אבל אכלה שית שנין כולי—However, if he consumed the produce for six years, etc.

OVERVIEW The case at hand is as follows. The מחזיק first claims מפלניא זבינתה and I was there שני חזקה. The מערער produces a שטר that he purchased it from the same מוכר four years ago. If the מערער can produce עדים that he lived there for the past seven years¹ the field remains by the מחזיק [since שני חזקה can imply more than three years]. If however the מחזיק can produce עדים only for the past six years, then even if he claims that he purchased the field before the מערער (even seven years ago, but since he cannot provide עדים), the field reverts to the מערער.

תוספות asks: הקשה רבינו יצחק בר מרדכי אפילו לא אייתי סהדי אלא דאכלה שלש שנין – The ם"ריב presented a difficulty; even if he did not bring עדים for all seven years**, but rather** he had עדים that he consumed the produce for only**** the past three years, nevertheless the מחזיק – יהא נאמן לומר לקחתיה קודם מינך² במיגו דאי בעי אמר מינך זבינתה³ – should be believed to claim that I bought it from the original owner before you bought it, since the מחזיק has a מיגו, for the מחזיק could have said to the מערער, ‘I bought it from you’. If the מחזיק would have claimed that he bought it from the מערער after the date on the שטר, the מחזיק would have been believed, since he has a valid חזקה and a טענה that זבינתיה מינך. Therefore he should be believed if he claims that he bought it before the מערער bought it. Why is it necessary to produce עדים that his חזקה predates the שטר s'מערער by three years? תוספות answers: ואומר רבינו יצחק דאין זה מיגו דמעיקרא לא יטעון כלל מינך זבינתה – And the ר"י says that the מיגו of זבינתיה מינך is not a valid מיגו; for originally when the מערער challenged him, the מחזיק would never claim that ‘I bought it from you (the מערער)’ –

for he does not know whether the מערער possesses a שטר that he (the מערער) purchased the field from the original מוכר. A valid מיגו is when the מיגו claim is equally presentable as the actual claim. In this case, the מחזיק would never claim that he bought it from the מערער, since he has no knowledge that the מערער ever bought this property from the same מוכר who sold it to him. Therefore if the מחזיק would claim that he bought it from the מערער, he would be placing himself in jeopardy of losing the field to either the original מוכר or anyone else who may produce a מכירה שטר from this מוכר. They could come and challenge his ownership to the field, using his own statement that he bought it from the מערער, as proof that he never bought the field from the original מוכר

SUMMARY A מיגו (of זבינתיה מינך) is not applicable where the litigant may jeopardize his position if he were to claim this מיגו (of זבינתיה מינך).

THINKING IT OVER

1. In תוספות question:⁵ would there be a difference whether the מחזיק claims I bought it seven years ago or whether he claims I bought it before you (but less than seven years ago)?⁶
2. The reason why the מכירה שטר of the מערער constitutes a מחאה is because the שטר has a קול; people know about it, and the מחזיק should have kept his שטר. How can תוספות argue that the מחזיק may not know⁷ whether the מערער has a שטר from the מוכר?!⁸
3. Is תוספות question (only) according to the רשב"ם or even according to the יש שמפרשים (in the רשב"ם ל,ב ד"ה והני מילי)?⁹

footnotes: ¹ It is self-understood that if the מחזיק can present עדים that he purchased the field from the מוכר (even one day) before the מערער, the field would then remain by the מחזיק. ² See ‘Thinking it over’ # 1. ³ Seemingly this seems to be a למפרע מיגו (see לאו ה"ד א,ל תוספות). Originally the מחזיק claimed 'מפלניא זבינתה וכו; to which the מערער responded that he has a שטר that he purchased it four years ago. The מחזיק now claims that he purchased it more than four years ago. However, now he does not have a מיגו of זבינתה מינך, since he already stated זבינתה מפלניא. (See נח"מ.)Perhaps, since in this א"הו we (seemingly) assume that the מחזיק is aware of the מכירה שטר, therefore it was certainly אדעתיה אסיק of the מחזיק that he needs this claim of more than three (four) years. In a case of אסיק אדעתיה we do say למפרע מיגו (see ל"הנ תוספות [footnote # 15]) especially since he is only being דבריו מפרש (minimally); ב"וצ. ⁴ See ‘Thinking it over’ # 2. ⁵ See footnote # 2. ⁶ See קטז אות ב,ל דף י"בל. ⁷ See footnote # 4. ⁸ See 'ה אות ד"סוכ. ⁹ See בל"י הנ"ל.

אמר רבה מה לו לשקר—רבה said; why should he lie

OVERVIEW The case at hand: both litigants claimed they inherited the property from their respective parents. One brought witnesses that it belonged to his parents, the other brought witnesses that he made a חזקה. רבה ruled that it should be awarded to the one who has חזקה עדי, since he certainly is saying the truth that it originally belonged to his parents; for ‘why should he lie’, he could have simply said, ‘I bought it from you’. אביי refuted this, saying that a מיגו (or לשקר לי מה) cannot displace the עדים who claim it belonged to the other litigant’s parents. תוספות reinforces, that it was רבה who made the ruling not רבא.

