Only because they rendered. This raises a difficulty: There is no [liability for] punishment without a warning! I will answer this difficulty in the next comment.

Intoxicated with wine they entered. [According to this] the explanation of “which He had not commanded them” is not the reason for their deaths. Rather, it only informs that they volunteered themselves to bring the incense, and not that He commanded them, as He had commanded Aharon (9:2): “Take, for yourself, a young calf...” And the explanation of (16:1): “[After the death of two sons of Aharon] in their coming close (בקרבתם),” is: At the time of their bringing an offering, and not that they had died because of [using] a strange fire. Rather, the main reason for their death was because they were intoxicated with wine. If it were not that Hashem wanted to be sanctified by means of Nodov and Avihu, they would not have died now, even though death had already been decreed upon them at the time they peered [See Shemos 24:11, Rashi there: “They envisioned Hashem.” They (Nodov and Avihu) gazed at Him insolently while engaged in eating and drinking]. Similarly, they would not have died on this day which was a joyous occasion for Israel, if they had not rendered a halachic decision on this day. (See more about this in the following). Gur Aryeh answers that [although death was already decreed at the time of Matan Torah] since Hashem’s anger passes, as it is written (Yishayahu 26:20): “Hide for almost a moment, until the anger passes,” and since that anger had passed, another cause was necessary to be liable for death. Re’m poses another difficulty: They were liable for death from the time of the Golden Calf, as punishment for Aharon, and Moshe’s prayer only helped for half the decree — that two [of Aharon’s four] sons would die [see Rashi 10:12]. Nachalas Yaakov answers: According to the assumption that Aharon’s sons would die solely for the sin of the Golden Calf, Elozor and Isomor should have died, for they were presumably less righteous than, and they did not have as much merit as, Nodov and Avihu. Gur Aryeh answers: We find concerning the wicked that if they continue the deeds of their forefathers, Hashem punishes them for their forefathers’ deeds, so too, concerning a completely righteous person. If his son does any sin, Hashem punishes him for the deeds of his father, and if the son does not sin at all, Hashem does not bring the sin of the righteous man upon the son. This [concept] necessitates that when the sons sin, it is added to the forefathers’ sins and then the sons are punished even for the sin of the forefathers. [Thus,] the sin of the sons together [with the sin of the forefathers] causes the punishment. See Kitzur Mizrachi where he brings additional views: Rabbi Yossi HaGelili said: For drawing close, in which they entered the innermost (Holy of Holies) they died. Rabbi Akiva said: For drawing close, in that they brought a strange fire they died. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah said: Because of both reasons they died. Bar Kappara said in the name of Rabbi Yirmeyah ben Eliezer: Because of four things they died: 1) For coming close, 2) for the offering that they brought without being commanded, 3) for the strange fire, a fire from the Beis HaKirayim (house of ovens), and 4) because they did not ask advice from one another.

That they are greater than I or you. The difficulty is raised: Perhaps the sanctification needed to be with both of them [Nodov and Avihu], for one of them would not be sufficient, and the two of them together were greater. Thus, two were needed, and they were better than Moshe alone or Aharon alone. How does Rashi know they were greater than Moshe and Aharon together? Another difficulty: How could Moshe make such a big mistake in thinking that he and Aharon were greater than them, and yet [in truth] Nodov and Avihu were greater? It would be enough if Moshe thought that they were all equal, and he erred in [only] one level? It seems [that the answer is:] It is written: “בקרובי אקדש (through those that are near me I shall be sanctified),” and בקרובי with a pasach is in the plural form. Moshe thought that they were all equal in goodness, and he said: I had known that the Temple would be sanctified with those singled out as special (במיודעיו) by the Omnipresent, and במיודעיו is in the plural form. I.e., two pairs are in the matter of “בקרובי אקדש” which is plural. If so, I thought: either me, and one of them, or you, and one of them, since we are all equal. But now that He did not want any of us, I see that they are greater than me or you (Rav Yaakov Trivash).

