ואי לא דאיננא לך כרב הונא אליבא דרבי יוסי¹—And if not, I will judge you as per the ruling of ה"ר according to ר"י.

OVERVIEW רבינא fenced in רוניא on all four sides and demanded from רוניא payment of (at least) אגר נטירא (the cost of a watchman).² רוניא refused. רבא told רוניא that if he does not pay for this limited amount, he will rule that רוניא must pay a much greater amount in accordance with the opinion of ר"ה אליבא דר"י. The question is, whether רבא truly maintained that the הלכה is according to ר"ה אליבא דר"י, or perhaps רבא does not agree with ר"ה אליבא דר"י he only said it as a threat to induce רוניא to pay the minimal amount.

קצת היה נראה שלא להפחידו היה אומר כן – It appears somewhat that רבא was not saying this to merely frighten him (רוניא); however רבא himself maintains that the ruling of ר"ה אליבא דר"י is not legally binding. This is not so, rather רבא agrees that the legal ruling should follow the opinion of ר"ה אליבא דר"י, instead of the compromise that רבינא was offering. תוספות proves his point that he was not merely trying to frighten him: מדלא קאמר ואי לא מגבינא לאפדנא מינך³ או מחינא לך בסילואה דלא מבע דמא⁴ – Since רבא did not say to רוניא ‘I will collect the amount due for the fence, from your house’ by placing a lien on it, or he should have told רוניא ‘I will smite you with a thorn that hurts but does not draw blood’. These are the types of ‘threats’ that we find in the גמרא that various דיינים used. The fact that he did not use any of these threats but rather warned him that if he does not agree to the compromise he will rule according to the strictest interpretation of the law, indicates that indeed the law is the way it was expounded by ר"ה אליבא דר"י. If the law does not follow the opinion of ר"ה אליבא דר"י, why did רבא use an empty threat, which he could not follow up on? He should have used the threats mentioned, which he could impose, to coerce רוניא pay רבינא (at least) the אגר נטירא. תוספות anticipates a question: ואף על גב דבלולב הגזול (סוכה דף לד,ב ושם דיבור המתחיל ולדרוש) אמר שמואל להנהו דמזבני אסא – And even though that in פרק לולב הגזול, שמואל said to the myrtle (הדסים) merchants (for the ד' מינים) – אשוו זבינייכו ואי לא דרשינן לכו כרבי טרפון – ‘Make your prices equal to the normal market value (do not overcharge because the people need the הדסים for יום טוב) and if not (if you refuse to listen to me) I will interpret the הלכה according to טרפון רבי’ who maintains that even a loped off הדס is כשר.⁵ ובעי למימר התם דלהפחידם היה אומר כן – And the גמרא wanted to say there that שמואל said this in order to frighten the merchants, but not that the דין is actually like ר' טרפון. It appears from that גמרא that even though שמואל did not threaten them with the abovementioned threats (of smiting them with a thorn, etc.), nevertheless we do not assume that his threat to rule according to ר' טרפון was a real threat. The הלכה is not like ר' טרפון, it was only an empty threat to frighten them. We may argue that here too in the case of רוניא it was an empty threat, and the הלכה does not necessarily follow the opinion of ר"ה אליבא דר"י. תוספות responds: הכא נראה דהכי סבירא ליה כדפירש רש"י⁶ – Here however it seems that רבא indeed maintained so, as רש"י explains; that we can infer from here that the הלכה is according to ר"ה אליבא דר"י. (תוספות does not explain the difference between our case and the case of the אסא.)⁷ תוספות offers an additional proof that the הלכה is like ר"ה אליבא דר"י: ועוד מדקאמר ליה זיל פייסיה במאי דאיפייס – And furthermore since רבא said to רוניא ‘go and appease him for the amount with which he agreed to compromise’, that –

indicates that according to the law רבינא was owed more, if not for the fact that רבינא already agreed to compromise. רבא referred to the amount that he expected רוניא to give רבינא, as a compromise on s'רבינא behalf. This indicates that according to the strict interpretation of the law, רוניא would be required to pay more.

SUMMARY תוספות maintains that רבא is in agreement with the ruling of י"דר אליבא ה"ר. If not, he would not have made this empty threat, but rather would have warned רוניא that there are ways to coerce him to pay רבינא the אגר נטירא. An empty threat may sometimes be used, when there is no other way to coerce the wrongful party, as in the case of שמואל and the הדסים merchants. Another indication that רבא agreed with ר"ה אליבא דר"י is the fact that he referred to s'רבינא offer as a compromise, indicating that legally רבינא could have demanded more.