רבה גרסינן דאביי ורבא אמרי לקמן (דף לג:) דלא סבירא להו הא דרב חסדא¹ – The text should read 'רבה'; not 'רבא' for אביי and רבא both say later in this פרק that they do not agree to that which רב חסדא maintained there; the reason they argue is-

because we do not apply the logic of ‘why should he lie’ – i.e. a מיגו – when it contradicts עדים**.** Therefore, since in this case it is a עדים במקום לשקר לי מה as אביי pointed out, the text cannot read 'רבא', for רבא agrees with אביי that אמרינן לא עדים במקום לשקר לי מה. We must conclude that the correct גירסא is 'רבה'.

SUMMARY ורבא אביי maintain that אמרינן לא עדים במקום לשקר לי מה; while it is רבה and רב חסדא who maintain that לשקר לי מה can be valid even עדים במקום.

THINKING IT OVER It seems so obvious that the גירסא is רבה; why would תוספות have to emphasize it?²

footnotes: ¹ The case there is (seemingly) identical to the (original) case here. רב חסדא maintained (like רבה) that we should award it to the מחזיק, since he has a מיגו. ² See א"מהרש (and 'וט 'ח אות ד"סוכ).

מה לי לשקר במקום עדים לא אמרינן—We do not apply the rule of ‘why should he lie’ when it contradicts witnesses.

OVERVIEW The case at hand: ראובן and שמעון each claim that a particular property belonged to their respective parents. ראובן brought עדים that his parents owned it. שמעון brought עדים that he made a חזקה in this property (subsequent to the death of both parents). רבה ruled that שמעון has a (מה לו לשקר) מיגו of מינך זבינתיה and is entitled to the land. אביי objected; the מיגו is merely attempting to prove s'שמעון claim of של אבותי. How can this מיגו substantiate s'שמעון claim אבותי של, when the עדים testify that it belonged to s'ראובן parents?! עדים are certainly a stronger validation than a מיגו. תוספות will discuss whether שמעון is actually contradicting the עדות of אבותי.

תוספות asks: תימה לרבינו שמשון בן אברהם אמאי הוי במקום עדים – And the א"רשב is astounded; why do we consider this לשקר לי מה (or מיגו) as contradicting the עדים?! It is possible that it belonged to the parents of the one who has the מיגו, as well as the parents of the other litigant. תוספות explains: נימא של אבותיו היתה יום אחד¹ ונאמר שלקחה² מאבותיו דהא טוענין ליורש³ – Let us assume on account of the מיגו that it belonged to the father of the בעל המיגו for one day. The מיגו substantiates his claim of אבותי של. It will not contradict the testimony of the עדים who claim that it belonged to the other litigant’s father, for we will limit the scope of the מיגו, and believe him that it belonged to his father for only one day. And we (ד"בי) will claim that the father of the בעל המיגו bought the property from the parents of his litigant. For בי"ד argues on behalf of an heir; תוספות goes on to explain, how we know that his father lived there for a day so that he is indeed considered an heir – ומהימנינן ליה בהא דקאמר שאבותיו דרו בו יום אחד⁴ במיגו דאי בעי אמר מינך זבנתיה – And we believe him in what he claims that his parents lived there for one day, with a מיגו; for he could have claimed ‘I bought it from you’.⁵ The בעל המיגו has חזקה עדי; since he could have claimed זבינתה מינך and would have been believed, we must also believe him when he actually claims אבותי של, at least to the extent that his אבותי lived there for one day. This will not contradict the עדים who testify (in general terms) that the litigant’s parents lived there. It will also permit בי"ד to claim on behalf of the המיגו בעל that his parents bought it from his litigant’s parents. תוספות expands his question: ולקמן נמי דקאמרי⁶ נהרדעי דהיכא דאמר של אבותי שלקחוה מאבותיך דחוזר וטוען⁷ – And also later when the גמרא states that the scholars of נהרדעי agree that in a case where the המיגו בעל subsequently claimed; ‘it belonged to my parents who bought it from your parents’ that he is permitted to restate his claim. Even though originally he stated that it belonged to my parents, implying that it did not belong to your parents; nevertheless he may qualify and restate his original claim to mean that של אבותי שלקחו מאבותיך. This concludes the forthcoming גמרא. תוספות concludes the question: Why is it necessary for him to claim that מאבותיך לקחו אבותי – הא אפילו לא יטעון שלקחוה אלא אמר שדרו בה יום אחד אנן טענינן⁸ ליה – for even if he will not claim that my parents bought it from your parents, meaning that he did not observe the transaction but rather he merely claimed that his parents lived there for (only) one day; that should be sufficient that he should acquire the property, for we (ד"בי) will argue on his behalf that his parents indeed bought it from his litigant’s parents. Why was it necessary for the נהרדעי to say that the המיגו בעל himself has to claim מאבותיך שלקחו אבותי של?⁹ תוספות answers: ואומר רבינו יצחק דשל אבותי משמע שהיתה מעולם של אבותי ולא שלקחוה – And the ר"י says the answer to the first question is that the phrase ‘it belonged to my parents’, implies that it always belonged to my parents and it cannot be interpreted to mean that they purchased it – עד שיפרש בדבריו – unless he explicitly states it. Therefore we cannot assume that the מחזיק meant to say that אבותי דרו בה יום אחד, but rather that they always lived there. This contradicts the testimony of the עדים. That is why it is considered a מה לי לשקר במקום עדים. Concerning the second question, תוספות continues: ולקמן דנקט שלקחוה לא שצריך שיטעון שידע שלקחוה – And later when the גמרא uses the term ‘**that they (**the parents of the מחזיק) bought it’ which implies that יומא חד בה דר is insufficient, but he must claim מאבותיך שלקחו, which contradicts the idea of וללוקח ליורש טוענין; it does not mean that it is necessary for the בעל המיגו to claim that he knows that they purchased it – אלא של אבותי שראיתי שדרו בה יום אחד על כן אני רוצה לזכות – But rather he is claiming ‘it is my parents’ since I have seen that they lived there for one day therefore I want to have a right in this property – דשמא לקחוה¹⁰ אבותי במשפט וטוענין ליורש:¹¹ For perhaps they have rightfully purchased it [from your parents], and בי"ד is obligated to argue on my behalf since I am an heir’. The מאבותיך שלקחו is to be understood that since I saw that יומא חד בה דרו, therefore בי"ד should claim that my parents לקחו מאבותיך.

