Likewise, I will bring the mode of a wedding canopy, which generally effects acquisition - in that it completes [the acquisition as far as it pertains to the husband's rights] to inherit from her and to annul her vows. Let [the mode of a wedding canopy] then also acquire here without [any additional act of] betrothal.

That they are effective against her will - that they serve to acquire in general: namely, intercourse [serves to acquire] a yevama, and a document in [the case of] divorce, and money in [the case of] a Hebrew maidservant.

In any event, with regard to marriage, we have not found [a case in which a woman can be acquired through] money against her will - which nevertheless, serves to acquire here [in the typical case of betrothal]. (And even against her will; if, for example, the father accepts betrothal [money] for a minor daughter... [Tosafot on Kiddushin:5a.14.1]) Thus: "Likewise, I will bring the mode of a wedding canopy..." [which generally effects acquisition, rendering a woman as married, and therefore it should also effect acquisition here.]

Two refutations of this matter - to that which you said, that the marriage canopy can acquire without [having previously given] money.

And furthermore, doesn’t a wedding canopy complete - that which you said, that a wedding canopy completes, etc. -- and since it only [in the typical case, from which you are trying to logically derive its power to betroth,] completes a marriage following [a prior act of] betrothal, how can you then derive [the power of] marriage canopy [to complete a marriage] without [a prior act of] betrothal from [the rule of] marriage canopy with [a prior act of] betrothal?

You are hereby betrothed [mekuddeshet] to me - or "you are hereby betrothed [me’oreset] to me".

And would the baraita teach in the latter clause a matter that contradicts the first clause - ? in the form of a challenge. When we say, in other places, "for no reason", it is regarding something that did not need to be taught, but was taught for no [particular] reason. But as for a latter clause which would contract a first clause -- that, no Tanna would teach.

This is what [the baraita] is saying - in the latter clause: but if he diverges from what we said [he should say]; if, for example, he gave [the betrothal money] and she spoke, it is treated just as if she gave and she spoke, with the result that she is not betrothed. This is because we require "a man takes" [Deuteronomy 24:1].

If he gave - in the mode of "a man takes" [Deuteronomy 24:1].

And she spoke - in the mode of "a woman is taken by a man".

And by rabbinic law we are concerned - that if another man came and betrothed her, she would need a divorce from both of them: perhaps the first one's betrothal was not valid, and the second one's took effect, or perhaps the first one's betrothal was valid and not the second one's.

With regard to betrothal, if he gave her etc. - since [Shmuel] wanted to state the latter clause regarding divorce; that is: "he gave her", etc., he chose this terminology.

You are hereby betrothed - and we do not include "to me" in the text [of Shmuel's statement].

There is no room for concern her - there is not even the shadow of a doubt that the betrothal is valid, since it is written that "a man takes" [Deuteronomy 24:1] and not that he takes himself for her. And as for divorce, there is no room for concern [that the divorce is valid], even to disqualify her [out of caution] from [subsequently marrying into] the priesthood.

Ambiguous intimations - [metaphorically,] a handle for grasping a thing. Even though it is ambiguous, it could serve to grasp onto a complete statement, as here, where he says "you are hereby betrothed," but did not say to whom.

Are considered like unambiguous intimations - where he said that she was to be betrothed to him.

Ehei - I shall be.

When a nazirite was passing before him - where by "I shall be" he certainly meant "I too shall be like this one". This indicates that we require an unambiguous utterance.