This Parshah was said on the day. Rashi is answering the question: Why didn’t he command them this Parshah immediately after the Mishkon was erected? Surely they arranged the camps on the day that the Mishkon was erected, and immediately afterwards he should have commanded them to send everyone who was impure out of the camp. He answers that it was indeed said on the day that the Mishkon was erected. Rashi is also answering another question: Where do we find that that any other Parshah was said to them on the day that the Mishkon was erected? He answers that “eight parshiyos…”

Three camps. Because it wrote the word “camp” three times in this Parshah.

Out of all of them. Regarding the metzoro the Torah writes “he shall dwell alone” (Vayikra 13:46) implying that he should dwell in a place where no other impure people go, i.e. outside the three camps. When the Torah wrote “and they shall not defile their camps,” (v.3) rather than writing “their camp” this implies that there was one camp for a zav and another camp for a person defiled by the dead. Now, since one defiled by the dead is permitted in the Levite camp, as explained previously, one may infer that a zav is permitted in the Israelite camp.

From the encampment of the Shechinah. You might ask: From where did Rashi know this? The answer is that the fact that one defiled by the dead is even permitted in the Levite camp is learned from Moshe Rabbeinu who was himself a Levi. The Torah writes “Moshe took the bones of Yosef with him” (Shemos 13:19) and he entered the camp of the Levites.

Means … bones. Meaning that the opinion of the Targum is that they were defiled through the bone of a corpse. Re’m explains Rashi’s proof: Had this been a term meaning impurity, a person who touched someone who became impure from a corpse would have also been rendered an av hatumoh (‘father’ i.e. originator of impurity) since [the verse would mean that] a person who touched someone who became impure from a corpse is commanded here to be sent out of the camp like a zav or a metzoro, which are both avos hatumoh. However this is not so, because a person who touches someone who became impure through touching a corpse only becomes a vlad hatumoh (‘offspring’ of impurity). Thus one is forced to say that “defiled by a [departed] soul” refers to bones. A bone is an avi avos hatumoh (‘father of a father’ of impurity) and one who touches it becomes an av hatumoh. You might ask: How did Rashi know this, perhaps the verse means that he was rendered impure by flesh rather than a bone. An answer is that if this was so the Torah should have written טמא בנפש (defiled by a soul), but what is meant by טמא לנפש (lit. defiled to a soul) — this implies that he was rendered impure by something connected to the soul — and this is the bones. Another answer is that it was because the Targum translates דמסאב לטמי נפשא (who were defiled by the bones of a soul) whereas he should have merely translated it as דמסאב נפשא (defiled by a soul). However the additional word לטמי implies bones.

This is the principal [payment] concerning which he took the oath. This was the value originally payable, thus Rashi explains: What is termed the principle? — The money concerning which he took the oath. This means to say that it is the money concerning which he took an oath, and not the additional fifth.

To whom he is liable. Rashi is answering the question: Why didn’t the Torah write “from whom he stole” instead of “to whom he is indebted”? This implies that [one returns the money] to the one to whom the principle belongs. For example, if someone lent money to the person who was robbed, and this [thief] came and stole it from him, he is obliged to give it to the lender who lent it to the person who he stole from. Thus Rashi stated “to the one to whom he is liable” to teach that one gives the money to the one to whom the victim of the theft is liable.

When he recants. Rashi is answering the question: Since the thief denied it and the one who caused him to swear has already died, how could it be that he now wished to pay? He answers that it is “when he recants…”

[This refers to] a proselyte who died without heirs. You might ask: In Parshas Behar it writes “and a man who will not have a redeemer” (Vayikra 25:26). Rashi asks: Is there anyone in Yisroel who does not have a redeemer? He answers that it refers to a redeemer who can redeem him from his sale. Meaning that he certainly has a redeemer, however he does not have a wealthy redeemer who can redeem him from his sale. Why didn’t Rashi explain that it refers to a proselyte who died without heirs, as he answers here? The answer is that there it was not possible to say that it referred to a proselyte, because the Torah wrote “and he sold some of his holdings” meaning [land] that he inherited from his father. But a proselyte would not have an inheritance from his father. Here it was also not possible to answer as Rashi did there, because anyone would want to receive the debt — the principle and the additional fifth, whether poor or wealthy.