He received a reward. Rashi is answering the question: Why is it written, “and Aharon was silent”? What could he have said about the decrees of Hashem? Could he challenge Hashem? With regard to this Rashi explains: He received a reward for his silence, i.e., for this reason it is written, “and [Aharon] was silent,” because he received a reward for his silence, for this reason Scripture writes, “and [Aharon] was silent.” Rashi reverses the order and explains “and Aharon was silent” before “through those that are near Me” in order to inform why Aharon was silent. Because he heard that his sons were Heaven fearing, near to, and singled out as special by Hashem. Therefore, he was silent. So, too, it is in the Midrash Rabboh (Gur Aryeh). The reason Rashi reverses the order is to prove why Aharon received reward for his silence. This is because in the natural order of things one who consoles does not praise the departed person in the presence of his relatives. On the contrary, they say words that are not painful to the mourner, such as we find concerning the daughter of R. Shmuel bar Yehudah (Bava Metzia 38a), where they told him that if something good was destined to come from her she would not have died. But here Moshe praised the departed ones in front of Aharon, [saying] that they were closer to Hashem than them. Aharon, then, should have intensified his crying, nevertheless, he was silent. Therefore, he was worthy of good reward (Divrei Dovid).

To him alone. I.e., [“To him, alone”] implies two [rewards]. Because of his silence he merited that he heard directly the Divine command which he had not been privileged until now. This is because: “[Rabbi Yehudah says:] Thirteen instances of ‘speaking’ are recorded in the Torah [directed] to Moshe and Aharon, and thirteen exclusions corresponding to them, [in order] to teach you that they were not said to Aharon but to Moshe, for him to tell Aharon” [see Rashi 1:1]. Furthermore, he merited that this section was said to him alone, and he did not share with Moshe, so that it would not seem that because of Moshe’s merit he heard the Divine command. Thus, it goes well even according to the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Yehudah, who is cited by Rashi above at the beginning of Vayikro.

Exalted. See Kitzur Mizrachi as to why Rashi did not give this explanation on the phrase “בקרובי אקדש (through those that are near Me I shall be sanctified)” since he brings the proof from the verse (Tehillim 68:36): “נורא אלקים ממקדשיך (“You are awesome, O God, from Your Sanctuaries).”

Uziel was the brother of Amram. [Rashi mentions this so that you would not erroneously] explain that דוד is referring to the husband of his aunt, as in Parshas Acharei Mos (18:14), where we find that דודתך is referring to the wife of your uncle. Alternatively, this is so that we will not err by saying that “Aharon’s uncle” refers to Mishael and Elzafan. Therefore, Rashi explains: Uziel was the brother of Amram.

So as not to disturb. Otherwise, it should say: Come closer and carry your brothers and bury them. Why does it say, “from the presence of the Sanctuary”? Rather: “Take away ... [so as not to disturb].” Rashi is answering the question: Why did Moshe not call Elozor and Isomor? It is explicit in Scripture (21:2): “for his brother” he may become impure. To this, Rashi answers that this taking out was not for the sake of burial. Rather: “from the presence of the Sanctuary” — “As a man who says...” Therefore, Elozor and Isomor were not permitted to become impure. And this is even though in fact Elozor and Isomor did not become impure even for the sake of burial from the strength of a Divine command (v. 7): “From the entrance of the Tent of Meeting you shall not go forth” (Nachalas Yaakov).

Of the dead men. As it is written, “בכתנתם (in their tunics),” and every כתונת mentioned in Torah Kohanim (Vayikro) is referring to garments of kehunah. Mishael and Elzafan, however, were Levites and not kohanim; so from where would they have tunics? Rather, it must refer to [the tunics of] the dead men.

Do not let [your hair] grow. Meaning: the hair of his head. I.e., someone whose hair grows long, the hairs become divided one from the other and become disheveled (פרע). [You might ask:] Rashi explains later in Parshas Sotah (Bamidbar 5:18): “And [the kohein shall] expose (ופרע) the [hair on the] head of the woman” — “He unravels the braids of her hair...” and yet here he explains that פרע means growing [the hair long]! The answer is: The unraveling of her hair braids is the ‘growth’ of her hair in terms of appearance, because until now it was braided and it seemed she had no hair, but with the unraveling of her hair it seems as if her hair grew.

