In which he is a witness. This is derived from “He is a witness,” which is redundant [since the verse had already stated “he heard an oath” and continues with “or saw or knew”]; it excludes a witness who heard [secondhand] from another witness, a relative, or an invalid [witness] — even though he hears an oath [demanding testimony] he is exempt. Also, it teaches: “And he is a witness” — now, at the time of the oath, he is a witness in the matter, [but if they made him take an oath that if he will become aware of testimony in the future that he must testify, he is exempt].

And after this impurity he eats. You should not err and say that only because of touching something impure which was concealed from him and was later became known to him does he bring an offering. Therefore, Rashi says: “After this impurity he eats holy [sacrificial food or enters the Temple]. His proof is since it is written, “And incurs guilt,” i.e., by eating holy [sacrificial] food or entering the Temple, which must be after touching this impurity, for otherwise, why would he incur guilt? [Could we say that] because he becomes impure he should bring an offering? We should not ask: How does Rashi know that he eats holy [sacrificial food] or enters the Temple? Perhaps he is obligated to bring the offering for another transgression! The answer is: Rashi’s proof is since it is written here (v. 3): “Whatever that impurity may be,” and in Parshas Chukas it is written (Bamidbar 19:13): “And his impurity remains upon him.” [We derive through a gezeirah shavah:] Just as there it deals with the impurity of the Temple, so too, here, it deals with the impurity of the Temple, i.e., that he enters the Temple. Furthermore, it is written here: “The impurities of man,” and it is written in Parshas Tzav (7:21): “The impurities of man,” just as there [it deals with] eating holy [sacrificial food], so too, here, [it deals with] eating holy.

The impurity. Meaning: [The impurity was concealed from him] and not [the fact he entered] the Temple or [the awareness of] its holiness, since it is written: “And this was concealed from him and he is impure” — [from which we derive:] He is liable for concealment of impurity and not for concealment of the Temple.

One who swallows the carcass. This causes a person to become impure in the place of swallowing [i.e., when the carcass that is swallowed touches the esophagus] to make garments [that he is wearing] impure; if he eats it and enters the Temple he is liable. You might ask: The word בה [“אשר יטמא בה (that causes impurity within)”] is an exclusion! They already answered in the Gemara (Shavuos 7b) that it is because there is an extra exclusion — for it is written [here] in the section of the sliding scale offering (i.e., a sacrifice whose worth varies in accordance with the financial ability of the person bringing it): “Or, if he touches the impurities of man.” Thus, something [which imparts impurity] through touching is included, but what is not [capable of making impure] through touching is not. The carcass of a kosher bird does not impart impurity through touching, if so, why does the Merciful One [in the Torah] write “within”? Hence, it is an “exclusion after an exclusion,” and “an exclusion after an exclusion” only comes to be inclusive.

And he does not know, for he forgot. It seems that the text [“and he does not know,” which seems to be Rashi’s words] is a scribal error, and it should say: “And he realizes” [i.e., as a divrei hamaschil (s.v.)] — “that he forgot the impurity.” It is, in effect, a separate comment, meaning: “And he realizes” — this is to say that he now realizes that he forgot about the impurity when he ate the holy food or entered the Temple. (Nachalas Yaakov). Nachalas Yaakov corrected the text based on the difficulty he had in Rashi’s text: “And he does not know, for he forgot.” [The reason he changed Rashi’s text is that] this does not follow any view — for Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva disagree about the reason the Torah repeats twice the word ונעלם (and it was concealed): Rabbi Akiva holds the view that we require that the person [who ate in impurity unintentionally] knew it was prohibited before the transgression and afterwards, and Rabbi Yishmael holds that the first word ונעלם obligates for not knowing he was impure and the second word ונעלם is for not knowing he entered the Temple or that he ate holy food. But Rabbi Akiva establishes it for previous knowledge and not for being unaware he was impure. Therefore, Nachalas Yaakov corrected the text [to follow the view of Rabbi Akiva]: “It should say: And he knew.” However, Gur Aryeh explains: He is only liable if he forgot the impurity but beforehand knew about the impurity. But if he had no knowledge whatsoever of the impurity, he is not liable. This is derived from the second time the word ונעלם is written: “ונעלם והוא ידע (and this was concealed from him, and he realizes).” This did not need to be written, for it is already written (v. 2): “And this was concealed from him, and he is impure.” Rather, you should place the phrase, “And he realizes” between one ונעלם and the other, and derive from it: After he had knowledge, he forgot the impurity. Therefore, Rashi writes as a comment to “ונעלם” — “And he did not know,” which is to say: [He is liable] specifically in this type of not knowing — that he forgot about the impurity [of which he once knew]. However, if he never knew about the impurity in the first place he is not liable.

