But its exchange is not. Meaning: The exchanged animal itself is not sacrificed, nevertheless, it becomes holy and does not go out to become non-sacred. It is left to graze until it develops a blemish. Then, it is sold and its value is used to buy a voluntary offering.

Ram or lamb. Rashi is answering the question: Why is it not written: “If he is bringing a lamb...” or “If he is bringing a goat...” [as it does regarding peace-offerings (3:7-12)]?

Whose owners have died. That is, [the owners died] before they brought the guilt-offering, so it no longer needs to be offered since death atones.

Have been atoned for. For instance, he separated a guilt-offering and it was lost, and he brought another guilt-offering. Afterwards, the first guilt-offering was found. If so, the owners have already received atonement. This guiltoffering needs to graze until it becomes blemished; they then sell it and buy a burnt-offering with its value. Rashi is explaining specifically that even though its value is destined to be used for the קיץ מזבח (when there were not enough sacrifices donated to keep the altar fully in use, the deficit was made up by Temple-funded sacrifices. This money is used to buy sacrifices for the “summertime altar”), if they slaughtered it without any designation it is not valid for a burnt offering before it is removed for pasture. Once it was removed for pasture, however, if it was slaughtered without any designation, it is valid. This is because it is written, “it is a guilt-offering,” implying: But not a burnt-offering. However, it is obvious that it is a guilt-offering and not a burnt-offering! Rather, this implies that sometimes it can be a burnt-offering. For instance: if it was removed for pasture and they slaughtered it without designation, it will be valid as a burnt-offering.

Even though [its fats] have not been burnt. I.e., since the guilt-offering is valid even if the fats were not burnt, it is no longer applicable to say that a guilt-offering brought for its own sake is valid but if not for its own sake is invalid. Because if you were to say this, the guilt-offering would have to have the fats burnt for its own sake, since “it is a guilt-offering” is written after the burning of the fats. [But this is not so,] for if the fats were not burnt it would still be valid, since atonement is only accomplished by the blood.

**The one who is fit to [accomplish] atonement.**Meaning: The phrase “One law applies to them both” is connected to the phrase following, “the kohein who will bring about atonement ...” for if it meant to equate the sinoffering and guilt-offering [this cannot be,] since it is already written: “As the sin-offering is, so is the guilt-offering,” in which they are equated.

Excluding a טבול יום (one who has entered a mikveh, but who has to wait for sunset to become ritually pure). Meaning: the sunset has not yet come.

A מחוסר כפורים. Meaning: Sometimes there is an impure person [that has entered the mikveh] who needs to bring a sacrifice the next day.

Who do not share. Excluding a טבול יום. Even though Scripture excluded them from a share in the meat, as stated above (v. 7), I might think that specifically with regard to the meat, which is eaten, and these kohanim are not fit to eat now — therefore, Scripture excludes them. Regarding the skins, however, since they are not fit to be eaten, I might think that although these kohanim are not fit for performing service, nonetheless they share in the skins. Therefore, it lets us know ... [that since they are not fit for performing service or eating,] they are excluded from sharing in the skins.

To the priestly family. Meaning: The kohanim were divided into twenty-four watches, and each watch had one week. Each watch was divided into six priestly families for the six weekdays, each day had one priestly family [assigned to it], and on the Shabbos day all six priestly families served together. Many raise the difficulty: It is written later (v. 10), “[It shall belong] to all the sons of Aharon,” with regard to the meal-offering mixed with oil or dry, and Rashi writes later: The verse which says: “to the kohein who offers,” is written concerning the meal-offering baked in an oven — why do we not say that there exists a difference between different types of mealofferings, that this one goes to the one who offers and this one is for all the sons of Aharon? It seems to me [that we can answer] in this way: When it says, “the kohein who offers,” it cannot mean strictly him, and that the members of the watch have no rights in it. This is because perforce the watch must be included, since “the one who offers” refers to anyone who was fit to offer, just as nearby (v. 7), “the kohein who will bring about atonement,” Rashi explains that “anyone who is fit to [accomplish] atonement has a share in it.” If so, it cannot be that only the kohein who offers shall have a share. Rather, perforce it means anyone who was fit [to offer] in that watch [has a share]. Then afterwards, concerning the meal-offering mixed with oil, when it says, “to all the sons of Aharon,” perforce it means to all the members of that watch as well, for certainly, it cannot be referring to all the kohanim in the world, since it would be impossible to share it with everyone. If so, Scripture poses a contradiction in the usage of language: First it uses a singular term to refer a watch [“the kohein who offers”], and afterwards a plural term, “to all the sons of Aharon.” Rather, we must say there is relevancy for the singular and plural terms. And that is that each watch had priestly families, for there were twenty-four watches, and each watch was divided into six priestly families; each priestly family had its day. Therefore, the singular term usage mentioned first is fine, because it excludes all the other [i.e., twenty-three] priestly families. And the verse, “to all the sons of Aharon” includes all those kohanim who were serving on that day, and not just the kohein who offers it (Divrei Dovid).

