'There is no prohibition from the Torah [in regard to meat and milk] unless it is in a manner of cooking, etc." but not by pickling (כבוש כמבושל does not apply) or salting (מליח כרותח does not apply), since they are not generally how one cooks.

"All meat and milk [mixtures] ... are permitted to benefit from." See the Tur and Issur v'Heter. It is also the opinion of the Mechaber (Rav Yosef Caro) in seif 3 that eating chicken in milk is a rabbinic prohibition and is permitted for receiving benefit even rabbinically. This is also the opinion of HaRav Aharon HaLevi in the Sefer HaChinuch Mitzvah 113. It is also the opinion of the Rambam in chapter 9 of Hilchot of Forbidden Foods explained there, he also explains in his commentary of the Mishnah in Chapter All the Meat (Hullin). It is also explained by HaRav HaMaggid (Vidal of Tolosa in the Maggid Mishneh commentary on Mishneh Torah). It is also understood by Maharshal in Chapter These Forbidden Things (אלו טריפות) siman 100. And the remaining Acharonim hold like the Rambam, and not like the Bach who held that the Rambam actually thought that chicken in milk is prohibited for receiving benefit rabbinically just like eating. And HaMordechai held this in chapter אין מעמידין and noted in the final chapter of Avoda Zara that through pickling or salting it is permitted to receive benefit. and this is how the Mechaber below holds.

"But meat of a pure animal in milk that is impure etc." The Tur says, 'but pure meat (of a kosher animal) in impure milk (milk from a non-kosher animal) or impure meat in pure milk, and meat of a chicken and non-domesticated kosher animal in pure milk is only a rabbinic prohibition for eating and are permitted to cook and receive benefit.' And the Beit Yosef writes, '[the Tur] did not intend to write this language since we don't see this language, that it is only rabbinic, for the first two cases, but only for the non-domesticated animal and chicken in pure milk. This is because in the case of pure meat in impure milk or the opposite, the Rabbis did not prohibit to eat because of mixing meat and milk. They did not establish any Rabbinic prohibitions [in this case], since it is already a Torah prohibition to consume impure meat or impure milk.' This is the corrected way to understand the text [of the Tur] and it is the proper understanding. However, the Bach understands the Tur as is written, that the first two cases are rabbinic prohibitions of mixing meat and milk. The practical reason being 'the piece becomes carrion'/ChaNaN (חנ"נ\ חתיכה נעשית נבילה explained in siman 92) which only applies in the case of mixing meat and milk and also to the case of 'the piece that is proper for serving' look there. This is the opinion of the Perisha. According to this, which is how we hold, ChaNaN applies to all forbidden foods, as the [Rema] writes in siman 92 seif 4 see there and search. This is also clear from Rashi and the Ran (Chapter All the Meat - Chullin 113a in the mishna) that [ChaNaN] is not a prohibition based on mixing meat and milk at all even rabbinically, and there is no reason at all that the Rabbis would prohibit on the basis of mixing meat and milk. It makes sense that the Rabbis prohibited mixing chicken with milk, lest one think they can also eat other meat milk, as the Rambam states there. However, the notion to prohibit pure meat with impure milk or vice versa has no reason to worry about transgressing another prohibited act. This seems to be the intention of the Beit Yosef in not prohibiting [pure meat and impure milk or vice versa] on the basis of mixing meat and milk, unlike the Bach, since it is already forbidden by the Torah and there is no reason to make a decree [fence to protect against another act]. The Beit Yosef is saying that there is no practical case to prohibit on the basis of mixing meat and milk. And this is also the ruling for the case of 'the piece that is proper for serving' which explained later in seif 110. Also the Drisha writes at the end there that there is no place that pure meat and impure milk or vice versa has a rabbinic prohibition and is considered carrion on a rabbinic basis.