Entering. [This is derived] from the gezeirah shavah mentioned above (see v. 2). However, this raises a difficulty. It is understandable over, for it is written: “And this [impurity] was concealed from him, and he incurs guilt,” i.e., because the impurity was concealed from him he entered the Temple. Here, though, it is written: “[And this was concealed from him,] and he realizes, he incurs guilt.” Could it be that because he knew he was impure he ate holy food or entered the Temple?! Perhaps the answer is: The verse is written out of order, and this is what is meant: “This was concealed from him and he incurs guilt” — because the impurity was concealed from him he entered the Temple and afterwards it was known to him that he was impure (Re”m). Furthermore, we can say: We derive a gezeirah shavah from the words ואשם ואשם, and we derive the later section from the previous section.

But not with his heart. I.e., if he decided in his heart by making an oath silently without verbalizing not to eat, and then he ate, he is not liable to bring an offering.

To himself. This excludes if he took an oath to harm others, for instance, [he said:] “I will hit Ploni,” but he forgot and did not hit him, he is not liable to bring an offering. Rashi’s proof is from what it is written: “To do harm or to do good” — we make a hekeish (comparison) between the two — just as to do good is optional, so too to do harm is optional, excluding harming others, which is not optional, as it is written (Devarim 25:3): “He shall flog him with forty [lashes]; he shall not exceed.” With regard [to an oath] to do good, however, he is liable [for failing to keep an oath] even towards others. [You might ask: If so,] why does Rashi write: “Do good” — for himself? [The answer is:] Since he said that doing harm is for himself, he said that doing good is also for himself, but in fact he is liable [even for failing to keep an oath] to do good for others, as it is explained in the third chapter of Shavuos (26b).

And he violated. Scripture is truncated; it should have written: “This was concealed from him and he violated.” Otherwise, for what would he bring an offering? Would he bring an offering because it was concealed from him? [You might ask:] Why does Rashi not explain here upon the word, “ואשם (and he incurs guilt)” as he does above, with regard to the word ואשם in the verse dealing with impurity (v. 2, 3)? The answer is: The word ואשם written here is followed by the phrase, “for any one of these,” which implies that it refers to all the aforementioned sins. Therefore, perforce we must say that the verse, “And it was concealed from him” is a truncated verse, and it is as if it says: “It was concealed from him and he violated his oath, when he realizes [his sin],” i.e., when he finds out afterwards. It then returns: “And he incurs guilt for any one of these... He shall bring his guilt-offering” (Re”m).

A sliding scale sacrifice. Meaning: If he is wealthy he brings a female lamb or she-goat; if he is poor he brings two turtledoves or two young pigeons; and if he is of the poorest of the poor he brings a tenth of an eiphah. Therefore, this offering is called the sliding scale sacrifice.

As is explained. Although Rashi does not need to say all this, for Scripture is clear about it, as it explicitly stated in this section, nevertheless, he says it so that he can say: “But [violation] of an oath...” as it says in the end of the parshah (v. 21): “If a person sins and wrongfully deviates...”

One organ. In the first chapter of Chulin (21b) Rashi explains because it is written: “He does not separate,” and a bird is slaughtered with only one siman (gullet or windpipe). If he does anything more than what is necessary it is considered “separation.” A further consideration: the [severing of the] entire organ is included in the mitzvah of slaughtering a bird in the preferred way — therefore, regarding shearing [the head], when he nips the entire siman it is not “separation.” With regard to the second siman, however, there is not even a mitzvah [of slaughtering] in the preferred way, as [the Rabbis] taught [in a Baraisa] (ibid. 27b): To obligate him in two simanim is impossible, for a bird was already compared to fish.

For its sake. This was explained above (Rashi 4:24) regarding the sin-offering of a leader. Rashi repeats it [here] because it is dealing with bird sinoffering and above it is dealing with an animal sin-offering, and [one cannot learn from the other because] they have dissimilar aspects. Therefore, he repeated the explanation here.

