To separate - lest you say that one is not liable unless both an ox and donkey fall in there together.

And fall - in the singular.

"And fall" can indicate many - as in "Let, then, Bezalel and Oholiab" [Exodus 36:1]; "even if the sign or portent comes true" [Deuteronomy 13:3]; "and if a lion or bear came" [I Samuel 17:34].

Anything else is not - how would I know [that] other things [which fall into a pit cause liability]?

So to all [must be] animals - it is answering according to the Rabbis. According to Rabbi Yehuda, [however, the word] "and" comes to include even other movable objects.

Birds - which do not impart ritual impurity through contact or by carrying.

If so - that what is included [in the law of Pit] is only what is similar to the explicit detail in both aspects.

Let the Merciful One write [only] one detail - either "ox" or "donkey", and we would interpret this to mean anything similar to what is explicitly detailed. From the fact that it wrote the other [i.e., both], if it is not relevant to [teach that the law only applies to] something whose carcass imparts ritual impurity -- which is included in the generalization -- then apply it to birds, which are similar to the explicit detail in that they are living animals. It would have been possible to object to this: now that both [terms, "ox" and "donkey",] are needed, how would a human being be excluded? But instead, [the gemara] proceeds from the topic of birds and continues to raise objections until it extracts and explanation for everything.

Whose firstborn is not sanctified do not - such as horses and camels. The Merciful One wrote "ox", which was not [otherwise] necessary, since from the generalization one could have included even horses and camels, since they are similar to the explicit detail in two aspects: they are living animals and their carcasses impart ritual impurity. But birds, which are only similar in one aspect, would not [be included in the law of Pit].

Rather - do not say that [scripture] returned to make a generalization so that [the verse] be interpreted according to "a generalization, followed by an explicit detail, followed by a generalization." Rather, I would say that [as the gemara proceeds to answer] "the verse states 'And the carcass shall be for him'", etc.

Are vessels subject to death - in the form of a question. According to the Rabbis, why do I even need a verse to exclude them? And how would Rabbi Yehuda be able to include them? We could not ascribe to them the verse "and the carcass shall be for him." [Exodus 21:34]

Their shattering is their death - therefore according to the Rabbis, "donkey" comes to exclude them as [shattering] is not actual death. "Ox" comes to exclude a human being, which is not a type of animal. If the Merciful One had only written one [of the terms "ox" and "donkey"], I would have said that this excludes a human being, but not vessels, since what would [a specific detail] be coming to exclude but some other living thing which is [at least somewhat] similar to it? Therefore "donkey" is needed. According to Rabbi Yehuda, "or" comes to include vessels, even though they are not subject to actual death. "Ox" comes to exclude human beings [which are,] similar [to an ox,] living things. Subsequently the gemara will ask why Rabbi Yehuda would need the term "donkey" [Bava Kamma 54a:11].

A disqualified consecrated ox - which was redeemed -- the carcass does not belong [fully] to him, as we have established in Bekhorot in the second chapter regarding disqualified consecrated [animals] following their being redeemed: “You may slaughter” [Deuteronomy 12:15] -- but not shear it. “[You may eat its] flesh” -- but not its milk. “You may eat it” -- but not your dogs. [Bekhorot 15a:20]

An ox, but not a person - which is not a type of animal.

But an ox belonging to a competent adult - in the form of a question; how could the verse exempt him?