והאמר רבי יוחנן כולי—However, ר"י said, etc.

OVERVIEW There is a מחלוקת between ג"ורשב א"ר, as to when we are א"ע פ"ע לכהונה מעלה. The גמרא says that we cannot assume that the מחלוקת is in a case where an א"ע was already מערער on the כהונה status; for יוחנן רבי taught that everyone agrees אין ערער פחות משנים. Therefore if there would be merely an דחד ערער, all would agree that א"ע פ"ע לכהונה מעלין. This statement of ר"י is mentioned several times in ס"ש; always in the form of a challenge: ‘But ר"י maintains משנים פחות ערער אין’. It never says explicitly in what context ר"י made this statement.¹ Our תוספות will resolve this issue.

ונראה לרבינו יצחק דרבי יוחנן עיקר דבריו² אהך משנה איתמר – And the ר"י is of the opinion that the main statement of יוחנן 'ר concerning אין ערער פחות משנים was taught regarding this משנה of אין מעלין לכהונה. והיינו³ דקאמר דברי הכל היינו רבן שמעון בן גמליאל ורבי אלעזר דאיירו בעוררין⁴ – And that (is) which ר"י said ‘all agree’, refers to רשב"ג and ר"א for they are discussing ‘contesters’; they both maintain (according to ר"י) that משנים פחות ערער אין. תוספות will substantiate his opinion that ר"י is discussing this משנה: ולהכי לא קא משני הכא הני מילי היכא דאיכא חזקה דכשרות – And therefore, since ר"י specifically maintains that רשב"ג and א"ר both agree that משנים פחות ערער אין, the גמרא does not answer here that perhaps א"ור רשב"ג are arguing over דחד ערער, and even though ר"י stated משנים פחות**** ערער אין these words (of יוחנן 'ר) apply only where there is a presumption of כשרות; only in such an instance are two עדים required to revoke the כשרות חזקת – אבל היכא דליכא חזקה דכשרות לא אמר⁵ – However where there is no כשרות חזקת, then ר"י did not say this ruling of אין ערער פחות משנים. The גמרא seemingly could have given this answer with the understanding that in the משנה of 'וכו מעלין אין there is no כשרות חזקת. Therefore א"ר can maintain חד ערער and not be in conflict with ר"י. This distinction between כשרות חזקת איכא and כשרות חזקת ליכא is a valid distinction concerning אין ערער פחות משנים – כדמשני בפרק עשרה יוחסין (קדושין דף עג,ב) גבי נאמנת חיה לומר זה כהן⁶ – As the גמרא answers in פרק עשרה יוחסין concerning the ruling that a midwife is believed to say ‘this infant is a כהן’. The explanation why the גמרא does not give the same answer here, is because the גמרא knew that ר"י – דאמתניתין דהכא קאי⁷ – was referring to this משנה of 'וכו מעלין אין, when he stated that דברי הכל אין ערער פחות משנים. ר"י is clearly stating that both רשב"ג and א"ר agree that מ"אעפ. Therefore we cannot say that they argue in a case of חד ערער. תוספות asks: ואם תאמר כיון דאמתניתין דהכא קאי – And if you say; since ר"י is referring to this משנה of מעלין אין – היכי פריך מיניה התם ובפרק קמא דגיטין⁸ (דף ט,א ושם) – How does the גמרא there in קידושין challenge the ruling there from the statement of ר"י, and similarly in the first פרק of מסכת גיטין; where the גמרא also challenges the presumption that it was an חד ערער from the statement of ר"י. If ר"י is specifically referring to the משנה of אין מעלין, then the גמרא could not challenge the rulings in גיטין and קידושין; for – דלמא הא דקאמר רבי יוחנן אין ערער פחות משנים היינו משום דאיכא עד אחד דמכשיר⁹ – Perhaps that which ר"י said that אין ערער פחות משנים that is because in the משנה of אין מעלין, where ר"א and רשב"ג discuss how we can be מעלה לכהונה, there is one עד who is מכשיר this person to be a כהן. In such an instance ר"י says that if there is an ע"א המכשיר, then there can be no ערער on his כשרות unless two עדים are מערער. However in the cases in מסכתות גיטין וקידושין where there is no עד המכשיר,¹⁰ then perhaps even ר"י would agree that even an ערער דחד is a valid ערער (even in cases where there is a חזקת כשרות).¹¹ תוספות answers: ויש לומר דהגמרא ידע דרבי יוחנן מיירי כדמסיק דיצא עליו קול שהוא בן גרושה – And one can say that the גמרא that asked these questions in מסכתות גיטין וקידושין knew that ר"י is discussing a particular situation as the גמרא concludes that originally it was presumed that that the father of this individual was a bona fide כהן, and it was afterwards that a rumor was spread that the individual is the son of a divorcee; invalidating him from the כהונה – ואחר כך בא עד אחד דמכשיר להסיר הקול ואתו בי תרי כולי – And afterwards an א"ע who was מכשיר came to remove the rumor and then two עדים came, etc.; to substantiate the rumor (and finally an additional א"ע came to deny the rumor). ובכהאי גוונא אמר רבי יוחנן דאין¹² פחות משנים – And it is in these circumstances that ר"י said אעפ"מ. It is concerning these (two) who come to substantiate the rumor, that ר"י says that there need to be two to substantiate the rumor; otherwise the ע"א המכשיר will be believed against the rumor and the ע"א המערער. תוספות will now conclude the answer: ואף על גב דעד אחד שהכשיר והקול כליתנהו דמי – And even though that when the two עדים who are מערער come, the situation is that the א"ע who was מכשיר and the rumor that denied him כהונה status; these two, the עד and the קול it is as if they do not exist; the cancel each other out. When the two עדים are מערער, it is as if there is no ע"א and there is no קול (as תוספות will shortly explain). Therefore since ר"י maintains that two עדים are required to make this ערער, it is tantamount to saying that two עדים are required for an ערער, even if there is no עד המכשיר. The עד המכשיר here is cancelled out by the קול. תוספות will explain why the ע"א המכשיר is cancelled out by the קול:

For the עד is inferior to the rumor (as תוספות will point out) if there was no חזקה. Now there is a חזקה; the father is מוחזק as a כהן, therefore even though there is a קול that the son is a גרושה בן, nevertheless the המכשיר א"ע is believed. However, we believe the א"ע in spite of the קול, only in combination with the original חזקה, which assists the א"ע and conflicts with the rumor. Were we to compare the א"ע against the קול without the aid of a חזקה, then the קול will be stronger than the א"ע. for a קול, which claims that he is a גרושה בן will invalidate his כהונה, even against a כשרות חזקת,¹³ however one עד, who claims that he is a גרושה בן, cannot invalidate the כהונה against a כשרות חזקת.¹⁴ This proves that a קול is stronger than an ע"א.**** It is only because the א"ע is assisted by the כשרות חזקת of the father in our case, that we validate the כהונה. The status of this כהן (after the קול and the המכשיר עד) is as it was originally, when we only knew of the כשרות חזקת of the father, without a קול and without an עד; for the קול and the עד cancel each other out.¹⁵ It is at this point that ר"י insists that any new ערער must consist of two עדים. This proves that משנים פחות ערער אין is valid even if there is no המכשיר א"ע.

SUMMARY We know that רשב"ג and א"ר are not discussing an חד ערער, since ר"י stated concerning their מחלוקת that משנים פחות ערער אין. This ruling of מ"אעפ applies (only) if there is a כשרות חזקת, even if there is no המכשיר עד; similar to the case of לכהונה מעלין where the המכשיר עד and the קול cancel out each other.

THINKING IT OVER תוספות asks that we cannot compare the situation in (וגיטין) קידושין 'מס to the case of ר"י, since by ר"י there is an המכשיר עד.¹⁶ Seemingly in קידושין 'מס, there is also an המכשיר עד; the חיה who claims כהן זה. Why is it any different than the case of מעלין לכהונה?¹⁷

footnotes: ¹ Indeed the ם"רשב here comments that it was never specified in which context ר"י made this statement.. ² It obviously applies to other situations as well, since the גמרא refers to this statement in various situations. ³ The הגהות הב"ח amends this to read והא instead of והיינו. ⁴ It may initially seem difficult to maintain that ר"י is referring to א"ור רשב"ג, since their argument entails either זילותא דבי דינא or עדות צירוף; and not concerning ערעור. Nevertheless since they are בעוררין איירי, their case consists of עוררין, therefore ר"י states that it must be two עוררין and no less. ⁵ There would be no need to say that our משנה is in a situation where הוא דכהן באבוה לן מוחזק. Rather there is no חזקה at all. ⁶ The ברייתא there states that the חיה is not believed if there is an ערער on the status of the child. The גמרא there asks how can an ערער of one contradict the testimony of the חיה; ר"י says משנים פחות ערער אין. The גמרא answered that there is a difference whether there is a כשרות חזקת or not. In the case of חיה נאמנת, the infant never had a כשרות חזקת; therefore even an דחד ערער is sufficient. ⁷ תוספות will therefore assume that in the משנה of מעלין אין there is a כשרות חזקת (as the גמרא shortly concludes). This will avoid any discrepancy with the גמרא in קידושין (see previous footnote # 6). ⁸ The משנה there states that if a גט is brought in י"א and there are עוררין then בחותמיו יתקיים. The גמרא asks, it cannot mean דחד ערער for ר"י maintains מ"אעפ, etc. ⁹ The מחלוקת between א"ור רשב"ג is concerning א"ע פ"ע לכהונה מעלין; implying that there is an המכשיר עד. ¹⁰ See ‘Thinking it over’. ¹¹ If we would not assume that ר"י is referencing this משנה, then it would be difficult to maintain that ר"י is discussing only a case where there is an המכשיר עד. It is not implied in his statement. However now that תוספות maintains that ר"י is referencing this משנה, and the משנה is discussing a case of המכשיר עד, then it is implicit that s'י"ר ruling may apply only if there is an המכשיר עד. ¹² The הגהות הב"ח amends this to read דאין ערער פחות. ¹³ This we can see from our גמרא; even though it was הוא דכהן באבוה מוחזק, nevertheless when there was a קול of בן גרושה the כהונה was voided. ¹⁴ Seemingly תוספות derives this from ר"י, who states משנים פחות ערער אין. See ל"מהרש and א"מהרש in כתובות דף כו,א תוס' ד"ה והאמר, who question the validity of this assumption, that an א"ע cannot כשרות חזקת במקום פוסל. This is what תוספות is trying to prove, that an א"ע cannot be פוסל (even if there is no המכשיר עד), against a כשרות חזקת (it seems to be circular reasoning). The ל"מהרש explains that we derive this (that an א"ע cannot contest a כשרות חזקת) from the s'גמרא answer in קידושין, that s'י"ר rule is only when there is a כשרות חזקת. This teaches us that when there is a חזקת כשרות an א"ע cannot contest it. Our תוספות is (merely) explaining how the גמרות (there) come to the conclusion that ר"י requires ערער תרי, not on account of the contradicting א"ע, but rather on account of the כשרות חזקת. The explanation is that there is no המכשיר עד since he is cancelled by the קול. Alternately the א"מהרש explains that otherwise (if an א"ע can invalidate a כשרות חזקת), the גמרא could have said that an א"ע invalidated the כהונה (without resorting to a קול) and another עד subsequently came and was מכשיר, etc. ¹⁵ Even though the קול is superior to the א"ע alone, nevertheless in combination with the חזקה, the קול (and the א"ע) cease[s] to function. Only the כשרות חזקת remains, which validates the כהונה. ¹⁶ See footnote # 10. ¹⁷ See נח"מ (בד"ה היכי).

