AND MOSES TOLD THE CHILDREN OF ISRAEL [ACCORDING TO ALL THAT THE ETERNAL COMMANDED MOSES]. “‘This is [stated] in order to separate the subject [of the offerings from that of the following chapter, dealing with vows and oaths].’ These are the words of Rabbi Yishmael. [The meaning thereof is as follows:] Since up till this point [we have] the words of G-d [to Moses],²¹⁹ … and the [following] section of vows begins with the statement of Moses,²²⁰ … it was necessary to separate the subject [of the offerings] by stating that Moses repeated it and told this section to Israel; for if this were not stated, one might have thought that he did not tell them this [section dealing with the offerings], but began his words with the section of vows.” These are the words of Rashi. But I do not understand them, for [we find] similarly that it says — at the end of the section [dealing with] blemishes [in priests], *And Moses spoke unto Aaron, and to his sons, and unto all the children of Israel;*²²¹ and it says at the end of the section of the festivals, And Moses declared unto the children of Israel the appointed seasons of the Eternal²²², 23:44. [and in both these cases the subsequent chapters also begin with G-d’s utterance to Moses; so why was it necessary, according to Rashi, to separate here the sections by saying that Moses declared those laws to the children of Israel]! But according to its plain meaning, the verse here comes to say that although this section deals with the laws of the offerings, G-d did not single out Aaron and his sons in connection with it, as in the sections of [the book] “the Law of the Priests” [i.e. the Book of Leviticus]. Instead Moses said it to all the children of Israel together, according to all that the Eternal commanded Moses, including the laws of refraining from work on the festivals,²²³ and [the laws of] the Daily Whole-offerings, the Additional Offerings, the vow-offerings and the freewill offerings, for thus it was told to Moses, Command the children of Israel.²²⁴, Verse 2. And the reason [for this] is because this commandment applies after they enter the Land, and it is a commandment to all Israel to observe [the laws of] the Daily Whole-offerings and the Additional Offerings [of the Sabbath and festivals] in their appointed times, and to bring their vow-offerings and freewill offerings. Furthermore, the main intention of the commandment [to offer up offerings] is that these days should be remembered and kept,²²⁵ and to refrain on them from all servile work [and therefore it was told to all the children of Israel]. Now this section is like the section of the festivals in “the Law of the Priests” [i.e. the Book of Leviticus]. For it says there at the beginning, Speak unto the children of Israel, and say unto them,²²⁶ and at the end it says, And Moses declared unto the children of Israel the appointed seasons of the Eternal,²²², 23:44. and here likewise at the beginning [of the section it says], Command the children of Israel, and say unto them²²⁴, Verse 2. and at the end [in the verse before us] it says, And Moses told the children of Israel according to all that the Eternal commanded. It did not mention [here in this verse that Moses told] “the appointed seasons of the Eternal,” because in this section here other matters are mentioned [as well] which do not apply to “the appointed seasons of the Eternal,” such as the Daily Whole-offerings of weekdays, and the Additional Offerings of the Sabbath and the New Moons. The interpretation given by Rabbi Yishmael [quoted above by Rashi] is because Scripture never has to say of Moses that he told the children of Israel all that G-d commanded him, [because it is self-understood that he always did so], and it is not usual for the Torah to say so at each and every section. Therefore the Rabbis [similarly] explained²²⁷ 3:12. the verse, “And Moses spoke unto Aaron, and to his sons, and unto all the children of Israel²²¹ — [as implying that] he warned Aaron about his sons [i.e., that Aaron as High Priest should preserve the sanctity of the Sanctuary, and prevent priests with a bodily blemish from performing the Divine Service], and [he warned] the sons concerning the Israelites [that they should prevent the Israelites from entering those parts of the Sanctuary which are forbidden to them], and [he warned] the Israelites about each other” [that they should each prevent the other from violating the sanctity of the Sanctuary]. And in the section of the festivals they explained [the verse, And Moses declared unto the children of Israel the appointed seasons of the Eternal]²²², 23:44. in many ways. [Thus they said]:²²⁸, 17:12-13. “This teaches us that Moses used to tell Israel the laws of the Passover on Passover, the laws of Shavuoth [the Festival of Weeks] on Shavuoth, and the laws of Tabernacles on Tabernacles. [It further teaches us that] in the very language that he heard it [from G-d], he told it to Israel. And all the sections [mentioned here] are subject to the same law.²²⁹ Rabbi Yosei the Galilean says: It states [and Moses declared unto the children of Israel] the appointed seasons of the Eternal,²²², 23:44. but the Sabbath of Creation [i.e., the weekly Sabbath] was not said together with them.’²³⁰ Ben Azai says: It is said, [And Moses declared unto the children of Israel] the appointed seasons of the Eternal,²²², 23:44. but the section of vows was not said together with them [as will be explained further on]. Rabbi²³¹ says: What does this verse — And Moses declared unto the children of Israel the appointed seasons of the Eternal²²², 23:44. — come to tell us? Since [hitherto] we have only learnt that the Paschal-lamb and the Daily Whole-offering override the Sabbath [i.e., are brought on the Sabbath although they entail doing work which is normally forbidden], because it says about them in its appointed season²³², 28:2 (Daily Whole-offering). [which includes even the Sabbath]; but we have not [yet] been taught that [the same applies to] the other public offerings. Therefore Scripture says: These ye shall offer unto the Eternal ‘in your appointed seasons’²³³ thus indicating that all public offerings mentioned in this section of the Additional Offerings of the festivals, override the Sabbath. [But we still do not know that the sheaf [of new barley brought on the second day of Passover], and the offerings brought with it,²³⁴ and the two loaves [brought on the Festival of Shavuoth] and the offerings that come with them²³⁵, Verses 17-18. [override the Sabbath, since they are not mentioned in this section of the offerings, and hence are not included in the phrase in your appointed seasons.²³³ But when Scripture says [there], And Moses declared unto the children of Israel ‘the appointed seasons of the Eternal,’²²², 23:44. it established ‘an appointed season’ for all [public offerings, so that they all override the Sabbath].” Thus far is the text of the Torath Kohanim.²²⁸, 17:12-13. Now it is possible to say that the interpretation of Rabbi Yishmael who said that [the verse before us: And Moses told the children of Israel … is said] in order to separate the subject [of the offerings from that of the vows, as Rashi mentioned], is identical with that of Ben Azai, who said: “It says the appointed seasons of the Eternal,²²², 23:44. but the section of vows was not said together with them,” meaning that the law of the festivals is not like the law of the section of vows, which was told to the heads of the tribes²³⁶ in order to say that a single person who is expert [in the laws] can release a vow, and so can three ordinary people, for the festivals require the sanctification [of the New Moon] by a court of [at least] three experts, as is explained in [Tractate] Baba Bathra.²³⁷ Ben Azai thus derived this distinction between them [the festivals and vows] from the limiting phrase: [And Moses declared] the appointed seasons of the Eternal, and Rabbi Yishmael derived this [same] principle from the [apparent] redundancy of this verse [before us], and [hence he explained] that it only comes to separate the subject of the festivals from that of the vows. Thus both of them [Ben Azai and Rabbi Yishmael] are saying the same thing, differing only as to the text from which this law is derived. The correct interpretation [of the words of Rabbi Yishmael who said that our verse comes only to separate the subjects] appears to me to be that he only intended to say [as follows]: Had He finished the section [here] of the festivals with [the verse]: These ye shall offer unto the Eternal in your appointed seasons,²³³ and begun [immediately with the verse] And Moses spoke unto the heads of the tribes of the children of Israel, saying: This is the thing which the Eternal hath commanded,²³⁶ it would have been possible [to explain] that the verse refers to the previous [subject], meaning that Moses spoke unto the heads of the tribes: “This is the thing which G-d commanded concerning the Daily Whole-offerings and the Additional Offerings” mentioned [previously], and the phrase unto the heads of the tribes would not be interpreted as referring to the following section of the vows. Therefore He divided [the subjects] and finished the section of the festivals [with the verse before us], And Moses told the children of Israel according to all that the Eternal commanded Moses, and then began the section of vows [with the statement] that Moses spoke unto the heads of the tribes, This is the thing that the Eternal hath commanded.²³⁶ This is the truth, for such is the explanation of [the expression] “to separate the subject” in many places in the Sifra and Sifre. And Rashi himself has already mentioned²³⁸ what the Rabbis have said in the Sifre:²³⁹ 157. “[Now therefore kill every male among the little ones,] ‘and kill’ [every woman that hath known man by lying with him].²³⁸ Why is [the expression]and kill used [since it has already been said once at the beginning of the verse]? It is to separate the subject. These are the words of Rabbi Yishmael. For if I were to read [the verse without the repetition of the expression ‘and kill,’ namely]: ‘Now therefore kill every male among the little ones, and every woman that hath known man by lying with him. And all the women-children … [keep alive], I would not know what the verse is saying [about the women who have known man by lying with him — whether they are to be killed together with every male mentioned in the beginning of the verse, or to be kept alive together with all the women-children mentioned in the following verse]. Therefore it says [again], and kill, in order to separate the subject [from the following verse].’ These are the words of Rabbi Yishmael.” Similarly we find [such a usage of the expression “to separate the subject”] in other places in the Torath Kohanim [i.e., the Sifra]. Matoth

