Of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira - he disagrees in the case of one who swears to perform a mitzva, an not in the case of one who swears not to perform a mitzva.

Where [the Torah] did not render, etc. - since the oath can be positive but cannot be negative.

Shall we say that Rav is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira - who does not require [that both] negative and positive [versions of the oath be possible in order to be liable] and would likewise not require [that both] past and future [versions of the oath be possible]?

Everyone agrees with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira - that is to say, according to Shmuel it is certainly subject to a disagreement between tannaim, since Shmuel would not presume that, according to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, we would exempt him.

Now negative and positive - since it is written explicitly "to bad or good purpose" [Leviticus 5:4], which implies such cases as "I will eat" or "I will not eat", [and yet Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira] does not require [that both be possible].

To the future and to the past - which are not explicitly stated [in the verse], how much more so would [Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira] not require [that both be possible].

When they disagree it is with regard to the opinion of the Rabbis - that they disagree. Rav would state that even his opinion would be shared by the Rabbis; we would not then say that according to Rav this is subject to a disagreement among tannaim. (Anywhere this type of language ["when they disagree" vs. "shall we say that they disagree"] is used in the gemara, it means that this is its opinion.)

Would "I will not don" have been possible - as an "oath on an utterance"? Is he not swearing to abrogate a [positive] mitzva?

When it is known to three people - these three already knew that this column was made of stone -- that is an "oath in vain", because once thee people know it, it is [considered] well-known. We have the text: And Rav concedes [in a case] where one says: On my oath I know testimony that is relevant to you, and it is found that he did not know, he is exempt, since it is not in the category of: I do not know testimony [that is relevant] to you.

And Rav concedes, etc. - even though he does not require that [both] future and past [versions of the oath be possible], he does require that [both] positive and negative [versions of the oath be possible]. As for one who says "upon my oath, I know testimony [that is relevant] to you -- the positive version is possible, but the negative version is not possible. "I do not know for you" is not possible, because [one who swears falsely that] "I do not know testimony for you" is not held liable by the All-Merciful on account of an "oath on an utterance" outside the premises of the court, but is only liable on account of an "oath regarding testimony", which applies only in court and to one who is fit to testify.

"I knew" or "I did not know" is subject to the dispute - of Rav and Shmuel, since both the positive and negative [versions of the oath] are possible, but the future [version of the oath] is not possible, since it would be an oath to abrogate a mitzva.

For that reason the Merciful One removed, etc. - and legislated it explicitly [in a separate verse] and with regard to that particular [i.e., guilt] offering. If it had not been written explicitly, [liability] would not have been possible to infer from an "oath on an utterance", since the future [version of the oath regarding testimony] is not possible.

But according to Rav, for what halakha did the Merciful One write it - and with regard to that particular offering? Is it not also in the category of an "oath on an utterance"?

Two - if he is fit to testify, and denied [knowledge of the testimony] in court, he should be liable to two [offerings, one] on account of an "oath of testimony" and [another] on account of an "oath on an utterance".

In one - on the same topic, it is written: "upon realizing guilt in any of these matters" [Leviticus 5:5]

And according to Abaye, for what halakha - according to [Abaye's understanding of the opinion of] Rav.

For every - for all [prohibitions] where it is written that [one is liable to bring] a sliding-scale offering: an "oath on an utterance" and Impurity of the Temple and its Sanctified Items, it is written "And it is hidden".

And here - regarding "oaths on testimony", it is not written "And it is hidden".

Intentionally - where [liability for a sacrifice] does not apply to an "oath on an utterance".

He is liable for one - due to the [oath on] testimony.

Unwittingly - since it is also possible to obligate him regarding the "oath on an utterance", he should be liable [to bring] two [offerings].

Is this not what they said - to you, since the verse explicitly excludes him from being obligated [to bring] two [offerings]. You are compelled to say that the verse excludes him in [a case of] unwitting violation, because in an intentional case, would it have been possible [at all] for [him to be liable to bring] two?! Why would he have to be excluded [from an intentional case]? There is no liability for an "oath on an utterance" in intentional cases!

We have the text: And if intentionally, how could there be [a case] of two?

Rava said, etc. - that is to say, it is not necessary to exclude him [using the verse of] "in any" [Leviticus 5:5]. The use of "in any" to exclude liability for two is not meant for [ruling out two offerings for an oath on testimony, that is, for liability for both] an "oath on testimony" and an "oath on an utterance", but rather [to rule out two offerings] for a mere "oath on an utterance": [that is,] if he said "I swear not to eat" and he ate wheat bread, barley bread and spelt bread, he is only liable for one [offering]. But it is not necessary to rule out [two offerings for an "oath on testimony"], [one for] "an oath on testimony" and [a second for] an "oath on an utterance". This is because an "oath on testimony" would have been included in the category of "oaths on an utterance" but had been stated separately in order to give a ruling on a novel matter; [namely, that it applies only] with those who are fit to testify, and [that the oath take place] before the court. Therefore, only its novel aspects apply, so he is liable only due to its being an "oath on testimony" and not regarding [its belonging to the category of] "oaths on an utterance".

By inference that Abaye - who requires the verse [of "in any"] to exclude [liability for two offerings].

The oath exists in principle - that is to say, [when one swears that] "I don't know any testimony for you" that there is still an aspect of an "oath on an utterance", but that the reason that one is not liable for two [offerings] is due to the exclusion? The practical difference would be in a case where it could still be said to be an "oath on an utterance" but not [technically] an "oath on testimony", such as with those who are disqualified from giving testimony, or [if the oath takes place] not before the court. [In those cases,] it would not be possible to exempt him using [the verse of] "in any", so would he then be liable [at least] due to its being an "oath on an utterance"?