According to the rule. Meaning: Its head is sheared in both simanim (gullet and windpipe) and according to all the instructions outlined in the [free-will fowl burnt-offering]. Rashi interprets: “כמשפט” [literally, as the judgment,] as “according to the rule” because [the term] judgment or justice does not pertain to an offering.

Not for its sake. Meaning: For example: He brought it at first for the sake of a pan-baked meal-offering and then at the time of taking a fistful he took it for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, or vice versa. Rashi repeats this here [see v. 9] because this is a meal-offering and those above refer to an animal or bird, and [one cannot be learnt from the other because] they have dissimilar aspects.

Of these three. One is a lamb or goat, the second is turtledoves or two young pigeons, and the third is a tenth of an eiphah of fine flour.

And the less severe. Meaning: The most severe of them are [entering] the Temple or [eating] the holy [foods] in impurity (5:2), which is punished by koreis. And a less severe case is the one who took an oath to testify (5:1), which is not punishable by koreis if intentionally violated, but Scripture equates the intentional violator to the unintentional one. This is because with regard to all of them it is written, “and this was concealed from him,” but here [concerning the one who took an oath to testify] it does not say, “and it was concealed from him.” [This comes] to make him liable [to bring an offering] for the intentional violator as the unintentional one. The least severe is the oath expressed orally, which is not punished for intentional violation with koreis, and the intentional violator was not equated to the unintentional one. [You might ask:] It is written (v. 7): “If his means are not sufficient [for a sheep...” which implies that the poor person brings turtledoves or pigeons for the same sin the rich person brings a lamb. If so, why would you assume: “Perhaps the most severe of them (=sins)...”? We can answer:] This refers to the wrongdoing, as if to say: If he did not touch upon a wrongdoing that would be sufficient when violated to be liable to bring a lamb, rather, only a lesser transgression — he should bring two turtledoves. And if he did not touch upon a wrongdoing that requires two turtledoves, but only a lesser wrongdoing, he should bring a tenth of an eiphah. Therefore, it writes: “In one of these” to equate the least to the most severe [sin].

Its remnants should be eaten. Accordingly, the meaning of “as a meal-offering” is: As the free-will meal-offering mentioned above, for all the remnants of all the free-will offerings are eaten by the kohanim.

Completely burnt. [According to this:] “To the kohein” is interpreted in conjunction with the preceding phrase and with the next phrase. I.e., [With the preceding phrase: “And it shall belong to the kohein” means:] If the meal-offering is from an [Israelite] sinner, [the remaining portion] shall belong to the kohein. [With the next phrase:] “To the kohein [as a meal-offering” means:] As the kohein’s free will offering, and any free-will meal-offering [of a kohein] — the remnants are eaten by the kohanim.

[Means] changing. I.e., He “changes” it from sacred property to not sacred, even though he did not drive benefit from it, for instance: If a Temple treasurer gave money of sacred property to another person who went and took it out of the domain of sacred property, the Temple treasurer has misappropriated the sacred funds, as the Mishnah states in Maseches Meilah. The correct text is: “אין מעילה אלא שנוי (מעילה always means ‘changing’),” and we should not use the text: “בכל מקום (wherever it occurs).” It means: This מעילה can only mean “changing,” etc. (Re”m). [This is because] Re”m raises the difficulty: The word מעילה written concerning the guilt-offering of thievery does not connote “changing,” because someone who withholds payment of a hired worker or denies owing a debt is not taking anything out of the owner’s domain, and yet it says there (v. 21): “ומעלה מעל (and wrongfully deviates).” This is no difficulty, however, for he certainly does take it out of the owner’s domain. This is because we have established the Halachah that the Sabbatical year will not release [the debt of] one who denies a loan and stands by his denial. But if there was no change of ownership, and it remained as it originally was [before his denial], the Sabbatical year should release him [from his debt]. Thus, this is [also] called “changing.” (Gur Aryeh). Divrei Dovid answers that it is also called a change of domain there, because the obligation [to bring a guilt-offering] is only if he swears falsely. If so, he turns away from Hashem in that he takes His Name in vain, and throws off His yoke. In this it resembles idolatry which is mentioned afterwards.

