Rebbi Meir states, he gives him the value of his wool It's a puzzle, for Rebbi Meir appears inconsistent. Here, he says the worker pays for the wool, implying alteration constitutes acquisition. Yet in Bava Kama (95a), regarding theft, the Mishnah quotes Rebbi Meir stating: if one steals a pregnant cow that calves, or a sheep with fleece and shears it, he must compensate for the cow and calf, or sheep and fleece. This suggests alteration does not constitute acquisition! This can be resolved by noting that the Bava Kama case involves a penalty imposed by Rebbi Meir, as explained there, because of the transgression of theft. Similarly, in Gittin 53b, Rebbi Meir penalises one who unintentionally renders something ritually impure, mixes it with priestly offering, or libates wine to an idol, likening unintentional action to deliberate damage. However, here, a penalty is inappropriate as the worker acted for the owner’s benefit, believing he was instructed thus. Yet, Rebbi Yehudah also seems inconsistent. There, he says a stolen item must be returned intact, implying alteration does constitute acquisition. Here, the Mishnah states "his hand is underneath," implying alteration does not constitute acquisition. Rabeinu Tam suggests that in theft, the thief intends to acquire the item. Here, the worker unintentionally caused damage, with no such intention.

It is obvious that it is a dispute and subsequently a general [ruling] It is curious why we need to resolve this by appealing to a general ruling. Even without that, we determine in Eruvin 46b that in disagreements between Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah, the legal precedent follows Rebbi Yehudah. If the concern is that some Amoraim dispute this principle, there are also Amoraim who dispute the principle of following a general Mishnah! Indeed, even regarding a dispute followed by a general ruling, some disagree later (Avodah Zarah 21a) concerning renting houses to idolaters. Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yosi disagree, yet Rav Yehudah rules in Shmuel’s name that the precedent follows Rebbi Yosi, despite the subsequent general ruling aligning with Rebbi Meir. Therefore, it seems the Gemara is not seeking to resolve this through the general ruling to establish legal precedent. Rather, the query is that this is a dispute followed by a general ruling, and even for those who reject the notion of legal precedent following the general ruling, it still holds weight as representing a majority view against a minority. It should therefore be assumed the rule is like the general Mishnah.

This is what we learn: because it is taught as a definitive legal statement This implies the entire Mishnah is presented as established legal doctrine, not as a matter of debate. We do not have the reading "Gabey," as Rashi suggested. This is incorrect, as there are opinions there that the legal precedent does not follow the Mishnah regarding retraction etc.

What appears that you will stand with me until evening Rabbeinu Yitzhak explains the question to mean: "Do you think you’ll manage to stay with me until evening?".

One who asks a sage and is declared impure should not ask another sage to be declared pure But surely, one could consult all scholars and have them debate, perhaps leading to a change of mind? It is only forbidden for the one asking if they fail to mention to the second Rabbi that they already consulted a first who forbade it. If they disclose this prior consultation, it is permitted. However, the second Rabbi should certainly be cautious about reversing a previous strict ruling. As stated in Niddah 20b, a Rabbi who has forbidden something cannot be overruled by a colleague unless the first Rabbi clearly erred, whether in the text or in their logical reasoning. In such cases, Sanhedrin 6a states that past actions remain valid, but the Rabbi who made the erroneous ruling must compensate from their own funds if they enforced their ruling materially. Specifically, a Rabbi's prohibition cannot be overturned, but a colleague can impose a stricter ruling than a lenient one. However, the Yerushalmi in Shabbat 17:2 recounts that when Rabbi Simon ruled leniently and Rabbi Ami ruled stringently regarding circumcision, Rabbi Simon was upset. The Yerushalmi questions this, citing the baraita that if a Rabbi rules leniently, one should not seek another ruling lest it be stricter. This seems to imply a lenient ruling cannot be overturned! The Yerushalmi clarifies that Rabbi Simon's anger was precisely because there is no basis for such a baraita concerning lenient rulings. The Sages only forbade seeking a second opinion after a strict ruling. Rav Yudan clarifies the incident was the other way around: Rabbi Ami ruled stringently, then Rabbi Simon ruled leniently, and Rabbi Ami was upset, aligning with the baraita about not seeking a lenient ruling after a strict one. Regarding the Gemara in Chulin 49a, where Huna declared an animal treifah and Rav Ada declared it kosher, they were both present in the Beit Midrash when the question arose.

In matters of Torah law, follow the stricter opinion Rashi generally ruled that whenever "there are those who say" appears in the Gemara (presenting an alternate reading), if it concerns Torah law, one follows the stricter reading. If it’s a matter of Rabbinic law, one follows the later reading. Riva explained that these alternate readings are secondary to the primary text, and the halakha follows the first version. Rabeinu Tam argues that in Torah law, one rules stringently, whereas in Rabbinic law, leniently, as with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korchah here. Rabbeinu Shimshon explained that wherever the Talmud's preferred approach can be discerned, one follows that approach.

And all of them who reverted Rashi explains this refers to thieves and Amei ha'Aretz. But surely an Am ha'Aretz is capable of repentance? Also, "forever" implies prior acceptance. Furthermore, Bechorot 30b cites a baraita stating that an Am ha'Aretz accepting Chaver status, if suspected of impropriety in one area, is suspected in all. This implies that if not suspected, they are accepted! Therefore, it seems to refer to Amei ha'Aretz suspected of neglecting tithes and Shemitah, who previously accepted Chaver status but then relapsed. The debate is whether to re-accept them as Chaverim. The Tosefta in Demai 2:8 connects this with an Am ha'Aretz accepting Chaver status. The Tosefta means those who accepted Chaver status and relapsed are never re-accepted, according to Rabbi Meir. The Sages say: if they relapsed "b'Matmoniyot" (privately), meaning they relapsed secretly but maintained Chaver practices publicly, they are rejected as they deceive people. However, if they relapsed publicly, without deception, they are re-accepted, as their repentance is likely genuine. Some interpret "made their words like Matmoniyot" differently: if they acted as Chaverim even in private, they are re-accepted. Given their strong commitment to repentance, even privately, they should not be rejected after a relapse. However, if they only acted as Chaverim publicly, they are not re-accepted, as they may be sinning secretly and misleading others.