SUMMARY The statement אבותי של (unless it is explicitly qualified) implies that it always belonged to my parents.

THINKING IT OVER תוספות asks that we should interpret the claim of אבותי של to mean בה יום שדרו אחד. Why did not תוספות ask simpler; let us interpret אבותי של to mean של אבותי שלקחו מאבותיך, (especially) since eventually that is the טענינן?!¹²**** What are the opposing assumptions of the א"רשב and the ר"י?

footnotes: ¹ It seems that תוספות assumes that the עדים did not testify that they knew that it belonged to the litigant’s parents up until their death; rather they testified that in general it belonged to his parents without being specific that it belonged to them until their death. ² The ש"רש is 'שלקחוה' גורס. ³ This follows תוספות opinion (in לאו ה"תוד א,ל דף), that we do not require עדים that יום חד ביה דר in order to implement the וליורש ללוקח טענינן. It is sufficient if the מחזיק claims that יומא חד ביה דר and can substantiate this claim with a מיגו (as in our case). See there (footnotes # 8&9) that others ([?]ם"רשב) disagree. ⁴ The המיגו בעל did not actually claim that his parents אחד יום בו דרו, but rather אבותי של. Nevertheless in order not to contradict the עדים we will interpret the אבותי של to meant that אחד יום בה שדרו של אבותי. ⁵ It is apparent from here that the claim of יומא חד בה דרו cannot be substantiated by a חזקה (alone); but rather a מיגו is required. Perhaps a חזקה can only substantiate an actual claim of purchase such as זבינתה מינך (or maybe even מפלניא דזבנה מינך קמי דידי זבינתה), however a claim of יומא חד בה דרו which by itself is not a valid claim (it must rely on the טענינן), that cannot be substantiated by a חזקה, ב"וצ. ⁶ The הגהות הב"ח amends this to read דקאמר דמודו נהרדעי. ⁷ The claim of מאבותיך שלקחו אבותי של is implied in the original claim of אבותי של. ⁸ See previous footnote # 3. ⁹ It would seem that the second question of the א"רשב follows the pattern of a 'לומר תמצא ואם'. Even if we were to assume that the טענה of אבותי של cannot mean יומא חד בה דדרו אבותי של for it is not implicit in the טענה, nevertheless if he were to claim (later) explicitly יומא חד בה דדרו אבותי של [similar to the case of ומודו נהרדעי] he should be believed (on account of ליורש טענינן), even if he did not state clearly שלקחו מאבותיך אבותי של. However, a difficulty remains. If we are to assume that the second question presumes that אבותי של does not imply יומא חד בח שדרו, then why should he be believed that יומא חד בה דרו even if he explicitly claimed it?! The מיגו of זבינתה מינך, has now become a למפרע מיגו (see קכב אות י"בל), since he already stated אבותי של! (See also footnote # 5.) Perhaps, here it is not considered a מיגו למפרע. The second claim of בה יומא חד דרו is naturally contained within the first claim of אבותי של. According to תוספות ל,א ד"ה לאו (see there footnote # 15), the reason and rule of למפרע מיגו is only when אדעתיה אסיק לא concerning the subsequent טענה. Here, however, not only is it אדעתיה אסיק that יומא חד בה דרו, but it is inherently contained in his first טענה. In such a case, אמרינן למפרע מיגו. See also previous אבל ה"ד א,לא 'תוס footnote # 3. ב"וצ. ¹⁰ The הגהות הב"ח amends this to read לקחוה מאבותיך במשפט דטוענין ליורש. ¹¹ It seems that the ר"י agrees to the premise of the s'א"רשב second question. His answer is that indeed this is what the גמרא means. ¹² See כ אות ד"סוכ.

ומודו נהרדעי היכא דאמר שלקחוה כולי—And the נהרדעי admit in a case where he claimed that my parents bought it, etc.

OVERVIEW All agree in the case of אבהתא עדי and חזקה עדי if the litigants retain their original claim of אבותי של that we award the property to אבהתא עדי. If the מחזיק changes his claim to זבינתה מינך, there is a dispute. עולא maintains חוזר וטוען and the נהרדעי maintain אינו חוזר וטוען.¹ If the מחזיק left the בי"ד, עולא admits that he cannot subsequently claim זבינתה מינך for we concerned that he was coached. נהרדעי admit that he can be מאבותיך שלקחו אבותי וטוען חוזר. The claim מאבותיך שלקחו is more implied in his original claim of אבותי של, than זבינתה מינך. The general rule is that a person may interpret and qualify his claim; he may not, however, change his claim.

The ר"י is in doubt in a case where the מחזיק went outside of בי"ד and then returned and came back to בי"ד if he can still claim this; i.e. thatאבותי שלקחו מאבותיך. Do we say that since he went outside we are concerned that someone taught him this new claim (as the דין is if he wants to claim now 'וכו זבינתה מינך); or perhaps the claim of אבותי שלקחו מאבותיך is so inherent in the original claim of אבותי של that he may claim it even after he left בי"ד and subsequently returned.