footnotes: ²¹⁹ See above, 28:1: And the Eternal spoke unto Moses, saying ²²⁰ Further, Verse 2: And Moses spoke unto the heads of the tribes ²²¹ Leviticus 21:24. ²²² Ibid. ²²³ Above, 28:18, 26. etc. ²²⁴ Ibid. ²²⁵ Esther 9:28. ²²⁶ Leviticus 23:2. ²²² Ibid. ²²⁴ Ibid. ²²⁷ Torath Kohanim, Emor ²²¹ Leviticus 21:24. ²²² Ibid. ²²⁸ Ibid. ²²⁹ This means, as explained further, that just as fixing the days of the festivals [through the sanctification of the New Moon] can only be performed by a qualified court (see Vol. II, p. 116) so the adjudication of vows [mentioned in the following section] requires a court of qualified experts. Hence the statement: “All sections [mentioned here — namely the preceding one dealing with the festivals, and the following one treating of vows], are subject to the same law.” ²²² Ibid. ²³⁰ This means that the Sabbath, unlike the festivals, does not require “sanctification” by the court, since its sanctity is permanent and endures forever, being based on its original sanctification by G-d at the creation of the world (Genesis 2:3). ²²² Ibid. ²³¹ This is Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi, the redactor of the Mishnah. Because of his great status, he is known simply as “Rabbi.” See also Vol. II, p. 349, Note 64. ²²² Ibid. ²³² Above, 9:2 (Paschal-lamb). Ibid. ²³³ Above, 29:39. ²³⁴ Leviticus 23:12-13. ²³⁵ Ibid. ²³³ Above, 29:39. ²²² Ibid. ²²⁸ Ibid. ²²² Ibid. ²³⁶ Further, 30:2. ²³⁷ Baba Bathra 121a. ²³³ Above, 29:39. ²³⁶ Further, 30:2. ²³⁶ Further, 30:2. ²³⁸ Further, 31:17. ²³⁹ Sifre, Matoth ²³⁸ Further, 31:17.

