This does not denote a command. Meaning that if this were a command, it would not be correct to say “by verbalizing as a pledge or as a donation” because donations are not commanded. Thus Rashi explains that “when it occurs to you…”

Satisfying. Not that Hashem receives satisfaction from the offering, for it is written (Tehillim 50:12) “Even if I were hungry I would not tell you…” as explained above in Parshas Tetzaveh (Shemos 29:18, 25). The reason for Rashi commenting on “a pleasing fragrance” before “or on your festivals” is that he first explains that “when you make the fire-offering” does not refer to a command, rather when it occurs to you to make a fire-offering to provide a pleasing fragrance. Linked to this he also explained “a pleasing fragrance” before explaining “on you festivals.”

In order to fulfill the holiday obligation. Rashi was forced to explain “or that you make…” so that one would not understand this as “by verbalizing a pledge, or by verbalizing a donation or by verbalizing [an offering] on your festivals.” For this is not so, given that the offerings on the festivals are obligatory and thus not dependant upon verbalization.

You should present libations and a meal-offering for each animal. Meaning that even though I said above that the verse “when you make a fire-offering…” was not referring to an obligation; nonetheless if you offer a pledge or a donation or an obligatory-offering on your holidays, you are obliged to offer libations and a meal-offerings with them.

With the oil absorbed. Meaning that the kohanim do not eat from it like the other meal-offerings mentioned in Vayikra. Rather it is completely consumed and the oil is absorbed in it, instead of being brought separately.

And the wine [is poured] into the bowls. There were two perforated silver bowls on the altar. The kohein would pour the wine and the water in the mouths of these bowls and the libations would flow down onto the top of the altar. On the altar there was a hole through which the water and wine would go down to the foundations of the altar which were hollow and extremely deep.

If it is a ram. Meaning that if it is a ram, you should make its meal-offering of two-tenths instead of the one-tenth for a sheep, also one-third of a hin of wine and oil instead of the quarter for a sheep. Thus one makes more for the ram than for the sheep. Here the meaning of או (lit. or) is אם (if), not the literal understanding of “or” which would imply that the sheep and the ram were the same.

The palgas. Meaning that until twelve months it is called a sheep, while from thirteen months onward it is called a ram. Thus from twelve months until thirteen months and one day I would not know whether it was considered a ram or a sheep regarding libations — whether it required the libations of a sheep or the libations of a ram. At this stage it is called a palgas. Therefore the Rabbis expound the word או to teach that it requires the libations of a ram. The name “palgas” is derived from two words “plag” (divided) “gas” (large) meaning that it is removed from being fully-grown and being referred to as a ram. (Nachalas Yaakov) The entire passage is explained in chapterShtei Middos (Menachos 91b) but it appears to me that Re’m overlooked this.

According to the number of animals. The verse is ambiguous, writing “according to the number” but not explaining which number, whether the animals or the libations. Furthermore, it repeats itself and writes תעשו (you offer/make) twice. Thus Rashi explains that “according to the number” refers to the animals. The first תעשו ([which] you offer) refers to the offerings while the second תעשו ([so shall] you make) refers to the libations. He also explains לאחד “for one” as meaning for each and every one and the second “according to their numbers” as meaning that the number of animals and libations should be equal.

Like me, like you. (Nachalas Yaakov) Rashi had to expand upon and bring proofs to his explanation because normally the two kafs would come to equate the two things together, not merely to equate one to the other. This is not so here where Rashi explains that they will be like you, but it is not possible to explain the other way, that you shall be like the proselyte. Thus he brings a proof from the verse “Like Hashem’s garden, like the land of Egypt” which means that so is the land of Egypt. There too, it is impossible to explain the other way — “like the land of Egypt so too is the land of the garden of Hashem” because the garden of Hashem is certainly greater than the land of Egypt. Similarly with “like me, like you” regarding Yehoshafat and Yehoram one can not explain the other way around and nonetheless Scripture writes it with two kafs.

For which no specific amount is required. Meaning that a single grain exempts the entire silo, given that the Torah merely says “the first of your grain-harvest” (Devarim 18:4).

For which a specific amount is required. The terumah taken from ma'aser does have a specific amount, one se'ah from ten.

