השותפין—The partners

OVERVIEW All three בבות (including בבא קמא ,בבא מציעא ,בבא בתרא) as well as other מסכתות including שבועות and מכות comprise סדר נזיקין. תוספות will determine why does בבא בתרא follow בבא מציעא¹

כולה נזיקין חדא מסכתא היא – The entire² order of נזיקין is one מסכת**.** כדאמרינן בהגוזל קמא (בבא קמא דף קב,א) ובפרק קמא דעבודה זרה (דף ז,א) – As the גמרא states inפרקהגוזל קמא³ and in the first פרק of מסכת עבודה זרה. Therefore it is logical to assume that there is a natural continuity between one פרק and another in the same מסכת. Specifically there should be continuity between the last פרק of בבא מציעא and our first משנה here in בבא בתרא. ואפילו לא הוי חדא מסכתא צריך לפרש למה נשנית מסכתא זו אחר בבא מציעא – And even if סדר נזיקין was not one מסכת, but rather בבא קמא, בבא מציעא and בבא בתרא (etc.) are separate ⁴מסכתות it would still be necessary to explain why was this מסכת – (namely בבא בתרא) taught after מסכתבבא מציעא. What connection is there between these two מסכתות? תוספות will offer a proof that the מסכתות were arranged in an organized manner; thus requiring an explanation for their specific order. כדאשכחן דדייק גמרא בריש מסכת שבועות (דף ב,ב) –

מכדי תנא ממכות סליק מאי שנא דקתני שבועות וכן בכמה מקומות – ‘Since the תנא concludedמסכתמכות, what is the reason that he is teaching שבועות after מסכת מכות’, and similarly in various⁵ places the גמרא requires the reason for the specific order of the מסכתות. We derive from those גמרות that there is a reason in the order of the מסכתות. What is therefore the reason that ב"ב is placed after ב"מ? תוספות anticipates a possible refutation of his question: והא דאמר (בבא קמא קב,א) בתרי מסכתות אין סדר למשנה – And that which the גמרא says that in two מסכתות there is no order to the משניות. This seemingly answers the original question⁶ ([at least] according to the one who maintains מסכת היא חדא לאו נזיקין כולה). תוספות responds that the statement למשנה סדר אין מסכת בתרי – היינו לענין מחלוקת ואחר כך סתם⁷ – was said only concerning the rule of מחלוקת ואח"כ סתם. This rule is valid only if the מחלוקת ואח"כ סתם is in the same מסכת. However if the מחלוקת ואח"ב סתם is in two מסכתות, we cannot follow this rule, as תוספות continues – משום דרבי לא שנה לתלמידיו כסדר המסכתות ופעמים שנה האחרונה קודם הראשונה⁸ – Because רבי did not teach his students like the order of the מסכתות which we follow, and at times he may have taught a later מסכת before an earlier מסכת. The question remains (even according to the כולה נזיקין לאו חדא מסכת היא); why was ב"ב placed after ב"מ? תוספות replies: ואומר רבינו יצחק דהיינו טעמא משום דקאי אהך פירקא דלעיל (בבא מציעא דף קטז,ב) – And the ר"י says that this is the reason why there is a logical continuity from ב"מ to ב"ב because our משנה is referencing the משנה in the preceding פרק**;** the last פרק of ב"מ, where it stated – הבית והעלייה של ב' שנפלו חולקים בעצים וכולי וקרי להו התם בגמרא שותפין⁹ – ‘A house and an attic that belonged to two people and it collapsed. The two original owners divide the wood, etc.’ amongst the two of them, and the גמרא refers to these two owners as partners. This is similar to our משנה where we have שותפין and we are also discussing a division of the wall and the property, there is therefore a logical continuity. תוספות continues to show an additional similarity from the very last משנה in ב"מ:

And we also have a משנה there concerning two terraced gardens, one higher than the other owned by different people and there was a vegetable growing in the elevation between the two gardens. The משנה discusses who can claim this vegetable as his, which is also a conceptual שותפות. They are (in a way) both partners in this plant; the lower garden is offering the plant air and sunshine, while the higher garden is providing the means for the plant to take root.

SUMMARY There is a dispute whether the נזיקין סדר is one מסכת or many. There needs to be justification why any מסכת follows its predecessor. The concept of בתרי מסכת אין סדר למשנה is only concerning the rule of מחלוקת ואח"כ סתם the הלכה is כסתם; in that it applies only in one מסכת. Our מסכת continues where we left off in the end of בבא מציעא. There the משניות were discussing laws of division among joint property owners. This theme is carried over in our משנה.

THINKING IT OVER

1. Can we ask why does פרק הזהב (for instance) follow פרק המפקיד (in ב"מ)?
2. Is תוספות explaining the order of the מסכתות or the continuity of the מסכתות?
3. Why is תוספות quoting that the גמרא calls them שותפין? We are discussing the משניות, not the גמרא!
4. Why does תוספות find it necessary to explain the connection by quoting both the first and last משנה of והעלייה הבית?

footnotes: ¹ It perhaps should be in reverse (for instance). Then obviously this מסכת would be called בבא מציעא. ² There is a dispute whether this is referring to the entire סדר נזיקין or only to the three 'בבות'. ³ The ‘First הגוזל’, also called 'עצים הגוזל' as opposed to the second הגוזל, called 'ומאכיל הגוזל'. ⁴ In the גמרא in ב"ק and ע"ז there is a מחלוקת between רב הונא ורב יוסף if כולה נזיקין חדא מסכת היא ⁵ See א,ב סוטה where the גמרא inquires why does סוטה follow נזיר. ⁶ It also poses a problem why does the גמרא seek an explanation why סוטה follows נזיר (and שבועות follows מכות [see footnote # 2]). ⁷ There is an accepted rule that if in one משנה we find a dispute between תנאים concerning an issue, and in a subsequent משנה, this same issue is resolved in favor of one of the disputants (by stating it in a משנה without mentioning any names – סתם), we follow the ruling of the סתם משנה as opposed to the disputant in the previous משנה. This rule is valid only if the subsequent סתם משנה is in the same מסכת as the previous משנה where there was the מחלוקת. If however the סתם משנה is in another מסכת, even if this other מסכת is a ‘later’ מסכת in the order of ס"ש, the rule does not apply. The reason for this rule (in one מסכת) is that it is assumed that originally רבי (who compiled and organized the משניות) taught us that this issue is in dispute (and no resolution has been made). If in a subsequent משנה (in the same מסכת) the issue was resolved, it obviously means that after his initial uncertainty as to whose opinion should be followed. רבי resolved the dispute. ⁸ Therefore even if we find a מחלוקת in מסכת שבת (for instance) and a סתם in מסכת עירובין, we cannot infer that the סתם in עירובין was taught after the מחלוקת in שבת (even though that in the סדר המסכתות ,עירובין follows שבת), for רבי may have learnt with his students עירובין before שבת. It would therefore be a מחלוקת ואח"ב סתם where the הלכה is not necessarily like the סתם, as opposed to a מחלוקת ואח"כ סתם, where the הלכה is כסתם. In one מסכת however, רבי taught it in the same order in which he subsequently compiled and organized it. The above notwithstanding, after רבי finished teaching all the ששה סדרי משנה to his students (in whatever order), he made a specific order in the משניות as to which מסכת comes first and which מסכת follows, etc. He certainly made this order in a reasonable manner. תוספות is searching for the reason in our specific case. ⁹ See ‘Thinking it over # 3.

כפיסין—Half-bricks

OVERVIEW There is a פסוק which states that לעתיד לבוא: it will be that 'אבן מקיר תזעק וכפיס מעץ יעננה'; ‘The stone will shout from the wall and a כפיס from (a tree) [wood] will respond to the stone’. It seems from this פסוק that כפיס is a wooden object. The גמרא however interprets כפיס to mean half-bricks, made from mortar; not wood. תוספות will resolve this apparent contradiction.

מפרש בגמרא¹ ארחי – The גמרא explains that כפיסין are half-bricks. תוספות asks: וקשה לרבינו יצחק והכתיב (חבקוק ב²) וכפיס מעץ יעננה משמע שהוא של עץ – The ר"י has a difficulty; for the פסוק states, ‘And a כפיס from a tree will answer him’, this implies that a כפיס is made from wood. It is not part of a brick. תוספות answers: ואומר רבינו יצחק דשמא היו מניחין עצים מלמעלה ומלמטה: And the ר"י says that perhaps they would place wood above and below the bricks (to frame them, etc.) Therefore there is no contradiction from the פסוק. The פסוק says that the כפיס brick will respond from within its wooden frame.

SUMMARY כפיסין are half bricks. They are used to construct a wall within a wooden framework. The פסוק states that the half brick כפיס will call out from its wooden framework to respond to the stone.

THINKING IT OVER Why did not תוספות ask his question later in the גמרא; when the גמרא interprets כפיסין to mean ארחי? Why is תוספות asking his question in the משנה, before we are certain what כפיסין is?!

footnotes: ¹ א,ג דף. See רש"י there ד"ה אריח. ² פסוק יא.

בגויל זה נותן ג' טפחים כולי‎—By unfinished masonry, this one provides three טפחים, etc.

OVERVIEW The משנה is very specific about the thickness of the walls to be built. Concerning the type of wall to be built, however, the משנה states מקום שנהגו לבנות וכו' בונין‎. The type of the wall to be built depends on the מנהג‎.¹ The משנה concludes and adds that הכל כמנהג המדינה‎. The question arises what does the משנה intend to teach us by adding הכל כמנהג המדינה‎? Does this refer only to other types of walls; if other types of material are used which are not mentioned in the משנה, then we follow that מנהג‎. However if the walls in the משנה are used, we cannot change the thickness of the walls as prescribed by the משנה‎. Or does it also refer to the thickness of the abovementioned walls; if the מנהג is to make these walls thicker or thinner, we also follow the מנהג‎? Our תוספות will address this issue.