AND MOSES SPOKE UNTO THE HEADS OF THE TRIBES. Scripture did not precede this section with [the statement]: “And the Eternal spoke unto Moses, saying: Speak unto the heads of the tribes, and say unto them: This is the thing which the Eternal hath commanded,” as He stated in the section [dealing with] slaughtering [offerings] outside the Sanctuary Court,¹ and in other sections. Instead, He mentioned it as the end of this section, saying, These are the statutes, which the Eternal commanded Moses.² And in the section of Vayehi Bayom Ha’shemini³ it says: And Moses said: ‘This is the thing which the Eternal commanded that ye should do,’⁴, Verse 6. See also Ramban ibid. Verse 2. but did not mention the [actual] command [given by G-d to Moses] at all. Similarly, in the section about the manna [it is said], And Moses said: ‘This is the thing which the Eternal hath commanded: Let an omerful of it be kept etc.’⁵ [although the Divine command about it to Moses is not expressly stated]. Now the heads of the tribes of the children of Israel are the princes of the standards, whom the tribes had appointed over their standards after Nachshon the son of Amminadab [prince of the children of Judah]⁶ and his colleagues had died. It is possible that they [the heads of the tribes referred to here] were those who are mentioned in the section [dealing with] the inheritance [of the Land]: *These are the names of the men that shall take possession of the Land for you;*⁷ or it may be that those [referred to here] were others, for there Scripture speaks about [the leaders of] the future [saying] that when they come to divide up the Land [in the time of Joshua] all those mentioned will be living, and they will represent them [in the apportionment of the Land]. And Moses spoke unto the heads of the tribes. The reason [why he did not address this section to the entire people] is because it was not necessary to teach all the children of Israel that the father and husband [of a woman] can declare void those vows [of their daughter or wife, respectively] which involve affliction of the soul, and perhaps it is [even] necessary to conceal these [rights] from them, so that they should not treat vows lightly. But it was to the Sages of Israel, the heads of their tribes, that he taught the ordinance [of vows]. The verse also alludes to the interpretation of our Rabbis⁸ [who said] that the heads of the tribes have a special function and power in vows over and above the rest of the people, namely, that a single person who is an expert in the laws can release a person from a vow [and therefore, this section was addressed to the heads of the tribes, i.e., the Sages]. Now the [power of] release from vows [by a Sage] is not expressly stated in the Torah, but it is a law declared to Moses on Sinai, and Scripture “hung it on a hair’s-breadth,” just as the Rabbis have said:⁹, 11b). “[The rules concerning] the release from vows [by a Sage] hover in the air, and have nothing [in Scripture itself] on which they can be based.” But Scripture did allude to it [by saying]: ‘lo yacheil’ (he shall not profane) his word.¹⁰ For it did not say: “he shall not transgress his word.” but commanded that he should not make “profane” his word, meaning that he should not treat the vow as a hollow [and irreverent] thing; and when he comes to the court and they find him a cause for absolution¹¹ and he regrets [having made the vow], and they release him thereof, he is not profaning it.⁹, 11b). And the reason for this [law being indicated in this manner of allusion] is as I have said [above], that Scripture treated absolution from a vow or oath as if it were one of the secrets of the Torah which are only to be revealed to those who are fit to [hear] them, and therefore they are written [in the Torah] in allusion. And this section [of vows] is placed here [in the Torah] because since [in the section above] He mentioned vows to the Sanctuary, [as it is said], beside your vows, and your freewill offerings, whether they be your burnt-offerings, or your meal-offerings, or your drink-offerings, or your peace-offerings,¹² therefore He said furthermore: “Apart from these above-mentioned vows, there are also vows of a secular nature. [In the case of these vows, too], according to all that proceedeth out of a man’s mouth¹⁰ he is obliged to fulfill, and to do all with which he bound his soul; for in [the case of] all vows [whether of a holy or secular nature] he shall not profane his word,¹⁰ but others may absolve it for him” [by finding him a cause for absolution, as explained above].

footnotes: ¹ Leviticus 17:2. ² Further, Verse 17. ³ Leviticus 9:1. ⁴ Ibid. ⁵ Exodus 16:32. ⁶ Above, 2:3. ⁷ Further, 34:17. ⁸ Nedarim 78a. ⁹ Chagigah 10a. Now although these rules concerning the release from vows by a Sage “have nothing [in Scripture itself] on which they can be based,” they are yet on an absolute par with those laws which do have support in Scripture, as “they are all the essentials of the Torah” (ibid. ¹⁰ Verse 3. ¹¹ Thus, for example, if a man vows or swears that he will divorce his wife, the court may say to him: “Had you known that people would say about you: ‘Such is the nature of this person to divorce his wife,’ and that they will say about your daughters: ‘They are the daughters of a divorced woman! What did her mother do that she was divorced?’ [Had you known all this], would you then have made your vow?” If he says, “Had I known this I would not have made my vow,” they may release him from his vow (Nedarim 66a). See also Note 44 further on. ⁹ Chagigah 10a. Now although these rules concerning the release from vows by a Sage “have nothing [in Scripture itself] on which they can be based,” they are yet on an absolute par with those laws which do have support in Scripture, as “they are all the essentials of the Torah” (ibid. ¹² Above, 29:39. ¹⁰ Verse 3. ¹⁰ Verse 3.

