Prohibited - deriving benefit from the animal [is prohibited], even though its slaughter was not for idol worship. Even if its blood was not [ultimately] sprinkled for idol worship, it is forbidden. The reason for [this ruling regarding] slaughter of non-consecrated [animals] is as derived by Rabbi Yoḥanan analogously from [the law] of piggul, which is [likewise involving intention during] one act of service regarding another: one who slaughters the sacrifice with the intention of sprinkling its blood on the following day [when it must be done that very day], it is piggul.

And Reish Lakish says it is permitted - he does not derive [the law regarding] "outside" [regular non-consecrated animals] from "inside" [i.e., the law of piggul]: [for non-consecrated animals in the context of idol worship], intention from one service to another is irrelevant.

This works out well - that the verse superfluously mentions slaughtering to teach a general principle [that only similar acts of service are punishable by death], and that we do not apply this exposition [of the verse's mention slaughtering being superfluous] as implying that one who has an intention from one act of service to another [renders the animal forbidden] -- works out well according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, since he derives its prohibition from [the law of] the intention of piggul. It is possible that one can derive the person's liability [to the death penalty for intention for idol worship in a different service while performing a service] from there as well. Thus one must say that [the verse's mention of] "slaughtering" is indeed superfluous. But according to Reish Lakish, who does not derive [prohibition] for idol worship from piggul, let us say that this mention of "slaughtering" is in fact for the following purpose: that [one is liable] for intending to perform another act of service during [the present] act of service.

Those idolators who worship the mountains - it is taught in a baraita in Tractate Avodah Zarah [Avodah Zarah 45a:1] that deriving benefit from the mountains is permitted, as it is written: "their gods, upon the [high] mountains" [Deuteronomy 12:2] -- but [you are] not [obligated to destroy] the hills [themselves that are] their gods.

The ones who worshiped it by the sword - even though it is attached [to the ground], it is not forbidden; nevertheless, it is still idol worship. Here too, no verse is needed, since slaughter is necessary for the sprinkling of the blood, and this one intended during the slaughter to sprinkle [the blood for idol worship], he is therefore considered as one who performed an act of idol worship, since sprinkling [of the blood] without having slaughtered is not sufficient [as an act of service]. Therefore you are forced to concede that if [as Rava bar Rav Ḥanan proposed] "bowing down" is mentioned specifically [in the verse] to teach a general principle, it was not necessary to also write "slaughtering".

"How do they serve" - implying that [if worshiped] in their usual fashion -- yes; not in their usual fashion -- no [this is not the subject of the verse's warning].

To exclude what - [to exclude which rite] that is not in the [idolatry's] usual fashion. Since we have derived from [the verse's singling out of] "bowing" that one is liable even for [those rites that are] not [also] services in [the Temple], [then what is meant to be excluded from the warning as a rite] that is not in the usual fashion? If we would say that it comes to exclude [worshiping] an idol with a degrading rite when its usual service is honorable -- for example, one who defecates before an idol which is supposed to be sacrificed to -- why would this verse [of "how do they serve"] be needed to exclude it?

It is derived from bowing - which teaches the general principle that one is only liable for an honorable rite, like bowing.

But that which Rabbi Eliezer says: From where is it derived that one who sacrifices an animal - which is an honorable rite -- to Mercury, whose standard manner of worship is degrading (likewise for Pe'or) [is liable]? If Rava bar Rav Ḥanan is right that "bowing" teaches a general principle, why do I need this [Rabbi Eliezer's] verse [Leviticus 17:7]? It is derived from "bowing" [Deuteronomy 17:3]!

To one who sacrifices in order to express insolence - and does not intend to accept it upon himself as a deity; this verse [brought by Rabbi Eliezer] teaches that he transgresses the prohibition.

Lost his oxen - and he went to look for them.

One who says: I will worship - from the moment they seduced him and he acquiesced, he is liable to the death penalty -- as we derive later [Sanhedrin 61b:3] on from "You shall not approve of him, nor listen to him” [Deuteronomy 13:9] -- but if one approved of and listened to the inciter, he is immediately liable.

I will go and worship - though he has not yet gone, [he is liable,] even though it is possible to say as of this point that he has reconsidered [his intention of idolatry].

Let us go and worship - even though he has included himself with others, in that it is possible to say that since the others have not gone he will also not go.

He said to him - the mishna is stating that if he [ultimately] worships it -- yes [he is liable, but if] he [only] says it -- no.

To one who states I only accept it upon myself - as a deity.

Only through worship - unless I worship it, since as long as he did not worship it, it does not constitute "approving of and listening". The latter citation [Sanhedrin 67a], which implies that he is liable as a result of a [mere] statement, is [referring to a case] where he accepts its divinity immediately; since he said "I will worship" the presumption is that he accepts it as a deity unless he has explicitly stated that he is only accepting it upon worshiping it.

Come and worship me - he is making himself into an idolatry and is seducing people to worship him.

Deems him liable - to death, as an inciter.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Actually, one is not liable - for an utterance without an action except for one who is incited to idol worship, and "approves of and listens" and says "I will worship" or "I will go and worship". But in the case of one who says "come and worship me", he is exempt. It comes out that Rabbi Yehuda must have some other reason [for exempting] one who incites others to worship him, because one who is incited is liable for [mere] statements.

One who incites to himself - with regard to one incites others to worship him, [Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree as to] if he is considered an inciter or not.

They do not listen to him - since he is a human being just like them, and even those who are liable to be seduced to worship other idolatries would not be seduced to worship a person.