This is the principle. The Torah did not write this previously when it said “But if the man has no redeemer to whom the debt may be returned,” omitting to write “[the debt] being returned,” because it relied on what was written previously where the Torah stated “and return the principal amount of his guilt, and [add] one fifth…” (v.7).

Then gives it to the kohein. Because if this were not so, if it was for Hashem it could not be for the kohein, and vice-versa. Furthermore, one cannot say that it would be for both — the sacrificial parts for Hashem and the meat for the kohanim, because then the Torah should have said “to Hashem and to the kohein.”

**In that watch.**You might ask: Perhaps he gives it to any kohein to whom he wishes, even if they are not in that watch. The answer is that since the Torah afterwards writes “besides the ram of forgiveness…” this implies that this should be given to the kohein aside from the ram of forgiveness. The ram of forgiveness was given specifically to a kohein in that watch, as the Torah writes in Parshas Shoftim “portion by portion they shall eat…” (Devarim 18:9). Therefore the principle and the additional fifth should also only be given to a kohein from that watch.

Mentioned in Vayikra (5:25). (Paneach Raza) The term “besides” implies that the Torah obliges one to bring it, therefore Rashi had to say that this is the one mentioned in Vayikra. Furthermore he had to mention this here, because one might think that when one returns stolen property to its owners, one requires an offering to atone for the heavenly judgment; however when one gives it to a kohein this itself is an atonement. Thus Rashi lets us know that this is not so.

But one does not know. (Ba’al Hamesader) A question is asked upon Rashi’s explanation: “Do we not know what must be done with them?” Surely there is an explicit verse in Parshas Korach “the bikurim of all that is in their land, which they bring before Hashem, shall be yours” (Bamidbar 18:13)! The answer is that in Parshas Mishpotim (Shemos 23:19) the mitzvah of bringing bikurim is listed as one of the six hundred and thirteen mitzvos, but Parshas Ki Savo (Devarim 26:1-11) only lists the mitzvah of recitation over the bikurim that is stated in that Parshah. In Parshas Korach Rashi explains on the verse “I have given [you the guarding of my trumah-gifts]” (18:8) that there is “a comparison to a King…” consequently “I have given” means “that I have already given”; thus “shall be yours” (18:13) also means [that the bikurim] have already been given. However, we do not find in the entire Torah that the kohanim were given the bikurim like they were given the other twenty-three gifts. Therefore Rashi here needed to explain as he did and switch the word terumah for the word bikurim, using the force of Rabbi Yishmael’s question.

Informing us that the executory benefits belong to the owner. Meaning that he can give them to any kohein to whom he wishes; this is termed טובת הנאה (executory benefits). Accordingly one may take a selah or more from an Israelite in order to give the produce to his daughter’s son who is a kohein, however one may not take money from a kohein in order to give the kohein these gifts. The Torah wrote “shall be his” meaning that the executory benefits belong to the owners.