IF A MAN ‘YIDOR NEDER’ (VOWETH A VOW). “[This means if] a person says: ‘May there be konam¹³ is a substitute for korban (offering), and is used for a vow of abstinence, meaning, “May this object be forbidden to me in the same way as it is forbidden to have any benefit from a holy offering.” upon me that I shall not eat, or that I shall not do such-and-such a thing.’ I might think that even [if he vowed] that he would eat n’veilah¹⁴ is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96. [which is forbidden by the Torah to be eaten] I apply to him [the verse], he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth.¹⁰ Scripture therefore says, to bind his soul with a bond,¹⁰ which means [that he has the power] to forbid [upon himself] that which was [hitherto] permitted to him, but not to allow himself to do that which is forbidden [by means of vowing to do it].” This is Rashi’s language. But the text of the Sifre¹⁵ 153. is not so. Instead the Rabbis taught there [the following explanation] of [the expression] *to bind his soul with a bond:*¹⁰ “I might think that even if ‘he swore’¹⁶ to eat n’veiloth and treifoth,¹⁴ is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96. abominable things and reptiles, I apply to him [the verse], he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth.¹⁰ Scripture therefore says, to bind his soul with a bond,¹⁰ which means [that he has the power] to forbid [upon himself] that which was [hitherto] permitted to him, but not to bind himself to do that which is forbidden [by means of vowing to do that which is prohibited by the Torah].” Thus the Rabbis [in the Sifre] mentioned this matter in connection with shevuoth (oaths), and the Rabbi [Rashi] changed it to apply to nedarim (vows).¹⁷. Ramban’s intent is to point out that Rashi, who made his comment on the phrase if a man voweth a vow, and speaks of konam [a term used only in vows], is diverging from the Sifre who gives this explanation on the phrase or sweareth an oath. Since, as will be explained further on, there are important legal differences between vows and oaths, Rashi’s application of the Sifre to the case of a vow [instead of to an oath] is thus incorrect. And in my opinion he was not mindful [about this],¹⁸ for the Rabbis have said¹⁹ that in the case of vows one makes the [actual] object [referred to in the vow] forbidden to oneself [as when one says: “May this bread be konam¹³ is a substitute for korban (offering), and is used for a vow of abstinence, meaning, “May this object be forbidden to me in the same way as it is forbidden to have any benefit from a holy offering.” upon me”], and therefore [vows] do not take effect upon non-tangible matters,²⁰, 13b. such as when one says, “A vow be upon me that I shall not speak to you, or that I shall not walk, or that I shall not sleep,” and similar expressions [affecting non-tangible matters]. Now this being so, it would appear that even in the case of a permitted object, if one said: “A vow be upon me that I shall eat today,” or “that I shall eat this loaf,” it is not a [valid] vow since this vow does not have any object at all on which to take effect, but [was expressed in such a way as to impose] a duty upon him [personally] to do it.²¹ [which is forbidden] that it is invalid, but even if he “vowed” to eat a permissible thing it is also invalid, since we do not find anywhere in the Gemara vows about matters which require one “to get up and do,” but only matters which require one to abstain from certain things. On the other hand, in the case of an “oath,” as where one says “I swear to eat this loaf,” the oath would indeed be valid. Since Rashi applied it to “vows,” it is therefore incorrect, as explained above. — The reason for this distinction between oaths and vows is as follows: An oath takes effect upon the person himself. Hence if he says, “I swear to eat the loaf,” he is obliged to do so. But a vow takes effect upon the object. Hence if he says, “This bread is ‘konam’ to me,” it is a valid vow and he may not eat it. But if he were to say, “A vow be upon me that I shall eat this loaf,” it would be invalid, since it is a contradiction in terms [the statement begins with a reference to a vow, but concludes with — “I shall eat …” — which is appropriate only for an oath]. And we do not find mentioned anywhere in the Gemara vows about [matters which require one] to “get up and do” [a particular action, but only about matters which require one to abstain from certain things, such as when he says, “May this loaf be konam upon me,” in which case he must fulfill the vow by not eating it]. And although we find in the case of vows [to G-d Who is] on high [that they are valid if uttered in the following manner]: “I undertake upon myself [to bring] a burnt-offering,”²² or “I undertake upon myself [to bring] a peace-offering” [which would seem to indicate that vows do take effect when expressed as an obligation resting upon a person, and not, as explained above, that they only take effect upon a specific object which itself becomes forbidden], this [vow is valid] because [there is a general principle that] dedicating something [verbally] to the Sanctuary creates an obligation on one’s property exactly as if it had been handed over to an ordinary person.²³ Or [it may be that] this is a stringency²⁴ of the object, we may yet explain the reason why vows to the Sanctuary are valid, because of a stringency ordained by the Rabbis based on the fact that since ultimately he will set aside a specific animal for his offering, therefore the effect of the vow takes place immediately upon his utterance thereof, and all his property becomes mortgaged to the fulfillment of the vow. applicable [only] to vows to the Sanctuary, because they [such vows] involve an object which becomes forbidden to an ordinary person and invested [with sanctity] for the Sanctuary when [the object is actually] set aside [as an offering]; therefore right from the start [when he merely bound himself verbally to separate an animal as an offering at some future date], the obligation created by the vow takes effect upon his property. But the case of [ordinary] vows of utterance [about a secular matter] we have no such rule, because there is no [tangible] object existing at all, neither at the beginning [i.e., at the time of uttering the vow], nor at the end [i.e., at the time that the vow is to be fulfilled]. Similarly, [the expression of the Sifre mentioned by Rashi that] he can “forbid [upon himself] that which was [hitherto] permitted to him, but cannot allow himself to do that which is forbidden [by vowing to do that which is prohibited by the Torah]” is a statement which is not correct to make in connection with vows [as Rashi did], because they do take effect on matters of [religious] commandments, just as they do on secular matters [i.e., on matters which do not come within the scope of the commandments]. Thus someone who says in the form of a vow “I will not make a Booth [for the Festival of Tabernacles]” or “I will not put on phylacteries” is indeed forbidden [to make the Booth, or to put on the phylacteries] although he thereby violates a positive commandment.²⁵ Similarly a man who vowed not to have [sexual] intercourse with his wife is forbidden [to have such intercourse with her] although he thereby violates a negative commandment.²⁶. See Vol. II, pp. 356-357, where Ramban discusses at length the nature of this prohibition. Similarly, vows take effect to oblige one to observe a negative commandment [although, of course, he already is bound not to transgress it], such as if he vowed not to eat n’veilah¹⁴ is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96. — [so that if he does it he violates two prohibitions: against eating n’veilah, and against breaking his vow, this principle being deduced] from the words of the Mishnah:²⁷ is prohibited to a person for some reason, such as n’veilah or treifah (see Note 14 above), or indeed any other prohibition, another vow — not to eat it — can still take effect upon that object doubly prohibiting the person from eating it, so that if he does eat it, he violates two prohibitions: one for having eaten n’veilah, and one for having violated his vow. “A vow may take effect upon a vow etc.” Thus a vow takes effect to forbid [not only that which was previously permitted, but also to forbid] that which was [already] forbidden [such as when he vows not to eat n’veilah]¹⁴ is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96., and [a vow takes effect] not to do [something] which he is [commanded to do and] forbidden to transgress [such as the duty to have sexual intercourse with his wife,²⁶. See Vol. II, pp. 356-357, where Ramban discusses at length the nature of this prohibition. as mentioned above], except that vows do not take effect to allow him to actively transgress a negative commandment.²⁸ the flesh of n’veilah which is prohibited by a negative commandment, the vow takes no effect whatever, so that if he does not eat it he is not punishable for having violated his word. But oaths are only able to render forbidden that which was [hitherto] permitted, and they do not apply at all to matters involving commandments, neither to transgress [the prohibition of] a negative commandment [even passively, such as by swearing not to have intercourse with his wife], nor to strengthen its observance [such as by swearing not to eat n’veilah],¹⁴ is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96. nor to neglect [the performance of] a positive commandment, such as [by saying]: “I swear that I will not make a Booth,” or “[I swear] that I will not put on phylacteries.” Even to strengthen the performance of a positive commandment [an oath] cannot take effect, so that if a person swears to fulfill a commandment and does not fulfill it, he is not liable for [breaking his] oath either to [the punishment of] stripes [if he deliberately neglects it] or to [bring] an offering [if he neglects it accidentally].²⁹ fulfill the commandment, he is responsible for neglect of a positive commandment, but is not subject to stripes or an offering for failure of fulfilling the additional oath, since his oath never took effect. But it is permitted for a person to encourage himself [to fulfill a commandment by swearing to do so], for it is written, I have sworn, and have confirmed it, to observe Thy righteous ordinances.³⁰ Therefore it is only with reference to swearing [and not, as implied by Rashi, to vows] that one can interpret [the expression] to bind his soul with a bond¹⁰ [as the Sifre does, that he may forbid upon himself that which was hitherto permitted to him, but may not allow himself to do that which is forbidden, by means of swearing to do it]. These are great [i.e., complex and important] laws, and the scholar will find them [explained in the Talmud] in their [proper] places.