A voluntary mealoffering. Meaning: This is the voluntary fine flour meal-offering mentioned in Parshas Vayikro (2:1), for the other types have already been listed, as it is written: “Every meal-offering that shall be baked in an oven and every one made in a deep pot or frying pan...” If so, “Every meal-offering mixed with oil” must be identified as the fine flour meal-offering.

So it is set forth in Menochos. It says here (v. 14): “תרומה ליי (separated portion to Hashem),” and it says with regard toתרומת מעשר (the tithe of the tithe): “תרומה ליי” (Bamidbar 18:26), just as later on it means one tenth, here, too, it means one tenth. Thus, we learn that each type [of bread] should be ten loaves. This is because if they were less than ten or more than ten, then the tenth of each type would be a piece of a loaf or half a loaf. The Torah however says, (v. 14): “one from each offering,” which means one whole loaf from each type; he should not take a piece.

Twenty esronos(tenths). This is because it is written here (v. 13): “לחם חמץ (leavened bread),” and with regard to the loaves of Atzeres (Shavuos) is written: “לחם תנופה שתים שני עשרונים (two bread wave-offerings; of two tenths)” (23:17). If so, we derive [from a gezeiroh shovoh] “לחם לחם” — just as each bread mentioned concerning Atzeres was one ‘tenth,’ [so too, here, each leavened bread was one ‘tenth’]. Here, there were ten loaves of leaven, since each type had ten loaves. If so, the amount of bread was ten ‘tenths.’ The total of the rest of the three types [of matzoh] was only ten ‘tenths,’ [thus, the total of all the four types was twenty ‘tenths’]. [You might ask:] How does Rashi know this? Perhaps each type [even of matzoh] was ten ‘tenths’! [The answer is:] If so, Scripture should have written, “And leavened bread...” why does it say: “With loaves —[leavened] bread [he shall bring]...”? It had already specified above the three types of leaves! Rather, it comes to tell you that the loaves should resemble the [leavened] bread, i.e., all the loaves [of matzoh] should only be ten ‘tenths’ as was the [leavened] bread by itself.

Scalded in boiling water as much as needed. Rashi does not intend to say that they were scalded in boiling water but not baked afterwards in an oven. Rather, they are required to be baked after the scalding, as it is written clearly regarding the meal-offering (6:14): “תופיני (well-baked).” Then, we derive from the words “מורבכת מורבכת (saturated, saturated)” for a gezeiroh shovoh.

That the bread is not holy. Otherwise, why does it need to say: “He shall bring his offering, along with his peaceoffering of thanksgiving”? It is written above (v. 12): “He shall bring along with his thanksgiving offering matzoh loaves...”! Perforce this verse comes for to be elucidated: “[This tells us] that the bread is not holy, etc.” Accordingly, the phrase, “Loaves of leavened bread,” is expounded with the preceding verse and the phrase following: With the preceding — “matzoh loaves mixed with oil ... and loaves of saturated fine flour mixed with oil, with loaves of leavened bread, etc.” and with the phrase following — “With loaves of leavened bread he shall bring his offering, along with his peace-offering of thanksgiving.”

One bread of each type. Rashi is answering the question: There was only one קרבן (offering) — the peaceoffering of thanksgiving! [How, then, can the verse say, “one from each קרבן”?] Therefore, he explains: “One bread of each type, etc.” because each type is called a קרבן.