What is written [immediately] above this subject? Normally Rashi only makes inferences from juxtapositions when matters are not written in their normal place, because then they were certainly written so for one to make an inference. Nonetheless, since there is no comparison between the laws of marriage and those of terumah and sanctified property, it is certain that they were only juxtaposed in order for one to make an inference. (Gur Aryeh) explains that [Rashi’s inference] is not from the juxtaposition of the passages, because if this were so he should have said “why was the Parshah of the sotah juxtaposed to that of sacred property,” as is his normal style. Rather, Rashi was answering the question: The Parshah should not have begun with the man, rather with the woman — saying “a woman who goes astray and acts treacherously…” given that she was the source of the sin. Therefore he explains “what is written above…” meaning that he was the source of the sin and “any man” refers to the passage above. See there. (Nachalas Yaakov) The matter is puzzling — ‘Tuviah sinned and Zeigud was punished?’ So too here — the husband sinned because he withheld the gifts to the kohanim and the woman was disgraced such that she had to come before the kohein! All the more so if she literally became defiled, it is difficult to understand how the sin of the husband could cause the sin of the wife. Rather, this is the correct explanation: The woman certainly has sins of her own and her sins caused the sin of promiscuity. Nonetheless if it were not for the combination of the sin of the husband with her sin of promiscuity, her sin would certainly have caused it to become publicized without the warning and seclusion. Thus the Beis Din would have killed her without causing disgrace to the husband, obliging him to bring her before the kohein and cause her to drink in order for her to die through the lethal waters. Instead, the combination with the sin of the husband caused there to be witnesses to the seclusion rather than witnesses to the defilement, and he had to bring her to the kohein in order to cause her to drink. Likewise, if she were to come away exonerated from the charge of promiscuity, had it not been for the combination with the husband’s sin, the sin of the wife would have lead to a simple rumor, without witnesses to her seclusion. Alternatively, there would have been only one witness to her defilement or she would have said that she would not drink — and in all of these cases one would not cause her to drink. Rather, here the combination with the sin of the husband caused him to have to bring her to the kohein in order to cause her to drink. (Gur Aryeh) [One may ask:] It appears that this is not specific to the case of a sotah, because had he been a zav or metzora he would also have needed a kohein, given that they too require a kohein. For if one did not say so, why should sotah be different? One may answer that the cases of a zav or metzora are different. If he wanted to be a sinner and not bring an atonement, who would know? Thus he would not necessarily need a kohein. However with a sotah, even a sinner would not wish his wife to be promiscuous, since it is the nature of people for this to be detestable, as the Torah writes “and he was jealous.” And since he was jealous, he would certainly bring her before the kohein. When one appreciates this matter further, one will see that it is measure for measure. Since he did not wish to give the gifts to the kohein, asking why he should give his money to the kohein, the Torah said “By your life you will need him.” You shall know the greatness of the kohein — that he is the intermediary between Hashem and Yisroel, making peace between them through the offerings. Yisroel are called Hashem’s wife as it writes, “If you do not know, most beautiful of women” (Shir Hashirim 1:8) and in many other places where they are termed a wife. Therefore this man will now require a kohein to whom he will bring the sotah, in order that he can also make peace between him and his wife. She strayed from him and the kohein would make peace between them. Surely this is exactly the same as when a kohein makes peace between Yisroel and their Father in Heaven, causing the Divine Presence to rest in the world. Similarly Rashi explains in Parshas Masei (Bamidbar 35:25) that Hashem is called a husband to Yisroel (see Gur Aryeh there). This man was one of them but he did not wish to recognize the greatness of the kohein, therefore he had to bring the sotah to the kohein in order to make peace between himself and his wife.

Spirit of foolishness. Meaning that their evil inclination would tell them that it was permitted - and this is the foolishness. If one did not say so then why would she be liable for death, given that it was due to foolishness?

Turns aside from the ways of modesty. Rashi specifically said “from the ways of modesty” and not “from the ways of the Torah,” because if it was from the ways of the Torah this would imply that she certainly was promiscuous, and if it was certain that she was promiscuous then we do not give her [the waters] to drink. Therefore he stated “from the ways of modesty,” meaning that she was seen embracing or kissing another man and there was a suspicion that she had been promiscuous.