The first of the loaves. Meaning that if one had ten portions of dough then one would have to give the entire first portion for the challah-offering, “the Torah therefore teaches…” You might ask: If so, why does it say (v. 20) “ראשית (the first portion) of your doughs”? The answer is that if the Torah had only stated “מראשית (of the first portion) of your doughs” one would have said that if one had twelve portions of dough, one would have to give a portion of the first, but that the others were exempt. Therefore it wrote “the first portion of your dough” to teach that one must give a part of the entire dough. Re’m raises a difficulty: Here we learn from the word מראשית (of the first portion) that one gives “part of it but not all of it.” However, concerning the first-fruits we learn from the word מראשית that one gives some of the first [fruits] but not all of them — that not all fruits are liable for the first-fruits offering, only the seven species, as is explained by Rambam and Rashi in Parshas Ki Savo (Devarim 26:2). Consequently, why do we not say, like here, that the fruit that ripens first are not all liable for the first-fruit offering, only one grape-cluster or one grape? He leaves this as a question both according to Rambam and Rashi. It appears to me that in the case of challah there is another qualification. The Torah writes, (v. 19) “when you eat from the bread of the land…” There is a difficulty as to why it had to say “the land” given that above (v. 18) it wrote “at your coming to the land.” Rather, it must come to teach that one is only liable for challah with produce for which the Land of Israel is praised — the five species of grain. If so, the word מראשית is left superfluous in order to expound that not all of the dough is liable, only part. However this would not be the case there where there is no superfluous wording.

An amount sufficient for “giving.” (Gur Aryeh) Even though Rashi previously explained that there is no specific amount. The answer to this difficulty is that here he refers to a mitzvah [to give more]; however it would certainly be considered a challah-offering even if one gave less than the amount sufficient for “giving.”

To indicate that it requires an ox as a burnt-offering and a goat as a sin-offering. But not an ox as a sin-offering, as [is the case] with someone who mistakenly transgressed any of the other mitzvos. Thus we have learned that the mistaken transgression of idol worship is not included with the other mistake transgressions; meaning that if it was not for this passage one would have thought that idol worship was included. However this passage teaches that it is not. (Gur Aryeh) You might ask: Let us learn the case of idol worship from the other transgressions and oblige him to bring an ox as a sin-offering. Since for other transgressions where one does not bring an ox as a burnt-offering, one does bring an ox as a sin-offering, in the case of idol worship where one brings an ox as a burnt-offering one should certainly bring one as a sin-offering. Sifri answers that the Torah writes “you shall make one young ox as a burnt-offering” meaning one for a burnt-offering but not as a sin-offering, given that it does not write “you shall make an ox as a burnt-offering.”

A single commandment … idol worship. Because it is written (v. 24) נעשתה (“having been done” in the singular form), which implies a single transgression.

And brazenly defies. He expounds aggados fallaciously, for example [he says that] “Moshe should not have written ‘the sister of Lotan was Timna’ (Bereishis 36:22)” (Sanhedrin 99b).

We heard from the mouth of the Omnipotent. The Torah writes “which Hashem said to Moshe” and it writes “all that Hashem commanded Moshe” which implies that the command was through Moshe. However it is written “which Hashem said” which implies that it was His speech, and that Yisroel heard it from His mouth when he spoke to Moshe. If so, which commandment was both by the word of Hashem and also through Moshe — one must say that it was “I am…” and “you must not have” which we heard from the mouth…

And ruled that one of the forms of service. The Torah writes in Parshas Vayikra (4:13) “a matter was hidden” which implies that only one aspect was hidden, but not the entire matter. They knew that it was forbidden to worship idols, only they did not know that this [particular] form of service was a forbidden. Alternatively we learn a gezeirah shavah (scriptural comparison) between the word דבר (matter) here and דבר in the verse “if a matter is hidden from you…” (Devarim 17:8), which implies “and not the entire matter.”

The ox as the olah-offering. [Rashi says this] so that you do not understand the words “they have brought their offering” as meaning the olah- offering and sin-offering. And that when it is written “and their sin-offering” it refers to the ox sin-offering mentioned in Vayikra. Consequently, the verse here would come to say that aside from the ox olah-offering and the goat sin-offering that are mentioned in this passage, they also brought the ox sin-offering that was mentioned in Vayikra. Therefore Rashi explains that this refers to the ox as the olah-offering, as it says “a fire offering to Hashem.” This is to the exclusion of a sin-offering which is not “a fire-offering to Hashem” given that only an olah-offering is considered as such.

Through idolatry. The vav of “ואם נפש” (and if one person) links this to the previous matter which referred to idol worship.

But for this, a goat is designated. Meaning that this is also a proof that the passage refers to erroneous idol worship. Because surely the offering for the erroneous transgression by an individual that is stated in Parshas Vayikra is a sheep or a goat, while in this passage it is specifically a goat.