"Meat of a wild animal and of fowl...and even eating etc." It is the thought of the Mechaber (Rav Yosef Caro) that meat from a wild animal and chicken is not forbidden to eat [with milk], even cooked, [from the Torah,] but only Rabbinically. And is permitted for benefit or to cook. The Maharshal and Bach relied on the Maharai (HaRav Isserlin of Temurat Deshen) on his Commentary on Shaarei Dura (Siman 76) who states that it is difficult to be lenient because of the Tosafot (Chullin 104a). Therefore, they held that meat from a wild animal and chick with milk is a Torah prohibition. In my book, I brought sources proving it is Rabbinic from the Talmud, and I brought there many opinions supporting this. Even the Maharai actually held that is only difficult to be lenient based on Tosafot regarding eat cheese immediately after chicken, but he generally agreed that mixing chicken and milk is Rabbinic. As he wrote in his Commentary of Shaarei Dura (Siman 69) that fully developed eggs are permitted to eat with milk since mixing chicken and milk is only Rabbinic [thus allowing us to be] lenient.....

"But fish etc..." The Ateret Zekenim (Menahem Mendel Auerbach 1620-89) writes, "in all situations [we] do not eat fish with milk because of the danger [of tzara'at], as it is explained in Orech Chaim siman 173." Really it follows the Beit Yosef that says this, however it is a scribal error since it is actually written about fish and meat being prohibited because of the danger [of tzara'at] with no mention of milk. Everyday it is common practice to cook fish with milk and eat it. Also the Darchei Moshe rejects the Beit Yosef [the danger is only in cooking together, but eating one after another is fine see Darchei Moshe on the Tur Yoreh De'ah 116] as does Be'er Sheva daf 100 and other Achronim reject him in this, as does the Talmud in Chapter How do we roast (Pesachim 76b). We conclude that is apparent that [eating fish and milk is allowed and] it is not even a worry of danger [of tzara'at].

1. In other words, according to all opinions, regarding the blood of fish, it is permitted completely. Even so, if one covers it in a vessel, it is forbidden because of ma'arat ayin [note: meaning possibly giving someone the impression that something is permitted when forbidden, etc] unless there are fish scales in it which indicate that [this] blood is fish blood. The blood of flesh is forbidden from the Torah; therefore a person who sees [this blood] will say one is eating the blood of an animal which is forbidden from the Torah. But fowl with milk is specifically rabbinical and we have no concern for marit ayin. And therefore, the meat of an animal in milk, which is Biblically forbidden, one should place almonds by it so the observer will not think it's actual milk. And so it's written with a Torah scholar there at the end of the klal chapter 2, and according to this one needs to say that it appears in a cooked dish, for if this wasn't the case even the meat of an animal wouldn't be a Biblical prohibition (to be combined with milk) and one wouldn't need to put almonds. And so it's proved with a Torah scholar there explicitly, see there in Simanei Talmid Chacham. But the Maharshal פכ"ה סי' נ"ב learns from this that the blood of fishes on Purim etc., which they are accustomed to eat chicken in almond milk, that it's forbidden unless one places almonds with it on the contents or on the side, as a sign -- and specifically with poultry, one should be more concerned not to represent pountry in milk as permitted even rabbinically, like Rabbi Yosei haGalili! Until here were the Maharshal's words. And so the acharonim agreed, and so it appears according to my humble intellect (it also came to the hands of S. Be'er Sheva' and I found that he also ruled thus), that is to say, even in rabbinic prohibitions we are concerned about marit ayin, and in many places including in the Talmud: Shabbat 54b, that a donkey can't go out with a bell even if plugged since it looks like he's going to market, and Rashi explains, to market to sell, which is to say, marit ayin. And it says in Shabbat 64b and is agreed on by all poskim, as is explained in Orach Chayim ש"ה that even though the prohibition of buying and selling on Shabbat is only rabbinic, like it says in Orach Chayim and Choshen Mishpat ס"ס רל"ה, and so it's proved ממעכן etc, that even in rabbinic matters we're concerned for marit ayin, and so it is said in many places.