What is the treachery. Rashi is answering the question: The words “acts treacherously toward him. And a man has lain [with her]” imply that there are two matters. Thus Rashi explains “What is the treachery? [A man] lay…,” as if it had written that a man lay with her. However this does not mean that a man really lay with her, because if this were so we not give her the waters to drink. Consequently the sequence of events in the passage is as follows: When she goes astray and turns away from the ways of modesty, and a spirit of jealousy comes upon him and he is jealous of his wife; If afterwards she is concealed long enough to have been defiled, then whether she acted treacherously towards him, for a man to lay with her conjugally and it was hidden from him, or whether a man did not lay with her and she was not defiled, rather he was only jealous of her even though she did not act, then the man shall bring his wife … (Re’m).

Lying with her. Rashi’s text read “And a man has lain with her conjugally. Lying with her disqualifies her but lying with her sister does not disqualify her from her husband (Yevamos 95).” Meaning that if her husband lay with her sister, she is not disqualified to her husband due to her sister’s promiscuity. For one might have said that she was disqualified due to a kal vachomer (a fortiori reasoning): Just as when one has relations with a ‘lesser’ prohibition, the one who causes the prohibition becomes forbidden — in a case where one has relations with a ‘stricter’ prohibition, the one who causes the prohibition should certainly be forbidden. Rashi explains that the ‘lesser’ prohibition is that of a married woman who can become permitted to others through divorce. [The kal vachomer is as follows]: If the wife was promiscuous, she becomes forbidden to her husband, which means she is forbidden to the entire world. Thus, in a case where he had relations with a ‘strict’ prohibition, such as the sister of his wife who is prohibited to him through by his marriage to his wife all the time that she is alive. Is it not logical that the one who ‘caused’ this prohibition should be prohibited — his wife should be prohibited to her husband, since she ‘caused’ the prohibition of her sister to her husband? Therefore the Torah said “with her” to teach that “lying with her disqualifies her…” (Yevamos 95a). However, a mistake occurred in the Rashi texts. I heard this from Rabbi Yitzchak Cohen z’l. I have found written that the comment, “incident of the two sisters…” should have been placed on the verse “if any man” (v. 12) where Rashi explained that she is doubly treacherous — against the “Man” in Heaven, and the man on earth. There the Midrash teaches: Against the “Man” on High and the man below — Hashem says to her “You are fooling your husband, perhaps you think that you can fool me” — there was an incident of two sisters …

This excludes a blind man. Meaning that there are two matters here and both are excluded by the verse. From the word מעיני (from [his] eyes) we exclude a blind man, who, even if it is known that she was promiscuous, does not cause her to drink given that he cannot see. While from the word נעלם (hidden) we infer that if he saw the two of them, but feigned ignorance that both of them were together, the waters do not examine her. The word מעמעם (feigned ignorance) is understood as in גחלים עממות (dimmed coals) which the Targum uses to translate the word “dim” (Vayikra 13:6).

Long enough. Meaning that the words “and she has been defiled” that are written after “and she was concealed” refer to a time long enough to have been defiled. This is the time that it takes to roast an egg and swallow it. Because if you were to think that it means that she was actually defiled, surely the Torah previously wrote “and a man has laid with her” which referred to defilement. Therefore I would not need the Torah to write the words “and she has been defiled”? Rather they must have come to teach that she was concealed long enough to have been defiled.

Even one witness. You might ask: From where does this inference come — is it because the Torah wrote “and there is no עד (witness) against her”. Surely we have established that wherever the Torah says עד (lit. witness in the singular) it refers to two. This is because it had to specify “one עד (witness) shall not arise” (Devarim 19:15) which implies that every עד written in the Torah refers to two, unless the Torah specifies that it is one, as Rashi explains in Parshas Shoftim (ad loc.). If so, here where it writes עד alone, this would imply that there are not two witnesses against her but there is one against her (and in such a circumstance one would cause her to drink the bitter waters). The answer is that the words “and there is no witness against her” refer to the words “and she was not seized forcibly” and not to “and he is jealous of his wife … that man shall bring his wife to the kohein” to cause her to drink (v. 14-15). Meaning that if there is no witness against her that she was not seized forcibly, i.e. there were not two witnesses to defilement, though there was one witness who saw that she was defiled — one would not cause her to drink, but she would be forbidden to her husband (Sotah 2a). Thus the word הא (but) in Rashi is like והא למדת (you have learned) and does not imply an inference, only a conclusion “you have learned this, but if there was [even one witness]…” Furthermore, Rashi was answering the question: Why is one witness believed to prohibit her to her husband? He answers that “there is no witness against her” to the defilement but there are witnesses to the concealment. Since there are two witnesses to the concealment who say that they saw that she was concealed with a certain person long enough for defilement, and there is one witness against her who say that she was defiled, this is enough circumstantial evidence to believe that she was certainly promiscuous. Thus the Torah writes “and there is no witness against her” here to teach you that it refers to the word נטמאה (and she had become defiled) above. Meaning that when there are [two] witnesses to concealment then one witness [to defilement] is believed. However, had it not been written here then I would not know that there were witnesses to the concealment.

