Avert your eyes as if you do not notice it. Because you cannot say [it means] that the person conceals from telling that he found them, because if so, if should have said “and conceal them,” which would imply that he is concealing [the fact] that he has them. But because it is written “and conceal yourself from them,” it implies that he conceals his eye from seeing it.

You may not observe it, etc. Rashi is answering [a difficulty]: The verse seems to be saying, “Do not see, rather conceal, etc.,” which implies that one is permitted to conceal himself [and this is not so].

The Rabbis, however, comment: At times, you may conceal yourself, etc. In which case? If he is a kohein and there is a [lost] ox in a cemetery; or if he is an elder and it is not fitting for his honor.

Would it seem reasonable etc. But, rather, ask him [about it]. And the word אותו refers back to “your brother,” meaning that you should inquire of your brother who is the owner of the lost item [by asking] for signs that the lost item had.

Provided there is a return, etc. Rashi is answering [the difficulty] that the verse should not have said “and you shall return it to him” [because that is obvious], but [only] “until your brother seeks it,” and if it is known to him that you have it, you are certainly obligated to return it to him.

Which does not produce and eat, shall be sold. So that one can fulfill, “And you shall return it to him.”

By averting your eyes, etc. Rashi has to give this explanation [again] even though he had given it above (v. 1), because he [then] explained the verse again according to the teaching of the sages that “at times you may conceal yourself,” so it seems as if he is not sure of the verse’s meaning. Therefore he says here that it is impossible to explain “you may not conceal yourself” except [as meaning] that you should not [conceal yourself, unlike the earlier verse where it also means that you sometimes may conceal yourself, etc.]

This refers to loading — to load the burden, etc. Rashi is answering the question: Why does Scripture change the wording? Here it is written, “You must surely lift it up with him,” but in parshas Mishpatim (Shmos 23:5) it writes, “You shall surely help [etc.]” He explains that there it is talking about unloading, to unload the burden, but the section here deals with loading.

He may not shave the pubic hairs, etc. I.e. [because] women customarily do this, meaning that he should not ornament himself with women’s adornments. You might ask: Why does Rashi give an alternative explanation [only] to the end of the verse? He should also have given an alternative interpretation to the beginning of the verse as well! For the Gemora (Nazir 59a) explains: R. Eliezer ben Yaakov says: From where [do we know that] a woman may not put on weapons and go out to war, because the verse teaches, “A man’s attire may not be on a woman.” Re”m writes: The same applies too, that a woman may not go out with weapons to war. Another answer why [Rashi offers] the alternative explanation [is because that] answers the question: Why in the beginning of the verse is it written, “A man’s attire may not to be on a woman,” while at the end [of the verse] it writes, “nor may a man wear a woman’s garment”? It should have written, “A woman’s attire should not be on a man”! Since Scripture alters [the wording], the verse is obviously talking about another matter [i.e., shaving the pubic hairs, etc.]. But according to the alternative explanation too, one has to answer why the verse uses a term of “wearing.” It should have said, “He should not adorn with women’s adornments.” Therefore the first explanation is also needed.

The Torah prohibited only, etc. Rashi wants to explain what he said earlier, “So that she resembles a man, in order to mingle with men,” and also afterwards, “In order to take a place among women,” so that you do not ask, how does he know to explain this way. Perhaps it is forbidden to wear [such clothes] in all circumstances because it is a Scriptural decree? He answers that [it is not a Scriptural decree] as the verse gives a reason [for it], “For the abomination of Adonoy, etc.” This indicates that “the Torah prohibited only, etc.”

While on top of her young. But if she is hovering in the air above the young, it is permitted to take her.

If, with an easily fulfilled commandment, etc. Rashi is answering the question: It should have said this regarding one of the other mitzvos! He answers that it is written it here because this mitzvah is more easily fulfilled than all, etc.

He deserves to fall. Rashi is answering the question: Why does the verse say הנופל [lit. the one who falls]? He explains that הנופל means, “He deserves to fall.” He continues and explains that if this person deserves to fall, why does one transgress a negative command if he did not make a fence and a person fell off? He explains because even so, “let his death not come about, etc.”