SUMMARY תוספות is in doubt what is the דין if he left בי"ד and now wants to claim של אבותי שלקחו מאבותיך.

THINKING IT OVER

1. The original claim of של אבותי is not acceptable. There is seemingly an equal probability of טענתיה אגמריה, whether it is מינך זבינתיה or שלקחו מאבותיך. Why should there be a ספק? The two cases should be the same!
2. Is תוספות ספק (only) according to the נהרדעי, or (also) according to עולא?²

footnotes: ¹ Their dispute is whether זבינתה מינך is implied in אבותי של or not. ² It seems from the structure (sequential order) of the גמרא, that the problem with 'וטען מאבראי ואתא', is by (the case of) עולא (and not by the case of נהרדעי).

אמר ליה רבא והא עדות מוכחשת היא—רבא said to him; But this is a contradicted testimony

OVERVIEW Testimony of witnesses can be disqualified in the following two ways: A. הכחשה – a contradictory testimony. If two groups of עדים contradict each other as to the veracity of an incident; where one group claims that it took place and the other denies that it took place, neither testimony is accepted, and their testimony is disqualified The גמרא will shortly cite a dispute between רב הונא and רב חסדא whether these two groups of עדים may testify in the future, or that they are disqualified to testify in future cases as well for they are considered (possible) liars (מספק). B. הזמה – a refuted testimony. If the second group of עדים testifies that the first group of עדים could not have possibly seen the incident at the purported time and place (regardless of whether the incident took place or not); for at that same time the first group of עדים where in fact together with the second group at a different location. In this case of הזמה, the second group is believed and the first group is refuted, and become disqualified to be עדים in the future as well. There is a dispute between אביי ורבא as to when this disqualification becomes effective. אביי maintains that the refuted (זוממין) עדים, become disqualified retroactively from the time of their testimony. Any testimony given by the עדים זוממין from their initial testimony (for which they were subsequently refuted) and onward, is voided. רבא, however maintains that they become פסול only from the time of their refutation by the עדים המזימים, and onward.¹ Any testimony given prior to their הזמה is valid. The case at hand: ראובן and שמעון are disputing the ownership of a property, each one claiming that he inherited it from his parents. ראובן had עדים that it once belonged to his father and in addition that ראובן made a חזקה in this property. שמעון only had עדים that he made a חזקה (contradicting the עדים of ראובן who claimed that ראובן made the חזקה). רב נחמן ruled that the two contradictory עדות אכילה cancel out, leaving ראובן with ownership on account of his עדי אבהתא. רבא disagreed and argued that these עדים of ראובן were already disqualified and are completely discredited. תוספות will be discussing sרבא' view.