According to the opinion of the Rav where he says that "all the more so [is it forbidden ab initio to cook meat in impure milk]," we need to resolve that which is written in the Tur Seif 3 that [meat and impure milk] are permitted to cook together and to derive benefit from. This is based on a literal Mishnah in chapter Kol Habasar [chapter 8 of Hullin]. And this is agreed upon by all the Poskim, meaning that it is permitted in practice according to Halacha. However, due to the concern for mar'it ha'ayin (appearance of impropriety), it is not advisable to do so. A practical implication would be situations where there is no concern for the appearance of impropriety, such as in the case of medical treatment and the like. Like that which the Maharshal wrote in 25:102, that [cooking] breastmilk [with meat] for health reasons is permitted, "even if there is no danger at all, since there is no prohibition involved except for mar'it ha'ayin." There are also other situations where there is no concern of mar'it ha'ayin. And this resolves what was left unanswered in the Torat Hatat regarding the Rashba. Indeed the words of the poskim who wrote generally that [milk from a non-kosher animal] is permissible to cook imply that even regarding mar'it ha'ayin, there is no concern. And such is found in the writing of the Maharshal, Perek 25. And this is the implied opinion of the Mechaber, who did not write that the milk of an impure animal is forbidden because of mar'it ha'ayin. Therefore, it seems clear to me that there, it is different since in any case, one of them (i.e., either the milk or the meat) is prohibited to eat, since there is definitely no issue with cooking per se, because you could have been cooking for medicinal or other purposes. When we say it is forbidden to cook them, we mean to eat them. What the mehaber says in seif 5 "it is forbidden to cook them," that must also mean to eat them. We see often in Scripture and Mishnah that eating is referred to as cooking. It's only in these cases [of eating] that there is mar'it ha'ayin.

1. We find this opinion in Seif 3. However, according to what is written in Siman 100:6, even with chicken there is reason to worry. And this is the holding of the Rashbah and the Mechaber. And there is no difference between an animal or fowl (i.e. between meat and chicken).

1. Even though it is embedded in sinews, etc., and that which appears earlier in section 86 paragraph 4, regarding one who struck a hen on its tail and it laid eggs, that they are forbidden due to the prohibition of a limb from a living creature if they are embedded in sinews—even if the yolk and white are fully formed—this implies that since they are embedded, they are considered like the flesh of the hen. However, this case is different, because regarding the prohibition of meat with milk from fowl, which is rabbinic, they were lenient; alternatively, this case is different because each component is permitted on its own. So wrote the later authorities, and this distinction is mentioned in Tosafot and the halakhic decisors, including the Rashba, who distinguish between the case of an egg from a carcass earlier in section 86 paragraph 3, which is forbidden, and this case here. And it seems to me that even without this, there is no difficulty from the case of the hen struck on its tail, for even though it is not considered flesh, nevertheless, even actual milk would be forbidden due to the prohibition of a limb from a living creature, were it not for the verse that revealed to us “a land flowing with milk and honey,” as mentioned above in section 81 subparagraph 11. If so, the verse that permits milk does so because it is not connected to anything and does not separate from flesh, but eggs that are embedded and attached are certainly in their state of prohibition. And even more than this, there are those who forbid even milk fluids due to the prohibition of a limb from a living creature, as mentioned above in section 81. And although we do not rule according to them, the reasons explained there are still significant. In any case, certainly embedded eggs are forbidden to all opinions due to the prohibition of a limb from a living creature. Furthermore, Rabbeinu Tam wrote that even fully formed eggs would be forbidden due to this prohibition were it not for the verse that permits them, as written in the Sha’arim section 64 and other decisors in his name. Therefore, certainly when they are embedded, and no verse permits them, they are forbidden due to the prohibition of a limb from a living creature, and this is clear.