תוספות responds to an anticipated question: והא דלא קאמר בגויל² ו' טפחים³ משום דלא נטעי למימר ו' לכל אחד‎ – And the reason that the משנה did not state, that by גויל a total of six טפחים must be provided by both parties? The משנה should have simply said בגויל ו' טפחים''. תוספות answers: because we should not mistakenly assume, that each of the parties must provide six טפחים‎. If the משנה would have simply stated 'בגויל ו' בגזית ה' וכו, one may have mistakenly assumed that this is the amount for each partner, thereby doubling the thickness of the wall. תוספות has an additional question: ואם תאמר אמאי אצטריך למיתני מדת גויל וגזית‎ – You may ask; why was it necessary for the תנא of the משנה to enumerate the measurements needed for גויל and גזית, etc. – כיון דתנן הכל כמנהג המדינה כמו שנהגו כן יעשו‎ – Since subsequently it was taught in our משנה that ‘everything should be done in accordance with the custom of the country’, whatever the custom is, they should build that way**.** If the מנהג המדינה was not to build a גזית wall of six טפחים, but rather more or less, we should follow the prevailing custom.⁴ Why therefore is it necessary to specify the thickness of these walls, since we will always follow the prevailing custom? תוספות answers: ויש לומר דאם נהגו יותר מו' בגויל לא יעשה וכן כולם אלא כשיעור המפורש‎ – And one can say; that if the custom was to**** build a גויל wall thicker than six טפחים he need not do it. And the same applies to all the walls mentioned in the משנה‎. He is obligated only for the amount specified in the משנה and no more**.** Either of the partners may refuse to bear the expense or to provide property for a גויל wall, thicker than six טפחים‎. His obligation is for three טפחים both in material and property but no more – תוספות concludes: ומיהו אם נהגו לעשות פחות מו' יעשה‎ – However if the custom is to build a גויל wall less than six טפחים thick, then either of the partners can decide that this is what he will do. He will participate only in a lesser wall, as is the prevailing custom. The other partner cannot coerce him to build a thicker wall, according to the measurement of our משנה‎. In this case, the מנהג overrides the שיעור of the משנה‎. תוספות proves this point: דאפילו אם נהגו בהוצא ודפנא⁵ יעשה כדמפרש בגמרא⁶ – for even if the custom is to build a wall from הוצא ודפנא, which is inferior to any of the walls mentioned in the משנה he may do so, as the גמרא explicitly states. – תוספות is of the opinion that the שיעורים in the משנה are the upper limits of the walls’ thickness, however if the מנהג is to build it narrower we follow the מנהג‎.⁷ This is what the משנה is referring to when it states 'הכל כמנהג המדינה'. Based on the above, תוספות presents the following question: ואם תאמר ומאי בעי בגמרא⁸ הכל כמנהג המדינה לאתויי מאי‎ – And if you will say; what is the question the גמרא poses, ‘what does the phrase ‘הכל כמנהג המדינה’ come to include’. The גמרא asks since the משנה states מקום שנהגו לבנות גויל וכו' בונין, we can surmise that we follow the local custom, why does the משנה add the phrase הכל המנהג המדינה‎? It seems redundant – ומשני לאתויי אתרא דנהיגי בהוצא ודפנא⁹– And גמרא answers that the phrase הכל כמנהג המדינה comes to include a place where the custom is to build walls from הוצא ודפנא‎. This concludes the quote from the גמרא‎. תוספות concludes his question: The גמרא could have offered a more obvious explanation why the משנה states 'הכל כמנהג המדינה'; not necessarily to include (only) הוצא ודפנא, but rather – לימא לאתויי כמנהג כל המקומות כמו שנהגו¹⁰ – Let the גמרא say that הכל כמנהג המדינה comes to include that one may build as is the custom in any place in the manner they conduct themselves. It includes (also) that we are permitted to build 'גויל וגזית וכו even narrower than the משנה states, if that is the מנהג המדינה‎. תוספות answers: ונראה לרבינו תם דדוקא בהוצא ודפנא אבל פחות מכאן אפילו נהגו מנהג הדיוט הוא‎ – And the ר"ת is of the opinion that הוצא ודפנא is specifically mentioned for it is the smallest wall allowed to be erected; however a wall which is inferior to הוצא ודפנא, even if that is customary in a locale to build walls inferior than הוצא ודפנא, it is a considered an inappropriate custom and is not to be followed. Either of the partners can insist on building a superior wall (of at least הוצא ודפנא).¹¹ The גמרא could not have answered as תוספות proposed that 'הכל כמנהג המדינה' comes to include ‘whatever the מנהג is’, because that is simply not true. We do not follow a הדיוט מנהג‎. תוספות concludes:

And the ר"ת proves from here; from the fact that the משנה and גמרא limit the power of המקום מנהג to הוצא ודפנא but no less, that there are customs that we do not rely on them. We do not follow these customs; even if the משנה instructs us to follow the מנהג המדינה, nevertheless it is not the intent of the משנה that we follow a מנהג הדיוט‎.

SUMMARY The משנה states 'בגויל זה נותן ג' וכו for if it would have stated simply 'בגויל ו we may have mistakenly assumed that each partner provides ו' טפחים‎. The measurements of the משנה are the upward limits. If the מנהג is to make it narrower we follow the מנהג (just as we see that we follow the מנהג of הוצא ודפנא). When the גמרא states that הכל כמנהג המדינה comes to include הוצא ודפנא, the intent is to provide us (also) with a lowest limit to the sturdiness of the wall.

THINKING IT OVER

1. Is there a connection between תוספות opening remarks and the first 'ת"וא'?
2. תוספות understands¹² the שיעורים in our משנה to be an upper limit only and the מנהג allows for us to lower this שיעור‎. Why did not תוספות assume the opposite; that the שיעורים are the lower limit, and מנהג provides for adding to this שיעור‎?
3. תוספות maintains we may lower the שיעור of the משנה if that is the מנהג‎. Does he derive that from a קל וחומר from הוצא ודפנא, or from הכל כמנהג המדינה‎?¹³
4. How did תוספות originally¹⁴ understand 'הכל כמנהג המדינה', and how is it understood in the מסקנא‎?¹⁵

footnotes: ¹ It is obvious that if the partners are in agreement, then any type of wall of any thickness (or no wall at all), may be built. The entire discussion involves situations where the partners disagree as to the type of wall, or thickness of the wall, to be built (or whether any wall at all is necessary). The laws here decide what each partner can coerce the other to build according to his preference. ² This question applies to all the measurements mentioned in the 'משנה; גזית וכו‎. ³ This would have been a more concise statement. We would assume that if the total is six טפחים, the partners would divide that amount amongst them. Why does the משנה need to state at length, that this partner must provide so many טפחים and the other partner must provide so many טפחים‎? ⁴ See ‘Thinking it over # 4. ⁵ הוצא are the לולבים of the date palm. דפנא are the branches of the bay tree. See א,ד רש"י. The הוצא ודפנא are interwoven to make a fence. ⁶ א,ד.The opinion of תוספות is that just as the מנהג dictates the type of wall to be built (i.e. even הוצא ודפנא) it also dictates the thickness of the wall, (even by 'גויל וגזית וכו). See ‘Thinking it over’ # 3. ⁷ See ‘Thinking it over’ # 2. ⁸ א,ד. ⁹ From 'מקום שנהגו לבנות גויל וכו, I would think that the options are limited to these four types of walls (depending on the מנהג) and no others. By adding הכל כמנהג המדינה, the משנה is teaching us that there is no such limitation. Even הוצא ודפנא is sufficient if that is the מנהג‎. ¹⁰ The advantage of this answer is that it would include those customs that vary from the שיעורים of the משנה, as well as those places that build (even) with הוצא ודפנא‎. This answer would also bolster תוספות assumption that the שיעורים of the משנה are only an upper limit, not a lowest limit (as well). See ‘Thinking it over’ # 4. ¹¹ The meaning of the גמרא that הכל כמנהג המדינה is ודפנא בהוצא דנהיגי אתרא לאתויי is not (only) that even הוצא ודפנא is included, but rather the משנה insists that it be a valid מנהג of at least הוצא ודפנא, but not less. See ‘Thinking it over’ # 4. ¹² See footnote # 7. ¹³ See footnote # 6. ¹⁴ See footnote # 4 10. ¹⁵ See footnote # 11.

לפיכך אם נפל הכותל וכולי‎—Therefore if the wall collapsed, etc.

OVERVIEW The משנה teaches us initially that (under certain circumstances) either partner can coerce his neighbor to share in building a dividing wall. The משנה then concludes לפיכך - therefore, since either partner can coerce the other to build, we can safely assume that they both built it together. That is why in case the wall collapsed, they both share equally in the material and space of the original wall. We may infer from the משנה that without the 'לפיכך'; i.e. when one partner cannot coerce the other to build a wall, then the דין is not necessarily that they divide equally. If the דין would be that they always divide equally, regardless whether they can coerce one another to build the wall, why does the משנה state 'לפיכך'?! They always divide, regardless! תוספות will be discussing what is the דין without the לפיכך; in a case where they cannot coerce each other to build. תוספות will argue that (seemingly) in such a case we will also say יחלוקו; if we do not know who built the wall. It will be necessary to explain why the משנה states that the דין of חולקים depends on the 'לפיכך'; on the power of coercion to build the wall.