The festal offering of the fourteenth. [You might ask:] On the verse in Parshas Re’eh (Devarim 16:4): “Neither shall any of the flesh remain all night until the morning,” Rashi explains: “Scripture is referring to the festal offering brought on the fourteenth of Nissan [and not to the Pesach offering], and it teaches with reference to it that it may be eaten for two days and [the intervening] night”! [Yet here he writes that it may be eaten for one day and a night]. [The answer is:] Rashi’s explanation here is according to the view of Ben Teima, who said that a festal offering that comes with a Pesach offering is eaten one day and a night, like the Pesach offering. And what Rashi says [in Parshas Re’eh that it is eaten] for two days, etc. is according to the Rabbis who disagree with Ben Teima. They hold the view that a peace-offering that comes because of the Pesach offering is eaten for only one day and a night, solely when it is a specific case of a peace-offering that comes from the surplus of a Pesach offering. For instance, someone separated money for his Pesach offering and he bought a Pesach offering, but there was a surplus of money. From that money he should bring a peace-offering. But since it originates from the Pesach offering, its laws are as that of the Pesach offering, to be eaten for one day and a night. Do not question why Rashi explains here according to the view of Ben Teima and later on according to the view of the Rabbis, since this is Rashi’s approach in a number of places in his commentary on the Chumash.

The time limit of its bread. As it is written: “On the day of its sacrifice,” and it is not written: “On its day it may be eaten.” Rather, this is to tell you that [the laws pertaining to] the loaves should be like the sacrifice itself with [the laws pertaining to] eating, because the loaves are also called a קרבן (sacrifice), as it is written (v. 14): “והקריב אחד מכל קרבן (he shall bring one from each offering).”

Until midnight. Rashi is answering the question: Why did the Rabbis say that he may eat it only until midnight and not later?

Thanksgiving for a miracle. Meaning: That which is written: “If either a vow or voluntary offering,” does not mean that what is written above it is not referring to voluntary offerings, because above it does refer to a voluntary offering! Therefore, Rashi explains: “Which he did not bring as thanksgiving...” however, until now it refers to one who brings an offering for thanksgiving for a miracle.

May be eaten. It may be eaten on the second day. You should not explain that it may be eaten on the first day, and on the next day it may also be eaten, and the remnant of it, i.e., of the second day, may be eaten on the third day. Rather, this is what it means: And on the next day the remnant from the first day may be eaten, meaning: what remained from the first day may be eaten on the second. According to this, the ו of והנותר is superfluous. Rashi’s proof is that it is written nearby (v. 18): “If it will be eaten ... on the third day...” [You might ask:] Why does Rashi not interpret this ו like the ו of (6:8): “ומשמנה (and some of its oil),” where he explains [that the ו of ומשמנה is a ו of explanation, meaning as if it is written:] And from where does he take the fistful? — ומשמנה — where the oil is plentiful. So too, here, let it be explained: And when is it permitted to eat on the next day? When the remnant is from the first day. However, the preferred way to fulfill the mitzvah is [to eat it] on the first day alone. This, indeed, is as Re’m wishes to explain. [The answer is:] Because if so, Scripture should write: “יאכל והנותר ממנו ממחרת (the remnant of it shall be eaten on the next day),” [and not: “And on the next day, the remnant of it may be eaten”], so that we would not err to explain that it is referring to the remnant from the second day, which is to what it seems to refer, rather than explaining that it refers to the first day. Thus, the ו is certainly superfluous. Above (6:8), however, there is no reason to err. Here, though, without the ו there is no reason to err, therefore, Rashi explains that the ו is superfluous. This answers the difficulty which Re’m raised on Rashi who did not explain this ו like the ו of ומשמנה.

One who intends during the slaughtering. Meaning: If he had an invalid intention about it at the time the kohein sprinkles its blood, that is, to eat it on the third day, which is beyond its permitted time, then it is invalid. But after it was sacrificed, and all of its service was properly performed, no intention or action can invalidate it.

Should become invalid retroactively. We should not raise the difficulty: Since the sacrifice was done properly, how could he make it invalid afterwards by the manner in which he eats it? The Sages already answered in Toras Kohanim: Just as we find concerning a zov and a zovoh, and one who counts a day against a day, who were in the presumption of being pure, yet when they see [a discharge] the day is removed from its presumption of purity, so too, here.

This should not enter the mind. Meaning: This is why the verse uses the term: “לא יחשב” to tell you that it is with thought (מחשבה) that it becomes invalid. And this is what it means: “The one who brings it,” that is, at the time of bringing the sacrifice, “לא יחשב לו,” meaning: He should not have the aforementioned thought: “it will be eaten ... on the third day.”