From here [we learn] that a mourner. Re’m writes: In Moed Katan (14b) Rashi explains that the fact the verse needs to permit the sons of Aharon implies that others are prohibited [to take a haircut], because Rashi holds the view that the verse, “Do not let [your hair] grow long” comes to permit Aharon’s sons [to take a haircut], and for that reason they inferred: This implies that every other mourner is prohibited. For if the verse comes to caution them — that they are not permitted to let their hair grow long, how could they infer from here that others are prohibited to take a haircut and are obligated to let their hair grow? In truth, the only inference that could be made is since Aharon’s sons are prohibited from letting their hair grow, this implies that other mourners are permitted to let their hair grow. However, this poses a difficulty: If the verse comes to permit Aharon’s sons [to take a haircut], but they are not obligated to let their hair grow, why does Scripture write, “So that you will not die” afterwards? This implies that if they let their hair grow they will die, as Rashi himself explains: Therefore, if you do so, you will die. If so, Rashi’s words seem to be contradictory. This matter needs analysis. See there where Re’m dwells at length on this matter. Perhaps [we can say:] Rashi sensed this difficulty and therefore explained in his commentary on Chumash: “From here [we learn] that a mourner is forbidden [to take] a haircut...”

**Therefore, if...**Re’m explains: Rashi explains this here, although it is obvious you can infer the positive statement from the negative statement, and so we infer throughout the entire Torah. [Here, however, it is] to teach that the verse’s intention is the affirmative statement that is inferred from it, and not the prohibition itself. This is because even in the rest of the optional matters that do not have the death penalty it is applicable to say with regard to them that if he will not do them he will not die. In this way we can explain “and you will not die” of (v. 9), “[do not drink] wine or any other intoxicant.” Rashi relies on his explanation here and does not explain similarly over there. It is from the superfluous phrases “you shall not die” that Rashi derives this, [because it did not need to be said] since Aharon’s sons were permitted to take a haircut, perforce they will not die. It seems that Rashi infers that this verse implies that other mourners are forbidden [to cut their hair], for if everyone else was permitted, and the verse only comes to caution that Aharon’s sons should not let their hair grow, if so, it would be difficult: Why does the verse need to caution them, since everyone else is permitted, why would you think that they would let their hair grow? Why should they be stringent and disturb the Omnipresent’s celebration? Furthermore: Why does it need to say, “and you will not die” — “therefore, if you do so, you will die”? Why do I need so much — a warning after a warning? It is understandable if all other mourners are prohibited [to cut their hair], for this reason we need a warning after a warning, so that you will not say that although Aharon’s sons were permitted to cut their hair, nevertheless, they could be stringent with themselves and go beyond the letter of the law since other mourners are prohibited [from taking a haircut]. For this reason Scripture needs to caution them, and write, “and you will not die” — “therefore, if you do so, you will die.” With this it seems to me that all Re’m’s difficulties are resolved.

**Must [be mourned] by all.**I.e., everyone is obligated to mourn if a Torah scholar is in pain, as the example here, in which Aharon was in pain. We should not say, however, perhaps this implies that if a Torah scholar died he must be mourned by all, as it is written: “And the entire House of Israel shall weep...” For if so, Scripture should have written, “and their brothers,” i.e., the brothers of the dead ones, which refer to all of Israel, “shall weep over the conflagration.” However, since it is written: “And your brothers,” it implies the brothers of Aharon, Elozor, and Isomor — the ones to whom Moshe was speaking.

In a manner which intoxicates. Meaning: If he took a break [in drinking] or he mixed it with the smallest measure of water he is exempt. [You might ask:] Rashi writes, without any qualifications, that one who enters the Tent of Meeting [while he is intoxicated] is liable the death penalty. However, Toras Kohanim it implies that only if one was intoxicated and performed Divine service is he liable death! The answer is: Since it is derived from a gezeiroh shovoh, and regarding sanctification of the hands it is written in Parshas Ki Sisa explicitly (Shemos 30:20): “Or whenever they approach the Altar for Divine service,” which is only at the time of Divine service, therefore it was unnecessary for Rashi to specify here.