פירוש¹ לפי שבונים הכותל בעל כרחם‎ – The explanation of the word 'לפיכך' – ‘therefore’,² is: since we build the wall even against the will of one of the partners,³ thereforethe rule is that they divide the material and the property.⁴ תוספות will now explain how is it that we determine that indeed it is required that the wall be built in partnership, even בעל כרחו of one of the partners. There are two options, depending whether we maintain היזק ראיה שמיה היזק or not.⁵ או משום דהקנו זה לזה לעשות גודא ללישנא קמא⁶ – Either because they contractually obligated to each other to build a wall, according to the first opinion in the גמרא, which maintains that היזק ראיה לאו שמיה היזק‎. When this wall collapses they will divide everything between them as the משנה states, providing that it is – וכגון דידוע לנו עדיין וזוכרים שהקנו זה לזה‎ – In the instance where it is still known to us and we remember that they contractually obligated to each other to build the wall. In such a case even though we are not aware of the details of their obligation, it is irrelevant. Once a general commitment was made, each partner is obligated to follow the specification of the משנה and can be coerced to do so.⁷ This is the explanation according to the לישנא קמא who maintains היזק ראיה לאו שמיה היזק‎. תוספות continues with the second option: וללישנא בתרא משום היזק ראיה‎ – And according to the concluding opinion which maintains that היזק ראיה שמיה היזק, there is no need to remember anything. We assume that they both built the wall on account of the היזק ראיה‎. Any partner can always coerce the other to build a wall between them. The other partner must contribute to this wall as the משנה specifies. According to this לשון, the 'לפיכך' of the משנה is universal. The דין of חולקים applies in all situations in a חצר‎. According to either option mentioned above we divide the wall because we assume that both partners contributed equally to this wall. That is what the 'לפיכך', means. It would seem that if for any reason we cannot assume that both partners built the wall, then we would not say המקום והאבנים של שניהם, for we are not sure that it belongs to both of them. What would be the ruling in such an instance? תוספות is presently discussing this issue. ואם תאמר ומאי איריא משום דבונין הכותל בעל כרחם⁸ בלאו הכי נמי הוי של שניהם‎ – And if you will say; why is the משנה teaching us that the partners divide since they must build the wall. We therefore assume that they indeed built the wall together. Without this assumption that they both built the wall it would also belong to both of them, when it collapses. There would be no choice. We do not know who built it. It is an equal ספק‎. Therefore בי"ד will rule that יחלוקו‎. How else can we rule?! The question is why the משנה implies that the (sole) reason for יחלוקו is 'לפיכך', since we assume that they both built it. The דין would be יחלוקו regardless; even if we are not sure who built the wall. תוספות anticipates a possible solution to this question, and rejects it. It is possible that if we do not know who built the wall, בי"ד will award it to one of the partners. If the wall collapsed into the property of one of the partners, and that partner claims that he alone built the wall, בי"ד will award it to him. That partner has possession of the stones. He will be considered a מוחזק;⁹ בי"ד will say to the other partner הראיה עליו מחברו המוציא‎. Bring proof that you contributed to this wall, and we will award it (partially) to you (as well). This is the case the משנה is referring to.¹⁰ It is understood now why the משנה says 'לפיכך'. It is only because we assume that both built the wall; that is why we say יחלוקו even if one is a מוחזק (the stones are in his possession).¹¹ If however there would be no 'לפיכך'; if we could not assume that both built the wall, then there would be no יחלוקו in the case where it collapsed into one partner’s רשות‎. Rather the דין would be המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה‎. תוספות rejects this solution for – אפילו נפל לרשותא דחד מינייהו כיון דאין חזית¹² לא לזה ולא לזה‎ – Even if the wall collapsed into the property of one of the partners, the דין would still be יחלוקו, since neither of them have a חזית; even if we are not certain that both built it. The fact that the stones are in the possession of one party does not make him a מוחזק‎. The other party is not a מוציא מחברו‎. In such a case also, the דין is יחלוקו‎. The question remains: why the 'לפיכך'?! תוספות will go on to explain and to prove that even if נפל לרשותא דחד, nevertheless we say יחלוקו without the 'לפיכך'. Since neither of the partners has a חזית to prove that the wall is his,¹³ therefore we will say יחלוקו‎.¹⁴ כדפריך בגמרא¹⁵ גבי בקעה לא יעשה חזית לא לזה ולא לזה‎ – As the גמרא asks concerning a ‘valley’; neither should make a חזית‎. This concludes the quote from the גמרא‎. תוספות continues with his proof – ואי הוה דהאיך דנפל לרשותו מאי פריך‎ – And if the דין would be that it belongs to the party, into whose property the wall fell, then how can the גמרא ask that there be no חזית at all – הא צריך לעשות חזית שלא יפול לרשות אחר ויאמר שלו הן¹⁶ – It is obviously necessary to make a double חזית in case it should fall into the other property, that owner should not be able to claim and say that it is his wall. תוספות has proven (from the דין of בקעה) that even if it fell into the רשות of either partner, he is not considered a מוחזק, even if we do not know who built the wall. The question, however, is why indeed is he not considered a מוחזק‎. תוספות will cite several cases, seemingly similar to our case, where the lone fact that the article in dispute is in someone’s רשות, this alone confers upon him the status of a מוחזק‎. והא דאמרינן בהשואל (בבא מציעא דף ק,א) גבי מחליף פרה בחמור¹⁷ – And that which the גמרא says in פרק השואל concerning the case in the משנה where one exchanges a (pregnant) cow for a donkey; תוספות will shortly cite the comment of the גמרא on this ruling – וכן בריש הבית והעלייה (שם דף קטז,ב) – And similarly in the beginning of פרק הבית והעלייה, the גמרא makes the same comment. The משנה there states that if two people own a house and an attic as partners; one owns the house and the other owns the attic. If the entire edifice collapses they divide all the material equally. Neither can claim that the whole bricks are his and the broken bricks belong to the partner, since we cannot recognize to whom these unbroken bricks belonged to originally. In both these cases the גמרא challenges the משנה: וליחזי ברשות דמאן קיימא וליהוי אידך המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה‎ – And let us see, in whose possession the disputed article is found and the other party will be considered as one who attempts to seize from his friend, in which case the burden of proof is on him. If the calf or the whole stones are in either of the parties’ possession, that person is a מוחזק and he gets to keep the calf/stones.¹⁸ The other party must prove that the calf /stones are his. If he cannot prove it, we leave it by the מוחזק‎.¹⁹ We see from these גמרות that by a ספק the מוחזק retains the disputed article. We do not say יחלוקו in face of this ממון חזקת‎.²⁰ The same should seemingly hold true in our case. If the wall collapsed into one רשות, that person should retain the stones, since he is the מוחזק‎.²¹ This would answer תוספות original question. Without the לפיכך, if we cannot assume that they both built the wall, then indeed if it fell לרשותא דחד, we would not say יחלוקו, but rather המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה (as we say in ב"מ by the calf/stones). However since we know for sure that they are partners (since they both must build the wall together, as previously explained) – therefore – 'לפיכך' the דין is חולקים‎!²² תוספות rejects the comparison of our case of השותפין to the cases in ב"מ of the ‘calf/stones’. The fact that there, in ב"מ, the דין is that whoever is in possession is the מוחזק, does not require that here in ב"ב, he is also a מוחזק‎. The cases are different; as תוספות goes on to explain. In ב"מ the reason why he is considered a מוחזק‎ – היינו משום דהתם מתחילה מבורר היה הדבר וברשות אחד מהן נולד הספק‎ – is because there in ב"מ by the ‘calf/stones’ originally (before the transaction and before the house collapsed) the situation was clear. The (fetus of the) calf belonged to the original בעל הפרה‎. We know whose stones belong to the בעל הבית, and whose stones belonged to the בעל העלייה‎. There was no ספק originally. The ספק was created while it was in someone’s possession. There was never a moment when there was a ספק that there was not a מוחזק‎. The ספק did not precede the חזקה‎. In fact the חזקה preceded the ספק‎.²³ Therefore, that type of ממון חזקת, where the ספק does not precede the חזקה, it is a valid חזקה‎. אבל הכא מעיקרא נולד הספק‎ – However here in השותפין where we are discussing what the דין should be without the 'לפיכך', namely if we are not certain who built the wall, then the ספק to whom the wall belongs, was created originally, from the moment the wall was built, before there was any מוחזק‎. תוספות illustrates this point: ואם היו באין לחלוק בעוד שהכותל קיים היו חולקין בשוה מספק‎ – For if they would come to בי"ד and argue how to divide the wall while the wall was still standing before it collapsed. If each one would claim that he built the (standing) wall, the דין would be they would divide the wall equally, since there is a ספק as to who built the wall. תוספות will soon conclude his thought; that since originally there is a ספק before there is a חזקה, and as a result of this ספק we say יחלוקו, therefore the חזקה that follows this יחלוקו does not have the power to deprive either of them of their rights in half the כותל‎. However, תוספות anticipates a certain difficulty in this assumption that if they would come to בי"ד to dispute the standing wall, בי"ד would rule יחלוקו‎. Generally there is an ongoing מחלוקת between סומכוס and the חכמים by בספק המוטל ממון‎. סומכות maintains that when in doubt, we say יחלוקו‎. The חכמים on the other hand disagree and argue that we do not say יחלוקו but rather המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה‎. Why is תוספות presuming that if they would come while the wall was still standing that בי"ד would say יחלוקו‎?! This is only the opinion of סומכוס; the חכמים disagree. תוספות presently addresses this issue. The דין will be יחלוקו‎ – אפילו לרבנן דסומכוס דלית להו ממון המוטל בספק חולקין‎ – even according to the רבנן who argue with סומכוס and they do not maintain that you divide monies that are in doubt to whom they belong, but rather we say המוציא מחברו עליו הראיה, nevertheless – הכא מודו כיון דליכא הכא חזקה לזה יותר מלזה‎ – The חכמים will agree here in this case of dividing the wall that we do say יחלוקו for here (when the wall is standing), neither party has a greater חזקה‎. There is no מוחזק while the wall is standing. We cannot say המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה; there is no מוציא and there is no מוחזק‎. Therefore the חכמים agree that we say יחלוקו‎. We have established that the דין is יחלוקו when the wall is standing even according to the חכמים‎. תוספות returns now to conclude the previous thought; that since in our case the ספק preceded the חזקה, and in fact בי"ד would have awarded each partner half of the standing wall. הילכך אפילו נפל לרשותא דחד מינייהו לא יפסיד האחר כחו‎ – Therefore it is understood why the חזקה after the wall collapsed is not valid, for even if it eventually fell into the רשות of either of the partners the other should not lose his right. He would have been awarded half by בי"ד; nothing really changed with the collapse of the wall. The same ספק that there was before the wall fell, exists now as well.²⁴ The fact that the wall fell in someone’s רשות certainly does not change anything. This חזקה does not give him any additional rights than what he had before, namely that they each receive half the wall. תוספות refers back to his original statement that if the שותפין would go to בי"ד while the wall was standing, בי"ד would rule יחלוקו even according to the רבנן, since there is no מוחזק and no מוציא‎. תוספות again questions this assumption: והא דלא אמר הכא כל דאלים גבר כמו בזה אומר של אבותי (לקמן דף לד,ב) – And the reason we do not say here in the case of השותפין where we do not know who built the wall, and they came to בי"ד when the wall was standing, we do not rule that whoever is stronger overpowers the other and retains the disputed article just as we say concerning the case where one says this belonged to my parents and the other claimed that it belonged to his parents. The case in question is where two people are arguing over a ship (or a parcel of land), each claiming that it is his, for he inherited it from his parents. Neither has any proof at all that it belongs to them, or that it belonged to their parents. The rule is כל דאלים גבר‎. Whoever is stronger may overpower his opponent and take possession of the ship/field. We do not say יחלוקו‎. תוספות asks that perhaps here by the שותפין with the standing wall, we should also say כל דאלים גבר and not יחלוקו‎.