**And if he thought of it, “it will be an abomination.”**Meaning: If he transgressed and thought. Rashi rectifies a number of matters in his paraphrase of this verse. He explains “המקריב אותו” as referring to the time of bringing the sacrifice, as aforementioned, and not as referring to the kohein who brings it, as implied by the plain understanding. Also, he explains “לא יחשב לו” as a prohibition on thought, and not as a matter of [not] being credited. Additionally, he added the word זאת to teach that the thought about which he is cautioned against having is this thought: “it will be eaten ... on the third day,” which is the thought of eating beyond the prescribed time. However, a thought [of eating] outside of the prescribed place is derived from the verse, “if it should be eaten ... on the third day” in Parshas Kedoshim (19:7), as Rashi explains there: “If this does not refer to [the prohibition of eating it] beyond its [proper] time, etc.” Also, he adds the words “if he thought” before the words, “it will be an abomination,” because otherwise it would be understood from the verse that when the kohein does not think that he will eat it beyond its time it will be an abomination.

**During the time limit.**During the [prescribed] time it is also an abomination since its invalidity is in thought at the time of slaughtering or sprinkling. Therefore, Rashi emends: “[even] during the time limit.”

Peace-offerings. This excludes the just mentioned פיגול, which is not eaten even without touching impurity.

A limb, part of which went out. Meaning: It went out of the courtyard, or, [with regard to] holy things of lesser holiness — outside the walls of Yerushalayim. The meat of an offering that goes outside [of its prescribed limits] is prohibited to be eaten because (Shemos 22:30): “You must not eat flesh that was torn off in the field.” The part that remains within [its prescribed limits] is permitted even though it touches the part that went out [its prescribed limits, and we do not say [that just as] something that touches the impure becomes impure, [i.e., if part of it becomes impure the entire thing becomes impure,] so too, [if part of the meat of an offering becomes] invalid [because it went outside, the entire meat should be considered invalid]. [This is] because the second word והבשר comes to include, since it should say, “כל טהור יאכל בשר (every pure person may eat the meat),” and no more, why does it say והבשר? Rather, it comes to include that this [i.e., the part of the meat that remains within its prescribed limits] is permitted.

Therefore. [Re’m poses the difficulty:] You might ask: Why does the verse need to teach me this? It can be derived from the fact Scripture needs to write concerning the Pesach offering that it may only be eaten by its “subscribers” (the members of the group that purchased it), who are the owners. This implies that peace-offerings, which are eaten for two days and a night, may be eaten by any person. Because if you were to assume that peace-offerings are eaten only by the owners, why does the Torah single out the Pesach offering, about which the Merciful One wrote that it is eaten only by the owners? According to this assumption, we could learn from peaceofferings, which are lenient, in that they may be eaten for two days and in any [form of] food [preparation], yet even so they may be eaten only by the owners; the Pesach offering, which is more severe, in that it may be eaten only one day and night, and it is eaten only roasted, is it not so much more so [that it may be eaten only by the owners]? The answer is: Were it not for this verse, I might think that the rest of the peace-offerings may be eaten only by the owners, and yet the verse concerning the Pesach offering is needed for itself, [to teach] that they are considered owners only if they “subscribed” to it before it was slaughtered, but after slaughtering they may not subscribe. This is not the case by other peace-offerings — even if some people became partners after slaughtering they are permitted to eat from it. However, if they do not join as partners they may not. For this reason, the verse is needed to teach this, so it appears to me (Minchas Yehudah). Re’m answers: Were it not for the verse: “Every pure person [may eat the meat...],” the verses would contradict each other: It is written concerning the Pesach offering (Shemos 12:4): “You shall make your count regarding the lamb,” which teaches that the Pesach offering is eaten only by the owners. This implies that peace-offerings may be eaten even by those who are not the owners, for if only the owners [may eat peace-offerings], Pesach should be derived from a kal vachomer from peaceofferings, as previously mentioned. [On the other hand,] it is written (Devarim 12:27): “And the blood of your sacrifices shall be poured ... and you shall eat the flesh.” This implies that peace-offerings may be eaten only by the owners. For this reason the Merciful One wrote the verse: “Every pure person...” to teach that the verse [in Devarim] “and [you shall eat] the flesh” is not meant to be interpreted precisely as referring only to the owners. Rather, any pure person [may eat] even if he is not an owner.