תוספות asks: תימה אמאי הואי עדות מוכחשת והא רבא אית ליה במרובה (בבא קמא דף עב,ב ושם דיבור המתחיל רבא)- It is incomprehensible! Why is the testimony concerning parental ownership (אבהתא עדות) considered as a contradicted testimony? We can perhaps salvage the part of the testimony where no contradictory testimony was provided; the אבהתא עדות. תוספות goes on to explain: For רבא maintains in פרק מרובה – ובפרק זה בורר (סנהדרין דף כז,א ושם דיבור המתחיל רבא) דעד זומם מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל – And in פרק זה בורר that a refuted witness becomes disqualified from the time of refutation and onwards; he is not פסול retroactively from the time of his testimony – ולא מפסל אלא משעה דאתכחוש – Rather he is פסול only from the time he was contradicted. The testimony that the עד gave prior to the actual הזמה (concerning other issues [not related to the הזמה]) is valid testimony. It would seem logical that this ruling concerning זומם עד, that הוא נפסל ולהבא מכאן, should apply to עדי הכחשה as well.² The disqualification of their testimony is not retroactive from the time of their testimony, but rather from the time they were actually contradicted and onwards.³ תוספות concludes the question: ואית לן למימר אאכילתה דאתכחוש אתכחוש אאבהתא דלא אתכחוש לא אתכחוש – And we should therefore assume that concerning their testimony regarding consumption (חזקה) where they were contradicted by the other group of עדים who claimed that the other party made the חזקה**, they are** indeed discredited and cannot be believed; that testimony is disqualified. However concerning their testimony regarding parental ownership where they were not contradicted; the other עדים said nothing concerning parental ownership of the property, they are not contradicted; and that testimony should not be disqualified. We should accept their testimony that it belonged to his parents. If we would maintain, that נפסל הוא למפרע, then their testimony would retroactively be invalid from the moment they stated it. At the time of their testimony they stated אבהתא and אכילתה together; it was one testimony. Therefore, since part of their testimony is obviously disqualified (at the time of their testimony), for it was contradicted; then anything else that they testified at that time (תוך כדי דיבור) is included in this disqualification. [There is a rule; a testimony that is partially nullified becomes completely nullified.] If we maintain, however, מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל, it would mean that after בי"ד heard all aspects of the case and found the עדים to be contradictory, their testimony becomes void from that moment on, only.⁴ At the time of their testimony, however, it should be considered a valid testimony.⁵ It is just that we cannot subsequently act on (part of) their testimony since it is contradicted by the other עדים⁶ and must be disqualified. However this should apply only to the testimony that is subsequently being contradicted. Any other testimony that they previously testified remains valid, since it was not contradicted.⁷ תוספות will now prove that we can separate the two aspects of their testimony; the עדות אבהתא and עדות אכילתה. We can accept one, even when we discard the other. דהכי אמר במרובה (בבא קמא דף עג,א ושם) דהוזמו על הטביחה ועל הגניבה לא הוזמו – For this is what the גמרא states in פרק מרובה concerning עדים who testified that an individual stole and slaughtered an animal, which would require the thief to pay four/five times the amount that he stole (תשלומי ד' וה'); if these עדים were refuted (הוזמו) concerning the slaughtering, however they were not הוזם concerning the theft; that testimony was not refuted by the המזימים עדים – אף על גב דתוך כדי דבור⁸ העידו על הגניבה ועל הטביחה – even though the המוזמים עדים testified consecutively דיבור כדי תוך, both on the robbery and the slaughtering; both testimonies were offered consecutively without interruption. This would seemingly make it into one testimony. Nevertheless the גמרא there maintains that – לרבא כיון דמההיא שעתא דקא מיתזמי הוא דקא מיפסלי – according to רבא**, since it is from that time that they were הוזם**; it is only from then that they become פסול, and not from any time before, therefore – אטביחה דאיתזום איתזום על הגניבה דלא איתזום לא איתזום – concerning the slaughtering which they were מוזם – איתזום – they were indeed מוזם; however concerning the robbery for which they were not מוזם they are not considered זוממין עדים regarding the robbery.⁹ This concludes the quote from the גמרא. We may derive from that גמרא, that (according to רבא that מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל) it is possible to separate the two aspects of their testimony even though they were offered simultaneously. The עדות of גניבה remains a valid עדות even though it was said together with טביחה עדות, which was subsequently הוזם. The same should hold true here. The עדות of אבהתא should remain valid, even though it was said together with the אכילתה עדות which was subsequently הוכחש. Why then does רבא, who maintains מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל, argue on נחמן רב and claim that it is an מוכחשת עדות. תוספות offers a qualified explanation: וללישנא דהוי טעמא דרבא¹⁰ משום דעד זומם חידוש¹¹ ואין לך אלא משעת חידושו ניחא – And according to the opinion [there] that the reason that רבא maintains עד זומם מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל, is because the law of זומם עד is a novelty, and you cannot implement this חידוש, only from the time when this חידוש takes place and onwards; i.e. from the time of the הזמה. According to this opinion it is understood. There is no question. תוספות initially assumed that since by הזמה it is מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל, therefore by הכחשה it is also ולהבא מכאן; therefore we had the question. However we can say that only by הזמה is it נפסל הוא ולהבא מכאן, as the reason indicates since it is a חידוש. However by הכחשה where there is no חידוש – we do not believe any group of עדים more than the other; in fact we believe neither group, then we follow the logical conclusion that the עדות is למפרע בטל; at the time of the testimony. It is at that point when they (may) have lied. If the testimony is למפרע בטל, then it is understood that we cannot believe the אבהתא עדות either, since it is part of a disqualified testimony. אלא ללישנא דמפרש טעמא דרבא משום פסידא דלקוחות הכא נמי נהימנינהו – However, according to the opinion that explains the reason רבא maintains**** עד**** זומם מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל**** is not because חידוש הוא, but rather on account of the purchasers’ loss.¹² Therefore here too by הכחשה, we should believe the עדים since it is מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל. תוספות anticipates a possible answer and rejects it. Seemingly one may argue that we maintain נפסל הוא ולהבא מכאן when we entertain a דלקוחות פסידא. However in our case, when both groups of עדים came to בי"ד together; even if we would rule that הוא נפסל למפרע, there will be no פסידא דלקוחות. These עדים did not sign on any documents between their הגדה and הכחשה. Therefore since there is no realistic דלקוחות פסידא, even רבא admits that נפסל הוא למפרע. תוספות rejects this idea: ואפילו היכא דליכא פסידא דלקוחות לא מיפסל למפרע אפילו לההיא לישנא – And even in a case where there is no loss to the consumers; as in our case, where they did not sign on any שטר between the הגדה and the הכחשה, nevertheless they are not disqualified retroactively even according to that opinion; which maintains that the reason נפסל הוא ולהבא מכאן זומם עד is (only) because of דלקוחות פסידא. An עד is always נפסל only ולהבא מכאן, even if there is no specific דלקוחות פסידא in that instance. תוספות will now prove that (even) according to the לשון that נפסל הוא ולהבא מכאן, is on account of דלקוחות פסידא, nevertheless they will always maintain that נפסל הוא ולהבא מכאן even if there is no דלקוחות פסידא in a specific case – מדבעי התם מאי איכא בין האי לישנא להאי לישנא – Since the גמרא queries there; in מרובה פרק what difference is there between this opinion (הוא חידוש) and the other opinion (דלקוחות פסידא) – ולא קאמר איכא בינייהו להיכא דליכא פסידא דלקוחות – And the גמרא does not state that there is a difference between them – in a case where there is no פסידא דלקוחות. The גמרא could have answered that in a case where there is no פסידא דלקוחות there is a difference between the two לשונות. If we maintain the reason is because עד זומם is a חידוש then it makes no difference whether or not there is a ללקוחות פסידא, in all cases it is מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל. However if we maintain that the reason is because of פסידא דלקוחות, then only when there is a פסידא do we say מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל, but when there is no פסידא, we should maintain that הוא נפסל למפרע. The גמרא however does not make this distinction. That proves