אין ערער פחות משנים—There is no contesting with less than two people

OVERVIEW י"ר states that משנים פחות ערער אין. This may lead us to assume that the only way to contest (a כשרות חזקת) is if there are two עדים who contest it. תוספות will point out that there is another way as well.

י"ר is not intending to exclude with this statement of פחות משנים ערער אין, every contention that is not composed of two עדים; but rather**** only a contention of one witness; that one witness may not contest (a כשרות חזקת) however a rumor can invalidate (even a כשרות חזקת)² as the גמרא will shortly conclude.

SUMMARY A כשרות חזקת can be compromised either by two עדים or by a rumor (but not by an ע"א).

THINKING IT OVER If we are able to assume that when the גמרא states 'ואחתיניה' after the קול, it does not mean that he became לכהונה פסול, but rather his כהונה was held in abeyance;³ is there any need to maintain that a קול can invalidate a חזקת כשרות?⁴

footnotes: ¹ The גמרא states that there was a חזקה that the father was a כהן, and then the rumor that the son was a גרושה בן invalidated his כהונה as the גמרא states ואחתיניה (see ‘Thinking it over’). ² See previous והאמר ה"ד תוספות. ³ See רשב"ם ד"ה ואחתיניה. ⁴ See נח"מ.

ונפק עליה קלא ואחתיניה—And subsequently a rumor was spread concerning him; and we demoted him

OVERVIEW The case at hand: It was assumed that the father of an individual is a כהן. Then there were rumors that he is a גרושה בן. The גמרא states that on account of the rumors – ‘ואחתיניה’; ‘we demoted him’. He was no longer considered a כהן. Our תוספות will discuss how he was ‘demoted’, and how he was reinstated after the testimony of the המכשיר עד. Seemingly it is a דינא דבי זילותא.¹

לאו דוקא אחתיניה אלא כלומר ממילא ירד – The term, ‘we demoted him’, is not to be taken precisely; that בי"ד ruled that he is unfit for כהונה and may not eat תרומה, etc. but rather the term אחתיניה means to say that he alone naturally demoted himself. There were rumors circulating about his כהונה eligibility; in order to avoid any controversy, he chose to waive his כהונה privileges. תוספות explains why it is necessary to interpret ואחתיניה in this manner: דאי דוקא אחתיניה אמאי אסקיניה והא איכא זילותא דבי דינא – For if אחתיניה were to mean precisely so; that בי"ד ruled him unfit for כהונה (based on the קול), then why did בי"ד subsequently elevate him to the status of כהונה when the ע"א testified in his favor? בי"ד should not do so for there is a demeaning of בי"ד! Originally בי"ד ruled that he is unfit for כהונה, based on the קול, and now בי"ד is changing its ruling and maintaining that he is fit for כהונה. This is a זילותא דב"ד. The גמרא is now maintaining that we are חושש לזילותא דבי דינא according to ר"א. Therefore it is necessary to interpret 'ואחתיניה' to mean that the כהן demoted himself; he never approached בי"ד. There was no original ruling of בי"ד that he is פסול לכהונה. Therefore בי"ד may now elevate him to כהונה. תוספות anticipates an objection to this interpretation: וליכא למימר ליכא זילותא אלא כשהורידו ב' פעמים – And it cannot be said that 'ואחתיניה' means that בי"ד demoted him, and nevertheless we are not concerned דינא דבי לזילותא when בי"ד will reaffirm his כהונה; because there is no זילותא דב"ד only if he was demoted two times; and after each time he was reaffirmed as a כהן; only this is considered a זילותא.² However being demoted and elevated one time is not a זילותא. If we assume this position then 'ואחתיניה' can be taken literally, that בי"ד demoted him, and not as תוספות maintains that he demoted himself of his own accord. תוספות rejects this opinion: דבשמעתתא מוכח דאפילו בחדא זימנא איכא³ זילותא – For it is evident from the discussion in the גמרא that there is a זילותא even with a one-time reversal. Therefore we must conclude that this 'אחתיניה' was not through ד"בי, but by this כהן himself. תוספות offers a different option: אי נמי הורדה גמורה קאמר – Or we can also say that 'אחתיניה' means a complete demotion by ד"בי, and not by the כהן himself – וליכא זילותא דבי דינא אלא היכא דהורידוהו על ידי עדות – And nevertheless there is no ד"דב זילותא, for only in a case where בי"ד demoted him through the testimony of עדים; only then would it be a זילותא if subsequently בי"ד would promote him – אבל בהורדה שעל ידי הקול ליכא זילותא:⁴ However, by a demotion caused by a rumor there is no זילותא if בי"ד subsequently reinstates him. In our case the original demotion was due to the קול therefore there is no זילותא if בי"ד will reinstate him on account of the המכשיר עד.

SUMMARY There is a ד"דב זילותא even by a single reversal. 'אחתיניה' however, means that the individual stepped down from the כהונה on his own. Alternately there is זילותא only when a פסק based on עדות is reversed; but not a פסק based on a קול.