Ravished. The verse is saying as follows: “And there is no witness against her” — meaning that there are not two [witnesses] against her but there is one, “and she was not seized forcibly” - rather he testifies that she did so willingly. In such a case she is forbidden to her husband. Thus it is a separate law on its own.

Before. This implies that the verses are not in order as explained above (on v. 12).

It is not known. Meaning that he neither know she was defiled nor know that she was not defiled as implied by the straightforward understanding of the words “and she was defiled … and she was not defiled”. Because the Torah writes “but it was hidden from her husband’s eyes” and the Rabbis learn that that if he saw that she was defiled then the waters do not examine her.

But not of fine flour. Re’m writes that Rashi is informing us of the reason why the Torah excludes fine flour and wheat. For one cannot explain he means to inform us that the words “flour” and “barley” in the verse are there to exclude fine flour and wheat, given that this is obvious. It is something that any schoolchild knows.

Identified as light. Meaning that oil is termed יצהר, as the verse writes “Your grain, your wine, יצהרך (your oil)” (Devarim 7:13). This is the same as the terms צוהר (skylight) and צהרים (noon) which refer to light.

But, they moved. מסיעין (they moved) in the sense of transferring.

He disentangles. This implies that פרע (disentangle) is a term of demolishing. You might ask: Rashi always explains the word פרע when used regarding the head as a term of growth. This was evident above in Parshas Emor (Vayikra 21:11) where he said that לא יפרע means “you shall not grow,” and below regarding the Nazir. The answer is that here it is also a term of growth, because when the hair is plaited it is shorter, and when one disentangles the plaits it ‘becomes’ longer. Thus it emerges that the disentangling causes the hair to ‘grow’. Re’m writes that though פרע is normally a term of exposing, as Rashi himself writes on the verse “for they were פרוע (exposed)” (Shemos 32:25) where he says that that this means exposed … as with “and expose the woman’s hair,” this is not a contradiction to his explanation that he disentangles the plaits of her hair. For Rashi’s explanation here is not inferred from the word פרע, rather from the superfluous word “the woman”. The Torah should have written “and expose her hair” since it refers to the woman mentioned previously. Thus “the woman” was added to allude to her whole body, teaching that one disentangles her hair revealing her heart and compounding her disgrace. It appears possible to me to say that by way of the disentangling one reveals how the hair appeared long before it was shortened.

Debasing. The reason that I found is a parable of a person who committed a sin. He went out to the market place and was embarrassed, so he covered his head and his face. Likewise one uncovers the hair of a woman who transgressed the command.

At the Nikanor Gate. He [Nikanor] was a virtuous person who brought copper doors for this gate from Alexandria in Egypt. In doing so Hashem performed many miracles, as is taught in Maseches Yoma 37b. Some say in the name of Maharam: Why Rashi did explain this out of order, after “and expose the woman’s head.” Furthermore, upon the words “before Hashem” (v.16) above he did not explain anything. The answer is that there it would be possible to explain “before Hashem” as referring to the sanctuary. However here, Rashi explains that he disentangles the plaits in her hair in order to humiliate her, in accordance with the teaching of the Rabbis that there were many actions through which she was humiliated. It would not be proper to do so in the sanctuary, therefore one is forced to say that it was at the gate of Nikanor.

