It is sold - for the purpose of plowing.

If he consecrated it, it is consecrated - the practical implication is that if he derived benefit from it, he [is considered to have] misappropriated [Temple funds].

It is returned - even though the court [subsequently] takes it, the bailee is exempt, since when he returned it it was a perfectly good ox.

It is not consecrated - since it is not [considered to be] in its owner's possession [as far as giving him the ability] to consecrate it.

With regard to items from which it is prohibited to derive benefit one does not say: That which is yours is before you - the practical implication is for one who stole leavened bread, and Passover came and went, and he returned it -- it is not considered returned.

As if so - [namely,] that according to the Rabbis one doesn't say [that which is yours is before you].

Let them dispute - [let] the Rabbis [dispute] regarding leavened bread on Passover, and let them say that he is liable [to reimburse the value of the leavened bread to the one from whom he stole it]. But we established in [the chapter of] "One Who Robs Another of Wood" that according to the Rabbis, he can say "that which is yours is before you," as is taught: if one robbed another of leavened bread, and Passover elapsed over it, and he returned it; and similarly, an ox before its verdict, one may say to him "that which is yours is before you," but not once its verdict has been issued. [Bava Kamma 98b:6] And is it not a rationale that the Rabbis accepted and thus taught that they concede regarding unleavened bread [after] Passover, that regarding items from which it is prohibited to derive benefit one may say "that which is yours is before you"? Rather, all agree that one may say "that which is yours is before you" regarding items from which it is prohibited to derive benefit where the prohibition comes automatically, such as with leavened bread on Passover, where one cannot say to the other "this is of no consequence." But here, it is because of this that the Rabbis say it is not considered returned: since [the owner could have] said to [the bailee] "now you have let my ox be seized", etc., this is an active form of damaging in that [the bailee complied with] taking [the ox] to the court. The language [Rabba] chose "if you had returned [the ox] to me" is not to say that the liability is because he did not return it to him [before the court case], because if so, he could also have said in the context of the case of leavened bread on Passover "if you had returned it to me I would have eaten it" [and thereby cause the robber to be liable]. Furthermore, according to Rabbi Ya'akov as well, since [he holds that] the verdict for an ox can be issued in its absence, let him say "if you had returned it to me I would have slaughtered it". Rather, the Rabbis do not make him liable for returning it now not having returned it earlier; regarding items from which it is prohibited to derive benefit one does indeed say "that which is yours is before you". Rather, his liability comes because [the bailee] actively brought [the ox] before the court. Then [the owner] says to [the bailee] as follows: "you shouldn't have brought it to court; if it was in my hands I would have smuggled it away from them."

Ultimately, they would have issued the verdict anyway - therefore it is damage that happened automatically, and not through active action.

Just as the owner [is sentenced to death] only in his presence - as is written, "unless he has stood trial before the assembly" [Numbers 35:12].

If he safeguarded it - with superior safeguarding.

All of [the other bailees] should also be exempt - from [reimbursing] the value of the ox -- except from the borrower -- since they are victims of circumstances beyond their control.

Reduced safeguarding - [like, for example,] a door that can withstand normal winds.

Fulfilled his safeguarding duties - since he does not have to strengthen its safeguarding, that was sufficient, and is not considered negligence. Therefore he is exempt from liability for the value of the ox -- with respect to the owners -- since a reduced safeguarding was sufficient. However he does require atonement [i.e. is liable for ransom].

Those have not fulfilled their safeguarding - since they were required to have strengthened its safeguarding so that it would have been guarded on behalf of its owners; it is negligence, analogous to theft and loss [for which those other bailees would have been liable].

In accordance with whose opinion? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir - who says in the mishna [Bava Kamma 45b:8] that it is not sufficient [to guard] a forewarned ox with reduced safeguarding, and therefore also teaches that they must pay ransom.