Between. I.e., that there should be a distinction between proper service and [one which is] improper, for the services that are done in intoxication are always improper [and then there is no distinction between proper and improper]. This is what Rashi explains: “Thus you learn that if he performed [the Temple service his service is] invalid.” This is because it is written (v. 9): “When you enter the Tent of Meeting and you will not die,” and we derive through a gezeiroh shovoh from sanctification of the hands and feet. There, it is specifically written when he performs Divine service, as I explained above. And perforce, if one performed Divine service while being intoxicated, he is liable the death penalty. If so, allthe services that are performed while being intoxicated are improper, and if so, why does is it written, “to distinguish”? Rather, perforce we must say that it means, “in order that you should distinguish, etc.” Even though regarding [the next phrase], “To distinguish ... between what is impure and what is pure,” this explanation is not applicable — that we would say: If you drink there will be no difference between the pure and the impure, and they will all be impure. Could it be that an intoxicated kohein who performed the Divine service would make it impure? It is improper [but not impure]! Perforce, we must say: “To distinguish ... between what is impure...” [means:] You should know how to distinguish, and not that there should be a distinction, etc. Despite this, Rashi had to explain [the aforementioned] way regarding the Divine service. Accordingly, one time the explanation of the word ולהבדיל is: “in order that you should distinguish...” in reference to [to the first phrase in the verse that teaches about the] Divine service, and another time: “in order that you know...” in reference to impurity and purity. With this it seems we can answer the difficulty raised by Re’m: Concerning the phrase: “To distinguish ... between what is impure and what is pure,” this explanation is not applicable! Re’m answered what he answered, see there at length.

Perhaps he is. Meaning: And the ו of ולהבדיל and the ו of ולהורות are in addition to the first subject [prohibition of entering while intoxicated] and they too are liable the death penalty.

Kohanim in their service. [Rashi knows this] because Scripture should have written only: “you and your sons.” In effect, when it is written, “with you,” it is as if it said “your sons will be with you.” But why do I need it? It is already written, “you and your sons.” Rather, it is to teach: “Kohanim in their service...” This answers Re’m’s difficulty: From where does Rashi derive this? The verse, “you and your sons” is needed for itself, [to teach] that the sons are included in the warning as well. We cannot say that he derives it from the word “you,” and it comes to exclude, for if so, it would have to mean only “you” [Aharon, and not even his sons,] are worthy of death. Meaning: Since the verse put “and you will not die” is juxtaposed to “you and your sons,” which is a command that refers to their service, perforce: Kohanim in their service [are worthy of] death, but halachic decision making, which is a command to all of Israel is not [worthy of] death. According to the assumption that halachic decision making is worthy of death as well, it should say, “and you will not die” (v. 9) after, “[And that you may] teach” (v. 11), so that it would refer to the entire subject matter (Nachalas Yaakov).

For the sin of the Golden Calf. You might ask: Above (v. 2), Rashi brings a Tannaic disagreement: One view holds because they rendered halachic decisions in the presence of their master, and the other holds because they entered the Sanctuary intoxicated with wine. The answer is: Both factors were the cause. If there had been only the deed of the Golden Calf, why did Hashem wait until now? Alternatively, why did He kill Nodov and Avihu, and not Elozor and Isomor? Rather, it must be [that the cause of death] can be attributed to another sin as well, each Tanna according to his reasoning. But if it was only for the last reason, I would say that there is no punishment without [a prior] warning, therefore the sin of the Golden Calf was necessary as well, since it had a warning.

And I also prayed. [The word] “also” includes the [Aharon’s] children.

And holy things are forbidden to an אונן****(mourner on whom the obligation of burying the deceased still rests). Otherwise, why does it need to say this to them? It already speaks about it in Parshas Tzav (6:9): “Whatever remains from it shall be eaten by Aharon and his sons” (Re’m).

Meal-offering of the eighth. The twelve princes began to bring offerings and Nachshon was the first. [You might ask:] There was also the [meal-offering of the] he-goat of Rosh Chodesh, and so there were three he-goats! [The answer is:] Nevertheless, Rashi did not want to mention the he-goat of Rosh Chodesh since Moshe did not command him to eat that meal-offering, as it is implied at the end, when Aharon told Moshe: If you heard [this law] regarding holy offerings of a [specific] time, etc. (see Rashi, end of v. 19). Moshe agreed [with the rationale of] Aharon’s words. This implies that Moshe did not explicitly say to eat it in the first place.