footnotes: ¹³ The word konam ¹⁴ N’veilah ¹⁰ Verse 3. ¹⁰ Verse 3. ¹⁵ Sifre, Matoth ¹⁰ Verse 3. ¹⁶ The words “he swore” show clearly that the Sifre is speaking about an oath, while Rashi applied it to a vow. ¹⁴ N’veilah ¹⁰ Verse 3. ¹⁰ Verse 3. ¹⁷ The language of the verse before us is as follows: If a man ‘voweth a vow’ unto the Eternal, or ‘sweareth an oath’ to bind his soul with a bond ¹⁸ In my “Kuntros on Variant Readings in Rashi according to the first print, Reggio 1475,” p. 27 (printed in Berliner’s Rashi, Feldheim, Jerusalem, 5730) I have shown that on the basis of a minor emendation in the text of Rashi [as found in the Reggio edition], Ramban’s criticism of Rashi disappears. ¹⁹ Nedarim 2b. ¹³ The word konam ²⁰ Ibid. ²¹ In other words, there is no question as to when a person “vows” to eat n’veilah ²² Kinim 1:1. ²³ Therefore when he says, “I undertake upon myself [to bring] a burnt-offering,” it is as if he had actually separated a specific animal to be an offering. Thus his vow attaches to a definite object, and therefore it is valid. ²⁴ In other words, even if we are not to resort to the preceding explanation that a verbal promise to the Sanctuary is tantamount to actual delivery ²⁵ The reason for this is that since a vow takes effect upon a particular object (see Note 21), he may forbid the use of the particular Booth or of the phylacteries in the fulfillment of the commandment. But he cannot prohibit their use by means of an oath, swearing not to use them, since the oath creates a prohibition on the person, and that is invalid for him to do, since “he has already sworn on Sinai” to fulfill the commandment, and an oath does not take effect upon another oath, as will be explained. ²⁶ Exodus 21:10: her food, her raiment, and ‘her conjugal rights’ he shall not diminish ¹⁴ N’veilah ²⁷ Nedarim 17a. The Mishnah there establishes the distinction that a vow may take effect upon another vow, but one oath may not take effect upon another. From this Ramban deduces the teaching that if an object ¹⁴ N’veilah ²⁶ Exodus 21:10: her food, her raiment, and ‘her conjugal rights’ he shall not diminish ²⁸ Thus if he vowed to eat ¹⁴ N’veilah ²⁹ The punishment for breaking an oath in optional matters deliberately is the same as for transgressing any negative commandment; i.e., stripes (Deuteronomy 25:1-3), and for accidentally breaking it, there is a duty to bring an offering (Leviticus 5:4-13). But if one swears to fulfill a positive commandment [e.g. “I swear to wear phylacteries”] the oath is invalid, because “he has already sworn at Mount Sinai” [to perform all the commandments of the Torah], and an oath does not take effect upon another oath (see Note 27). Therefore if he does not ³⁰ Psalms 119:106. See Nedarim 8a. ¹⁰ Verse 3.