THINKING IT OVER

1. Seemingly the second ראיה of תוספות is readily understood. Why is it only a ‘second’ proof?⁸
2. If we were to assume that רבא disagrees with י"דר אליבא ה"ר; what would רבא himself maintain in this case?
3. Can this case be in accordance with the לישנא אחרינא, that מקיף וניקף איכא בינייהו?⁹

footnotes: ¹ י"דר אליבא ה"ר maintains that the ניקף must pay 'הכל לפי מה שגדר'. ² See רש"י ד"ה פייסיה. ³ See ב"ק דף יב,א. ⁴ See later ב"ב דף קנא,ב. This refers to a נידוי. ⁵ If שמואל had ruled like ר"ט that a הדס may be missing the top, the prices of הדסים would have fallen dramatically, since loped off הדסים are plentiful. ⁶ See רש"י ד"ה הג"ה. We might infer from this תוספות that תוספות accepted this ה"הגה to be the opinion of רש"י. Others however suggest that the גירסא in תוספות be emended to read either 'כדפירישית' or 'כדפירש ר"ש', referring to the רשב"ם. The ר"ת of תמ"ש, which appears at the end of the הגה"ה, is 'תוספות מורינו שמואל'. ⁷ The commentaries explain that in the case of the הדסים, there was no choice but to frighten them with an idle threat. שמואל could not have told them that he would make them pay. They did not owe anything to anyone; they merely raised the prices of the הדסים (which perhaps they may have had the legal right to do so). Here however, if the הלכה is that he is required to pay (only) אגר נטירא, then רבא should have threatened him accordingly, and not with an empty threat. ⁸ See פני שלמה and נח"מ ⁹ See בל"י אות קא.

ארבעה לצלא כולי—Four for a (tanner)¹ [hide]², etc

OVERVIEW The גמרא relates that רוניא purchased a field which was adjacent to s'רבינא field(s). רבינא as a בר מצרא who has the first refusal rights to this property sought to evict רוניא from the property he purchased. [רבינא would obviously reimburse רוניא the price he paid.] רב ספרא prevented רבינא from doing this. He explained to רבינא that people say that a poor tanner (צלא), as well as a rich tanner (צללא), requires the same four loaves of bread to sustain himself. Similarly רוניא, the poorer of the two, requires this field (at least as much as you, רבינא, do) to sustain his family. Therefore your claim as בר מצרא should be set aside in the interest of affording רוניא a profitable livelihood.³ תוספות has various difficulties with this interpretation.