THINKING IT OVER What are the relative advantages (and disadvantages) of both answers of תוספות (and of footnote # 4)?

footnotes: ¹ See רשב"ם ד"ה דחיישינן. ² This position may be reaffirmed from our גמרא (according to this interpretation). First the קול demoted him; then the המכשיר עד promoted him. The עדים again demoted him, and the final עד seeks to promote him. ³ In the case of אבהתא עדי and חזקה עדי, there was a one time אחתיניה and a one time אסקיניה. Similarly in the case of ר"ימב where there were ותרי תרי; she is permitted to remain married on account of a ד"דב זילותא of a single reversal. ⁴ תוספות does not explain the difference between קול י"ע הורדה and עדים י"ע. Some commentaries maintain that this answer of תוספות follows the opinion of the (דחיישינן ה"ובד ואחתינהיה ה"ד) ם"רשב that the 'אחתיניה' of a קול, even when acted upon by בי"ד is not a ממש פסול (as by עדים); but rather בי"ד is waiting to clarify the situation. The term 'הורדה ‘גמורה would merely mean that בי"ד preformed the הורדה; but not in the sense that it is a ממש פסול. Therefore there is no זילותא, when we are מכשיר him later. Alternately; If the original פסק was עדים י"ע and בי"ד is now changing the פסק (because of new עדים) then there is a זילותא; since the new פסק is based (only) on a ספק (of ותרי תרי), it may be better to leave the original פסק stand. However if the original פסק is based merely on a קול, everyone understands that if new evidence arises which refutes the קול (completely), then בי"ד must change the פסק. ג"וצע.

ואתא חד סהדא ואסקיניה—And one witness came and we promoted him

OVERVIEW Our גמרא states that when an א"ע testified that he is a כשר כהן we quashed the rumor and promoted him back to his original כהונה status; allowing him to eat תרומה (etc.).

תוספות anticipates the following difficulty: ואף על גב דאמרינן בפרק המגרש (גיטין דף פט,א¹ ושם) דלא מבטלין קלא גבי גרושה לכהן² – And even though the גמרא states in פרק המגרש that we do not quash a rumor concerning a rumored divorcee who was married to a כהן. תוספות is asking why is it that here the גמרא assumes that we are מבטל the קול with (only) one עד. תוספות responds that the reason we are not מבטל the קול there is: משום דאית ליה תקנה אבל הכא דאי לא מסיקנא ליה פסול לעולם³ מבטלין – Because in המגרש פרק there is a solution for the כהן and his (former) wife. They can both marry other people. However, here if we do not promote him to כהונה status he will always remain a defiled כהן, therefore בי"ד acts to nullify the rumor; and allow him to be a כשר כהן. תוספות offers another distinction:

Or we can also say, that in our case since it is concerning תרומה nowadays, which is only מדרבנן, therefore the חכמים were lenient, and permitted to be מבטל the קול. In המגרש פרק however, it is a question of גרושה לכהן which is an דאורייתא איסור, therefore the נהרדעי were more stringent and would not allow to be מבטל a קול.

SUMMARY We are מבטל a קול if the פסול of the קול is permanent, or if it is pertaining to an איסור דרבנן (only).

THINKING IT OVER Will בי"ד be מבטל a קול that is a דרבנן פסול; however the פסול can be remedied?

footnotes: ¹ Seemingly it should read א,פא. See תוספות there ובנהרדעא ה"ד. See also ואסקיניה ה"ד ב,כו כתובות תוספות. ² There was a rumor spread concerning a כהן, that he divorced his wife. Nevertheless they continued to live together. The ruling was that she must leave her (former) husband and the rumor was to be investigated. The גמרא asked what is there to investigate! The נהרדעי rule that we do not nullify a קול! [תוספות there adds that we are not מבטל the קול even if there are עדים that contradict the קול.] She therefore must leave (her former husband) the כהן. ³ Even though that the woman will also always remain a גרושה and be לכהן אסורה; nevertheless (even) if we were to be מבטל the קול she would still (certainly) be לכהן אסורה, for she is an איש אשת.

אנן מסקינן ליה—We promote him

OVERVIEW Our גמרא states that if it is a case of ותרי תרי concerning a possible גרושה בן, the ruling is that we elevate him to כהונה status. Our תוספות will discuss and explain the different rulings concerning ותרי תרי.