In addition the Rabbis derive. Meaning: Furthermore you should know that it is an expression of a curse, given that the Rabbis derive from here that someone who curses Hashem is subject to koreis when there are no witnesses or warning, when it is done intentionally. However, if it had not been an expression of a curse, then how could the Rabbis derive from here that one who curses Hashem is subject to koreis? Rather the verse is certainly to be explained in this way.

By the word of the Omnipresent. Meaning that the term “the word of Hashem” here refers only to idol worship which was the first of the Ten Commandments that Yisroel heard by the word of the Omnipotent. This was not the case for the other commandments which were only heard by the word of Moshe, even though they too were the word of Hashem. Though Rashi explains that “blasphemy” refers to one who curses Hashem and not to idolatry, the phrase “for he has denigrated the word of Hashem” refers to idolatry. Thus it is as if the Torah had said “he has blasphemed Hashem and [the soul of that person] shall be cut off … And if he denigrates the word of Hashem and violates His commandment; the soul of that person shall certainly be cut off.”

During the time his sin is within him. And it is as if the Torah had stated “when the sin is within him.” Rashi had to give this explanation because it is impossible to explain “the sin is within him” as referring to the koreis as in “he shall bear his sin” in Parshas Tzav (Vayikra 7:18), since the Torah here has already mentioned koreis explicitly.

They kept only the first Shabbos. Meaning that if not so, why does the Torah mention that they were in the desert? Rather it is to teach that immediately after they came to the desert this man desecrated Shabbos, but not beforehand. One may ask: In chapter Kol Kisvei (Shabbos 118b) it says “If Yisroel had observed the first Shabbos, no nation or tongue could overpower them.” The answer is that these Midrashim disagree with one another. One may ask: It states (Sanhedrin 56b) Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: “As I commanded you” (Devarim 5:12) — this refers to Shabbos and monetary laws which I commanded you at Marah. This means that this it not their first Shabbos, as Tosafos ask (Shabbos 87b). The answer is that Rashi avoids this question because in Parshas Beshalach he explains “There he gave them” (Shemos 15:25) — in Marah he gave them some laws to involve themselves with, Shabbos, the red heifer and monetary laws. This implies that he informed them of these laws and taught them that Hashem would in the future command them so. Ramban also gives this explanation in Parshas Beshalach. Thus they had not yet been commanded to abstain from forbidden work on Shabbos, only to learn about the positive mitzvah of Shabbos (Kitzur Mizrochi). In my opinion this is not a question at all, because there the Torah does not say that they did any forbidden work, rather they went out to gather but did not collect anything. Thus they did not physically sin at all. Rather they did not observe Shabbos in thought, which is not considered a desecration. Therefore the Gemara says “if [Yisroel] had observed…” meaning that had they observed it in thought as in action, then no one could overpower them. However, here the Torah says that this man came and physically desecrated Shabbos.

They warned him but he did not desist from gathering. The Torah does not say “those who found שקשש” (that he had gathered) rather “מקושש” (he was gathering) meaning that after they saw and found him he was still gathering. Why is it presented it in this manner? To teach that they warned him, but he still continued to gather. This is Rashi’s explanation in Sanhedrin 41a. Re’m explains that if not so, why does the Torah need to say “those who found him gathering,” surely it is obvious that “they brought him near” refers to those who found him. Rather the Torah is saying that those who found him approached him, and he was still gathering, and did not desist.

How to execute him. The Torah writes “since it was not specified what was to be done to him” which implies that they knew he was liable to the death penalty, as it is written “One who desecrates it shall surely die” (Shemos 31:14), nonetheless it had not been specified by which death penalty. However regarding the person who cursed [Hashem] in Parshas Emor (Vayikra 24:12) it says “to explain for them” which implies that they did not know whether he was liable for death or not. You might ask: The standard death penalty in the Torah is strangulation, as Rashi explains in Parshas Emor. Why is this not the same [penalty] regarding Shabbos, where the Torah also mentions the death penalty without clarification, when it writes “one who desecrates it shall surely die”? The answer is that they were uncertain, given that one who desecrates Shabbos is compared to one who engages in idolatry, and idolatry is punishable by stoning. (Kitzur Mizrachi) One cannot pose a difficulty according to Rabbi Yehudah who says that one is not liable for a punishment until one is warned which form of death penalty will be imposed. For the case of the wood gatherer was different, given that it was a one-time ruling. Maharan answers that they may have warned him by incorporating all four court imposed death penalties, thus allowing him to be killed using any of those forms.

Similarly “constantly remember” and “constantly keep.” Meaning that this is in the present tense, even though it was not to be done constantly, only at that time when he desecrated Shabbos. Since it refers to anyone who would ever gather, and thus desecrate Shabbos, the present tense is appropriate; for it would always be incumbent upon them to execute by stoning anyone who transgressed this prohibition.