YIDOR NEDER LA’SHEM (VOWETH A VOW ‘UNTO’ THE ETERNAL). The meaning of [the expression] ‘yidor neder la’shem’ is not like that of ‘asher nishba la’shem (how he — David — swore ‘unto’ the Eternal),³¹, 132:2. for that [expression mentioned by David] is like ‘vayishava lo’ (and he swore ‘to him’)³² [‘lo’] is its literal meaning — “unto him,” and the intention is to say that the oath was “for his benefit.” Likewise the prepositional lamed [in the word la’shem] used by David has its literal meaning — “for ‘the benefit’ [so to say] and glory of G-d,” since the oath concerned his determination to build the House of G-d. which means that he swore to him for his [the recipient’s] benefit. But [the use of the prepositional lamed in the case of vows is equivalent to the use of the preposition beth (“by”)³³ in the case of oaths [in the examples cited above] has the meaning of “to” — to the benefit of the recipient, as is the case of Eliezer where the oath was for the benefit of Abraham. This principle, however, cannot be made to apply to vows, since in our verse it says if a man vows a vow ‘la’shem,’ and the verse is not speaking exclusively about vows to the benefit of the Sanctuary but refers to vows of all sorts, even of secular matters. Hence we must say that the prepositional lamed in vows has the same meaning as the beth [not the lamed] in oaths, which in both cases means “by” — by G-d. In other words, the prepositional lamed in vows and the beth in oaths are identical in meaning. Finally, Ramban will conclude that the Cabala does offer an explanation why a different preposition is used in each case. Thus it is shown that the mystic character of the Sacred Language is deeply embedded in the text of the Torah. in the case of oaths, for] in the case of oaths Scripture says: ‘u’vishmo’ (and ‘by’ His Name) shalt thou swear;³⁴ v’ashbiacha ‘ba’shem’ (and I will make thee swear ‘by’ the Eternal);³⁵ as I swore ‘lecha’ (unto thee) ‘ba’shem’ (‘by’ the Eternal), the G-d of Israel, saying: Assuredly Solomon thy son shall reign after me;³⁶ swear ‘li’ (unto me) here ‘bei’Elokim’ (‘by’ G-d).³⁷ But in the case of a vow Scripture does not say: “he vows ‘ba’shem’ (‘by’ G-d)” but la’shem (‘to’ G-d). The Sages in the Sifre have already alluded to the reason for this matter [the different terminology], saying:³⁸ 153. See Vol. I, p. 66, where Ramban quotes this Sifre. “What is the difference between vows and oaths? Vows are like vowing³⁹ ‘by the life of the King;’ oaths are like swearing ‘by the King Himself.’ Although there is no [clear] proof for this explanation [in Scripture], there is an allusion to it: By the living G-d, and by the life of your soul. I will not leave thee.”⁴⁰ And the secret thereof is that the shevuah (oath) is derived from the word shivah [“seven” — alluding to the seven Emanations], for she [wisdom] hath builded her house, she hath hewn out her seven pillars,⁴¹ whereas the vow is on [the level of] understanding, the beginning of His way, the first of His works of old.⁴², 8:22. Thus you find that vows take precedence over the Torah, and therefore they apply to commandments just as to optional matters [as explained above]. Thus all vows are la’shem (“to” the Eternal), whereas all who swear [do so] “by” Him.