To exhaust her. One cannot say that this was for waving, as previously in the verse “upon the palms of Aharon and upon the palms of his sons” (Shemos 29:24) in the context of the inauguration. There the Torah continues, “and shall wave,” while here it begins with causing her to drink the bitter waters and the oaths of accursedness. Only afterwards does it write “and shall wave” (v.25). Therefore one is forced to say that it was in order to exhaust her etc.

So that the Sacred Name not be erased. [R. Hendil] Rashi did not explain this above when he also wrote that they acted to exhaust her (s.v. “The Kohein shall station”). The reason is that there he was commanded to exhaust her so that she would not drink and die. The Torah took pity on her since there were neither witnesses nor warning of her defilement. However here it is not possible to say this because there is no reason to be concerned about her to this extent, since she turned aside from the ways of modesty and transgressed the warning to conceal herself. Rather, here Hashem was concerned for the honor of His name.

Because of their aftermath. Thus מי המרים means “the bitter waters” while המאררים למרים (v. 24) means “[they shall enter her] to become bitter and lethal” becoming bitter and destructive in her mouth. (Gur Aryeh) If this were not so why would they be bitter? Though the Gemara says that they would place a bitter grass in them, because the Torah writes המרים (the bitter [waters]), nonetheless the word המרים with a hei denoting the definite article (the bitter [waters]) implies that it was for this that they were known. We do not explicitly find anywhere [in the Torah] that they would place a bitter substance in them. Therefore Rashi says that they were termed bitter because of their aftermath.

If no [man] laid. Meaning that one should not say that he adjures her by the Holy Name, like all other oaths where we explain that one swears with the Holy Name. Re’m explains: This is so that one should not say that the statement is one matter and the oath is another. If no [man] laid, הנקי (be absolved); but if he laid, לא תנקי (do not absolved). There are texts that read “but if he laid, חנקי (may you choke).” This is why the Torah wrote the word חנקי without a yud (with a chirik taking its place) in order to teach homiletically term חנק (strangulation) as if it had been written with the letter hei as part of the root [of the verb]. This is possible because the letters hei and ches are interchangeable and thus one can homiletically learn “may you choke” meaning that you shall die.

In the sense of “if”. Rashi is answering the question: The word כי (which would have been translated here as ‘since’) implies that she had certainly been promiscuous, and if she had certainly been promiscuous then one would not cause her to drink.

The way. Meaning “if what I said is not true may [disaster] happen to me…” For if this was not so, the Torah should have said “Hashem shall place אלה (a curse) in you”. Thus the lamed of the word לאלה is in place of the word “for” (the verse reading “Hashem shall make you for a curse), meaning that she shall be a tool for everyone who curses or makes an oath.

For the curse. Tosafos in the first chapter of Kiddushin (27b) explain that one could have easily derived “for the curse … for the oath … from this husband … from a different husband” from one Amein, since it refers to all that was said in this passage. The curse and the oath are written explicitly here, while the Torah also writes “while you were married to your husband” (v. 20) which implies both this husband and another husband. Thus the other Amein refers to women who were engaged or waiting for levirate marriage who are not mentioned in this passage, and Rashi has condensed his words. This raises a difficulty: If Rashi’s opinion was so, he should have said “Amein if from this husband, if from different husband; Amein for the curse and for the oath. However, Rashi elaborated where he should have been brief and said the word Amein twice — Amien for the curse and Amein for the oath — and similarly Amein if from this husband, Amein if from a different husband. Thus it is certain that Rashi here means to explain that these two Ameins are needed for what was mentioned, one for the curse and one for the oath, and similarly one Amein if from this husband and one if from a different husband. And there is no difficulty that there are only two Ameins here, for one may answer that one can derive two things from the one Amein. Rashi here did not want to explain [that it referred to] the cases of the betrothed woman etc., because they are not implied by the verse, only through oral tradition like most of the Oral Law. Rashi only explains the language of the Torah — and it should have written Amein and Amein with a vav if it was adding another case. (R. Y. Triosh)

He brought her offering. As the Torah writes (v. 26) “…and burn it on the altar” and after that he shall cause the woman to drink the water”.