As benefit is brought about through the meritorious, and injury through the guilty. And therefore everyone will murmur that you are guilty because this person fell off your roof.

Wheat, barley, and grapeseed. Not only wheat and barley, but any two kinds of other seeds [are included]. You might ask: How does Rashi know that one needs two other kinds of seeds with the grapeseed, perhaps [only] one other kind with grapeseed is enough? The answer is that if so, the verse should have said, “Do not plant in your vineyard mixed species,” which would then imply that planting one other kind of seed within your vineyard is considered mixed species. But since it is written, “Do not plant your vineyard mixed species,” it implies that mixed species are involved here even without any consideration of your vineyard. You might ask: Why does the Torah add this prohibition here when we see earlier in parshas Kedoshim (Vayikra 19:19) it is written that even sewing only two seeds together is forbidden? The answer is that the earlier prohibition forbids [two] mixed seeds as it is written, “Do not sow your field with a mixture of different seeds.” [By doing this] one only transgresses one negative command. But here one transgresses two negative commands, the prohibition of mixed seeds and the prohibition of mixed seeds in a vineyard.

This applies, as well, to any two species in the universe, etc. You might ask: From where does Rashi know this? Perhaps the prohibition applies only to plowing with an ox and a donkey! The answer is that we derive this by comparing the word “ox” here to the word “ox” regarding Shabbos where it says (above 5:14), “Your ox and your donkey and all your animals.” Just as there, all animals are included, so here too, all animals are included. And because “ox and donkey” is not to be understood literally, so too, “you may not plow” is not to be understood literally, “and applies as well, to leading them together, etc.”

The meaning is “a mixture.” The Rabbis interpret, etc. This excludes felt, which is not spun and woven. Such cloth is not subject to the prohibition of a mixture of threads. See earlier in parshasKedoshim (Vayikra 19:19).

He will ultimately. . . Rashi is answering: Why does it say, “And he has relations with her and hates her”? It should have written, “If a man marries a woman, and berates her with calumnies etc.”! He explains, this is to teach you that because he hates her, he will ultimately berate her with etc.

We derive from here that no statement may be made, etc. Otherwise, why does the verse write “this”? Maharan asks: Why do we need this verse? Why not learn this law from the verse of parshas Mishpatim (Shmos 23:1), “Do not accept a false report, etc.,” and there Rashi explains, “This is an admonition… to a judge, that he not listen [to the claims of one party until the other party arrives].” The answer is that our verse is necessary to make someone who presents his claims before the other party arrives, liable for violating one negative command and one positive command. In my humble opinion you can answer that if we only had that verse one would think that the prohibition applies only when both parties themselves are making claims. But where the woman herself is not saying anything as we see in the coming verses, one might think the husband may make his claim not in her presence. So the verse tells us that this is not so. (Kitzur Mizrachi)

Those who nurtured the evil branch, etc. Otherwise, the verse should have said, “They will take the girl and prove, etc.” Why does it say, “The girl’s father and mother”? Therefore it is to be expounded: See these [i.e., these parents] who nurtured this evil branch, etc.

This teaches that a woman is not permitted, etc. Because the woman is also standing in the court as it is written, “The girl’s father and mother will take, etc.” Yet afterwards it is written, “The girl’s father should assert, etc.,” and it is not written, “The girl’s mother should assert.” Therefore, “This teaches, etc.” (In the name of Maharitz). Re”m explains that [this teaching is derived because] otherwise Scripture should have said, “The girl should assert to the elders, ‘Look! This man has promulgated libelous words against me, etc.,” being that she is the defendant.

This is figurative, etc. Otherwise, what would happen if the cloth had been lost or laundered; or who knows whether it is hers or whether it is virginal blood?

Flogging. Because we learn “and chastise” from “and chastise” and “son” from “son.” It is written here “and they shall ויסרו (chastise him),” and by the wayward and rebellious son it is written (above 21:18) “and they shall ויסרו (chastise him).” Just as over there it means flogging, so too here it means flogging. And from where do we know [that it means flogging] over there? Because by the wayward and rebellious son it is written “בן (son),” and by flogging (below 25:2) it is written, “Should the wicked one (בן) deserve flogging, etc.” And we learn “son” from “son” as I explained.