footnotes: ³¹ Ibid. ³² This is in reference either to Genesis 24:9, where Eliezer swore to Abraham to find a wife for Isaac from the country of his birthplace, or to Genesis 47:31, Joseph swearing to Jacob that he would bury him together with his fathers. In both cases the meaning of the prepositional lamed ³³ The gist of Ramban’s reasoning is as follows: The prepositional lamed ³⁴ Deuteronomy 6:13. ³⁵ Genesis 24:3. ³⁶ I Kings 1:30. ³⁷ Genesis 21:23. ³⁸ Sifre, Matoth ³⁹ This is the text in the Sifre and in Ramban here. In Genesis, however, Ramban has “swearing” (Vol. I, p. 66). The intent of the texts in both places is equivalent. ⁴⁰ II Kings 4:30. See Vol. I, p. 66, Note 290 where this text is explained in detail. ⁴¹ Proverbs 9:1. ⁴² Ibid.

AND IF A WOMAN VOWETH A VOW UNTO THE ETERNAL … 5. AND HER FATHER HEARETH HER VOW. Scripture wanted to mention the [case of] prohibition first [in Verses 4-5, namely that if she makes a vow and her father is quiet about it or confirms it, then all her vows shall stand ..] in order to tell us that a young girl [in her father’s house] is also subject to the negative commandment mentioned [previously], that he shall not break his word,¹⁰ and therefore if her father confirms her vow [expressly or tacitly] the vow shall stand, but if he disallowed her, it shall not stand.⁴³ And Scripture states [in conclusion], and the Eternal will forgive her, because her father disallowed her,⁴³ in order to tell us that G-d will only forgive her if she acted [in disregard of her vow] after her father had disallowed it, but not [if she broke it] at the beginning, that is, if she [first] transgressed her vow and later on her father disallowed it, just as the Rabbis have said: “[The father or husband] ‘cuts off’ [the vow from the moment that he disallows it], but [unlike a Sage] he does not uproot it retrospectively.”⁴⁴ the time of “release” or “annulment.” In the case of the release by the Sage, since it takes effect retrospectively, there is no sin. In the case of the father or the husband, however, there is a sin entailed.

footnotes: ¹⁰ Verse 3. ⁴³ Verse 6. ⁴³ Verse 6. ⁴⁴ Nedarim 68a. The intention of this statement is to contrast the law, of a Sage who “releases” a vow, with that of a father or husband who “annuls” it. In order that a vow or oath should be valid, the person who makes it must at the time of the utterance thereof have been fully aware of its consequences. If at that time he did not fully understand all that his vow or oath entailed, the Sage points this out to him and affords him an opportunity to regret having made it. If he so declares that he regrets it, the Sage “releases” him from the vow or oath. This release “uproots it” from the very start, since it has now been shown that he made it under a misapprehension. The father or husband, on the other hand, is empowered by the Torah to “annul” the vow or oath, even if made under no misapprehension and the daughter or wife does not regret it. Therefore there is no power of retroactive effect; instead, the “annulment” only “cuts off” in the future. One of the differences between these two procedures is here referred to by Ramban, and that is namely, if the person who made the vow or oath violates it before

AND IF SHE WERE AT ALL [BETROTHED] TO A MAN, AND THERE ARE VOWS UPON HER. In the opinion of our Rabbis⁴⁵ Scripture [here] is saying: “and if she, this woman [mentioned above in Verses 4-6] were at all [betrothed] to a man, and bound herself by a bond, being in her father’s house, in her youth⁴⁶ — and there are vows upon her, meaning that her father had not heard them, so that they were neither annulled nor confirmed, and her [betrothed] husband hears them as well [as her father who hears them now when she is betrothed], then he makes void her vow,⁴⁷ signifying that he also joins [now] with the father in annulling her vows [that are upon her].”

footnotes: ⁴⁵ Nedarim 71a. ⁴⁶ Verse 4. ⁴⁷ Verse 9.

And the phrase she were at all ‘to a man’ means that she is [promised] unto him but [still] is in her father’s house, and has not yet come to his [the man’s] house, and [hence] this must refer to a betrothed girl, for Scripture calls her too, the wife of his fellow.⁴⁸ of the man to whom she is betrothed, in the same way that here he is described as her ish (man) — literally “husband.” Now our Rabbis did not explain [that this verse refers to a fully-married wife, and teaches] that a husband himself can annul the vows of his married wife which she “brought along” from her father’s house to his house, as would seem the simple meaning of the verse, for if that were so, why would Scripture have to repeat itself and say [in Verse 11], And if a woman vowed in her husband’s house, for if he can annul [even] those vows which preceded [his marriage to her], surely [he can annul] those vows which [she makes whilst she is] in his house!⁴⁹ a woman vowed in her husband’s house etc.? It must be because Verses 7-9 speak about a betrothed woman, in which case both the father and the betrothed do jointly annul her vow. “If the father revoked the vow but not the betrothed, or if the betrothed revoked it but not the father, the vow is not revoked. Still less need it be said if one of them explicitly confirmed the vow” (Nedarim 67a). — It should be noted that the term “betrothed” in this connection has reference to the actual “betrothal” of a man to a woman to be his wife [not a mere “engagement”]. In the eyes of the Jewish law she is then considered his wife, except that the consummation of the marriage takes place some time after the betrothal. And [even without resorting to this reasoning], it is the tradition [of the Rabbis] which decides [the true meaning of the verses].