**What does this verse teach?**You might ask: Above, as well, why did Rashi not explain: “Take the meal offering” — What does this verse teach? Because it is [a communal mealoffering,] etc.? Why did he need to explain: “Even though you are אוננים and holy things are forbidden to an אונן”? Another difficulty: Nearby (v. 13), Rashi explains: “For so have I been commanded” — “That they should eat it while they are אוננים.” Perhaps “for so have I been commanded” [means] they should eat the meal-offering as matzos? The answer is: “For so I have been commanded” implies a novel law — even though the law is otherwise regarding other meal-offerings. If it refers to [the law] that they should eat the meal-offering as matzos, this is obvious, for every meal-offering is eaten as matzos. Therefore, Rashi needs to explain: They should eat it while they are אוננים. Also, this is why he needs to explain above: “Take the meal-offering” — “Even though you are אוננים...” because the verse, “For so have I been commanded” refers back to it. However, if he was to explain above [on “Take the meal-offering”]: Because it is a communal meal-offering, it would no longer be applicable to write: “For so I have been commanded,” because with one command alone, in which He commands them regarding a meal-offering that this meal-offering will be treated like any other meal-offering, it would be sufficient. Why does it say again: “For so I have been commanded”? Rather, perforce, it was because of אנינות He commanded, which is contrary to the precedent that an אונן is prohibited to eat holy sacrifices.

Of the communal peace-offerings. Re’m writes: I do not know why Rashi does not include here the breast of Nachshon’s peaceofferings that was brought on that day, as he included Nachshon’s meal offering with the communal meal-offering of the eighth day, etc. (see Rashi v. 12). [The answer is:] Regarding the meal-offering, concerning which the verse comes to permit [to be eaten although they are] אוננים, Rashi found it necessary to include Nachshon’s meal-offering, so that you would not say that the verse only means to permit a communal meal-offering about which it revealed the law explicitly; Nachshon’s meal-offering, however, which was not revealed in the verse, was not permitted and is prohibited to be eaten by אוננים. [Therefore, Rashi lets us know otherwise in v. 12]. However, concerning the breast of the wave-offering, about which we have not been taught any novel law that is not included in other peace-offerings, why would Rashi need to include Nachshon’s peace-offerings, for what difference would there be between Nachshon’s peace offerings and these peace-offerings? (Gur Aryeh).

Within the camp of Israel. Meaning: Even though those impure from contact with the dead and the other types of impure persons are found there. Rashi’s proof is from the fact Scripture did not write: “In a sacred place,” perforce it means a place that is partially pure. And since it says above regarding the meal-offering (v. 13): “You shall eat it in a sacred place,” [this implies:] It, and not another. [Thus, the place of eating the breast] is removed from the place of the Shechinoh and established to be in the camp of the Levites. Furthermore, since it is written afterwards: “In a pure place,” this implies a further leniency, and it may be eaten in the Israelite’s camp, for it is obvious that they may not eat it in an impure place.

Additional sacrifices for Rosh Chodesh. This is the goat of additional offerings of Rosh Chodesh that is offered as a communal sinoffering, as it is written (v. 17): “And He gave it to you, to bear the iniquity of the congregation.” Which goat bears the sin of the congregation? This is the goat of Rosh Chodesh.

**Why was.**The following is Re’m’s text: “Why was this one burnt and why were these not eaten?” I.e., they did not eat it [the goat of the additional sacrifices for Rosh Chodesh] during the day because of אנינות but rather left it to be eaten towards evening, when the time of אנינות would be finished, according to the view of Rabbi Yuda and Rabbi Shimon (Zevachim 101a) who said that the prohibition of אנינות is permitted at night. It was burnt and not eaten because it was touched by something impure [and so it could not be rectified, thus, it was immediately burnt]. But, according to Rabbi Nechemiah [ibid.] the reason was because it was of the sacrifices [ordained] for the generations [which were not permitted to אוננים] and אוננים are prohibited to eat from offerings both during the day and the night by Torah law. Thus, they burnt it immediately (Re’m). However, if we have the text: “And why were these eaten?” it is then entirely one inquiry: Why was this one [the goat of the additional sacrifices for Rosh Chodesh] burnt and this one [the he-goat of the installation or the goat offered by Nachshon] eaten? Either both of them should have been burnt or both of them eaten! This, however, is one inquiry, [yet Rashi writes there were two inquires], therefore, we should use the text: “And why were these not eaten?” Gur Aryeh uses the text: “Why were these eaten?” He explains, however, that there are two inquires: “Why was this one burnt? If it was because of אנינות — is it not true that אנינות is permitted to you! According to your response that you were not allowed to eat them because of אנינות, why, then, did you eat the other sin-offerings?” This is considered two inquires — the first is according to the truth and the second is according to their response.