And where. Meaning: We derive through a gezeirah shavah [from the words] חטא חטא from terumah. It says here: “וחטאה בשגגה (and unwittingly sins)” and it says regarding terumah (22:9): “ולא ישאו עליו חטא וגו' (lest they bear sin...).” Just as חטא mentioned with regard to terumah is [referring to the case] where he benefited from it, as it is written (ibid. 14): “If a man inadvertently eats of sacred-offering,” where he benefits by eating, so too חטא mentioned here is where he benefits from the sacred property — even if he did not change it from the sacred domain to an ordinary domain and did not harm it — for instance, he drank from a gold cup or wore a sacred ring on his finger. Thus, the meaning of וחטאה is “or he unwittingly sins,” i.e. [“If a person wrongfully deviates”] — he changes it from one domain to another but does not have benefit, [“or he unwittingly sins”] — or he has benefit from it but does not change it, he has misappropriated “and shall bring his guilt-offering...”

Against eating. Meaning: [Perhaps] the same applies as with the other benefits that are included in “consuming,” where the Merciful One [in His Torah] was not concerned that it be harmed, so too here the Merciful One warned only against eating and the like, but not that it must be harmed, [for example,] if he wore a sacred garment and had a copper coin’s worth of benefit from it, even though he did not harm it in the value of a copper coin, he has misappropriated? The verse says: תמעול מעל — it [thus] includes [even actions aside from eating]. I.e., if it is a thing which usually gets damaged, he has not misappropriated if he has benefit from it until he damages it. This is as [the Rabbis] taught [in a Mishnah] (Meilah 18a): One who derives benefit from sacred property, even though he has not damaged it the worth of a copper coin, he has misappropriated; these are the words of Rabbi Akiva. But the Sages say: One does not misappropriate with something which is susceptible to damage until he damages it, but with something that is not susceptible to damage he misappropriates as soon as he derives benefit from it. How is this so? If he placed a gold necklace [of sacred property] on her neck or a ring on her finger, or drank from a golden cup, he has misappropriated.

תמעול מעל — it [thus] includes [even actions aside from eating]. [Rashi does] not [mean] exactly that it includes, because we do not actually derive this through an “inclusion.” Rather, [it is derived] from a comparison (hekeish) to idolatry, in which it is written מעילה (Divrei Hayomim I, 5:25): “They deviated from the God of their fathers”: Just as regarding idolatry there is a change, for until now, before he bowed down to it, it was in his domain and benefit was permitted, but now its domain has changed and it has entered the domain of the idolatry, and deriving any benefit from it is prohibited; this is its damage. This is what is meant by: “It includes” — Scripture includes it through this hekeish. Here as well, if it is a matter that is usually damaged, even if he has benefit from it he has not misappropriated until it is damaged (Re”m).

Excluding sacrifices of lesser holiness. Meaning: Misappropriation is not applicable to the meat of sacrifices of lesser holiness both before the blood is sprinkled or after the blood is sprinkled, because they are not designated for the sake of Hashem alone; their only restriction is that they may be eaten only inside the walls [of Jerusalem], but they are permitted to an ordinary Jew who may eat them. The meat of sin-offerings and guiltofferings as well: misappropriation is applicable to them before the blood is sprinkled, but after sprinkling there is no misappropriation since they are permitted to be eaten by the kohanim.

Implying toughness. See above in Parshas Vayeitzei on the verse (Bereishis 31:38): “[And I did not eat any] rams of your flocks...”

Worth two selaim. Rashi informs us that בערכך means “they are worth,” and not an actual estimation, for the translation of estimation and appraisal is not applicable here. Rather: “they are worth.”

The principal and the fifth. Rashi informs us that the meaning of, “את אשר חטא (that which he sinned)” is the principal, as if it says: “The principal upon which he sinned he shall pay,” and not “the sin that he sinned,” as the apparent meaning of Scripture, for the concept of payment does not pertain to sin, and certainly that [it is not something that] he would give to the kohein (Re”m). We find in regard to terumah that he pays the principal to the owners and the fifth to any kohein he wishes, therefore, Rashi needed to explain that he gives the principal and the fifth to the kohein (Nachalas Yaakov).