that the גמרא maintains (even according to the reason of פסידא דלקוחות) that in all instances whether or not there is a פסידא דלקוחות we maintain that מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל. In summation: the question remains; according to the לשון that רבא maintains עד זומם מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל because of פסידא דלקוחות; the same rule should apply to עדים מוכחשים that the testimony becomes בטל מכאן ולהבא. Therefore only the contradicted testimony (עדי חזקה) should be disqualified but the uncontested testimony (עדי אבהתא) should remain. Why does רבא claim that it is an עדות מוכחשת?! תוספות has an additional question: ועוד קשיא דקאמר בסמוך אליבא דרב חסדא כולי עלמא לא פליגי – And there is another difficulty, for the גמרא will shortly state that according to רב חסדא, who maintains that both groups of עדים that were מוכחש cannot testify in the future (for they are [suspected] liars), no one argues; both נחמן רב and רבא will agree that it is an מוכחשת עדות and we cannot accept (even) the testimony of אבהתא. The simple understanding is that since רב חסדא disqualifies both עדים (as opposed to הונא רב who only disqualifies their testimony in this case where they are מוכחשים עדים); therefore we cannot accept the testimony of אבהתא עדות since they are פסולים עדים. משמע דרב נחמן לא מצי סבר בשום ענין כרב חסדא דחשיב להו סהדי שקרי – It seems from the גמרא that נ"ר can in no way maintain like רב חסדא, for ר"ח considers them false עדים. It seems from the גמרא that נחמן רב and רב חסדא are mutually exclusive. If we accept the ruling of ח"ר that the עדים are פסול, we cannot accept the ruling of נ"ר, that they are believed concerning the אבהתא. תוספות challenges this assumption – ומנא ליה דלמא סבר רב נחמן דמכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל¹³ – But how does the גמרא derive this; that נחמן רב disagrees with ח"ר, perhaps נ"ר maintains that he becomes disqualified (according to רב חסדא) only from now and onwards; however למפרע they are כשר. Therefore we can believe their previous testimony of אכילה עדות which was not contested. תוספות offers an answer on the second question: ומיהו הא איכא למימר משום דלא קיימא לן כרבא בהא¹⁴ – However, we can say this, to explain why the גמרא asserts that נ"ר and ח"ר disagree; we cannot reconcile them by assuming that נ"ר maintains מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל, because we do not follow the ruling of רבא in this case of נפסל הוא ולהבא מכאן. Rather we follow the opinion of אביי that הוא נפסל למפרע. It is assumed that נ"ר also maintains למפרע הוא נפסל (since generally הילכתא כר"נ [בדיני]). The first question, however, remains. We are discussing the opinion of רבא, and it is רבא who maintains נפסל הוא ולהבא מכאן, why therefore does he argue that it is an מוכחשת עדות?! תוספות answers: ונראה דסוגיא דהכא כההיא לישנא דחידוש – And it appears that we are forced to say that this סוגיא follows the view of that opinion that the reason רבא maintains נפסל הוא מכאן ולהבא is since זומם עד is a חידוש. It is therefore understood, as תוספות mentioned previously, that this applies only to עדים זוממים, which are a חידוש. However by הכחשה עדי where there is no חידוש in the fact that we follow neither group, then the ruling will be that the testimony is disqualified למפרע, and since the two testimonies of אכילה ואבהתא were said simultaneously (דיבור כדי תוך), they are both disqualified. This is what רבא meant when he said היא מוכחשת עדות והא since it is למפרע מוכחשת. A question still remains; how will the לשון of דלקוחות פסידא explain our גמרא where רבא argues מוכחשת היא עדות והא? תוספות continues: אבל ללישנא דפסידא דלקוחות סבר דלא אמר ליה רבא לרב נחמן מעולם הכי – However, that opinion that the reason רבא maintains מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל is on account of פסידא דלקוחות, they will maintain that רבא never said such a thing to ר"נ that it is an עדות מוכחשת. Since רבא maintains that we always say (both by הזמה and הכחשה) that the פסול is מכאן ולהבא, therefore the עדות אבהתא which was not מוכחש will be accepted, as ר"נ ruled. תוספות will now offer a different solution to his question. תוספות originally assumed that we can divide the testimony of the עדים into two parts; אבהתא עדות and אכילה עדות. We will maintain that even though עדות אכילה was contradicted, but since עדות אבהתא was not contradicted, it should be accepted. תוספות supported this view from the גמרא in מרובה concerning עדים who were מוזם on their testimony of טביחה but not on the testimony of גניבה. The גמרא there maintains that if we assume that עד זומם מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל, then אטביחה דאיתזם איתזם but אגניבה דלא איתזם לא איתזם, and we accept their testimony concerning גניבה .תוספות until now considered the two cases identical. The ריב"א will distinguish between the case of גניבה וטביחה and the case of אבהתא ואכילה. ולרבינו יצחק בן אשר נראה דלא דמי הך דהכא לההיא דמרובה – And the א"ריב is of the opinion that the case here concerning ואבהתא אכילה is not similar to that case in מרובה פרק**,** concerning וטביחה גניבה דהתם גניבה וטביחה תרי מילי נינהו – For there, stealing and slaughtering are two separate issues. One can be liable for גניבה even if he is not liable for טביחה ולהכי אגניבה דלא איתזום לא איתזום כיון דלהבא הוא נפסל – And therefore concerning their testimony of גניבה for which there was no הזמה, they are not מוזם. We believe them that he stole. The liability for stealing exists regardless whether he was טובח afterwards or not. The two חיובים do not depend on each other, therefore we can separate them since רבא maintains that an זומם עד is להבא נפסל. At the time of their testimony they were כשרים עדים. They testified that someone stole. That testimony on its own makes the גנב liable to pay. אלא הכא כי איתכחוש אאכילה איתכחוש נמי אאבהתא דאבהתא בלא אכילתה לא מהני – However here it is different, since the testimony concerning אבהתא is dependent on the עדות of אכילה as תוספות continues to expound. When they were discredited concerning the חזקה**;** the other עדים claimed that the other party made the חזקה, they are also discredited concerning the parental testimony; we cannot accept their testimony that it belonged to his parents, even though no one is contradicting them. The reason is because the two testimonies of אבהתא ואכילה are intertwined for testifying merely that it belonged to his parents without testifying concerning the חזקה**, is not sufficient** to grant him the property, even if it indeed belonged once to his parents. If we were to verify that it belonged to the parents of one of the litigants (ראובן) but the other litigant (שמעון) has עדים that he made a חזקה, the ruling would be – דהוי מוקמינן בידיה דאית ליה סהדי דאכלה שני חזקה – We would have placed it in the possession of the one who has witnesses that he made a חזקה. The reason why שמעון who has חזקה עדי would retain it even though he has no עדים to support his claim that he inherited from his father, is because – דנאמן לומר היתה של אבותי יום אחד¹⁵ במיגו דאי בעי אמר מינך זבינתה – He is believed to claim that it belonged to my father for one day, since he has a מיגו, for he could have said instead I bought it from you (ראובן). The מיגו establishes that his father owned it at some point (after s'ראובן parents). שמעון will retain the property for he has a חזקה שיש עמה טענה. The עדות of אבהתא alone cannot grant the property to ראובן (as just explained). In fact if the עדים testify only that it belonged to s'ראובן parents, the property will be awarded to שמעון. The only strength of these עדים is if the claim of אבהתא is combined with the עדות of אכילה. This עדות must be viewed as one whole עדות, not as two separate עדויות. Therefore since the עדות of אכילה was מוכחש, it is a הכחשה of the entire עדות including the עדות of אבהתא. It is not similar to עדי גניבה ועדי טביחה. There still remains, however, a certain difficulty with this answer. The גמרא shortly will initially maintain that the dispute between ר"נ and רבא parallels the dispute between רב הונא and רב חסדא respectively. ר"נ who states that we accept the עדות אבהתא agrees with רב הונא that the עדות מוכחשים are still עדים כשרים in the future, while רבא, who states that we cannot accept the עדות אבהתא agrees with רב חסדא that the עדים מוכחשים are עדים פסולים (מספק) in the future. The גמרא, however, retracts this assumption. It is possible that רבא can agree with רב הונא that these עדים are כשר in future cases – עדות אחרת; it is only in the very same case – לאותה עדות, that רבא maintains that they cannot be believed. This גמרא implies that originally we assumed that אותה עדות and עדות אחרת are equal (otherwise there would be no comparison). If they are believed לעדות אחרת (the view of רב הונא) they should also be believed לאותה עדות (the view of ר"נ); if they are not believed לאותה עדות (רבא) they would not be believed לעדות אחרת (רב חסדא). תוספות poses his question:

However, since as of yet before the final מסקנא of the גמרא that the גמרא considers our case of ואכילתא אבהתא like an אחרת עדות**;** that the two testimonies are not entwined, but rather they are separate testimonies, as in the dispute between ה"ר and ח"ר which deals with אחרת עדות; and רבא cannot agree with ה"ר (even though it is an אחרת עדות) but must follow the ruling of ח"ר. Therefore, the answer of the א"ריב will not appropriately resolve the difficulty; for if they are separate testimonies (עדות אחרת), then, since רבא maintains מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל, the עדות of אבהתא is separate from עדות אכילה, and should be accepted. [Or conversely:] The ריב"א distinguishes between the case of גניבה וטביחה which are two independent עדויות, and אכילה ואבהתא which are dependent on each other and considered as one. If this distinction is inherent in understanding רבא, then how could the גמרא assume that עדות אותה and עדות אחרת are the same? We see that רבא distinguishes even באותה עדות whether the two עדויות are entangled or not. Certainly רבא will distinguish between אותה עדות and עדות אחרת.

SUMMARY רבא maintains עד זומם מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל. If this is because עד זומם חידוש הוא, then by הכחשה it will be נפסל למפרע. However if it is because of פסידא דלקוחות then by הכחשה it will also be נפסל מכאן ולהבא. According to this latter view רבא will agree to ר"נ that the עדי אבהתא is valid (just as the עדי גניבה are valid) since it was not contradicted. The ריב"א distinguishes between עדי גניבה which is not entwined with עדי טביחה as opposed to עדי אבהתא which is dependent on עדי אכילה, and therefore the entire testimony is פסול even if we maintain the view of פסידא דלקוחות.

