Of every creditor. The verse is disarranged, for the shmitah only applies to the hand of the creditor [and not to his entire self] — that he shall not have a hand [i.e., the ability] to claim his debt. Rashi adds the word של (of) because it says ידו [spelled] with a vav (his hand), then we need to explain whose hand it is. Therefore Rashi continues and says, “...of every creditor.” Rashi also adds the word את, to indicate that “his hand” is the object. For without the word את then “his hand” is the subject, as in “And his hand reaches (Vayikra 25:26).”

Then there will be no one destitute among you. The word, “only,” is connected to the previous verse, “End it [poverty], so that there will be no one destitute among you.” As if it said: The promise to you, “There will be no one destitute among you,” applies “Only if you will listen.”

Listen a little, etc. Rashi is answering the question: What is the meaning of “only” that is written in this verse? For every instance of, “only,” is an exclusionary term. Rashi explains: It is excluding from, “listen,” and perforce it is coming to be expounded, “Listen a little, and you will be given the opportunity to listen much.”

The neediest [lit., whoever desires most] should be given preference. The most destitute among them. In other words: If someone needs a particular item then give it to him first, since he desires it most.

Your paternal brother should be given preference over your maternal brother. Otherwise why is the term מאחד (among one of) needed? Rashi interprets the word מאחד as מיוחד (a particular brother), which is referring to your paternal brother. For it is written below (25:5) says [a related term, יחדו regarding paternal brothers], “When brothers dwell יחדו (together).”

This refers to a wife, etc. In other words, you must provide him with a wife.

Perhaps this is a mitzvah**? The Torah therefore teaches, “So that he does not cry out.”** That verse is written in Parshas Ki Seitzei (below 24:15). Even though that verse deals with a day laborer, and the verse here pertains to lending to the poor, nevertheless they both pertain to the poor. For it is written here, “Your destitute brother,” and it is written there, “For he is a poor man, etc.”

Even if you merely say that you would give, etc. Since the word הדבר (this thing) is written, they expounded it as being related to the word דיבור (speech). Likewise the verse (Bereishis 12:17), “Regarding the matter (דבר) of Sarah,” is expounded as, “Through Sarah’s speech.” Otherwise, why is the term, “this thing,” needed? Rather it should simply say, “Because of this, Adonoy will bless you.”

For this reason. I.e., the term על כן does not mean, “since,” as in, “Since (כי על כן) I did not give her to Shailoh my son (Bereishis 38:26),” and, “Since (כי על כן) I did not allow you to touch her (ibid. 20:6).” For in those verses, the expression על כן is connected to the word כי — and every instance of כי על כן in Scripture means, “since,” as Rashi explains in Parshas Vayeirah (ibid. 18:5). But here the expression על כן means, “For this reason,” because it is written without the word כי.

I am counselling you for your own good. Otherwise, why is the word, “saying,” needed? For no form of the word דיבור (spoke) is mentioned beforehand so that the word, “saying,” should follow it.

When the courts sold him for his larceny, etc. You might ask: From where does Rashi know this? Perhaps he sold himself, similar to the verse (Vayikra 25:39) ונמכר לך (And he is sold to you), where he sold himself. We cannot say that Rashi’s explanation is because it already says, “And he is sold to you,” regarding when he sold himself, and therefore the verse here is apparently redundant [and must be discussing a different case — when the courts sold him]. If so [we could say to the contrary], it already says, “If you purchase a Hebrew slave (Shmos 21:2),” regarding when he is sold by others — the courts [and then the verse here must be discussing a different case — when he sold himself]. Re”m answers: Perhaps the expression, “And he is sold,” on its own means that he is sold by others. For the word נמכר is the nifal verb form, which usually means that a subject is acted upon by others. Except regarding the verse, “And he is sold,” it is first written, “When your brother becomes impoverished,” and continues to explain, “And he is sold.” Perforce, it means that he sold himself. But it seems to me that regarding a Hebrew slave we learn one verse from another: It is written here אחיך העברי (Your brother-Jew), and it is written there עבד עברי (Jewish slave) — just as in the verse there he was sold by others, so too here he was sold by others.

