,25 speaks of this condition continuing for ימים רבים, “many days.” Seeing that the word ימים always means a minimum of two days, the additional word רבים is taken to mean three days or more (in the third chapter of Shevuot 29). The Talmud quotes Moses as telling the Israelites: “Know that I do not make you undertake an oath merely on my own behalf but also on behalf of G’d.” The Talmud asks why Moses had to say this? Why did he not merely say that they undertook this oath in his own presence? The answer given there is that he meant in the presence of G’d, His celestial tribunal, and himself. This was considered a public oath. Moses warned the Israelites that such a public oath could never be retracted.

Nachmanides explains that 'on behalf of G-d' includes also the entire congregation of Israel, similar to what the Sages explain (Gen. 19,24) "and G-d rained down on Sodom etc." to include the heavenly court (Bereshit Rabbah 51,50). The only reason that Moses himself had to be part of this procedure was that he acted as the agent of the Jewish people vis-a-vis heaven. When the sages said that if someone swears a public oath such an oath can never be abolished this is so only when the annulment is not requested in order for the party bound by the oath to perform a commandment which he could not perform unless he had been released from his oath. This applies particularly to a commandment from which the community of the whole benefits, such as the writing of a Torah scroll. If the party bound by an oath not to write a Torah scroll was the foremost scribe in his town, it is possible to release him from such an oath (according to the view of Rabbeinu Tam in Gittin 36, Tosafot). Maimonides in Hilchot Shevuot 6,8-9 agrees with this. He phrases this as follows: “if one swears an oath in public or vows a vow in public such undertakings can never be annulled except for the performance of a commandment. How does this work in practice?” Say, a person had sworn publicly not to accept any benefit from a certain third party forever, and a situation arose when the people of his city needed a Mohel to perform the rites of circumcision for the child of the third party involved in that oath, the procedure outlined earlier for releasing someone from his oath may be invoked. The person who was under oath not to act as Mohel may perform the task, receive his payment even from the people concerning whom he had sworn not to accept any benefits. Alternatively, if the one who swore the oath was a ritual slaughterer at a time when he was not the only one in his town, and the other ritual slaughterer, שוחט, had become incapacitated so that the whole town would not have any meat unless the first שוחט was released from his oath, he can be released according to the standard formula we described. He is then also allowed to accept payment for the services he rendered. It would be an unnecessary harshness to release the party for the performance of only this particular commandment. Rashi does not agree that the only commandment which would cause this person to be able to be released from his oath is a commandment which no one else in that town could fulfill except him. Rashi believes that the expression in the Talmud על דעת רבים, which we translated as “in public,” does not mean that but means that he did so with the consent of the people who were witness to such an oath. Seeing that the people at large would not agree to someone committing himself on oath to a lifestyle that interferes with mitzvah-performance, they may be viewed as having disagreed concerning matters involving the performance of commandments by the person swearing the oath. As a result of their attitude the person qualifies to have his oath dissolved for the sake of performing any commandment. (compare Rashi Makkot 16). Nachmanides agrees with Rashi that even an oath contracted in public is subject to annulment for the sake of any commandment being performed thereby.