Through witnesses, and with a pre-warning, etc. Otherwise, why is she stoned? For even if it is true that she behaved promiscuously, perhaps she did so before her marriage. And even if she behaved promiscuously after her marriage, perhaps she acted without witnesses or pre-warning. Therefore Rashi explains, “Through witnesses, etc.”

In the presence of all the people of her city. It seems to me Rashi is citing a proof to his explanation that “her father’s house” actually means “in her father’s house,” i.e., the letter ב [and the word “in”] is missing. [He proves this] by explaining that “the people of her city” actually means “in the presence of all the people of her city.” The reason he says this is because the verse states, “The people of her city will stone her with stones,” which implies that they are the ones who begin [stoning], yet this cannot be because it is written (above 17:7), “Let the hand of the witnesses be against him first, etc.” Perforce the verse really means (באנשי עירה) “among the people of her city,” i.e. “in the presence of all the people of her city.” This proves that it is common for a verse to omit the letter ב [the word “in”]. Rashi is also answering another question: The verse implies that the reason she is liable for stoning is “because she committed a disgraceful act ... [in] her father’s house.” However, according to this, why does the Torah make someone liable for stoning if he had relations with a married girl [elsewhere] in the city? She did not behave promiscuously in her father’s house! To answer this question Rashi explains: “And a man encounters her in the city,” this is why he had relations with her. The breach summons the thief.” In other words, because she acted immorally by not remaining at home as is customary for virgins, then she certainly was also promiscuous in her father’s house, and therefore she is liable for stoning. Now we can understand why Rashi explains the verses out of order. [Note: In our text, Rashi explains the verses in their correct order]. This also answers Re”m [who asks this same] question, “I do not know a correct reason, etc.”

This excludes lascivious activity etc. I.e. if he had intercourse with the woman in a body part [of the body] other than “that place.” For the woman does not derive pleasure, only the man. [In such an instance] they are both exempt because Scripture writes “both of them” which implies that they both derived equal pleasure. Even though [in a case] where he had sodomized her, and the woman does not derive pleasure, they are both liable. That case is different because it is specially included from the words (Vayikra 18:22) “משכבי אשה (lit. the ways of having intercourse with a woman).”

This adds those following them. There are varying texts here. In some commentaries it is written, “This adds those following them (אחריהם),” without a מ"ם at the beginning of the word. This means that if she and he were sentenced to death, even so, if he had intercourse with another woman, or if another man had intercourse with her, the secondary individuals too, are executed and we do not say that a person sentenced to death is already considered dead so that the secondary individuals are considered as if they had intercourse with corpses. Rather, these secondary individuals are also liable to the death penalty. And in some commentaries the text reads, “This adds those committing sodomy (מאחריהם, lit. from behind them),” with a מ"ם at the beginning of the word. This means from behind her, i.e. sodomy.

Another interpretation: “Even both of them,” etc. Because according to the first interpretation you might ask that it is obvious he is liable if he had sodomized her, because it is written (ibid) משכבי אשה, which teaches that she has two משכבים (ways to “lie” with her), a normal way and through sodomy. So why do I need the word “also”? Therefore Rashi explains, “Another interpretation, etc.” And according to the other interpretation you might ask that it should have said, “They shall both die, the man who had intercourse with the woman [and] also (גם) the woman.” Therefore he gives the first interpretation.

Adds the fetus — if she was pregnant, etc. Regarding a similar matter Rashi explains in Erchin (7a), “Because it should [only] say ומתו (they shall die), and I would know that “they shall die” cannot mean less than two. (Nachalas Yaakov)

This (the murderer) appears to teach, etc. Rashi is answering the question: The wording of the verse implies that the murderer is teaching us something about the married girl, whereas we actually learn nothing from the murderer! [Actually] the murderer “learns” from the married girl. Just as the married girl can be saved from sin by killing the rapist as the verse indicates by saying, “there was no one to rescue her,” implying that if there was someone to rescue her, he could do so by using any means, so too in the case of the murderer, one may save the [intended] victim by killing the pursuer.