Rather, because of two novel teachings here, etc. You might ask: Why does Rashi not state another novel teaching — that a Hebrew (male) slave is not set free if his master mutilates the tips of his limbs. For the verse here compares him to the Hebrew maidservant, [and she is not set free if mutilated] as it is written in Parshas Mishpatim (Shmos 21:7). Perhaps the answer is: The rule stated by our sages, “Any segment of the Torah which is written and repeated — it is only repeated for the sake of a novel teaching,” applies only to a novel teaching stated explicitly in the verse. But it does not apply to [something like] this, which is merely an outcome of the comparison [between the slave and maidservant] (Re”m). But it seems to me: Regardless of the comparison here, we still would not learn that the Hebrew (male) servant is set free if mutilated. [This might have been attempted] through a fortiori reasoning from a Canaanite slave [as follows]: Regarding a Canaanite slave, who is not set free after six years. Nevertheless he is set free if mutilated. So then regarding a Hebrew slave, who is set free after six years, does it not logically follow that he too is set free if mutilated? But I would retort: A Hebrew maidservant disproves this logic. For she is set free after six years, but she is not set free if mutilated, and so a Hebrew slave would be the same. We could not learn through a fortiori reasoning from a Canaanite slave that a Hebrew maidservant is set free if mutilated, for Scripture writes explicitly that, “She shall not go out [free] in the manner of male slaves [if mutilated].” [It seems to me].

The literal meaning of this is “adornment.” In other words: The master should adorn his slave lavishly, and this will indicate to the slave that his master treated him benevolently.

Just as these are distinguished by their blessed status, etc. Flocks are [blessed because they] bear offspring and multiply. So, too, whatever grows from the earth. However, this excludes mules, since they do not bear offspring and multiply.

Also, the Rabbis derive in tractate Kiddushin through the gezeirah-shavacomparison principle etc. I.e., the verse here says, “Do not send him away empty-handed,” and in Parshas Ki Sisa regarding a first-born son it says, “Do not appear before Me empty-handed (Shmos 34:20).” Just as regarding a first-born son the amount is twenty silver pieces, here too the amount is twenty silver pieces. From where do we know the amount regarding the first-born? [We know] from Yoseif, the first-born son of Rochel, who was sold to Egypt for twenty silver pieces.

Perhaps this follows the plain meaning? Etc. And we should not say: Perhaps this verse refers to a slave sold by the courts two or three years before the *yovel —*He goes free in the yovel, but a slave who has been pierced should serve forever, which is the plain meaning of the verse. For the answer is: A slave sold by the courts is set free because the verse says, “And he shall return to his family (Vayikra 25:41).” If so, then what is the verse, “Everyone shall return to his family, etc. (Vayikra 25:10),” referring to? It must mean that a slave who has been pierced is set free in the yovel. See Parshas Mishpatim (Shmos 21:6) and Parshas Behar (Vayikra ibid.).

His master gives him [a Gentile maidservant], etc. I.e., The Hebrew slave may even be forced to take her. Otherwise [if the meaning is that he is merely allowed to take her], it is already written (Shmos 21:4), “If his master gives him a [maidservant] wife, etc.”

It is a mitzvahto declare ‘You are hereby consecrated as a firstborn.’ Otherwise, why is תקדיש (you must consecrate) necessary? For it is already consecrated.

Another interpretation. One cannot say, “You must consecrate”, etc. The first interpretation is problematic: What is the mitzvah to declare, “You are hereby consecrated,” if it is already consecrated? Therefore Rashi says, “Another interpretation, etc.” And the second interpretation is problematic: For the term תקדיש (You must consecrate) implies that the animals itself must be consecrated, and not its monetary value. Therefore Rashi also says the first interpretation. This answers the question that is asked: Rashi’s second interpretation is the viewpoint of Rebbi Yishmael, but the first interpretation is the viewpoint of the Rabbis who argue with him, and the halacha follows the Rabbis. Why then does Rashi mention the viewpoint of Rebbi Yishmael if the halacha does not follow him? Perforce Rashi is only coming to explain the verse close to its simple meaning, and to set each matter in the verse properly.

Then donate, to the sacred hekdeshdomain, the value of its beneficiary payment. Re”m writes: Here Rashi explains, “Donate to hekdesh the value of its beneficiary payment.” But in tractate Erechin (29a) Rashi explains, “Donate to akohein the value of its beneficiary payment,” which is difficult to understand. Furthermore: In tractate Bechoros (31a) the Mishnah says, “The monetary benefit of sacred animals that have been disqualified is given to hekdesh. They may be sold in the market and weighed in the usual manner; except for the firstborn and (animal) tithes, since their monetary benefit is given to their owners [the Kohanim].” Yet how can Rashi say here that the beneficiary payment of the firstborn is given to hekdesh? I found [a solution] written, which I think is correct: Rashi’s explanation here, "Then donate, to hekdesh, the value of its beneficiary payment,” is referring to a firstborn that was sanctified, for then its beneficiary payment is given to hekdesh. But there [in Erechin and Bechoros] is referring to a firstborn that was pledged, for all pledges are given to the Kohanim. Therefore Rashi explains there, “Give its beneficiary payment to the Kohanim.” See Erechin 28b, 29a.

Just as the second tithe is not disqualified from one year to the next, etc. As it is written regarding the tithes (above 14:28), “At the end of three years, separate all the tithes of your produce,” and Rashi explains, “This comes to teach that if one withheld his tithes, etc.”