²⁵ תוספות answers that we cannot compare the case of השותפין to the case of זה אמר של אבותי‎. התם הוא דליכא דררא דממונא²⁶ אבל הכא איכא דררא דממונא‎ – Over there, by the case of זה אמר של אבותי we say כל דאלים גבר and not יחלוקו, because**** there is no monetary attachment between either of the litigants with the article in dispute. We have no reason to suspect that either of them have an interest in the disputed article. In fact it may not belong to either of them. Or it may belong to one of them. However, here by השותפין there is a דררא דממונא‎. When we notice a wall between two adjoining properties we automatically assume that both (or either) of the adjoining property owners has an interest in this wall. When there is no דררא דממונא there is no reason to say יחלוקו‎. When בי"ד rules יחלוקו we are awarding each individual, part of the object. There is no compelling reason to award them anything if there is no דררא דממונא‎. It could be they both do not own anything in this article. בי"ד tells them we have no way of verifying the veracity of your statements, therefore you are on your own, so to speak. However when there is a דררא דממונא there is compelling reason to award each of them half. It is evident that each party has (at least a possibility of) an interest in this article by virtue of the circumstances itself. בי"ד needs to protect that interest. It does so by ruling יחלוקו‎. Therefore in the case of השותפין as well as in the cases of מחליף פרה בחמור and הבית והעלייה, we say יחלוקו‎. In conclusion: תוספות proved that if the wall between two adjoining properties, fell לרשותא דחד, that person is not a מוחזק, even if we are not sure who built the wall. The דין in such a case will be חולקים‎. The question remains; why does the משנה say לפיכך‎? The לפיכך indicates that the דין is חולקים only because we are assuming that they both built it. This is not true. The דין will be חולקים even if we are not sure at all who built it; and even if נפל לרושותו דחד‎. תוספות will now answer the original question: ומתרץ רבינו יצחק דהיינו הך דפריך בגמרא²⁷ פשיטא כדפירש בקונטרס²⁸ – And the ר"י answers¸ that indeed the גמרא actually asks this question; ‘it is obvious’ that the דין is חולקים, as רש"י explains it. The גמרא questions: why does the משנה say 'לפיכך 'וכו' חולקים, it is obvious?! The literal way of understanding the question is; once the משנה taught us that they must build the wall it is obvious, that when the wall collapses it belongs to both of them, since they both built it. תוספות, however maintains this is not the intention of the גמרא‎. Rather the question of the גמרא is as**** רש"י explains the question: why does the משנה connect the דין of חולקים with the previous ruling that both have to build the wall; דאפילו לא פסיק לן דינא דמתניתין שמתחילה בין שניהם עשאוה בעל כרחם‎ – for even if the תנא of our משנה would not have ruled that originally they both were required to build it together, nevertheless the דין would have been – היו חולקין בשוה ואפילו דנפל לרשותא דחד מינייהו כדמוכח גבי בקעה‎ – They would be required to divide everything equally, and even if it fell into the property of either one²⁹, they would still have to divide as is evidenced concerning the case of בקעה**,** which תוספות mentioned previously.³⁰ תוספות maintains that his question and the question of the גמרא when it asks 'פשיטא‎!', are identical.³¹ What indeed does the גמרא answer on this question? תוספות continues to cite the גמרא: ומשני לא צריכא דנפל לרשותא דחד מינייהו פירוש ושהו ברשותו הרבה³² – And the גמרא answers; ‘it was not necessary to utilize the לפיכך except in a case where it fell into one person’s property’. This concludes the quote from the גמרא‎. However this answer is seemingly not sufficient. תוספות has already made it clear that even without the 'לפיכך' the דין would be יחלוקו even if נפל לרשותא דחד‎. What is the answer?! תוספות continues: The explanation of נפל לרשותא דחד מינייהו is that the material that fell into that person’s property remained in his property for an extensive period of time. The other partner did not come to claim the stones until a much later date from when they originally fell; therefore – מהו דתימא כיון דשהו ברשותו הרבה‎ – One may have thought since they were in his possession for so much time – ניהמניה שעשאוה כולה מיגו דאיבעי אמר ממך לקחתיה והיה נאמן³³ משום דשהו הרבה‎ – We should believe the מוחזק if he claims that he built the entire wall himself. How can we believe him [if we assume that they are both obligated to build the wall] (alternately, תוספות has already taught us that he is not a מוחזק since the חזקה followed the ספק)? תוספות explains that we should believe him that he built the wall by himself, since he has a מיגו, for he could have claimed I bought the stones from you after the wall collapsed. Had he actually claimed that he bought the stones from him, the דין would be that he would have been believed since they were in his possession for so much time. Therefore now that he is claiming that he built it himself, I may have thought that he should be believed with this 'מיגו', that he could have said, ‘I bought the stones from you’. This מיגו is valid only because it was שהו ברשותו הרבה, if however the other partner came immediately to claim the stones, there is no מיגו of לקחתיה ממך‎. Even if he would argue that לקחתיה ממך he would not be believed if לא שהו ברשותו הרבה, since it is normal that when the wall falls it may fall in anyone’s רשות‎. He cannot claim that he bought it, if the neighbor comes to claim it within a reasonable time. תוספות anticipates a challenge to this assumption that if שהו ברשותו הרבה, the מוחזק is believed to say לקחתיה ממך‎. ואף על גב דאמר בריש הבית והעלייה דשותפין לא קפדי אהדדי³⁴ – And even though the גמרא states in the beginning of הבית והעלייה פרק that partners are not particular towards each other. It would seem to follow that even if the collapsed wall remained an extended time ברשותא דחד, he still cannot claim לקחתיה ממך, since אהדדי שותפין לא קפדי‎. תוספות responds: הכא מיירי דשהו יותר מכדי רגילות דאטו משום דשותפין נינהו לא יקפידו עד עולם‎ – Here by השותפין, it is a situation where it remained more than it is customary. It was in the possession of the מוחזק an inordinate amount of time. Can we assume that just because they are partners they will never mind if an article that one has an interest in, should remain in the possession of his partner forever?! Obviously it is not so! The rule of אהדדי קפדי לא שותפין also has time limits. Our case of השותפין is in a situation where this time limit was exceeded. Therefore if the מוחזק would claim לקחתיה ממך he would be believed. That is why if he claims that he built it, he would be נאמן במיגו of לקחתיה ממך; if we were not certain that they both built it together. תוספות anticipates an additional question on his assumption that the מוחזק is נאמן to claim לקחתיה ממך since it was שהו ברשותו הרבה: ולא דמי לגודרות דאין להם חזקה³⁵ (לקמן דף לו,א) – And we cannot compare our case of השותפין to the case of ‘flocks’ of sheep; concerning which the דין is there is no חזקה for flocks of sheep. This seems to contradict what תוספות said that if שהו הרבה, there is a חזקה; why by גודרות is there no חזקה, no matter how long they are in his רשות‎?! תוספות answers that there is a distinction between השותפין and גודרות‎. לפי שאין ידוע ביד מי הם‎ – Since it is not known to the original owners in whose possession they are presently**.** By גודרות there is no חזקה ever, for it is not known in whose possession they are! ‘A’ does not know where his גודרות went! He is looking all over for them! We cannot fault him for not going to ‘B’ and claim the גודרות‎. ‘A’ had no idea that they were by ‘B’! – אבל הכא לא היה לו להשהותו כל כך ברשותו‎ – However, here by השותפין we can fault the מוציא‎. If they were indeed his, and he did not sell them to the מוחזק, then he should not have let them remain so long in the possession of the מוחזק‎. The מוציא knew that they are by the מוחזק‎! The fact that he did leave them by the מוחזק for such a long time gives credence to the claim of the מוחזק that לקחתיה ממך, and he is believed. תוספות has established that in the case where [we are not sure who built the wall and] the wall collapsed ברשותא דחד and it was שהו ברשותו הרבה, the דין is that the מוחזק is; a) believed to claim לקחתיה ממך; and b) is therefore believed to claim that he built it, since he has the מיגו of לקחתיה ממך‎. We return to the original question of תוספות and the גמרא‎. Why is the דין of חולקים dependent on the חיוב to build a כותל‎? Seemingly the דין of יחלוקו will always apply even without the חיוב to build. The answer is that in a case where שהו ברשותו הרבה, the מוחזק has a מיגו of לקחתיה ממך and is therefore believed if he claims that he built it (if there would not be a חיוב לבנות). We might have thought that even when there is a חיוב לבנות, he should still be believed that he built it himself since he has the מיגו of לקחתיה ממך‎. The חיוב לבנות does not contradict the טענה of לקחתיה ממך, and seemingly does not contradict the argument that בניתי כולה‎. It is possible that he built it himself and has ceded his right to coerce his neighbor. The מיגו should support this contention. That is the answer to the פשיטא‎. It is not obvious that we divide the wall; we may have thought that the מיגו is sufficiently strong to award the מוחזק the entire כותל‎ – קא משמע לן כיון דמעיקרא על שניהם היה לעשות לא מהימן לומר שהוא עשה הכל‎ – The משנה teaches us with the phrase לפיכך וכו' 'של שניהם, that since initially they were both required to build the wall,**** the מוחזק is not believed to claim that he built it all by himself, even though he has a מיגו‎. Had he said לקחתיה ממך he would have been believed even if we know that they both built it together, nevertheless now that he is not claiming לקחתיה ממך, but rather that he built it, the מיגו is not sufficient to support his argument – דמיגו במקום עדים הוא דאנן סהדי שלא עשאה לבדו‎ – For it is a מיגו which contradicts witnesses. If there were witnesses that they both built the wall together, and the מוחזק would claim that he built it himself, even if he has a מיגו of לקחתיה ממך, he would not be believed. The proof of עדים is much greater than the ‘proof’ of the מיגו‎. In the case of our משנה even though there are no actual עדים to testify that they both built it, however it is considered as if there are עדים that they both built it, for we (בי"ד) are the witnesses that he did not build the wall himself. This does not mean that we actually know that they both built the wall, but rather we are certain in our minds that neither built the wall by themselves – כיון שהיה יכול לדחוק את חבירו בדין שהיה עושה עמו‎ – Since he was able to pressure his friend legally that the friend should build it together with him. No person would forfeit this right to have the partner share in the expense of the wall, and rather do it on his own. This then is the חידוש of the משנה when it says לפיכך, that even though he may have a מיגו, nevertheless he is not believed and we say חולקים, because there is the אנן סהדי which is stronger than the מיגו‎. All of the above applies only when there is the אנן סהדי, and the resultant לפיכך‎. In a case where there is no אנן סהדי, either according to the מ"ד that היזק ראיה שמיה היזק, in a case where we do not know that they agreed to build a כותל, or in a בקעה according to everyone, the דין will be different, as תוספות concludes: אבל בבקעה אם שהו הרבה היה נאמן לומר שעשאה במיגו דאי בעי אמר לקחתיה‎ – However in a בקעה, where there is no חיוב to build a wall, the דין is different. If a כותל was built in a בקעה, without a חזית, and the wall collapsed ברשותא דחד if it remained in his רשות for an extended time, the מוחזק would be believed to claim that he built it by himself, even though there was no חזית to substantiate his claim. The reason he is believed is because he has a מיגו, for he could have claimed I bought it from you; in which case he would have been believed since it was שהו ברשותו הרבה, as תוספות explained previously. The מיגו is sufficiently powerful that it overrides the lack of a חזית‎.³⁶ תוספות concludes: והאי שינויא אינו אלא מאבנים אבל מקום הכותל לעולם פשיטא שחולקין אותו‎ – The abovementioned answer explains only the חידוש that they divide the stones in spite of the מיגו that the מוחזק has; however, concerning the place of the wall, which the משנה**** teaches that they divide that as well, it was always obvious that the place is divided among the two parties. We do not need the משנה to teach it to us. Concerning the מקום there is no מוחזק, and therefore no מיגו‎. Even if we are not aware at all who built the wall (in a בקעה for instance, without a חזית), we would still divide the place of the wall.³⁷ Why then does the משנה teach us that we divide the הכותל מקום as well, since it is obvious and unrelated to the דין of אותו מחייבין‎? תוספות replies: ואיידי דנקט אבנים נקט המקום:³⁸ however since the משנה mentioned that they divide the stones, he also mentions that they divide the place since in fact it is true, and did not require any major elaboration on part of the משנה‎.