THINKING IT OVER

1. Every הזמה is automatically a הכחשה. If we assume the reason of זומם חידוש עד, הוא should not the זוממים עדים be מספק לעדות פסול from the time of their testimony?¹⁷
2. תוספות cannot reconcile the ריב"א with the ס"ד of the גמרא that it is comparable to an עדות אחרת.¹⁸ Perhaps we can differentiate between the עדות אחרת concerning the מחלוקת of ר"ה ור"ח and the חד מילי of the ריב"א. The מחלוקת between ר"ה ור"ח is whether or not these עדים are (now) considered to be liars. According to ר"ה that they are not liars, and are believed in other (future) testimony, then the עדות אבהתא cannot be considered מוכחשת since the עדים are כשרים¹⁹ and אבהתא is an עדות אחרת than the עדות אכילה²⁰ (even if they are entwined). We must conclude that רבא agrees with ר"ח, that they are liars. Once we assume that they are פסול לעדות, we cannot separate the testimony of אבהתא from אכילה, since אבהתא requires אכילה, making אבהתא ואכילה into one הגדה, and this הגדה is offered by עדים פסולים (מכאן ולהבא עכ"פ).²¹

footnotes: ¹ There are two explanations in the גמרא (in ב"ק) why רבא maintains his (questionable) position (for seemingly since these עדים certainly lied at the time of their testimony, they should become נפסל from that time onward). One is that since the entire idea of עד זומם is a (חידוש) novel concept (for why should we believe the second group more than the first group); therefore we limit the חידוש as much as possible (אין לך בו אלא חידושו) and the power of the עדים המזימים to disqualify the עדים זוממין is limited to the moment of הזמה and onward. The second explanation is that if we were to פסל them למפרע, then there would be losses (ללקוחות) פסידא to all those who used these עדים (in between the עדות and הזמה), for their documents of loans and purchases would be voided. See later footnote # 11. ² In fact one may argue that the פסול of הכחשה is weaker than the פסול of הזמה. If by הזמה the פסול is only ולהבא מכאן, then certainly by הכחשה the disqualification of their עדות should only be ולהבא מכאן. ³ By הזמה the terms ולהבא מכאן or נפסל הוא למפרע is referring to the פסול of the עד himself. By הכחשה, however (according to הונא רב), these terms refer to the disqualification of the עדות, not to the עדים at all. ⁴ It would therefore make no difference which group of עדים testified first, or the order of their individual testimony, whether they said אבהתא first or אכילתה first. In all instances they become an מוכחשת עדות only after all the testimony is presented, accepted and ruled upon by ד"בי. ⁵ This should be true even according to רב חסדא who maintains that these עדים become פסול for future עדות. It is only after the הכחשה that they become פסולים עדים but not at the time of their עדות הגדת (see תוספות second question further on, and footnote # 13). ⁶ According to רב חסדא this will cause them to be disqualified as עדים in the future as well (on account that they are שקר עדי ספק). However neither they nor their testimony are disqualified retroactively. ⁷ If we maintain ולהבא מכאן then at the time of the testimony there was no contradictory testimony, they were עדים כשרים; therefore there is no ruling of כולה בטלה מקצתה שבטלה עדות. See 'וכו מט אות ד"סוכ. ⁸ דיבור כדי תוך – means the time that it takes to say the words 'רבי עליך שלום'. If the interruption between statements was less than that time, it is considered דיבור כדי תוך; as one statement. ⁹ They are not obligated to pay the קנס of זמם כאשר concerning the גניבה, but only for the טביחה. In addition, the גנב has to pay the תשלומי כפל based on their testimony. ¹⁰ The הגהות הב"ח amends this to read דרבא התם משום דעד זומם חידוש הוא ואין לך בו אלא ¹¹ See footnote # 1. ¹² If we were to disqualify them retroactively, then all those buyers who used these עדים on their מקח שטרי (with no way of knowing that these עדים will subsequently be disqualified retroactively), will suffer irreparable loss. Their שטרות will be voided. Therefore the law instituted that they become פסול only ולהבא מכאן. According to this opinion there is no difference between הכחשה and הזמה, if we protect the consumer in the case of הזמה the same protection is required in the case of הכחשה. ¹³ This second question (even though it seems similar to the original question) adds an additional dimension. According to the first question תוספות argued that if נפסל הוא ולהבא מכאן then we should believe the אבהתא עדות (at least) according to הונא רב who maintains 'וכו ומעידה עצמה בפני באה זו. There is no פסול in the עדים; it is just that we cannot follow the testimony of either group since they are ז"זא מכחישים. However concerning אבהתא עדות in which there was no הכחשה we can follow their testimony. תוספות is now adding that even if they become פסולים עדים on account of the הכחשה, nevertheless if we maintain הוא נפסל ולהבא מכאן, that פסול is effective in future cases, not in their past testimony. Therefore the אבהתא עדות, which was not מוכחש and was offered before they became פסולים עדים, should be accepted (see footnote # 5). ¹⁴ This is represented by the letter 'ע' (נפסל הוא למפרע זומם עד) in the ruling that 'ם"קג ל"יע'ב כאביי הלכתא. ¹⁵ Even if שמעון originally claimed אבותי של, he can still restate his claim to mean מאבותיך שלקחו אבותי של, (in order not to contradict עדים s'ראובן who say it belonged to s'ראובן parents). שמעון will be believed on the basis of the מיגו, and would be awarded property since he has a חזקה. ¹⁶ See ‘Thinking it over’ # 2. ¹⁷ See נח"מ (בד"ה וללישנא). ¹⁸ See footnote # 16. ¹⁹ This would be true (in the ד"ס) even if we maintain נפסל הוא למפרע, for there is no פסול. ²⁰ Even the עדות אכילה is not considered ‘false’; we just cannot deal with it since it is contradicted. ²¹ See אברהם ברכת.