**But if it contains only the yolk, etc.,**it implies that even if it is not embedded, anything that has not developed beyond the yolk is considered like the flesh of the bird, as the Rashba wrote. In my writings I elaborated on this and concluded that ideally one should not eat with milk even those eggs that have developed both yolk and white but still have a soft shell, even if they are not embedded—according to the views of the Rashbam, Mordechai, Agudah (first chapter of Beitzah), Sha’arim section 76, Or Zarua, and Mahari in his glosses to Sefer HaDinim. However, after the fact, if they were cooked with milk, it seems they are permitted. But if they are embedded, even after the fact they are forbidden, since the Bahag (page 35b) ruled like Rabbi Yaakov, and this is the version found in all manuscripts of the Rif in the first chapter of Beitzah. It is also written in Shiltei Giborim (chapter 25, page 315a) in the name of the Rif, and the opinion of the Ran also supports this unless one emends his words in chapter 25. This is also the view of Rabbi Yonatan as cited in Orach Chaim and Kol Bo section 105, and it is evident that the Rashbam and his supporters hold that the halacha follows Rabbi Yaakov, for otherwise the sugya in the first chapter of Beitzah cannot be reconciled according to their view. So too wrote the Agudah explicitly in section 62, and the Jerusalem Talmud also rules clearly like Rabbi Yaakov. This is also implied somewhat in our Babylonian Talmud, which, after two versions, concludes by establishing the baraita according to him and not like the Geonim who left the Rif’s ruling as a difficulty. Also, the Beit Yosef and other later authorities wrote simply that all the poskim ruled like the first tanna, but this is incorrect, as I have already proven. The main definition of “developed” refers to eggs that have developed both yolk and white. If those with soft shells are embedded, they are forbidden even after the fact; if not embedded, they are permitted. But those small eggs that have developed only the yolk, even if not embedded, are forbidden even after the fact, for they are like the flesh of the bird. So ruled the Tashbetz in section 70, although he did not distinguish between embedded or not, and it seems from his words that those which have developed both yolk and white are permitted after the fact even if embedded. The main ruling is as I have written. It is also somewhat puzzling why no emendation was made here. Nevertheless, it seems that even if only the yolk has developed and they are embedded, one may be lenient in cases of significant loss, and in such cases it is fitting to rely on Rashi, Tosafot, the Rosh, the Tur, and Rabbi Yerucham. It also seems that according to their view, “embedded” refers to those small eggs that have developed only the yolk and are attached to the spinal flesh, and not as the Beit Yosef wrote that according to the Tur quoting Rashi, it refers to when they have separated from the spinal flesh and contain red streaks. The Ateret Zekenim followed this interpretation, but Rashi himself did not explain it that way. Also, in both the first and second versions in the Talmud, it is clearly proven not like the Beit Yosef but as I have explained. Furthermore, the words of the Maharshal in chapter 25 section 12 are puzzling on this matter and contradict each other compared to what he wrote in chapter 1 of Beitzah section 19—see there. All this is from a legal standpoint. However, Mahari wrote—and it seems that women do not follow the leniency even when the eggs are fully developed and the outer shell is completely hard—see there. The Maharshal and the author of Tashbetz followed this custom. Nevertheless, it seems from the words of Mahari and the others that this is merely a stringency, and therefore in places where there is no established custom, one need not be concerned about it at all. The Bach tried to find a reason to say that the custom is law, but his words are not compelling—see there.

“It is forbidden to cook them in milk.” This is the language also used by the Ateret Zekenim, (the Taz) but it is imprecise, for cooking is obviously permitted—even actual poultry, as explained earlier in section 86 paragraph 3, is permitted to be cooked with milk, even according to rabbinic law. Rather, the phrase “to cook them” here means “to eat them [after being cooked in milk].” And the law regarding salting eggs found inside a bird is explained earlier in section 75—see there.

But if one ate them on their own—even if they are still embedded in the cluster—so it is written in Orach Chaim there, and it implies that even if only the yolk is developed and they are still embedded in the cluster, it is permitted to eat cheese or milk afterward. See there. And the meaning of “embedded in the cluster,” as Rashi explains, is that they are connected to the flesh of the spinal column.