SUMMARY When there is a wall between two properties (in a בקעה) and there is no indication at all who built it, the דין is that if the wall collapsed they divide the place and the stones between both neighbors, even if the wall fell into one person’s property. We know this is true, because the גמרא contends that when two people jointly build a בבקעה כותל, there is really no need to build a חזית at all. For even if it will fall לרשותא דחד the דין will still be חולקים‎. There is no מוחזק in this case as opposed to the cases of מחליף פרה בחמור and הבית ועלייה, for there the חזקה precedes the ספק, while here the ספק precedes the חזקה‎.³⁹ The ספק originated with the building of the wall. While the wall was standing, if each of the neighbors claimed it as his, the דין would be יחלוקו, since there is neither מוציא nor a מוחזק‎. We would not say כל דאלים גבר since there is a דררא דממונא‎. This דין carries over to the collapsed wall, regardless where it fell. However in a situation where the wall remained ברשותא דחד for an unusual extended period of time, then in the above situation, where there is no hint as to who built the wall, the one in possession would be believed to claim that it is his, for he has a מיגו of לקחתיה ממך‎. Had he claimed לקחתיה ממך he certainly would be believed. Therefore he is also believed to claim אני בניתי כולה‎. If, in the above case of שהו ברשותו הרבה, we are aware that they were required to build it jointly, then if he claims לקחתיה ממך, he would be still be believed. The requirement of building it together does not preclude the possibility of a subsequent purchase by the מוחזק‎. He is considered a מוחזק, if שהו ברשותו הרבה, despite the fact that אהדדי קפדי לא שותפין, since it is such a long time, even שותפין would not allow this to happen. If however in the above case the מוחזק claims בניתי כולה he is not believed, even though he has a מיגו of לקחתיה ממך‎. It is considered a מיגו במקום עדים‎. Common sense testifies that no one will willingly forfeit his right to coerce his neighbor to build a wall jointly, and instead build it himself. It is this case that the משנה is referring to when it states that (only) חולקים‎. Without the לפיכך the מוחזק will be נאמן במגו דלקחתיה ממך however the לפיכך tells us that it is a מיגו במקום עדים, when there is a חיוב לבנות jointly.