דאוקי תרי בהדי תרי ואוקי גברא אחזקיה דמוחזק לן דאביו כהן הוא – For we place the two עדים who are פוסל against the two עדים who are מכשיר; thus effectively negating both groups of עדים and the person is placed in his original presumptive status; for it is presumed by בי"ד that his father is a כהן כשר**;** therefore the son is also a כשר כהן.¹ תוספות has a difficulty with this resolution of ותרי תרי; that we revert to the כשרות חזקת of the father: ותימה דאמרינן בפרק האומר בקדושין (דף סו,א) גבי ינאי המלך ויבוקש ולא נמצא – And this is astounding! For the גמרא states in פרק האומר in מסכת קדושין concerning King ינאי. There was a controversy surrounding the (גדולה) כהונה of המלך ינאי. There were rumors that his mother was in captivity among non-Jews;² thereby making ינאי a חלל who is לכהונה פסול. The חכמים ‘suggested’ to ינאי that he give up the כהונה on account of these rumors. The חכמים there continue to relate that the matter concerning her captivity was investigated and the rumor could not be substantiated. The גמרא there asks: היכי דמי אילימא דתרי אמרי אישתבאי ותרי אמרי לא אישתבאי – How is this that the rumor could not be substantiated, and ינאי was vindicated; could we say that two עדים claimed that she was in captivity and two other עדים claim that she was not captured; this cannot be, for it is – תרי ותרי נינהו מאי חזית דסמכת אהני סמוך אהני ואמאי לא נמצא – Two witnesses against two witnesses, why do you see to depend on these עדים who claim לא אשתבאי and are vindicating ינאי, depend on these עדים who claim אישתבאי; therefore, continues the s'גמרא question ‘so why did the חכמים say that nothing could be substantiated’! Since it is ותרי תרי, it should be considered a ספק and ינאי should be פסול לכהונה. Why did the חכמים insinuate that nothing was found that could invalidate ינאי from the כהונה?! He should be פסול on account of the ותרי תרי. This concludes the citation from the גמרא in קדושין. תוספות concludes his question: והשתא מאי קא פריך אדרבה אית לן למימר אוקי תרי בהדי תרי ואוקי גברא אחזקיה – But now according to the interpretation presented in the beginning of תוספות that by ותרי תרי we maintain the original כשרות חזקת, then what is the challenge in קדושין מסכת as to the status of ינאי; that he should be פסול by ותרי תרי, on the contrary! It makes sense why ינאי was vindicated, for we should maintain there just as we say here, that we place two עדים against two עדים and we place the person on his original חזקה**;** which means – ואוקי ינאי אחזקת אמו דלא אישתבאי³ – And we should place ינאי based on the חזקה of his mother that she was not in captivity. תוספות question is; just as here the עדים concerning גרושה בן cancel out (it is ותרי תרי) and the son is a כשר כהן based on the כשרות חזקת of his father; similarly by ינאי the עדים of אישתבאי cancel out (ותרי תרי). There remains the כשרות חזקת of the mother. ינאי should be כשר on account of the חזקת כשרות of his mother. In both cases neither son (ינאי nor the s'כהן son) has a כשרות חזקת of their own; only from their parents. The ruling should be the same in both cases. If the כשרות חזקת of the parents applies to the son, then ינאי is כשר. If the כשרות חזקת of the parent cannot apply to the son then the s'כהן son should also be פסול. תוספות will now cite how רש"י explains the גמרא there in קדושין: ופירש התם בקונטרס דחזקת האם לא מהניא להכשיר את ינאי – And רש"י explained there in קדושין מסכת the reason we do not follow the חזקת האם concerning ינאי, is that the חזקה of s'ינאי mother cannot be applied to validate ינאי for כהונה – לפי שאין עדים באין לפסול את האם לכהונה אלא להעיד על ינאי – Because the witnesses who claimed אישתבאי are not coming to invalidate the mother for כהונה status but rather they came to testify against ינאי that he is the son of a שבויה. The status of the mother is irrelevant here. The mother is not present. The עדים are stating that ינאי is a שבויה בן; and ינאי has no כשרות חזקת.⁴ תוספות rejects this interpretation of רש"י: ואין נראה לרבינו יצחק דלמה לא יועיל חזקת האם לבן – And the ר"י is not satisfied with this interpretation; for why should not the חזקת האם apply to the son as well – הואיל ואינו יכול להיות שתהא האם כשרה אם לא יהיה הבן כשר – Since it is impossible that the mother should be a כשרה unless the son is also כשר. If the son is not כשר since he is a שבויה בן, then the mother is automatically a שבויה. תוספות argues that we cannot separate the האם כשרות from the (ינאי) הבן כשרות, since they are dependent on each other. Therefore it does not matter what the intent of the עדים are; whether to testify concerning ינאי or his mother, in all cases the status of the אם and the בן are to be the same. The mother has a כשרות חזקת; therefore we cannot be פוסל the son, whose status is linked with his mother. תוספות does not agree with the reasoning of רש"י and will now show that it also contradicts our גמרא: ועוד דהכא אף על גב דעל הבן מעידים לפסלו מהניא ליה חזקת האב להכשירו – And furthermore there is a difficulty with רש"י, for here in our גמרא even though the עדים are testifying to be פוסל the son and not the father (similar to the case of ינאי and his mother), nevertheless the חזקה of the father helps to be מכשיר the son. Why therefore should it be any different by ינאי and his mother?!