ואשה כי תדור, “and if a woman makes a vow, etc.” A female of twelve years and over is called אשה, “a woman.” Her vows and oaths are legally valid. If she is between 11 and 12 years of age she is presumed to be a minor though she is examined if she understands the implication of a vow or an oath. If she does, she is subject to the same rules as a male between the ages of 12 and thirteen. If she is less than eleven years old she is a minor in all respects of the law. Her pronouncements have no legal standing whatever. If a female is over 12 years of age or a male over 13 years of age their vows or oaths are legally binding even if they did not know to whom [i.e. that this involves an undertaking vis-a vis G’d. Ed.] they made such commitments (Maimonides Hilchot Nedarim 11,1-3). This entire paragraph reveals many important laws concerning vows and oaths in very few words. The legal status of women concerning vows may be divided into four categories: 1) A נערה, girl between the age of 12-12 years and six months; 2) An ארוסה, a girl betrothed but not yet having moved in with her husband. 3) A married woman (after חופה); 4) A widow. When a נערה has a father she remains under his legal control and her father can invalidate her vows on the day he hears about them but not later. The logic behind this is that she would have attached a mental rider to her vow that her father would approve of it. If she finds that she was mistaken and her father objected upon hearing of it, her vow was never valid in the first place. The same logic does not apply to vows undertaken by a male of corresponding age. Just as the father is legally empowered to sell the services of his daughter to a stranger, an entitlement which does not extend to selling the services of his son, so the father is also legally entitled to countermand vows made by a daughter not yet fully of age. When such a נערה has attained the age of 12 years and six months she is considered adult in all legal respects and no longer under her father’s legal control (Niddah 47). She is fully responsible for all her vows and oaths, the same as a widowed woman or a divorcee. The words of verse 10: כל אשר אסרה על נפשה יקום עליה, “everything she has prohibited upon herself- shall remain upon her,” apply to such a 12 and a half year old single girl. If, while under the age limit, she made a vow and her father annulled it on the day he heard of it, it is as invalid as if it had never been uttered. When the Torah adds the words וה' יסלח לה, that “the Lord will forgive her,” the sages reasoned that these words are applicable when the girl who had made the vow is in need of forgiveness, such as when she violated her vow being unaware that her father had already canceled it (Niddah 47). Obviously, if someone commits what he or she perceives to be a violation of G’d’s law they are in need of forgiveness even if technically, for reasons unknown to them they did not commit a sin. As to the woman who has been betrothed. The Torah speaks here about a woman who prior to her betrothal made a vow or swore an oath and who enters the first stage of her marriage with such vows still valid. The Torah, by employing the words, ואם היו תהיה לאיש indicates that the girl (under 12 and a half years old) has not yet completely left her father’s domain and also has not yet come under the domain of her husband concerning his interest in the matter. Her father and husband-to-be must both annul her vows in order for such an annulment to be legally valid. This is what we learned in Nedarim 66 seeing that we presume that when she made the vow she mentally resolved that it would be with the approval of both her father and her husband-to-be. Both her father and her husband-to-be have to hear it on the same day in order for both of them together to be able to annul it. The Talmud adds, that if the fiance of the betrothed girl dies before she reaches the age of maturity and she had moved into her husband’s home (after חופה), she reverts to her father’s domain and he can cancel her vows as if she had made them before she was married. If her father died prior to her having become fully married, (חופה), her husband cannot annul her vows until after she is fully married to him (Maimonides Hilchot Nedarim 11,10).

ושמע אישה...והחריש לה, “and her husband hears of it (her vow) and remains silent concerning it;” the word אישה in this verse means הארוס שלה, her husband-to-be, fiance who gave her קידושין.

ואם ביום שמוע אישה אותה ...וה' יסלח לה, “and if on the day her husband hears about it ..he revokes it, etc.” the verse speaks about a situation when the father of the girl has already made use of his right to annul her vow. Under such circumstances her husband has the right to complete the annulment commenced in part by her father. This is why the Torah first wrote the additional words בנעוריה בית אביה, “while she was not of age and in her father’s house.” If the (wife) in question had made vows (in her father’s house while he was alive) prior to her becoming betrothed to her husband, her husband cannot revoke them. This is the meaning of Nedarim 72 that the husband cannot revoke vows made by his wife before she became betrothed to him, seeing that the principle that she automatically presumes her husband’s consent to such a vow would not have applied while she did not even know who her husband was going to be. This assumption that vows are made on the understanding that both father and husband do not object is the only reason why a vow, i.e. an undertaking of Biblical force can be revoked by a husband invoking only rabbinical force. The example we have in mind is a twelve-year old who is fatherless but mature enough to understand the meaning of her vows who has been given in marriage to her husband by her mother. The situation of a widowed woman we mentioned as category 4 above refers only to a woman who became a widow after having been fully married (חופה), i.e. after having lived with her husband. Her status, as well as that of a divorcee, is that she had no longer been under the authority of her father at all. Seeing that the authority of her father had ceased completely after she had received חופה, the final stage of becoming married, her father will not again have any authority over her regardless of her age. This also proves that the institution of חופה is Biblical in its legal force, and that once there had been חופה, if her husband is a priest he must defile himself at her burial, is entitled to inherit her, and is exclusively entitled to revoke her vows [inasmuch as they affect him. Ed.]