THINKING IT OVER

1. Why does the גמרא answer 'דחד לרשותא דנפל'? According to תוספות that was assumed in the question!⁴⁰ The גמרא should have answered that it was שהו ברשותו הרבה‎. It seems that the הספר מן חסר עיקר‎!
2. Why is לקחתיה ממך believed (even) if שהו ברשותו הרבה,⁴¹ why don’t we say it is a הספק שנולד לאחר תפיסא‎?
3. In the case of a בקעה, and שהו ברשותו הרבה, where the מוחזק claims בניתי כולה; does he need a מיגו of לקחתיה ממך to be believed or can he be believed directly because of his טענה בניתי כולה, since it was שהו ברשותו הרבה‎?⁴²
4. In a בקעה where both agree to build the wall together, seemingly a חזית is not really required. Should we not require a חזית in order to protect the מוציא in case it was שהו ברשותו הרבה by the מוחזק‎?

footnotes: ¹ One may think that the meaning of לפיכך is that since we know that they built the wall together, therefore they divide. תוספות negates this interpretation. That would be too obvious. If we know that they built it together, then obviously they divide the מקום ואבנים‎. Rather the explanation of לפיכך is, that since we know that either partner can coerce the other to build, but not that since we know that they actually built it in partnership. ² When we say לפיכך' – therefore’, this presumes that there is a prior cause which triggers the effect, the resultant ‘therefore’. תוספות is explaining what is causing the effect that they divide the material and the space. ³ Either of the partners can coerce the other to build the wall according to the specification of the משנה‎. ⁴ The assumption is that since either partner can coerce the other to build the wall in partnership, he will certainly do so. No one partner can later claim that he built the wall on his own (and solely on his property). We assume that neither built the wall alone; rather they built it together. ⁵ See the גמרא immediately following the משנה‎. The concept of היזק ראיה is that either party may be suffering a loss of value of his property since he cannot use it to its fullest extent. He is hampered by his neighbor who can see all that he is doing. The dispute in the גמרא is whether this damage warrants that the aggrieved party can coerce the neighbor to join him in building a wall, or not. ⁶ This opinion maintains that the only way one partner can coerce the other to build a wall (according to the specification of the משנה), is if they initially agreed (with a קנין) to build a wall. They did not specify at the time of this agreement as to the details of the wall. Either partner can subsequently coerce the other to build it according to the prescribed specifications of the משנה‎. ⁷ If, however, we do not remember that there was a קנין, then according to this opinion, it seems that if the wall collapses we may not necessarily say יחלוקו‎. We are not certain who built the wall. The משנה when it says 'לפיכך' is not discussing this case. It is only discussing the case where we know that there was a קנין‎. ⁸ Each partner may coerce the other to build it. ⁹ This type of מוחזק is not because the חזקה ‘proves’ that it is his. Rather the fact that the disputed object is in his actual possession, automatically makes the other claimant a מחבירו מוציא (under certain circumstances), and therefore the burden of proof is on the מוציא‎. ¹⁰ See the א,ד גמרא the line beginning שניהם‎. ¹¹ There is good reason to assume that both built the wall; since either one can coerce his partner to participate, we assume that he did so. ¹² A חזית is a certain סימן made on the כותל to prove ownership. ¹³ It seems evident from תוספות later, that the lack of a חזית is not proof that he did not build it. Rather the lack of a חזית is a lack of proof that he did build it. See footnotes # 21 36. ¹⁴ In this case, without the 'לפיכך', the חלוקה will be מספק, as opposed to the case of 'לפיכך' where it is a חלוקה וודאית‎. ¹⁵ ב,ד דף‎. The משנה states that by a בקעה, if both parties consent to build a dividing wall they should make a חזית on both sides of the wall, to insure their equal ownership rights to the wall. The גמרא asks; why should they both make a חזית‎? There should be no חזית at all and everyone will realize that it belongs to both. [The גמרא there answers that indeed a חזית is generally not needed at all. The משנה is discussing a particular situation where a double חזית is needed.] ¹⁶ If there will be a double חזית then no matter where the wall falls no one will be able to claim falsely that he alone built the wall. There is the double חזית to prove otherwise. If however there is no חזית at all, then if we were to consider the one in possession to be a מוחזק, the other will lose out without the חזית‎. The fact that the גמרא maintains that no חזית needs to be made, proves that even if the stones are in either party’s possession he is not a מוחזק and the דין is יחלוקו, (even) if we do not know who built the wall. ¹⁷ The exchange became effective when the owner of the original cow made a חליפין קנין on the donkey and acquired it for himself, thus automatically transferring the cow into the possession of the original owner of the donkey. The pregnant cow was not present at the transaction. After the transaction they became aware that the cow had given birth to a calf. We are not certain when the calf was born. If it was born before the transaction, then the calf belongs to the original בעל הפרה [The transaction was to exchange (only) the פרה for the חמור; not a וולדה פרה]; if it was born after the transaction it belongs to the new בעל הפרה (the original בעל החמור). The משנה there states that the דין is יחלוקו‎. The בעל הפרה and the בעל החמור divide the value of the calf. ¹⁸ In the case of the calf he receives the entire calf. By the stones he can retain all the whole stones that are on his property, but must give an equal amount (by volume, weight, etc.) of broken stones to the other party כמובן‎. ¹⁹ The גמרא answers there, that the משנה is discussing a case where it is in neither רשות‎. However if it would be ברשותא דחד the דין is המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה‎. ²⁰ תוספות cited these two cases as proof that we say הממע"ה, because they have similarities to our case of השותפין‎. In all these cases the חזקה does not prove anything at all. There is a serious doubt as to the ownership of the disputed item even after the חזקה‎. In addition, in these cases the חזקה was not there originally. The person was not always מוחזק in the object; it occurred eventually. There was a time that we know that he was not the מוחזק‎. ²¹ See footnote # 13. ²² Were we to accept this answer, there would in turn be a difficulty by בקעה; how can we say חזית יעשו לא‎?! It may fall ברשותא דחד‎. ²³ When we became aware of the ספק (the birth of the calf, the collapse of the house) the disputed article was already in someone’s רשות‎. ²⁴ This is in contrast to the two cases in ב"מ. By מחליף פרה בחמור there is a new ingredient; the calf was born during the חליפין process. We are not certain whether immediately before or immediately after. No one can claim the calf based on the previous situation. Everything changed with the חליפין process and the birth of the calf. Therefore the חזקה resolves the ספק in favor of the מוחזק‎. Similarly by הבית והעלייה; there is no prior claim. It should be borne in mind that they both agree that half the stones belong to each; they are only disputing which stones. It is not recognizable to whom the (whole) stones belong to. The situation has changed. There was no doubt before the collapse of the house. After the collapse there is a new ספק‎. This is resolved by the חזקה‎. ²⁵ Were we indeed to say כל דאלים גבר by השותפין, then the previous line of reasoning which differentiated between the case of השותפין and the cases in ב"מ would be refuted. The fact that the ספק preceded the חזקה would be irrelevant. When the ספק existed the rule would have been כל דאלים גבר, meaning that possession determines ownership. This continues to be the rule after the wall collapses. If it fell in one’s רשות, he is the אלים גבר‎. ²⁶ See היכא ה"ד ב,ב ב"מ תוספות (and דררא ה"ד ב,לה ב"ב) who interprets דררא דממונא to mean that בלא טענותיהם יש ספק לבי"ד without their claims בי"ד is in doubt as to whom the object belongs to. It is a self-generated doubt. In the case of זה אמר של אבותי there is no self-generated doubt. The ספק is created by the litigants only. ²⁷ א,ד דף‎ . ²⁸ See רש"י ד,ב ד"ה פשיטא‎ . See following footnote # 29. ²⁹ רש"י does not state this at all. When תוספות says בקונטרס כדפירש, he is referring to the general thrust of the question 'פשיטא'. It is not to be understood literally, but rather the way רש"י and תוספות interpret it. ³⁰ See the main text by footnote # 15 16. ³¹ It may be appropriate to summarize the question as follows: Since even without the 'לפיכך', the דין is יחלוקו, then certainly with the 'לפיכך' the דין is surely יחלוקו; it is פשיטא‎! See שלמה פני‎. ³² See ‘Thinking it over # 1. ³³ This is true even after the 'לפיכך'; even if we know that they both built the wall, he is believed to say לקחתיה ממך if it was שהו הרבה‎. See ‘Thinking it over # 2. ³⁴ Generally people are particular and insistent that their belongings be in their possession. Therefore if an article is in someone’s possession we assume that it is his. Any other person, who claims it, must prove ownership. If it is indeed his, how come someone else possesses it? This rule does not apply by partners. If people own a business in partnership, neither can claim that any article associated with the business belongs solely to him, even if it is in his private possession; for אהדדי קפדי לא שותפין, they are not particular whether their business items are in either partner’s possession. In our case, we consider the wall a partnership. They both presumably built the wall together. They are considered partners in this wall. ³⁵ If it was known that a particular flock of גודרות belonged to ‘A’. A while later these גודרות were in the possession of ‘B’ who claims that he bought them from ‘A’, who, in turn, denies the sale. The דין is that the גודרות revert back to ‘A’, since ‘B’ has no proof that he bought them. The fact that they are in his possession is no proof of ownership, since גודרות move on their own. It is very possible that the גודרות left ‘A’, on their own and wandered over to ‘B’. Therefore ‘B’ never has a חזקה, no matter how long the גודרות are in his possession. [See the גמרא there that רבא rules that there is a חזקת ג' שנים by גודרות‎.] ³⁶ The lack of a חזית is not a proof that he did not build it himself; rather it is merely a lack of proof. The מיגו therefore is the proof that he did indeed build it. See footnote # 13. See ‘Thinking it over # 3. ³⁷ In a בקעה כותל without a חזית, if it was נפל לרשותא דחד and it was שהו ברשותו הרבה, the דין would be as follows: The מוחזק would retain the אבנים, since he has a מיגו of לקחתיה‎. However the הכותל מקום is divided equally. (The same would obviously also apply if he actually claimed לקחתיה‎.) ³⁸ One may have wondered, since the משנה mentions only the אבנים and not the מקום, perhaps the מקום has a different דין‎. To remove any such misconception the משנה states both. ³⁹ This is commonly referred to as הספק שנולד לאחר תפיסא‎. ⁴⁰ See footnote # 32. ⁴¹ See footnote # 33. ⁴² See footnote # 36.

סברוה¹ מאי מחיצה גודא—They assumed, what does מחיצה mean; a wall

OVERVIEW There are two opinions in our גמרא, how to interpret the word מחיצה in our משנה, and subsequently whether היזק ראיה שמיה היזק or not. Each of these opinions is introduced with the term סברוה. The term 'סברוה' generally refers to an opinion which is originally introduced, only to be refuted later. We do not find however that either of these opinions is refuted. Why therefore does the גמרא introduce them with the term סברוה? Our תוספות will offer two interpretations.

תוספות anticipates and responds to the following question: אף על גב דלבסוף קאי – Even though that this assumption (that מחיצה refers to a wall) remains at the conclusion of the סוגיא. Those who maintained that גודא מחיצה, were not refuted, nevertheless – קאמר סברוה לפי שזה הלשון אינו עיקר מחמת פירכא² דלקמן – The גמרא refers to their opinion as ‘they assumed’, since this opinion (that מחיצה means גודא) is not the main opinion, on account of the refutation(s) mentioned later in the גמרא. Even though each refutation has been deflected and explained to satisfy this opinion that היזק ראיה לא שמיה היזק, however – ודיחוי בעלמא הוא האי דמשני וכלשון שני הלכה וכן פוסק רבינו תם – the answers given were merely deflections, and not satisfying answers, and the final ruling is like the second opinion that היזק ראיה שמיה היזק, and indeed the ר"ת rules that היז"ר שמיה היזק. The גמרא therefore refers to this first לשון as סברוה to indicate that להלכה we do not follow their opinion, but rather the opinion that היזק ראיה שמיה היזק. תוספות anticipates a follow-up question: The reason the גמרא uses the term 'סברוה' for the first לשון is because the הלכה does not follow that opinion. Why is it then that the גמרא uses the same term 'סברוה' to introduce the second לשון?³ That לשון is according to the הלכה! תוספות responds: ואגב דנקט בהאי לישנא סברוה נקט נמי בלישנא אחריתי – And since he uses the term 'סברוה', by this (the first) opinion (to indicate that we do not follow this לשון), therefore he uses it as well by the other (second and valid) opinion. תוספות offers another approach: ועוד אומר רבינו יצחק דבפרק קמא דנדרים (דף יא,א) איכא סברוה⁴ – And furthermore says the ר"י that in the first פרק of מסכת נדרים there is the expression 'סברוה' – אף על גב דלבסוף קאי ומסיק הכי: Even though that ultimately that opinion remained and was accepted as such. Therefore here too in our גמרא, we may maintain that either or both of the 'סברוה' are valid opinions.⁵

SUMMARY The גמרא uses the term סברוה for the first לשון to indicate that we do not follow this opinion להלכה. The refutations to this opinion were not satisfactorily answered. However once we used the term 'סברוה' to introduce one opinion we used it as well to introduce the other opinion. Another approach is that 'סברוה' can refer to an acceptable opinion that is not subsequently refuted or retracted.