⁵ תוספות offers his explanation: ונראה לרבינו יצחק דהיינו טעמא משום דמסקינן בפרק ד' אחין (יבמות דף לא,א ושם דיבור המתחיל תרי) – And it seems to the ר"י that this is the reason why there is a difference between our גמרא and the case of ינאי, because the גמרא concludes in פרק ד' אחין – דכל תרי ותרי הויא ספיקא דרבנן⁶ והאם⁷ נמי הוי ספיקא דרבנן – That every case of תרי ותרי is a ספיקא דרבנן, and [there] (by the mother of ינאי) it is also a ספיקא דרבנן. According to תורה law if it is a ותרי תרי we follow the original חזקה; however the חכמים decreed that even if there is a היתר חזקת by a ותרי תרי, and התורה מן it should be מותר, nevertheless we treat it as a ספק and we take the more stringent view (if it is an איסור דאורייתא). ולהכי פריך התם סמוך אהני – And therefore the גמרא there in קדושין challenges the assumption that the rumor could not be substantiated; saying**, depend on these** עדים who testify that אשתבאי – דנהי דמדאורייתא אמרינן אוקי תרי בהדי תרי ואוקי איתתא אחזקה – For granted that according to תורה law we rule that we place the two against the other two (as if they do not exist)⁸ and we place the woman (s'ינאי mother) on her חזקת כשרות; which would make לכהונה כשר ינאי – מכל מקום מדרבנן יש לפוסלה – Nevertheless, she should be considered מדרבנן פסול. Therefore the גמרא says we should be אהני סמוך; that she is פסול as if we pay attention to the עדים that claim אישתבאי. The question remains, however, why in our case do we bestow the האב חזקת to the son, even though here it is also ותרי תרי; he should be מדרבנן לכהונה פסול! תוספות explains: והכא לענין תרומה דרבנן הקילו להתירו בה בתרי ותרי ולאוקמיה אחזקיה⁹ – And here in our גמרא they were lenient since the discussion here is merely concerning a rabbinic תרומה, not a תרומה דאורייתא therefore they were lenient to permit him to eat this דרבנן תרומה in a case of תרי ותרי and to establish the son as a כשר כהן based on the חזקה of the father. In summation: According to תוספות in a case of ותרי תרי, then מדאורייתא the ruling would be that אחזקה אוקמי. If there is a היתר חזקת then it would be מותר (however if there is a חזקת איסור then it is a איסור ודאי, not a איסור ספק). The רבנן, however, decreed that by ותרי תרי even when there is a היתר חזקת, nevertheless we prohibit it מספק. This ruling applies only if the איסור in question is an דאורייתא איסור (as in the case of ינאי, where a חלל is לכהונה פסול and is forbidden מדאורייתא for all כהונה functions),¹⁰ however when the איסור in question is merely an דרבנן איסור (as in our גמרא, where we are discussing whether the son may eat הזה תרומה בזמן which is only a מדרבנן תרומה), then we revert back to the תורה ruling, namely that by ותרי תרי we follow the original כשרות חזקת. This follows the general rule that לחומרא ספיקא דאורייתא and לקולא דרבנן ספיקא. תוספות anticipates a difficulty with the idea that ותרי תרי is merely a דרבנן ספק however מן התורה we follow the חזקה: והא דאמר לעיל שנים אומרים מת וב' אומרים לא מת כולי – And concerning that which the גמרא previously stated in the case where two עדים said that he died and two עדים said that he did not die, etc., the ruling there is that initially she should not remarry – אבל נשאת ואחר כך באו עדים לא תצא¹¹ – however if she remarried and then the עדים came and claimed that he did not die, then everyone agrees that she need not leave her new husband – אף על גב דתרי ותרי ספיקא דרבנן היא – Even though that ותרי תרי is merely a מדרבנן ספק, as previously explained – ומדאורייתא אית לן לאוקמה אחזקה דהויא אשת איש – And according to תורה law, however, it is required that we should establish her status based on her original חזקה; that she was a married woman – והיה לה לצאת אף על פי שנשאת לאחד מעדיה – And she should be required to leave the new husband even though she remarried to one of her witnesses who is certain (as she is) that her husband died. If we were to maintain that ותרי תרי is a התורה מן ספק and we do not accept any חזקה to resolve this ספק; but rather the ספק status remains by ותרי תרי,¹² then we can understand that גמרא. There are ותרי תרי; it is a איש אשת ספק, so בי"ד will not permit them to marry מספק. If however they are already married and the new husband and wife both claim that they are sure the husband is dead, then since they were only אסור to marry מספק, therefore this ספק that בי"ד has is not sufficient to revoke their marriage, since they are ודאי that he is dead. However since we are maintaining that מדאורייתא by ותרי תרי we follow the original חזקה, therefore this woman is איש אשת בחזקת from her first husband and is התורה מן אסור to remarry. How can we allow them to remain married just because they claim בודאי that the husband is dead?! How can their ודאי remove the תורה איסור that was created through the חזקת איסור?!¹³ תוספות answers: אומר רבינו תם דאתיא חזקה דדייקא ומנסבא ומרעה חזקת אשת איש – The ת"ר says that here it is different, for the חזקה that a woman is meticulous in first assuring that her husband is dead and only then does she remarry; this חזקה comes and undermines the איש אשת חזקת. The איש אשת חזקת is not powerful enough to create a איסור חזקת. There is an opposing חזקה. The fact that the woman is remarrying and claiming that she is sure her husband is dead weakens the איש חזקת אשת. A woman will not remarry if she is unsure of her (original) husband’s status. She does not want to transgress the איש אשת איסור; she does not want her children to be ממזרים etc.; in short a woman will only remarry after a meticulous search that assures her that her husband died. This חזקה counteracts the איש אשת חזקת. Therefore if she remarried it is only a איסור ספק to ד"בי, therefore תצא לא. תוספות challenges this previous assumption that there is a ומנסבא דדייקא חזקת: ואם תאמר כי איכא ב' עדים לא דייקא דליכא חומר בסופה – And if you will say; if there are two עדים who testify that her husband died, then she is not meticulous in verifying that her husband died, for subsequently there is no stringency – כדאמר בהאשה רבה (שם דף פז,ב ושם) נשאת שלא ברשות מותרת לחזור לו – As the משנה states in פרק האשה רבה, if she remarried without requiring permission from בי"ד (in a case where עדים testified that her husband died), and then her original husband returned she is permitted to return to her original husband. ומפרש התם דהיינו שנשאת בעדים – And the גמרא explains there that the meaning of the term**** ברשות נשאת שלא is that she remarried based on the testimony of עדים who claim that her husband died. If only one עד claimed that her husband died then she requires a (special) בי"ד רשות to remarry (since התורה מן two עדים are required to testify). בי"ד grants her this רשות with a provision that if her husband returns then she will not be able to remain married to either of her husbands and will lose her monetary rights, etc. This ensures us that she will be meticulous before she remarries. However if two עדים testify that her husband died, then she is permitted to remarry without any specific בי"ד רשות. If her husband returns we are not that strict with her; including that she may return to her previous