כל נדר וכל שבועת אסר לענות נפש, “any vow or oath which results in a personal affliction, etc.” Here the Torah teaches that the fact that the Torah has granted the husband of a woman the right to interfere with her vows and to annul them is not a carte blanche applicable to any type of vow. The husband’s authority applies only when such a vow results in personal pain or discomfort also involving him in his marital status. If his wife were to vow not to wash or bathe herself, keeping such a vow would clearly interfere with their marital life; as a result of such considerations the Torah permitted her husband a veto power over such vows. It goes without saying that the husband can veto any vow of his wife which would interfere directly with their family life together. The husband’s authority extends to his wife’s vowing not to use eye-shadow or even certain products for sale in specific stores. We derive all this from the words בין איש לאשתו “between man and his wife,” in verse 17. The reason the husband has the right to interfere in vows concerning either ענוי נפש, self-affliction, and matters directly involving inter-marital relations is that his wife (any wife) is subservient to her husband in two areas; he is entitled to demand that his wife appear attractive to him and not take measures which result in her becoming physically repugnant to her husband. Our sages in Ketuvot 62 understood this concept as derived form Genesis 3,20 “for she (Chavah) is the mother of all living beings,” as meaning that the wife’s purpose in life is to enhance the quality of life of her husband not the reverse. In matters of their sexual relations there is no need for additional proof that the wife is subservient to the needs of her husband as denial by the wife of the husband’s legitimate rights whether with a vow or without a vow means that she endangers her marriage and would forfeit her כתובה upon being divorced for cause. In matters which have no bearing on the successful relations between husband and wife the husband has no authority to interfere with his wife’s vows.

מיום אל יום, “from one day to the next.” This verse makes it clear that revoking a vow must occur during the same day, the day being considered the same period as during the six days of creation. The day commences with nightfall and extends for 24 hours until the next evening. It is not a period of 24 hours commencing at the moment when the husband hears about his wife’s vow. If the woman made a vow in the morning of any day the husband upon hearing of it has only till nightfall of the same day to oppose and revoke it. This is the reason the sages permitted the husband to revoke vows made by his wife on the Sabbath if these vows were not directly related to the Sabbath (Nedarim 77). This, in spite of the fact that revoking a vow is similar to pronouncing judgment, something that is forbidden on the Sabbath. If the husband were not allowed to revoke such vows his wife could always make vows on the Sabbath and thus undermine her husband’s authority to cancel her vows. This relaxation of the rules of the Sabbath applies only to a husband revoking the vow of is wife. If she needs the services of a judge, expert or quorum of three laymen to release her from a foolish vow, she will have to wait until after the Sabbath as outsiders who are not affected by her vows are not given leeway to use their authority in releasing someone from a vow on the Sabbath. If the woman’s vow involved matters pertaining to the Sabbath on which she made the vow, the expert has the right to use his authority to release her from such a vow even on the Sabbath. An example of such a vow would be one which would have prevented her from eating on the Sabbath in question. The time frame we discussed applies both to the father and to the husband as the case may be, starting from the time they heard of the vow in question. If a husband or father canceled the woman’s vow later than the time the Torah permitted and the wife or daughter ignores her vow relying on her father or husband having revoked it, he is held liable for violating her vow. This is why the Torah writes here: ”if he will revoke them (the vows) after his having heard” (in contrast with verse 13 where the wording is “on the day he hears about it”), he will bear her iniquity.” This verse gives rise to a general rule in halachah: “he who through his actions causes his fellow to become guilty of a trespass will personally bear the penalties which result for his fellow from his action” (Sifri Mattot 156, quoted by Rashi).