In the value recorded. It is the value of two silver selaim (shekalim) of holy selaim. You might ask: Say that the guilt-offering of the nazir and the guilt-offering of the metzoro is two selaim, and the guilt-offering [brought by one who seduced] an engaged maidservant is even one sela. The Sages answered this question in Toras Kohanim: I include the guilt-offering of an engaged maidservant which is a [two-year old] ram, the same as the uncertain guilt-offering, and I exclude the guilt-offering of the nazir and metzoro which is a [one-year old] lamb and not a ram.

A guilt-offering two-years old. This is surely a scribal error, because why would Scripture need to write that the guilt-offering of the engaged maidservant should be two-years old, since it is written “ram” concerning the engaged maidservant (19:21), the same as here? What is the strength of “ram” written here over the word “ram” written concerning the engaged maidservant? Furthermore, Rashi says: Perhaps I should include the guilt offering for a nazir and the guilt offering of a metzoro? But why would you think that the guilt-offering of the nazir and metzoro should be a two-year old ram, when it is written “lamb” concerning them, and whenever it is written “lamb” or “calf” it refers to a one-year old? Rather, we have to correct the text: “that it should [consist] of a ram worth two Shekalim.” This is because it is not written regarding the engaged maidservant, “the valuation of two shekalim,” and so it lets us know here that we require two shekalim here as well (Gur Aryeh).

Acted faithlessly with Hashem. Toras Kohanim. This is the explanation: In the section regarding misappropriations it is written (v. 15): “If a person wrongfully deviates” and does not say, “from Hashem” [as it does here] (Nachalas Yaakov).

With witnesses and a document. This raises a difficulty: What denial is there here of witnesses and a document, and [how is] taking a false oath [applicable]? For surely, when there are witnesses he does not take any oath, for he must pay. It seems that Rashi is referring to that which it says in Baba Metzia (3a): [Rabbi Chiya] taught [in a Baraisa]: One says to his fellow man: I have one-hundred gold pieces deposited by you, but he responds: I have nothing of yours, and witnesses testify that he has fifty. He must pay fifty and take an oath on the rest, as the law of one who admits to a partial amount [of the claim]. This is because his oral confession should not be greater than the testimony of witnesses, and the same law applies if the claimant later shows a document for fifty (Divrei Dovid).

The Third between them. Meaning: Hashem, Who is the Third between them. What it says afterwards: “or a deposit, or theft, or oppressed his friend,” refers only to: “and [he] denies to his friend” but not to: “[he] deviates from Hashem.”

That he stole something from him. Meaning: The phrase, “or theft” does not refer back to “and he denies to his friend,” that you should say “או בגזל” is the same as “פקדון,” which means: he gave his friend a deposit, money which he placed in his possession to invest, and we would [then] say “או בגזל” is also explained this way — that his friend gave him a stolen object he had stolen and he [the recipient] denied to his friend with regard to that deposit. [This cannot be,] for if so, “בגזל” would be the same thing as “פקדון.”

Any of these. Rashi added the word “these” to say that the phrase “אשר יעשה וגו' (whatever [someone] will do...)” is not connected to the word “מכל (of all)” that appears before it. Rather, [מכל is connected to על אחת (in any), as if it says] “in any of all these aforementioned instances,” and it is a truncated verse. “Whatever [someone] will do” is an independent matter, for Scripture wishes to inform us that it is not unusual that someone will deny money to his fellow man, even though there is a Halachic presumption that a person is not brazen-faced in front of the one to whom he is indebted. This is because it is a common matter that someone swears falsely for the sake of denying his fellow man’s money.

To repent. Otherwise, who is forcing him to return the theft, since there were no witnesses here? Perhaps by himself? If so, what did he think originally when he denied and swore falsely? Rather, it must be: When he recognizes in himself [the need] to repent... This is a truncated verse, and it is as if it says: “It shall be that when he admits that he sinned and incurs guilt, he shall return the stolen property...”

The principal. Meaning: The principal is called the head because it is the head of the money, since it is the main source and the root of all profit that results from it, just as the head of a living creature which is the main source and root of all its limbs.

The money belongs. To exclude someone who is the relative or friend of [the one to] whom the money belongs. This is the same as: “Everyone’s holy things shall belong to him” (Bamidbar 5:10), upon which the Sages derived that it is his prerogative to give them to whichever kohein he wants, because the pleasure of giving to whom he chooses is the right of the owners. See later in Parshas Naso (ibid.).