Bodily uncleanness. We derive a gezeiroh shovoh from the words טומאתו טומאתו: It is written here: “וטומאתו עליו, (while his uncleanness is yet on him),” and it is written there in Parshas Parah (Bamidbar 19:13): “עוד טומאתו בו (and his uncleanness remains upon him).” Just as there it refers clearly to impurity of the person (ibid.): “Whoever touches a corpse,” so too, here, it refers to impurity of the person. Rashi explains the later phrase: “וטומאתו עליו,” before he explains the preliminary [point]: “The warning for an unclean person who ate clean [sacrificial meat], etc.” because at first I might think that “וטומאתו עליו” refers to impure meat, and if so, it has a warning from the strength of the verse (19): “The flesh [of offerings] that will touch [any unclean thing may not be eaten],” and the punishment from the strength of this verse: “while his uncleanness is yet on him, [that person’s soul] shall be cut off.” [It is a generally accepted rule in regard to prohibitions and punishments in Vayikro that every punishment must be accompanied by a warning in another verse]. However, now that he explains that “וטומאתו עליו” refers to bodily uncleanness, it only speaks here of a warning for the meat’s uncleanness and the punishment for bodily uncleanness. The warning [for bodily uncleanness], though, is from the strength of the gezeiroh shovoh. That is: here it is written טומאתו, and [it also says טומאתו] by an impure person who enters the Beis HaMikdash, concerning which it states a warning and punishment. Thus, here, too, it has a warning. Afterwards, Rashi raises the difficulty: If so, why does it need to mention כרת again regarding bodily uncleanness? [He answers:] There are three כריתות (Divrei Dovid). אתו here has a warning.

Not explicitly mentioned. Rashi is answering what you might ask: There is no punishment [for a prohibition] unless there is a warning [in the Torah]! Therefore, he explains: “[The warning...] is not explicitly [mentioned in the Torah].”

**Derived it with a גזרה שוה.**The גזרה שוה is written in Parshas Chukas (Bamidbar 19:13), טומאתו בו as previously mentioned. And [the punishment of] כרת (ibid.), and its warning is written in Parshas Naso, as it is written (5:3): “And they not defile their camps, in which I dwell among them,” which is a warning not to enter the Beis HaMikdash with bodily uncleanness. We derive [through a gezeiroh shovoh] טומאתו that is written here from טומאתו written there, just as טומאתו there has a warning, so too טומאתו here has a warning.

Three כריתות. One in Parshas Emor (22:3): “any person of your offspring who will draw near to the holy things ... [while his impurity is on him, that soul shall be cut off].” The Gemara says in Zevachim Chapter 4 that when it says “who will draw near” it refers to eating: What does it mean, “who will draw near”? It is said concerning something that is fit to be brought near [the altar]. And how is that so? Because it had already been consecrated in a holy vessel. The other two כריתות are mentioned in Parshas Tzav (v. 20): “The person who eats of the flesh of the peace-offering,” and the next verse (v. 21) reads: “A person who touches anything unclean.” Concerning both of these it says: “[that person’s soul] shall be cut off.” [Rashi explains:] “One is [to teach] a general rule” — meaning: The one [in Parshas Emor]: “to the holy things,” which includes everything. One from the two mentioned in Parshas Tzav [teaches the rule regarding] a particular case. This is a rule [handed down at Sinai as a method of expounding the Torah] explained in Toras Kohanim, in the beginning of the sefer: Something that was included in a general rule, and [then] was singled out from that rule to teach, was not singled out to teach only about itself, but rather to teach about that entire general rule. How is that so? [Peace-offerings need not have been mentioned separately:] “The person who eats of the flesh of the peace-offering, etc.” since peace-offerings were included in the general category of “to the holy things.” Why then, did they depart [as a separate category here]? To compare to them — just as peace-offerings are special in that they are brought to the altar, so too, anything else that is brought to the altar [is included in the punishment of כרת]. This excludes animals dedicated to the Temple upkeep that one is not liable to the punishment of כרת [if he eats their flesh] while in a state of impurity.