He turned. Otherwise, why was he angry at them? Aharon was included in the anger as well, and he was required to respond (v. 19): “and then such [tragedy] befell me!” This is how it appears in Toras Kohanim — that he was angry with Aharon as well.

**Answer.**Rashi was forced to explain this way, because wherever it says “לאמר” in the Torah [it means] to tell others. Alternatively, “וידבר” is a general rule, and “לאמר” is a detail (כלל ופרט). Here, however, these explanations are not applicable, and therefore Rashi has to explain: “Answer my questions!”

**Did [they then eat it] outside?**Meaning: You would assume the question “why” refers to the phrase “in the sacred place,” as if Moshe asked: Why did you not eat it in the sacred place?” For this reason, Rashi is answering the question: Did they then eat it outside the sacred place? Rashi answers: The word “why” refers to “did you not eat it,” and the meaning of “in the sacred place” is: Since it was in the sacred place, and did not go out [from its permitted boundaries] to become invalid. However, it would be impossible to make this statement if Moshe did not ask them first whether it went out [from its boundaries] and they answered him that it did not. Therefore, Rashi inserts: “Perhaps it went out ‘beyond the curtains’ and became invalid?” The statement, “for it is holy of holies” is the reason for the statement, “Perhaps it went out beyond the curtains...” (Re’m).

**Did not [come] for atonement.**You might ask: In the beginning of the parshah it is written (9:7): “and atone on your behalf,” which refers to the sin-offering of the eighth day. Perforce, these also came for [the purpose of] atonement. The answer is: When it is written “and atone on your behalf” it does not really mean atonement, but rather it is only an expression of cleansing and preparation. Similarly, we find regarding the person with tzora’as, where it is written (14:19): “and atone (וכפר) for the person undergoing purification from his impurity.” What was his sin for which he needs atonement? Rather, it must be that there as well it is an expression of becoming fit.

**You should have.**It does not mean they should eat it now, as the expression implies, since it was already burnt.

**Regarding the meal-offering.**This is because it [the goat of Rosh Chodesh] is holy of holies and should be eaten in the sacred place like it [the meal-offering]. However, we should not say that “as I have commanded you” refers to the breast that is the wave-offering and the thigh that is the separated portion, regarding which Moshe instructed them to eat as well (v. 14). This is because they are sacrifices of lesser sanctity, and they are eaten in a pure place, thus, we cannot derive [laws pertaining to] sacrifices that are holy of holies [which must be eaten in the sacred place] from those of lesser sanctity. It appears to me that the answer is: [Moshe could not be referring to the breast and the thigh] because Hashem did not command explicitly regarding eating the breast and the thigh, but rather only regarding the meal-offering, as Scripture states (v. 12): “Take the meal-offering ... and eat it [as] matzos.” Moshe, however, added them by his own reasoning by comparing the eating of the breast and thigh to the eating of the meal-offering (Nachalas Yaakov).

The term “speaking” is an expression of harshness. Meaning: [This is true] where it is not written afterwards לאמר, as I explained in Parshas Va’eira (6:2). Alternatively, when the speech comes in a private conversation, such as (Bamidbar 21:5): “The people spoke (וידבר) against Hashem and against Moshe, ‘Why have you brought us up...’” in which it should say ויאמר since it is a private conversation. Here, too, it should say ויאמר אהרן וגו', since it is a private conversation (Re’m). And this is what I wrote in Parshas Va’eira.