THINKING IT OVER

1. What are four ways that the term 'סברוה' may be used?
2. How can we interpret 'סברוה' to indicate that this opinion does not follow the הלכה, when the term 'סברוה' is used here in both opinions?

footnotes: ¹ The students, who were studying our משנה, assumed. ² See רש"ש who emends the text to read 'פירכי', in the plural. ³ See גמרא דף ג,א, ל"א וכו' סברוה וכו'. ⁴ The משנה there (י,ב) stated if one made a נדר and said [לא] לחולין שאוכל לך he is forbidden to eat by him. The גמרא states, סברוה that he meant to say לא לחולין להוי אלא קרבן, and this remains למסקנא. (See רב אשי on יא,ב) ⁵ It would seem that according to the ר"י, the הלכה is not necessarily that היז"ר שמיה היזק.

כדתניא מחיצת הכרם שנפרצה—As we learnt in a ברייתא; the wall of a vineyard that was breached.

OVERVIEW The word תנן (or דתנן) refers to a משנה. The word תניא (or דתניא) refers to a ברייתא.¹ When there is an anonymous דין in a משנה (without a specific תנא mentioned), we (generally) assign that opinion to רבי מאיר. This is known as סתם משנה ר"מ. However a סתם ברייתא is not necessarily ר"מ at all.

יש ספרים דגרסי דתנן ואומר רבינו תם שאינה משנה בשום מקום – There are text that read 'דתנן', we learnt in a משנה**,** instead of דתניא, we learnt in a ברייתא; however the ר"ת says there no such משנה anywhere. The correct reading is 'דתניא'. תוספות asks: (ואם כן)² היכי פשיט מינה בהגוזל קמא (בבא קמא דף ק,א ושם) דרבי מאיר דאין דינא דגרמי³ – Since it is not a משנה how does the גמרא in פרק הגוזל קמא conclude from this ברייתא that ר"מ executed the laws of גרמי.⁴ ואם היתה משנה הוה אתי שפיר דסתם משנה רבי מאיר היא – And if this ברייתא of מחיצת הכרם would actually have been a משנה instead of a ברייתא it would have been properly understood how we can deduce from the law of מחיצת הכרם that ר"מ is דאין דינא דגמרי. The case of מחיצת הכרם falls in the category of גרמי.⁵ We can therefore deduce from (the משנה of) מחיצת הכרם that ר"מ is דאין דינא דגמרי since an anonymous משנה is attributed to ר"מ.⁶ תוספות answers: ואומר רבינו תם דמשמע ליה דאתיא כרבי מאיר מכח מתניתין דכלאים דמייתי התם⁷ – The ר"ת says that it is evident to the גמרא**** that this ברייתא is in accordance with the view of ר"מ based on the משנה of מסכת כלאים, that the גמרא cited there in ב"ק. The משנה states: המסכך [את] גפנו על גבי תבואתו של חבירו [הרי זה] קידש וחייב באחריותו – One who spreads out his grapevines over his neighbor’s (growing) grain; this act hallows the grain (and the vines) to be prohibited from use**, and** the owner of the vines is liable for his neighbor’s loss. This concludes the quote from the משנה. וההיא סתם משנה היא⁸ הילכך ההיא נמי דקתני קידש רבי מאיר היא – And that משנה in מסכת כלאים is indeed a סתם משנה. Therefore this ברייתא of מחיצת הכרם, where it states that the תבואה is קידש**,** it becomes כלאים, must follow the view of ר"מ. The גמרא rightfully proves from this ברייתא that ר"מ is דאין דינא דגרמי. תוספות concludes:

And there is no need to elaborate here anymore!

SUMMARY We can prove from our סתם ברייתא of מחיצת הכרם that ר"מ is דאין דינא דגמרי. There is a משנה סתם, i.e. ר"מ, which maintains that the בעל הכרם is חייב if he spread his vines over someone else’s grain. Our ברייתא maintains like the (ר"מ) סתם משנה that it does become כלאים. The case of the ברייתא is considered a דינא דגמרי. We can therefore infer that ר"מ is דאין דינא דגרמי.

THINKING IT OVER What would be the דין if someone pours milk into a friend’s meat stew?⁹

footnotes: ¹ הנשיא יהודה רבי – הקדוש רבינו edited all the sayings of the תנאים that preceded him and incorporated those that he chose, in the משניות. The other teachings of the תנאים that were not incorporated in the משניות but remained outside the משניות are called ברייתות. The word ברייתא means ‘outside’. A משנה is generally considered to have a preferred status over a ברייתא. ² Others emend this to read: 'ואם תאמר'. ³ גרמי refers to a damage inflicted on someone indirectly. The alleged perpetrator did not physically cause the damage. The גמרא there seeks to prove that ר"מ maintains that in case of גרמי the perpetrator is liable. ⁴ The גמרא there in ב"ק cites a case where an individual showed his friend a coin to ascertain if it is legal tender. Had he advised him incorrectly, thereby causing him a loss, it would be considered a case of גרמי. There is another type of indirect damage known as גרמא, where even ר"מ agrees that he is פטור. See תוספות דף כב,ב ד"ה זאת as to the difference between גרמי and גרמא. ⁵ The בעל הכרם did not physically or directly damage the בעל השדה, nevertheless the דין is that the בעל הכרם is חייב באחריותו. ⁶ Any משנה that is not stated in the name of a specific תנא, that משנה is attributed to be the opinion of ר"מ. There is no תנא whose name is mentioned in conjunction with the דין of מחיצת הכרם. Had it been a משנה, it would have been the opinion of ר"מ that he is חייב even though it is only גרמי. However since it is not a משנה, but rather a ברייתא, there is no rule that a סתם ברייתא is ר"מ. We cannot arbitrarily assign this ברייתא to ר"מ. How then does the גמרא infer from this ברייתא that ר"מ is דאין דינא דגמרי?! ⁷ The גמרא there quoted this משנה (before quoting our ברייתא) in an attempt to prove that ר"מ is דאין דינא דגמרי. The גמרא refuted the proof, maintaining that it is not גרמי, since he physically spread the vines over his neighbor’s crops. ⁸ There is no תנא associated with the פסק of חייב באחריותו. This means that it is the opinion of ר"מ that the בעל הכרם is liable for the damage he caused by making the כלאים תבואה. There are other תנאים in that משנה who contend that the grain does not become כלאים, for one individual cannot effect a prohibition on something which does not belong to him [See ‘Thinking it over’]. כלאים become בהנאה אסור, according to these תנאים, only if the grapevines and the grain belong to the same person. ר"מ obviously disagrees. In our ברייתא of מחיצת הכרם, we are confronted with the same issue. The בעל הכרם and the בעל השדה are two individuals. According to the other תנאים it would not become כלאים. The ברייתא however disagrees and states 'קידש זה הרי'; that it becomes כלאים. ⁹ See תוספות יבמות פג,ב ד"ה אין.

אומר לו גדור—He says to him; Fence it!

OVERVIEW The ברייתא of מחיצת הכרם is discussing a case where a dividing wall between a vineyard and a grain field (that had different owners) was breached. There is then sufficient cause to be concerned about כלאים, since the vines and grain are immediately adjacent to each other. The ברייתא states that he tells him to repair the breach, and if he repaired it and it was breached again, he should tell him again. If he showed no interest in repairing, then he is liable for any damage that is caused if there is an actual איסור כלאים. It is not clear in the ברייתא, who is told to repair the fence. In addition it would seem that both the בעל הכרם and the בעל השדה should be jointly responsible to build the fence, since each one is contributing equally to the potential איסור כלאים. Why is only one party required to repair the fence? Indeed if someone is required to repair the fence why the need to tell him; especially twice?! תוספות will be discussing these issues.