**And one to teach regarding a sliding-scale sacrifice.**As it is written in Parshas Vayikro (5:2): “and this [impurity] was concealed from him, he is impure and incurs guilt.” We would not know why he incurs guilt. Could it be that because he was impure he should incur guilt and bring a sliding-scale sacrifice? Therefore, this [third] כרת was made available to teach that [the sliding-scale sacrifice] comes to atone for this כרת, referring to [a person in the state of impurity who ate] sacrificial meat. [However,] if this does not refer to sacrificial meat [eaten by a person] in [the state of] impurity [then it should be used to teach something else]. [It is not needed] because it is [already] derived from a gezeiroh shovoh: Regarding the sliding-scale sacrifice it is written (ibid.): “or the carcass of an impure animal of pasture,” and it says concerning one who eats sacrificial meat in the state of bodily uncleanness in Parshas Tzav (v. 21): A person who touches [anything unclean] ... or an impure animal ... and then eats some flesh [of the peace-offering].” Just as later on [in Parshas Tzav] it refers to sacrificial meat in impurity, so too, here, [regarding the sliding-scale sacrifice] it refers to sacrificial meat in impurity. Thus, [since it is not needed for this], it should be used to teach about one who enters the Temple in impurity.

[Fat ...] does not acquire uncleanness. Meaning: If [the verse came] to permit deriving benefit, [it would be unnecessary] since one is permitted to derive benefit from a נבלה (the carcass of an animal which has been slaughtered improperly), as it is written (Devarim 14:21): “To the stranger that is in your gates...” thus, the fat is also included. Perforce, it comes [to teach] that the fat does not cause impurity of נבלה and may even be used for oiling the hides of animals dedicated to the Temple upkeep. For this reason it is written, “may be used for any purpose.”

And fall on the prohibition ofחלב. [Although Rashi writes, “he will be liable for the prohibition of נבלה”] the same applies to the prohibition of טריפה (an animal which died of natural causes, or would have died of such causes had it not been slaughtered). Rashi needs to mention both of these examples: the fat of a נבלה and the fat of a טריפה, for if it let us know only נבלה, I would say that regarding נבלה a prohibition falls on another prohibition because it acquires a severe impurity, but regarding טריפה it does not. And if it let me know only concerning טריפה, [I would say that regarding טריפה] a prohibition falls on another prohibition because it is a prohibited while still alive, but regarding נבלה it is not. For this reason, both are necessary.

Excluding the blood of fish and grasshoppers. Otherwise, why does it say, “be it of fowl or beast”? However, we should not say it excludes the blood of wild beasts (חיה). This cannot be, because חיה is included in the word בהמה. It not only excludes [the blood of] fish and grasshoppers, but also human blood. This is because this verse follows the rule [of Torah interpretation handed down at Sinai] of a general rule that is followed by a specific rule (כלל ופרט) — that the general rule includes only what is specified in the specific detail — fowl or בהמה. Other blood, however, that is not the blood of fowl or בהמה, is not included.

It applies in all habitations. You might ask: Why does Rashi reverse the order and not explain according to the order of the verse? The answer is: Without this [that Rashi first explains “be it of fowl or beast”], I might say that “in all your dwelling places” comes to include that everything in your dwelling places would be prohibited, even [the blood of] fish and grasshoppers. Now, however, that it is written, “be it of fowl or beast,” which excludes [the blood of] fish and grasshoppers, if so, it raises a difficulty: Why do I need, “in all your dwelling places”? Rather, it must be coming to teach us that it applies even outside of Eretz Yisroel since it is an obligation of the individual. You might ask: It is obvious that since it is an obligation of the individual that it applies whether in Eretz Yisroel, etc. [so why do we need the inclusionary phrase?] Therefore, Rashi explains: And in Maseches Kiddushin [it is explained why it was necessary to state this]. It is explained there: If Scripture did not write, “in all your dwelling places,” I might assume that since it is included within the general discussion of sacrifices, when the sacrifices are extant [i.e., when the Beis HaMikdash is standing] the fat and blood are prohibited, but when there are no sacrifices, they are not prohibited. Therefore, it teaches us [that these prohibitions apply to all times]. Divrei**Dovid answers why Rashi reverses the order and first explains “be it fowl or beast” and then “in all your dwelling places,” which appears earlier in the verse. This is because Scripture says (v. 25): “Anyone who eats fat [of an animal from] which is offered a fire-offering to Hashem...” Meaning: There is a prohibition of fat and blood specifically from an animal that is fit for sacrifices, however, there is no prohibition from what is not fit for sacrifices. Accordingly, the verse, “be it fowl or beast,” refers to “fowl” such as turtledoves and young pigeons; and “beast” refers to the type that is pure [for sacrifices], in particular. According to this, I would explain that when the verse says, “in all your dwelling places,” it comes to prohibit all types of blood, even [from animals] not fit for sacrifices. But now that the verse, “be it fowl or beast” excludes the blood of fish and grasshoppers, by the strength of a כלל ופרט (that the general rule includes only what is specified in the specific detail), and [thus] the general rule that is mentioned does not prohibit all the types, if so, there is a difficulty: Why do I need “in all your dwelling places”? Even without it, we know that it does not depend on whether or not it is fit for a sacrifice. Rather, the blood of every fowl and beast is prohibited. Therefore, Rashi cites the Gemara in Maseches Kiddushin which answers this.