footnotes: ⁴⁸ Deuteronomy 22:23. Thus she is already called the wife ⁴⁹ So why, then would the Torah state the obvious (in Verse 11): And if

EVERY VOW, AND EVERY BINDING OATH TO AFFLICT THE SOUL, [HER HUSBAND MAY ESTABLISH IT, AND HER HUSBAND MAY MAKE IT VOID]. “Since He had said [in the preceding verses] that a husband may annul [his wife’s vows], I might think that this includes all her vows! Scripture therefore says, to afflict the soul, meaning that he can only annul vows which afflict the soul, and they are explained in Tractate Nedarim.” These are the words of Rashi. But his language here is [too] concise, because a husband annuls vows which afflict the soul, such as [if she vows] “The fruits of the world be forbidden to me,” or even if she [only] vowed that she would not taste one of all the kinds [of fruits]; and likewise he may annul matters [which concern the relationship] between himself and his wife, even if they do not involve affliction of the soul, such as [if she swore] “I will not paint [my eyes]” or “I will not put powder on my face,” or “I will not have sexual intercourse,” these being matters about which He said, between a man and his wife,⁵⁰ as is explained in the last chapter of Tractate Nedarim.⁵¹ Such is also the law with respect to the father himself, as we have been taught in the Sifre:⁵² 155. “I only know that a husband may annul vows [which concern the relationship] between himself and his wife, and vows which afflict the soul, [to the exclusion of other vows which he may not annul]. Whence do I know that the father [is similarly limited in his rights]? You can reason [in the following manner] etc… But I have not succeeded in establishing [the father’s law] by reason. Therefore Scripture says: These are the statutes, which the Eternal commanded Moses, between a man and his wife, between a father and his daughter.⁵⁰ [This teaches us that] we must of necessity compare the father to the husband, sothat just as the husband may only annul vows [which concern the relationship] between himself and his wife, and matters which involve affliction of the soul, so also the father may only annul matters [which concern the laws] between him and her,⁵³ and matters which involve affliction of the soul.” It is also taught in this way in the Gemara Yerushalmi of Tractate Nedarim.⁵⁴

footnotes: ⁵⁰ Further, Verse 17. ⁵¹ Nedarim 79b. ⁵² Sifre, Matoth ⁵⁰ Further, Verse 17. ⁵³ Such as if she vows not to give him the wages for her work. ⁵⁴ Yerushalmi Nedarim XI, 1. For “Yerushalmi” see Vol. III, p. 192, Note 44.

[BUT IF HE SHALL MAKE THEM NULL AFTER THAT HE HATH HEARD THEM], THEN HE SHALL BEAR HER INIQUITY — “he [the husband] takes her place.⁵⁵. Ramban presents another interpretation. Thus we learn that one who causes somebody else to commit an offense takes the place of that person with respect to all punishments [which that person would otherwise incur].” This is Rashi’s language, taken from the Sifre.⁵⁶ 156. It would appear that this woman [broke her vow] in error or was misled, for Scripture speaks [here] of a husband who heard [his wife’s vow and did not annul it on that day], and the wife does not know about this, and after some time he “annulled” [the vow, although he in fact no longer had the power to do so], and told her that [he annulled it] in the day he heard it.⁵⁷ Thus Scripture teaches us two things: that the husband bears her iniquity as if he had made a vow and profaned his word, and that she is totally free and not liable to any of the punishments [found elsewhere] for errors.⁵⁸ But if the wife knows that he [her husband] did not annul it in the day he heard it,⁵⁷ and she is versed in this law [that he only has a right to annul her vows on the day that he hears it, and not later, and nonetheless she breaks her vow], then she is the guilty one, and [since] the husband did not cause the offense, therefore his punishment is [only] like that of someone who can protest [at another person committing a sin] and does not protest. Now Scripture mentions this case with reference to a husband [misleading his wife to think that he annulled her vow in the day he heard it,⁵⁷ when in actual fact he “annulled” it only afterwards when he no longer had the right to], although the same law applies to a father [and his daughter’s vows], because Scripture speaks of normal circumstances, that a father usually guards himself against doing this because of his love for his daughter, whereas a husband might perhaps hate his wife and think that he will make her guilty [by misleading her to break her vow]. Now Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra wrote: “Then he shall bear her iniquity, because she is under his control.” If so, the verse is speaking of a case where he forces her to do that which she has bound herself⁴⁷ [not to do, and it is then that he shall bear her iniquity]. But it is not correct [since the same laws obviously apply when he misleads her without actually forcing her].

footnotes: ⁵⁵ According to Rashi the verse speaks about a case where the husband confirmed his wife’s vow, and then on the same day annulled it, which he can no longer do. If she only heard about the annulment but not about the confirmation, and therefore unknowingly violated her oath — he bears her iniquity ⁵⁶ Sifre, Matoth ⁵⁷ Above, Verse 15. ⁵⁸ See Ramban on Leviticus 1:4, (towards the end). ⁵⁷ Above, Verse 15. ⁵⁷ Above, Verse 15. ⁴⁷ Verse 9.