husband, and retains her monetary rights. תוספות question is that since there are two עדים who testify to her husband’s death,¹⁴ therefore there will be no בסופה חומר. If there is no בסופה חומר, then there is no דייקא ומינסבא, since the woman is not that concerned. If there is no ומינסבא דייקא, there remains only the חזקת אשת איש. If there is a איש אשת חזקת, how can she remain married in face of this איש אשת חזקת, since מדאורייתא we follow the חזקה in a case of ותרי תרי?! תוספות answers: ויש לומר הואיל ומכחישים זה את זה איכא חומרא אם תעמוד תחת בעלה¹⁵ בטענת ברי שלה- And one can say that since the two groups of עדים contradict each other, therefore there is the same stringency here as if she would have remarried ברשות בי"ד if she will remain with her new husband based on her claim of certainty that she knows for sure that her husband died. בי"ד is lenient with her only if she remarries on the basis of the testimony of two uncontested עדים. If however, the עדים are eventually contested, and she remains married on the basis of her assuredness, then she must face the consequences, if it turns out that she is wrong and her ‘previous’ husband is still alive. Therefore by תרי ותרי she will be דייקא ומינסבא, since there is a חומרא בסוף. This דייקא ומינסבא cancels out the חזקת איש אשת. The woman’s status is only a ספק איסור at most. If she claims ברי לי, then בי"ד cannot separate her from her new husband. תוספות has an additional question: ואם תאמר ב' אומרים נתגרשה וב' אומרים לא נתגרשה – And if you will say; in the case where two עדים claim that she was divorced, and two other עדים claim that she was not divorced – אמאי לא תצא בנשאת ואחר כך באו עדים הא לא דייקא – Why is she not required to leave her new husband, in a situation where she first remarried based on the testimony of the first group of עדים, and afterwards a second group of עדים came who claimed that נתגרשה לא. Why does the ברייתא state that she need not leave!? For she is not meticulous in the verification process, in a contested divorce case – דדוקא במת הוא דדייקא שיראה שמא יבא וידעו הכל שלא מת – For it is specifically only by a claim of death that she is meticulous in verifying his death; the reason is for she is afraid that perhaps her previous husband may return and everyone will know that he did not die. Therefore by מיתה she is very meticulous. However by גירושין, she is not that concerned if her husband returns, for even if he claims that he did not divorce her, people will not be sure that it is true. Especially since the woman claims (and two עדים support her contention) that he did divorce her. Therefore since she is not that concerned, there is no ומינסבא דייקא. This leaves us only with the איש אשת חזקת. Why therefore do we permit her to remain with the new husband?! תוספות anticipates a possible answer, and rejects it: ואינה נאמנת לומר נתגרשה דשלא בפני בעלה מעיזה ומעיזה¹⁶ – And she is not believed to claim that she was divorced, for not in the presence of her husband, a woman is indeed very brazen. There is no reason to believe her. תוספות adds an additional point: ועוד¹⁷ היכא דאיכא עדים דקא מסייעי לה מעיזה ומעיזה – And furthermore, in a case where there are עדים who are assisting her and supporting her claim that she is a divorcee certainly she is brazen. She is only believed when she says I am divorced, in the presence of her husband; for a woman does not have the העזה to claim in the presence of her husband that she is divorced, unless it is true. However not in the presence of her husband and especially if other עדים support her, a woman has the העזה to claim that she is divorced even if it is not true. Therefore we cannot believe her statement that she is divorced. There is also no ומינסבא דייקא in the case of גירושין**.** Seemingly there only remains the איש אשת חזקת**.** The woman should not be permitted to remain with her husband. תוספות answers: ויש לומר דלענין הכי דייקא ומרעא חזקת אשת איש – And one can say that concerning this issue; whether she can remain with her new husband, she is meticulous and she weakens the איש אשת חזקת; the reason for this is – דלעולם יראה שמא יוזמו או יפסלום בגזלנות – For she is always concerned that perhaps her supporting עדים will be מוזם or invalidated by being accused that they are גזלנים. She will have nothing to fall back on, since there are עדים who claim that she was never divorced. Therefore she is דייקא ומינסבא. תוספות has one final question: ואם תאמר למאי דלא ידע דבאומר¹⁸ ברי לי איירי מאי קאמר היא גופא באשם תלוי קיימא – And if you will say when the גמרא did not yet know that we are discussing a situation where she claims ‘I am sure that he died’;¹⁹ before we came to that conclusion and we thought that the woman has no opinion as to the status of her husband why does the גמרא state as a challenge, that how can she remarry ‘she herself needs to bring an תלוי אשם’; why does the גמרא say that; since she does not know the status of her husband – הוה ליה למימר בחטאת קיימא – The גמרא should have stated she has to bring a חטאת קרבן. According to תוספות our סוגיא maintains that ותרי תרי is a ספיקא מדרבנן. However מדאורייתא we follow the חזקה. In this case of תרי ותרי, the woman is בחזקת אשת איש. Therefore if she does not claim ברי לי, then she is בחזקת אשת איש and is required to bring a קרבן חטאת; not an אשם תלוי! תוספות answers: ויש לומר דפריך אפילו נאמר דתרי ותרי הוה ספיקא דאורייתא – And one can say that the challenge of the גמרא is even if we were to assume that ותרי תרי is a ספק תורה. If we assume that ותרי תרי is a דאורייתא ספיקא, then we do not follow any חזקות, but rather it is left as a ספק. If it is a דאורייתא ספיקא, then it is understood why the גמרא cannot claim that she should bring a חטאת קרבן. A חטאת קרבן is brought only if one certainly transgressed an דאורייתא איסור, but not if one is doubtful whether he transgressed an דאורייתא איסור as in our case where it is merely a ספיקא דאורייתא. כדפירישית בפרק ד' אחין (שם דף לא,א דיבור המתחיל אי) מכל מקום²⁰ באשם קיימא – As I explained in פרק ד' אחין, nevertheless even if it is only a דאורייתא ספיקא she is required to bring a תלוי אשם קרבן for (perhaps) transgressing a ספק איסור.