The kohein**’s hand beneath**. Since it is written (Devarim 26:4): “And the kohein will take the basket from your hand,” just as there [it refers to] the hand of the kohein, so too, here, it refers to the hand of the kohein. And yet it is written: “His hands shall bring it,” which refers to the [hands of the] owner. How [do we resolve the apparent contradiction]? “The owner’s hands should be [on top ... with the kohein’s hand beneath].”

That three kohanim. Although it would be sufficient with one, this is because “the glory of the king is when there is a multitude of people.”

Since it is said. Meaning: Since it is written: “את החלב על החזה יביאנו (he shall bring the fat on the breast)” it did not need to additionally write: “את החזה (and the breast).” Therefore Rashi explains that the second phrase “את החזה” refers to the phrase “להניף אותו (to wave it),” as if it says: The only reason he brings the breast together with the fat is to wave with it. Were it not for this, I would think that the aforementioned phrase “the fire-offerings of Hashem” includes [both] the fat and the breast that appear in the verse after it. You might ask: It is clearly written in the next verse: “The kohein shall burn the fat on the altar and the breast shall belong to Aharon and to his sons.” How, then, could we have assumed that the breast would also be [burnt] with the fire offerings? The answer is: Were it not for the verse: “And the breast to wave,” I would think that the verse (31), “The kohein shall burn the fat on the altar and the breast shall belong to Aharon and to his sons” comes to teach that you should not say that even the breast is a fire offering, [which you might say] because it is written, “the fat on the breast.” However, it (v. 31) does not teach that the meat is not eaten as long as the fats are below the altar (see Rashi there). Now that it is written, “and the breast to wave,” which teaches us that the breast is not one of the fire offerings, the verse, “and the breast shall belong to Aharon and to his sons” remains available to teach that the meat is not eaten while the fats are below the altar (Re’m). Were it not for the verse, “and the breast to wave,” I might think that part of the breast is for a fire offering and part is for Aharon, as we say (3:4) regarding the liver. (Gur Aryeh) Gur Aryeh’s answer poses a difficulty: The liver is different, because it is written (ibid.): “יותרת על הכבד (the lobe on the liver)”; the expression על הכבד is extra. Therefore, the Sages derived that he should take a small part [of the liver with the lobe]. This is not so, here, regarding the breast, where the fat is placed upon it, and there is no extra expression. Thus, it appears to me that I might assume this is what it means: “His hands shall bring the fire-offerings of Hashem” refers to the fat and the breast, since both of them are relevant as fire offerings of Hashem. However, the Merciful One gave [the breast to] Aharon and his sons from the table of the Most High, and it would not be the property of the owner with which he could betroth a woman. Therefore, it teaches us know that the breast is not of the fire offerings of Hashem at all, and it is the property of the owner. With this, the language of the later verse is understandable as well (v. 34): “Because the breast wave-offering... I have taken from Bnei Yisroel ... and I have given them to Aharon the kohein.” This verse poses a difficulty: What new information does Scripture give here? According to what I mentioned it goes well: Scripture teaches us that they were taken from the Bnei Yisroel and not from the table of the Most High. Thus, what Hashem has given to them is the property of the owner (Divrei Dovid).

Or at the time of burning. Although above, regarding the sin-offering, Rashi writes only (6:19): “Excluding the one who is impure at the time of sprinkling the blood,” this is because Scripture writes here: “And the fat,” which implies that he needs to be pure at the time of burning the fat [as well] (Gur Aryeh).

He moves them. [Rashi knows this] because it is written (Shemos 29:27): “[Sanctify the breast of the wave-offering and the shoulder of the terumoh-offering] which were [the] waved and uplifted [parts].” The meaning of תנופה is waving to and fro, and תרומה is an expression denoting lifting up, and as a matter of course lowering.

For the day of installation of the kehunoh. Every place where the expression “מלוי יד” (literally, filling the hand) appears, it means the installation, as above in Parshas Tetzaveh.