Rather. Meaning: Why does it need to say: “Behold, today they brought...”? It would have been sufficient to say: “Such [tragedy] befell me, if I had eaten...” Rather, this is what it means to say: Moshe said to them [Elozor and Isomor]: Perhaps you sprinkled its blood as אוננים after the death of your brothers, and an אונן who performs the service profanes it? Therefore, you did not eat it. Moshe did not see their actions because he was heavily involved with the Shechinoh on that day And he was afraid they found the blood of this he-goat that had not yet been sprinkled and they sprinkled it. Aharon answered him: “And did they, who are ordinary kohanim, bring [it], so that you would think it is invalid? I brought [it], for it is incumbent upon me, as it is written (9:7): “Approach the altar,” and a kohein godol may bring [a sacrifice while being] an אונן. Accordingly, the ן of הן היום is in place of a ם, [meaning: Did they bring today?], as in (Rus 1:13): “הלהן תשברנה (Would you wait for them?).” Re’m explained this at length, but I was brief. Re’m writes: “[You might ask:] Bringing a sacrifice is more lenient than eating it, for a kohein godol may bring a sacrifice while he is an אונן but he may not eat from it, and here they were permitted even to eat from it while they were אוננים, so much more so they [would be permitted to] bring the sacrifice. [The answer is:] Nevertheless, Moshe said to them: “Perhaps you erred and thought...” This raises a difficulty, though, for according to Re’m’s words — that the bringing of the sacrifice is more lenient and it is permitted [to an אונן] — if so, why did Aharon reply: “And did they bring it...” which implies that it would be invalid if they indeed brought it, from the perspective of bringing it. [On the contrary,] Aharon should have answered better: “Would it be invalid today? It is permitted! Rather, the reason it was burnt was because such [tragedy] befell me, and there was no one to eat it, since there is a difference in the law between the sacrifices earmarked for a [specific] time and the sacrifices prescribed for generations.” Therefore, it appears to me that it should be interpreted according to its plain meaning: An אונן who performs Divine service actually profanes it, and Aharon ruled as the law is for [future] generations. The kal vachomer, indeed, can be refuted, because the leniency for eating the sacrifices of an אונן is different here, in that it was only so the sacrifices would not become נותר (left-over), for there were no other kohanim in the world, only these, and they were אוננים. This is not so regarding the bringing of the sacrifice, however, since the kohein godol was permitted to bring it. Thus, it remained prohibited [for an ordinary kohein to bring it]. It would be impossible, however, for the kohein godol to eat the entire amount, and ultimately it would become נותר. This is the reason for the law of [future] generations as well: A kohein godol may bring sacrifices while he is an אונן since there are many Divine services that only he is allowed to perform. However, [regarding to eating from the sacrifices] all kohanim are allowed to eat from the sacrifices, therefore, the kohein godol may not eat. [The point is that] it is not because the prohibition of eating the sacrifice is more stringent than the prohibition of bringing it, and therefore there is no kal vachomer (Nachalas Yaakov). Gur Aryeh explains that Divine service is more stringent than eating [sacrifices], because we find that a kohein with a blemish may eat sacrifices, but he is invalid to perform Divine service. If so, we cannot use the [following] kal vachomer: Eating [sacrifices] is more stringent because it is prohibited to a kohein godol when he is an אונן, yet it was permitted to the sons of Aharon while they were אוננים, then the Divine service, which is more lenient, in that it is permitted to the kohein godol when he is an אונן, is it not logical that it should be permitted to the sons of Aharon who are אוננים! [This kal vachomer can be refuted] because we can object: Eating has a leniency that it is permitted to a kohein with a blemish [whereas such a kohein is invalid to perform Divine service].

And if I had eaten. Meaning: [Rashi adds ifbecause the expression] ואכלתי implies he had already eaten it, but this was not so, for it had been burnt (Kitzur Mizrachi).

Permitted, for [the laws applying to] an אונן**[relate] only...**You might ask: This answer is only according to the view that it was burnt because it had touched something impure; for if it was because of אנינות (the state of being an אונן), so much more so it would pose a difficulty: Why did they burn it, they should have waited until the night [to eat it], as Ramban writes. If so, what difference does it make that he answered him that it was prohibited due to the אנינות of the day, but not at night, considering that it was burnt because it touched something impure. What kind of answer was this? We can give a forced answer: Moshe was not asking that perhaps it touched something impure, because according to his reasoning they should have eaten it right away. If so, they certainly could have prevented it from touching impurity in the short amount of time from sprinkling the blood until eating. Probably, they would have eaten it right away, as those with alacrity perform mitzvos as soon as possible. Thus, Aharon answered: “Today” — i.e., there is a prohibition for אנינות in the day, and they were forced to leave it [i.e., not to eat it] until the evening. This made created the possibility for it to have been touched by impurity and therefore it was burnt.