Since it says “abdomen” and “thigh”. Rashi is answering the question: Wasn’t this was also written previously (v. 22) “these lethal bitter waters will enter … to swell the abdomen…”? He answers “since it [merely] says…”

They will be [harmful and bitter] for her. Not that the waters would enter there towards some bitter substance, for they were already in her stomach and there was no other bitter substance there.

Up and down. I have explained this in Parshas Emor (Vayikra 23:11).

Above the hand. We learn [a comparison] to the word “hand” from the Peace-offering where it writes “his hands shall bring it” (Vayikra 7:30). Just as there the owners wave the offering with the kohein, so too here she waves with the kohein. However, the verse also writes “the kohein shall take” thus how can both be true? Rather, the kohein waves and she also waves with him with her hands above the hands of the kohein. Furthermore, he learned this from the word “from the hand” meaning that the hand of the woman was above the hand of the kohein. For if this was not so the Torah should have written “the kohein shall take from the woman” — why was it necessary to say “from her hand”?

Before taking the handful. Rashi is answering the question: The word והקריב (and bring it close - a term that normally denotes the bringing of an offering) implies that he offered the minchah. However afterwards (v. 26) it writes “the kohein will scoop out from the meal-offering,” implying that he had not yet scooped anything out. So how could the Torah write that he should offer the handful which had not yet been scooped out? Rashi answers that the word והקריב connotes placing, meaning that he placed the minchah on the southwest corner.

I will not drink. Meaning that if she said “I will be divorced from him without collecting a kesubah, but I will not drink” then we do not listen to her, since the Holy Name has been erased. [We only do not give her to drink if] she says “I am defiled.” However before the Holy Name is erased, if she says “I will not drink, and I will be divorced without collecting a kesubah” then we listen to her and do not make her drink, even though she does not admit to being defiled.

We coerce. Rashi explains in Perek Hayah Notel (Sotah 19b) that they would open her mouth against her will and pour the water down her gullet. The Aruch explains that this is an elongation of the root ער having the connotation of intoxication.

Tested her. Even though in the curse itself the Torah writes “to swell the abdomen and collapse the thigh” (v. 22) with the stomach first and then the thigh, this does not refer to the abdomen and the thigh of the sotah, rather to the abdomen and the thigh of the adulterer.

Use her as a curse. Even though Rashi explained previously that “everyone will swear through you” and “will curse through you” (v. 21), here it is not possible to explain so, because if this were so why would it have been necessary [for the Torah to repeat it]?

Among those who know her. Because it is a greater embarrassment for her.

During this concealment. It was unnecessary to say this, because the entire passage refers to a woman who was warned and concealed herself. Nonetheless Rashi was obliged to explain the words “and is pure” as meaning “from any other place” other than the man about whom she was warned and was concealed with. Thus he first explained that “if the woman was not defiled” refers to concealment with the man about whom she was warned.

Furthermore. You should not say that “she will bear seed” is the continuation of “she will be cleansed,” which would mean that she will be cleansed and therefore she will bear seed or that she will be cleansed from the things that prevent her from childbearing and consequently she will bear seed. Rather Rashi explains that she will be cleansed from the lethal waters, referring to her being saved from the swelling of the abdomen and the collapse of the thigh. He then explains that “she shall bear seed” means that furthermore she shall bear [seed].

The sotah is forbidden. Since the Torah had to write “the man is cleansed of sin,” meaning that she is permitted to him after drinking, this implies that before she drinks she is forbidden to her husband.