And there is no need to elaborate any longer, and I explained it at greater length in מסכת כתובות.

SUMMARY In a case of תו"ת, the ruling מן התורה is, that we follow the חזקה, whether there is a חזקת היתר or a חזקת איסור. The חכמים however instituted that even if there is a חזקת היתר, it should still be treated as a ספק. If the issue is a דאורייתא, we go לחומרא if it is a רבנן, we go לקולא. We follow a חזקת איסור לחומרא only if the חזקה is not compromised; otherwise it remains (only) a ספק. The חזקה of אשה דייקא ומינסבא applies (even) by תרי ותרי; and even by a תו"ת of גירושין it is sufficient to allow her to remain with her (current) husband.

THINKING IT OVER In our גמרא we say that the son has the כשרות חזקת from his father the כהן.²¹ Seemingly there is no connection; the father may be a כשר כהן who married a גרושה,²² thereby disqualifying the son from the כהונה.²³ It is not clear what תוספות is adding by citing the גמרא in יבמות.²⁴ Seemingly until now we also assumed that ת"תו is a דרבנן ספיקא; otherwise (if it were a ספיקא דאורייתא), we would not follow the חזקה. תוספות should have merely stated the difference between our גמרא and the case of ינאי in מסכת קדושין. תוספות explains that in our גמרא the son is permitted to eat (only) תרומה דרבנן. ²⁵ In a case of a דרבנן (ספק) then by ותרי תרי we follow the היתר חזקת. It seems from תוספות that if there would not be a חזקת היתר, then he would be אסור in this תרומה דרבנן for he is a חלל ספק. The general rule is that by a ספק דרבנן we are lenient (even without a היתר חזקת), Why is it necessary here to rely on the היתר חזקת?²⁶ 4. תוספות has a difficulty with the ruling that if נשאת ואח"כ באו עדים לא תצא. It seems that תוספות is asking the question according to רמב"י.²⁷ However the question can certainly be asked according to the ת"ק as well for they maintain that in all cases תצא לא.²⁸

footnotes: ¹ The above is (somewhat) excerpted from the interpretation of the ם"רשב here and רש"י in ב,כו דף כתובות. However they maintain that the כשרות חזקת is (also) based on his status after the first המכשיר עד testified; not (only) on the חזקת אביו as תוספות states. See ‘Thinking it over’ # 1. ² A Jewish woman who had relationships with a non-Jew is considered a זונה. She is forbidden to marry a כהן. Any child she has from a כהן is considered a חלל, who is לכהונה פסול. A woman who was held captive among non-Jews is considered מדרבנן as a זונה, regardless whether it is known for sure if they had any relationship with her. See footnote # 10. ³ s'ינאי mother was certainly not in captivity prior to the date which the rumor alleges she was captured. Therefore, since there is a ותרי תרי whether or not she was in captivity, we place her on her original חזקה that she was never in captivity. ⁴ י"רש does not attempt to distinguish between our גמרא (where we do follow the original חזקה) and the גמרא in קדושין (where we do not follow the האם חזקת). There is a distinction however, for רש"י maintains that the reason the son of the כהן is assumed to be a כהן (is not merely because of the כשרות חזקת of the father, but rather) because there is (also) a כשרות חזקת for the son, based on the testimony of the first המכשיר עד. See previous footnote # 1. ⁵ See previous footnote # 4. ⁶ תוספות (seemingly) does not mean that ותרי תרי is a דרבנן ספיקא in the usual sense (where we say דרבנן לקולא ספיקא), but rather that the ספק is מדרבנן. Therefore if the issue at hand is in a דאורייתא it will be לחומרא and by a דרבנן it will be לקולא as תוספות shortly states. See ‘Thinking it over’ # 2. ⁷ Others amend this to והתם instead of והאם. ⁸ If we were to maintain that by ת"תו it is considered as if both עדים are testifying; it would be quite difficult to understand how the חזקה can outweigh the status of the עדים (that contradict the חזקה). However if we maintain that ת"תו is viewed as if the contradictory עדים are not present, then it is understandable that the חזקה can decide the case (for no עדים contradict it). ⁹ See ‘Thinking it over’ # 3. ¹⁰ In the case of ינאי it may also be considered only an דרבנן איסור, since the שבויה איסור is an מדרבנן איסור (see footnote # 2). Nevertheless on the possibility that she was נבעלה, then (s)he is מדאורייתא לכהונה אסור. In our case of דרבנן תרומה, it is always only a רבנן question, never a דאורייתא issue. ¹¹ See ‘Thinking it over’ # 4. ¹² This view may be seen as being supported by the גמרא in קדושין concerning ינאי. The גמרא there says סמוך אהני (on those that are אוסר), even if there is a היתר חזקת. ¹³ It is understood that even though the חכמים said that ותרי תרי remains a ספק and we do not rely on the חזקה; however that is only if there is a היתר חזקת. Then the חכמים decree that even though מדאורייתא it is מותר on account of the חזקת היתר, nevertheless מדרבנן it is אסור. However if מדאורייתא it is אסור because of the חזקת איסור, then the רבנן will certainly not say that it is only a ספק (and it should be מותר!??)! ¹⁴ The question (seemingly) becomes stronger since תוספות is discussing the case of עדים באו כ"ואח נשאת, at the time of her remarriage there were only the המתירים עדים. She is certainly not ומינסבא דייקא. See footnote # 11. ¹⁵ See previous footnote # 13. ¹⁶ There is a rule that if a woman declares in the presence of her husband, that she is divorced; the woman is believed. There is a חזקה that a wife will not be that brazen to her husband’s face. If she claims she is divorced, we assume that she is. תוספות is noting that in this case we cannot say that here too the woman herself is believed that she is divorced, and that her statement counteracts the איש אשת חזקת (just as in a regular case where a wife says to her husband גרשתני) ¹⁷ תוספות may be saying that even if the husband appears and she claims in his presence that she is divorced, nevertheless in this instance she cannot be believed. ¹⁸ Seemingly it should read 'באומרת'. ¹⁹ See תוספות דף לא,ב ד"ה ואם. ²⁰ תוספות may be alluding to the issue whether an תלוי אשם is brought only when איסורא איתחזק. ²¹ See footnote # 1. ²² A כהן who marries a גרושה is still a כשר כהן, even though his children are חללים. ²³ See נח"מ (בד"ה הא'). ²⁴ See footnote # 6. ²⁵ See footnote # 9. ²⁶ See סוכ"ד אות כא. ²⁷ See footnote # 11. ²⁸ See א"מהרש and שלמה פני.