Nachmaides, in justifying this ruling, writes that the woman in question is considered as either having sinned unwittingly or as having been deceived altogether and not having sinned at all by violating her vow. The verse we quoted is understood by Nachmanides as applying to a husband who, when he heard of the vow did not object, and when he eventually voiced his objection claimed that it was within the time frame permitted by the Torah Accordingly, the verse teaches a) the husband bears the guilt and penalty as if he had made the vow and violated it. b) she is free from all guilt pertaining to her vow. If his wife was aware of the fact that her husband did not revoke her vow in time, seeing she knew the law, she is held liable for acting on the basis of such an objection. Her husband, while not liable for her vow, is nonetheless liable for having caused such a guilt to come into existence. He had squandered an opportunity to protest his wife’s vow in time and had neglected to do so, thus becoming indirectly responsible for her violating her vow. Although the Torah writes this legislation using the husband as the example and therefore guilty party (although the same legislation applies to her father as long as he has the authority over her), it may be that in most such situations the father, out of his love for his daughter, would immediately voice his objection thus protecting his daughter against becoming guilty of profaning her vow. A husband who may be angry at his wife for making such a vow in the first place, may be less considerate in protecting his wife against trespassing, wanting her to become guilty of a guilt-offering. (Thus far Nachmanides).

בין איש לאשתו, בין אב לבתו, “between man and his wife, between father and his daughter.” Our sages in Sifri Mattot 156 drew a comparison between husband and father. Just as the husband is only permitted to revoke those vows of his wife which either directly affect their marital relations or which represent an affliction upon his wife threatening to make her repulsive to her husband’s eyes, so the father also may only cancel vows of his daughter if they are either an affliction for his daughter undermining her health, or otherwise disturb the normal relationship between father and daughter. If, for instance, the daughter had vowed not to provide the services for her father which a daughter is expected to perform for him, the father is entitled to declare such a vow as null and void. This is also spelled out specifically in the Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11,1. Nachmanides, in his volume on the laws of vows, agrees with the Jerusalem Talmud.

Maimonides does not base his rulings on vows on the Jerusalem Talmud and rules that the father has an unrestricted right to cancel vows made by his daughter prior to her reaching the age of 12 and a half years. (Maimonides Hilchot Nedarim 12,1). He follows the plain text of the verse which does not speak of any restrictions. When the scholars from Luneil challenged Maimonides’ ruling pointing to the Sifri we quoted as their source, Maimonides told them that the author of the Sifri unless otherwise noted is Rabbi Shimon, and that we do not generally rule according to his opinion when it conflicts with the opinion of other scholars. Concerning the subject of the efficiency and therefore desirability of making vows altogether, Maimonides writes in Hilchot Nedarim 5,23: “if someone engages in the practice of making vows to help him build his character, resist temptation, etc., then such a practice is praiseworthy. Example: if someone used to indulge in excessive consumption of wine and strong drink and he imposes upon himself a vow to abstain from drinking wine for an extended period in order to help him overcome his desire to imbibe this is a good idea. Similarly, if someone pursued illegal gains, i.e. payment for services not rendered, and the like, and he repents and wants to reinforce his resolution to desist from this in the future, he may make a vow not to accept gratuitous benefits from certain people, or even from all persons. There are other similar situations when the making of a vow is basically desirable. The principal criterion governing the desirability of a vow is if it helps the person making it to better serve his Creator. Pursuing this line of thought, our sages in Avot 3,13 have said נדרים סיג לפרישות, “vows are a fence for abstinence.” Maimonides quotes several verses from the Bible in support of such an attitude, such as Psalms 119,106: “I have firmly sworn to keep Your just rules.” (Clearly, even David had to reinforce his resolutions with an oath). We know that Yaakov made a vow from Genesis 28,20. Our sages in Bereshit Rabbah 70,1 said that the reason that Yaakov added the word לאמור, “to say,” before spelling out the details of his vow was to tell his descendants that when they would find themselves in a situation similar to that of the patriarch Yaakov, they too should resort to making vows. In Numbers 21,2 we find that the Israelites accepted their patriarch Yaakov’s advice and vowed to destroy the Canaanites and their belongings if only the Lord would make them victorious over their attackers, the Canaanites.