There is no flogging for it but there is nevertheless a prohibition. Similarly, with the milk of a dead animal, there is still a prohibition, as will be explained below in section 90 regarding the rennet, and as the Rav wrote in the nearby gloss. And all of these imply that there is indeed a prohibition, even regarding male milk. As for what the Rav (the Rema) wrote in the gloss—that male milk is not called “milk” at all—this will be clarified in subparagraph 16.

Milk of a dead animal—that is, milk that was extracted from it after its death, whether it died on its own or was slaughtered—this makes no difference, as will be explained below in section 90 regarding rennet. And this is clear.

**“And one does not receive lashes for eating it due to the prohibition of meat with milk.”**This is the language used by the Rambam, and it implies that his opinion is that the reason one does not receive lashes is specifically because it is meat with milk. However, for blood, one would receive lashes for eating it—even if it was cooked—since he holds that cooked blood is still a transgression. Nevertheless, we hold that blood which has been cooked or salted is only prohibited rabbinically, as explained earlier in section 69 subparagraph 39 and in several other places.

“And male milk is not called milk, etc.”— this implies that since it is not classified as “milk,” and there is not even a rabbinic prohibition, it does not render the food forbidden. However, in the Or Zarua HaGadol (Orah Hayim) it is written that it is no worse than a woman’s milk. From the words of the Maggid Mishneh (chapter 9 of Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot), it appears that male milk is rabbinically prohibited, and he writes that this also seems to be the view of the Rambam, whose language the Shulchan Aruch adopts. This is also somewhat implied in the Talmud (Beitzah 25b), where Shmuel says: “There, [the verse refers to] the milk of its mother, not the milk of a male; the milk of its mother, not the milk of a slaughtered animal.” If so, since both are excluded from a single verse, and we hold that the milk of a slaughtered animal is at least rabbinically forbidden (as will be explained below in section 90), so too male milk. It seems that the Maggid Mishneh is referring to male milk from an animal, as Rashi explains in the Talmud there: “Not the milk of a male, who had a small amount of milk from the teats, such as if they changed and developed teats.” This is also how the Maharshal explains it in section 100. And this is clearly implied in the Talmud, which later asks: “What is the law regarding one who cooks in the milk of a kid that never nursed?” He replied: “Since Shmuel needed to say ‘the milk of its mother, not the milk of a male,’ it is because a male cannot become a mother. But this one, since it could become a mother, it is forbidden.” This proves that the discussion is about male milk from an animal. But male human milk is certainly no worse than a woman’s milk. According to this, the Shulchan Aruch, which quotes the Rambam’s language—implying that male milk is exempt from lashes but still forbidden—and the gloss of the Rema do not disagree.

“Whey, etc.”— and it is written in the Or Zarua HaGadol (Orah Hayim) there that even the whey that remains after cheese is made, as the Mechaber writes in the following paragraph, renders the food forbidden.

“There are those who say it is forbidden to stoke the fire, etc.” And in the Mordechai there it is written that it is forbidden to cook prohibited meat in a Jew’s home using a pot belonging to a non-Jew, lest the Jew come to stoke the fire, etc. Therefore, maidservants who are non-Jews should have two separate pots—one for meat and one for milk. So too ruled the Tashbetz at the end of section 76. However, “meat” is not specific; the same applies to other foods, since the reasoning applies equally. Nevertheless, this is only a stringency, and the general public is not careful about this.

“Forbidden for benefit”—this refers to a case where they were rinsed in boiling water and mixed while still hot. Otherwise, they are not forbidden for benefit, since the prohibition is not biblical and only applies through cooking, as explained above in section 1 and section 3.

And it is common for meat and milk to become mixed there. Yet it is not prohibited for this reason to wash the head with it, since the benefit is only for washing the head, and because it is not a matter of eating, it is not considered benefit—since one does not derive enjoyment from the substance of the prohibition itself. As will be explained below in section 94, see there; and also in section 108 paragraph 4 in the gloss, and at the end of section 155 in the gloss.