פירוש¹ לבעל הכרם והוא² המזיק – The explanation of the phrase ‘He says to him’; the word ‘him’ refers to the owner of the vineyard for he is the aggressor. It is the responsibility of the בעל הכרם to repair the breach in the dividing wall. The reason the בעל הכרם is required to repair the wall and not the בעל השדה, even though seemingly each one is causing the other’s field to be come כלאים, is – דארבע אמות שאמרו³ להרחיק הוא בשביל עבודת הכרם⁴ כדאמרינן בפרק שני לקמן (דף כו,א) – Because the four cubits which the חכמים said that one is required to distance himself from the boundary of his neighbor’s property that is on account of the work required to cultivate the vineyard, as the גמרא states later in the second פרק.⁵ תוספות responds to an anticipated difficulty: ואפילו רבי יוסי דקאמר לקמן (דף יח,ב כה,ב) על הניזק להרחיק את עצמו⁶ – And even according to ר' יוסי who later states it is incumbent on the injured party to distance himself. תוספות maintains however that even if we agree that הניזק על להרחיק, nevertheless the ruling of the ברייתא (and the משנה of ד' אמות) is still valid. The reason is – האמר רב אשי לקמן (דף כה,ב) מודי ר' יוסי בגירי דיליה⁷ – For רב אשי said later in the גמרא that that ר' יוסי agrees that if the damage is done with his arrows, then it is להרחיק המזיק על. In our case of עבודת הכרם, it is considered גירי דיליה. The בעל האילן will physically take the plow and bring it into his neighbor’s field. In this case it is considered גירי דיליה and ר' יוסי will agree that you must either distance yourself ד' אמות or build a dividing wall. When that wall is breached the בעל האילן reverts to being the מזיק, and is required to repair the wall. תוספות addresses now the issue of the requirement that the בעל הכרם be told (twice!) to rebuild the wall. ואומר רבינו יצחק דלהכי קתני אומר לו גדור ולא קתני חייב לגדור⁸ – And the ר"י says that the reason the ברייתא uses the expression 'גדור לו אומר' – ‘he says to him rebuild the fence’, and the ברייתא does not say that ‘he is obligated to repair the fence’. תוספות will explain that here the ניזק is required to remind the מזיק – לפי שצריך להתרות בו ואם לא התרו בו לגדור אינו חייב באחריותו⁹ – For here, it is required to warn the מזיק and if they did not warn him to repair the fence the מזיק is not liable for the damages incurred on account of the איסור כלאים. ולהכי נקט נמי תרי זימני נפרצה אומר לו גדור אף פעם שניה כשנפרצה צריך להתרותו – And that is also the reason that he mentions two times; ‘if it was breached he says to him, ‘fence it’’! The reason the ברייתא mentions it twice is because if he repaired it once, and it was breached a second time, then even the second time that it was breached he is required to warn the מזיק. The initial warning the first time, when he subsequently repaired it, is not sufficient – שאינו סבור להיות חייב לגדור כל שעה – For the מזיק does not deem it appropriate that he is required to repair it every time. In order for him to be liable for איסור כלאים after he repaired it once and it broke, he must be warned a second time. Otherwise he is not liable. ונפרצה פעם שלישית מספקא לרבינו יצחק אם צריך להתרותו כל שעה – And if it was breached a third time; after he was twice warned and rebuilt twice the ר"י is doubtful, whether it is required to warn him every time; otherwise there is no liability on the part of the בעל הכרם – או שמא סגי בתרי זימני ואין צריך להתרות בו יותר – Or perhaps twice is sufficient; and there is no requirement to warn him further. He was warned already twice, He realizes that it is his continual obligation to have the wall repaired תוספות offers a different explanation for the redundancy of גדור לו אומר נפרצה. ורבינו תם מפרש דלהכי נקט תרי זימני לאשמועינן – And the ר"ת explains – that the reason he mentions twice the requirement to tell the בעל הכרם to repair the fence is to teach us – שאם יש תוספת מאתים בין מה שהוסיף בנפרצה ראשונה ובין מה שהוסיף בנפרצה שניה – That if there was an additional growth of a two hundredth amount between what was added during the first breach and between what was added during the second breach. During each breach individually it did not grow a sufficient amount to equal a two hundredth, but if the growth during both breaches were to be added together it would equal to a growth amount of a two hundredth (or more) – דאין מצטרפין לאסור ומראשונה ראשונה בטלי¹⁰ – They cannot be combined to prohibit the produce, and from after the repair of first breach the additional growth of the first breach becomes nullified. והארכתי בהגוזל קמא (בבא קמא דף ק,ב ושם) ובפרק במה אשה (שבת דף סה,א) : And I have dealt with this at length inפרקהגוזל קמא and in פרק במה אשה.

SUMMARY In the case of מחיצת הכרם שנפרצה it is the obligation of the בעל הכרם to rebuild the wall. The בעל הכרם is considered the מזיק, since he is not permitted to plant within ד' אמות of the boundary line, unless there is a dividing wall. ר' יוסי who normally maintains that עצמו את להרחיק הניזק על also agrees that the responsibility lies with the בעל הכרם, for since the concern is that the בעל הכרם will plow in his neighbors field to cultivate his כרם, that is considered גירי דיליה. Nonetheless, unless the בעל הכרם is explicitly warned to rebuild the wall, he will not be חייב for the איסור כלאים, since he does not realize that it is his obligation. Indeed he must be warned even a second time (after the original breach had been repaired and was broken again). We cannot assume that the בעל הכרם realizes that it is his ongoing responsibility. Concerning whether he must be warned a third time תוספות is unsure, perhaps twice is sufficient to have the בעל הכרם realize his responsibility. Another explanation why the ברייתא mentions the warning twice, to inform us that the rule of הוסיף מאתיים is כלאים, refers only to a הוספה of מאתיים during one breach period. We cannot combine the growths of two breach periods for the amount of הוסיף מאתיים.

THINKING IT OVER

1. The ברייתא of מחיצת הכרם can follow the view of ר' יוסי since it is considered גירי דיליה. We also derive from מחיצת הכרם that ר"מ is דאין דינא דגרמי.¹¹ It seems contradictory that it should be both גירי דיליה and דינא דגמרי!
2. If we were to assume that one is required to warn the בעל הכרם on the third time also, what would be the דין concerning a fourth, fifth, etc. time?
3. How does the ר"ת derive from the ברייתא that we do not combine the הוספה of each נפרצה?
4. What would the ר"ת maintain is the דין when the בעל הכרם was warned only once, and it was נפרצה a second time; is the בעל הכרם חייב?

footnotes: ¹ תוספות is negating s'רש"י explanation that it is the בעל הכרם who is responsible to rebuild the wall on account of כלאים (since עבודת הכרם is ד' אמות it is as if the כרם extends an additional ד' אמות into the שדה הלבן and is causing the כלאים.) ² The הגהות הב"ח amends this to read דהוא. ³ The משנה there (כו,א) states that one who plants trees on his own property must distance himself from his neighbor’s property four אמות from the property line. Perhaps that is why it is referred to as מחיצת הכרם; since it is the obligation of the בעל הכרם to erect this מחיצה. ⁴ The term עבודת הכרם is to be understood to include any type of tree that requires cultivation of ד' אמות. ⁵ It was customary to plow underneath the trees for a distance of four אמות radius, from the trunk of the tree, to cultivate the soil underneath the tree. If one were to plant his tree adjacent to the property line, there is concern that he may bring his plow into his neighbor’s property, which he has no right to do. Planting a tree near the property line is considered an act of aggression. He is a מזיק. However if there is a dividing wall between the properties, he may plant trees right up to the wall. There is no concern that he may take his plow into the other property since there is the dividing wall. If however the wall is breached, the concern of עבודת הכרם returns. It is the obligation of the בעל העליו to repair the wall; otherwise he is a מזיק, since his tree is within ד' אמות of his neighbor’s property, which is forbidden. In our ברייתא of מחיצת הכרם, the בעל הכרם planted his vines up to the property line since there was a dividing wall between him and the בעל השדה. Once the wall was breached, it became the duty of the בעל הכרם to repair the wall as just explained. Therefore as long as he does not repair the wall he is considered the מזיק and any resultant damage caused by his negligence to repair the wall is his responsibility. [The responsibility of the בעל הכרם extends even into an area for which originally he was not solely responsible. The בעל הכרם had to build the wall on account of עבודת הכרם not for כלאים. Nevertheless he is responsible not only to limit the damage caused by עבודת הכרם, but even for the damage caused by the ensuing איסור כלאים, since he is considered the מזיק. This liability for the איסור כלאים may be considered דינא דגרמי (as opposed to his responsibility to build the fence)]. The בעל הכרם, therefore, is also responsible for any damage of כלאים caused by his vines, since he is the מזיק. ⁶ ר' יוסי is discussing the following case: The משנה states that one must distance a tree twenty five אמות from his neighbors pit; so that the roots of the tree do not eventually weaken the pit. If the tree was planted after the pit was dug, the owner of the pit has the right to chop down the tree (provided he pays for the tree).ר' יוסי is of the opinion that even if the pit preceded the planting of the tree, he may not chop down the tree, for the owner of the tree has every right to plant a tree on his own property.ר' יוסי maintains that if the victim does not want to suffer let him dig his pit where no one will be able to weaken it. It would seem that ר"י would not agree to the משנה which states that a tree must be distanced from the property line four אמות. According to ר"י one should be able to bring his tree to the property line, since he is currently not doing any damage. The two cases seem very similar. ⁷ One may not shoot arrows from his own רשות and damage objects in his neighbor’s רשות. ר' יוסי agrees that we do not say עצמו את להרחיק הניזק על in any case which is considered גירי דיליה. The case of the tree and the pit is not considered גירי דיליה. When the tree is being planted there is no damage to the pit. The damage will be later, and will happen by itself without any involvement of the בעל האילן. ⁸ Seemingly it should have said he is obligated to build the fence. We rarely find this expression that the victim needs to remind the aggressor of his duties. ⁹ It would seem from תוספות that if he did not warn the בעל הכרם to repair the fence, it would still become כלאים; however the בעל הכרם would not be liable to pay for the damage. The reason he is not חייב is because the damage inflicted by the בעל הכרם is considered only גרמי (see previous תוספות), [since he is not causing the damage directly]. One is liable for the damages of גרמי (according to some opinions) only if it is done במזיד. Therefore he has to be told to rebuild, otherwise the בעל הכרם assumes that it is not his responsibility to rebuild. He is considered a בשוגג גרמי. ¹⁰ After each repair, if during that breach it did not grow מאתיים, then that growth of כלאים becomes בטל, as if it never happened. By the next breach we start estimating anew how much it grew during the present breach. If at this new breach, less than מאתיים grew, it is again disregarded after the current repair. It is only בכלאים אסור if it grew מאתיים during the period of a single breach. ¹¹ See previous כדתניא ה"ד תוספות and also footnotes # 5 [in brackets] 9 in our תוספות