So named because of the threads. According to the first interpretation there is a difficulty: The Torah should have stated “to make for themselves פתילים (threads)” given that the verse mentions “a פתיל (thread) of blue”. Therefore Rashi brings the other interpretation. However according to the other interpretation there is a difficulty: The Torah should have said מציצין (viewings) rather than ציצית, therefore he also brings the first interpretation where the verse states “He took me by the ציצית (fringes) of my head.”

Of the chilazon-fish. This is a fish that comes out of the sea once every seventy years, and its appearance is similar to that of the sea. One would use it to color a thread of wool that is placed on the tzitzis.

The numerical value of tzitzis is 600. Re’m writes: It appears to me that Rashi’s explanation is according to the opinion that one expounds a verse according to the way the words are read. Here one reads ציצית as if it was written in full with two yuds (rather than ציצת as it is actually written).

And the eight threads … equal 613. Not that the Torah’s intent was so, because there are opinions that one can use sixteen threads. Similarly regarding the knots, though under Torah law one only needs one knot, one can make more [than five]. Rather it was the intention of the Rabbinic enactment that there be five knots, no more and no less, in order to complete the sum [of 613] such that there would be a greater remembrance of the mitzvos when one looked at the tzitzis and the knots. Thus Rashi explains the verse according to the situation after the enactment rather that before so.

Faithful in enacting punishment. אלהים (God) has the same numerical value as זה דיין (He is a judge), teaching that this refers to His attribute of strict justice.

On condition that you accept my decrees. But not “to be God” because either way He would be God. However the acceptance of His decrees, making Him “your God,” was part of the condition. Had He not redeemed them from the house of bondage they would have been like the other nations, having no obligation to accept the decrees.

Another interpretation. Meaning that there is a difficulty with the first interpretation, given that the Torah also writes “to be your God” which implies that I will rule over you even against your will, therefore he brings another interpretation. However according to this other interpretation there is a difficulty that the Torah only needed to say “I am Hashem” given that regarding the plague of the firstborn it only wrote “Hashem struck…” Thus why was it necessary to add “your God”? Consequently the first interpretation was also necessary.

Indigo dye. Rashi explains that this is a color similar to techeiles. However the Torah said “a thread of techeiles” and techeiles is colored with the blood of the chilazon-fish. This verse was necessary in order to teach that one transgresses from the moment that one ties the thread, as Tosafos write in Bava Metzia 61b.

But not on a garment with five [corners]. Meaning that one would have placed tzitzis on all five corners. Nonetheless, one is obliged to place tzitzis on four corners even if the garment has five, given that “one hundred is included in two hundred.” This point is agreed to by all. However Re’m explains this as meaning that a garment of five corners is entirely exempt and that though Rashi brings the words of Rabbi Moshe Hadarshan, he himself does not agree. (Nachalas Yaakov) Initially Rashi uses the heading “on the corners” that was stated here and gives a reason why specifically said “on the corners.” Then he uses the heading “on the four corners” that was stated in Parshas Ki Seitzei (Devarim 22:12) and explains “but not on a garment with three…”

Correspond with the eight days that the Israelites waited from the time they left Egypt until they sang. You might ask: In Parshas Beshalach (Shemos 14:5) Rashi explains that they sang on the seventh day of Pesach. The answer is that he holds that the night is considered part of the preceding day. This is similar to [the concept of ‘day’ regarding] offerings about which the Torah writes “On the day that you slaughter you shall eat, and that which remains until morning you shall burn in fire” (Vayikra 19:6). There, why would it only be necessary burn it in the morning? Surely once the Torah wrote “on the day that you slaughter you shall eat,” one would have already been obligated to burn it at night. Rather it is certain that one is also permitted to eat it at night, given that the night is considered part of the preceding day. The start of the exodus was calculated from immediately after they slaughtered, roasted and ate the Pesach offering, thus from the start of the exodus there were eight days. However from the actual exodus which was on the fifteenth of the month there were seven days, because if one does not include that night they sang on the seventh day. Rabbi Moshe Hadarshan is also of this opinion. This is in contrast to Re’m who explains that these are the words of Rabbi Moshe Hadarshan but Rashi is not of this opinion. See Nachalas Yaakov who disproves the view of Re’m and says that these are Rashi’s words and not those of Rabbi Moshe Hadarshan. For it is only the comment “why was the passage of the wood gatherer juxtaposed…” which is to be attributed to Rabbi Moshe Hadarshan.