He admitted and was not ashamed... [Rather Moshe said: I heard and I forgot (Zevachim 101a)]. This raises a difficulty: Where does the verse hint that he admitted by saying: “I heard [and I forgot],” perhaps he admitted by saying: “I never heard”? The answer is: The phrase, “Moshe heard” is superfluous, for it is obvious he heard, as he spoke with Aharon. Rather, this is what it means: Since Moshe had already heard previously, Aharon’s words were good in his eyes afterwards, for he had forgotten what he had heard (Divrei Dovid). Rashi’s words raise a difficulty, however, because it should not say “וישמע,” but rather: “...ומשה שמע’,” which is in the past tense. Then, it would mean that because he had already heard it was therefore good in his eyes. Another difficulty: Rashi should have made his comment on the s.v. וישמע and not on “It was good in his eyes.” Therefore, it appears that the verse’s language is surely reversed, and the word “וישמע” is superfluous as well. It should say only: “And it was good in Moshe’s eyes.” Although the word וישמע hints at hearing, as implied by Targum Yonasan (see there), nevertheless, we should derive from the fact that it should say: “He heard and it was good in Moshe’s eyes.” However, [according to the way it is] now, “it was good in his eyes” does not refer to Moshe alone, but rather comes to hint that we should also explain: “It was good in his eyes,” i.e., in Aharon’s eyes. [This follows the saying]: Hashem spoke once and we heard twice. Thus, since וישמע comes to teach regarding ‘hearing,’ it must be that Moshe admitted he had heard and forgot, and therefore, “it was good in his eyes,” i.e., also in Aharon’s eyes, for he was happy that his understanding [of the matter] was in agreement with the Omnipresent’s point of view (Rav Yaakov Trivash). Some raise the difficulty: It implies here that it is a greater shame if he would say “I forgot” than if he said “I never heard,” and yet in Shabbos (119b-120a): “Rabbi Katina said: Even at the time of Yerusholayim’s shame there were still honest men there, as it is written (Yeshayahu 3:7): ‘[I will not be a ruler,] while in my house there is neither bread nor clothing,’ which refers to Torah, and they would not say: I learned and I forgot.” [Thus, they were honest because they would admit to being completely unlearned although they could have said: I learned and forgot]. This poses a difficulty: Perhaps [they were not honest at all but] they just did not want to say “I learned and I forgot” because it is a great shame. [Otherwise, they might have lied]. However, there is no difficulty at all. There, it is referring to the entirety of Torah — that he does not know anything about it — in such a case it is a great disgrace if he says he never learned any Torah. It would be better for him to say: I did what is incumbent upon me and I learned, but I forgot for some reason. However, this is not so here where it refers to one matter. It would have been more comfortable for Moshe to say I learned much Torah, but one matter I have not learned yet. Furthermore, we can say: How could Moshe say: “I never heard”? If so, from where would Aharon know? For if Moshe never heard, [from where would Aharon know? Rather,] the praise of Moshe’s admission was in this: Regarding anything that has two types of rationale, one to permit and one to forbid, people will often rationalize one way and then later retract from their original line of reasoning, because the second line of reasoning seems more logical. Thus, there is no shame in retracting. Therefore, if Moshe would have said: I never heard, but my reasoning was originally to permit, but Aharon posed a difficulty on it. And since there was an opposite reasoning [not to permit], it would not be shameful for Moshe [to retract from his original position]. However, now that he [originally] heard it was forbidden, and he forgot and ruled to permit from the strength of his reasoning, and then he remembered that he heard explicitly to forbid, this clarifies now that his reasoning was wrong. In this, there is great shame. If so, the Gemara in Shabbos (ibid.) presents no difficulty, for there it is not applicable to say they relied on rationale that would result in shame (Divrei Dovid).