תוספות asks: לפירוש הקונטרס מקשה רבינו תם [הא] אין מרחמים בדין⁴ – The ר"ת has a difficulty with s’י"רש interpretation; for we are not merciful in judgment. תוספות asks a second question: ועוד דקאמר סבר רבינא לסלוקי משמע שטעה רבינא⁵ – And furthermore the גמרא states that רבינא proposedto remove רוניא from his newly acquired property. The word ‘proposed’ indicates that רבינא was mistaken; that he proposed to evict him, but was informed that legally he had no right to remove רוניא. תוספות has an additional question: ועוד מה שייך כאן האי מעשה – And additionally, what does this story have in common with our גמרא here. Why is this story mentioned here? תוספות anticipates a possible answer: אי משום דאיירי ברבינא ורוניא⁶ – Perhaps it is mentioned here because it is concerning רבינא and רוניא, as in the previous story of רבינא surrounding רוניא. תוספות rejects this answer, for if this is the reason that he mentions it here, then – לייתי נמי מעשה דהמקבל (בבא מציעא דף קט,א) רוניא שתלא דרבינא הוה – The גמרא should also mention the story of המקבל פרק, where the גמרא relates that רוניא was the sharecropper for רבינא. The גמרא there relates a story concerning רוניא and רבינא, and nevertheless that story is not mentioned here – והנך תרי עובדי דשמעתין לייתי נמי התם⁷ – And these two stories of our גמרא should also be mentioned there according to this line of reasoning (that the גמרא prefers to combine various stories concerning the same people). תוספות has one final question: ועוד דצלא הוא עור כדאמרינן (מועד קטן דף כז,א) מאי דרגש ערסא דצלא – And furthermore the word צלא means leather as the גמרא states in מו"ק, ‘what is a דרגש? The גמרא explains that it is a leather bed’. This would seem to contradict s'רש"י interpretation that צלא is a tanner.⁸ תוספות offers a different interpretation: ואומר רבינו תם דזבן ארעא אמיצרא דרבינא – And the ר"ת says that רוניא bought land bordering s'רבינא field – היינו אמיצר אותם שדות דאקפיה רבינא מארבע רוחות – Meaning on the boundary of those fields which רבינא surrounded רוניא from all four sides. The field that he bought was inside and adjacent to the encircling fields of רבינא as well as to s'רוניא field – והיה רבינא מצרן מג' רוחות ורוניא מרוח אחת – And רבינא shared a common boundary with this field that רוניא bought on three sides⁹ and רוניא shared a boundary on this new field that he bought, from only one side.¹⁰ תוספות questions s'רבינא reasoning that he should take priority over רוניא: ואף על גב דאמר בהמקבל (בבא מציעא דף קח,ב) הני ארבע בני מצרא – And even though the גמרא states in פרק המקבל these four people that border a property (from different sides) that is up for sale, and each one claims that he should have priority in buying this field – דקדים חד מינייהו וזבן מאי דזבן זבן¹¹ – Where one of them preceded and bought the property, without the consent of the other three, the rule is whatever he bought – he bought. It is his. Seemingly here too, since רוניא was a בר מצרא and he already purchased the property, רבינא had no right to remove רוניא. תוספות responds, that our case is different than in פרק המקבל. מכל מקום סבר רבינא לסלוקי משום שהיה מצרן מג' צדדין ורוניא רק מרוח אחת¹² – Notwithstanding that רוניא was also a בר מצרא, רבינא planned on removing רוניא, for רבינא was abutting this field from three sides however רוניא was abutting only from one side. Nonetheless – אמר ליה רב ספרא אמרי אינשי ארבעה לצלא – רב ספרא said to רבינא, people say four זוזים are paid for a piece of leather – פירוש לעור גדול צריך ליתן לעבדן ד' זוזי וד' לצללא עור קטן – meaning that one needs to pay the tanner four זוזים to cure a large piece of hide and four זוזים need to be paid for a small hide – כלומר צריך ליתן מן הקטן כמו מן הגדול שיש טורח בקטן כמו בגדול – This teaches us that it is required to give the same amount of money from one who cures the small hide as from one who cures the large hide, for an equal effort is required to cure a small hide as for a large hide. Therefore the tanner takes the same price for both – הכא נמי מאי טעמא דינא דבר מצרא – Here too by the case of רבינא and רוניא what is the reason for the law of בר מצרא,** that he has the first refusal right to the property? משום שיהיו כל שדותיו סמוכין שיוכל לחורשן בבת אחת¹³ – In order that all his fields be near each other so he will be able to plow them all together – ולכך הוא מצרן מרוח אחת כמו אתה מג' רוחות – Therefore רוניא is considered an equal בר מצרא (even though he abuts) from (only) one side – just as you – רבינא are a בר מצרא (even though you border) on three sides. The difficulty רוניא will have in plowing two separate fields is equal to the difficulty רבינא will have in plowing the fourth field separate from his three fields. Once any בר מצרא buys an adjacent property the other בני מצרא cannot protest. רוניא will derive the same benefit from his two fields being together, just as רבינא would derive from his four fields being together. The example from the tanner teaches us that the two benefits are equal.¹⁴ This answers תוספות first question. רב ספרא granted רוניא the field not on account of his poverty, but rather because רוניא is considered the same בר מצרא as רבינא. The second question is also answered; that רבינא indeed erred in assuming that he is the primary בר מצרא. תוספות offers another explanation: והרב רבינו אברהם פירש דהך ארעא דזבן רוניא אמיצרא דרבינא – And אברהם 'הרב ר explained that this field that רוניא purchased on the boundary of s'רבינא fields – היינו אמצרא דאותן שדות שהיה רוניא אריס בהן כדאמרינן רוניא שתלא דרבינא הוה – this means that he purchased a field on the boundary of those fields of רבינא in which רוניא was a sharecropper of those fields as we just cited from the גמרא in פרק המקבל that רוניא was a sharecropper by רבינא – והכי קאמר ליה רב ספרא לרבינא אף על פי שאין לרוניא בגוף הקרקע כלום – And this is what רב ספרא said to רבינא even though רוניא does not own anything in the fields of רבינא, so how can he claim that he is a בר מצרא on the field that he just bought; when in truth רבינא was the proper בר מצרא, since he actually owned the adjoining property – מכל מקום הואיל שהוא עובדן הרי הוא מצרן כמו¹⁵ – Nevertheless since רוניא works on the adjoining property (that belongs to רבינא) רוניא is considered a בר מצרא [just as you – רבינא]. רוניא derives a benefit from the fact that the field he bought borders the fields he is sharecropping (s'רבינא fields). He will be able to tend to his own field while he is tending s'רבינא fields – דאמרי אינשי ארבעה לצלא נותנין ד' זוז על העור – For people say, ‘four for the hide’ meaning one pays four זוז for the hide – וכמו כן צריך ליתן לצללא לאומן המעבד את העור: And one must pay in addition the same amount to the tanner, the craftsman who cures the hide. This expression conveys the idea that the value of the work to process the material is equal to the value of the material itself. Therefore, רוניא, the sharecropper is an equal בר מצרא as רבינא the owner.¹⁶ They have an equal interest in acquiring the adjoining field.

SUMMARY תוספות asks four questions on s'רש"י interpretation¹⁷ of the dispute between רבינא and רוניא concerning who is the בר מצרא.

1. In a תורה דין we are required to follow the law, and not rule on the basis of mercy. Why did רב ספרא award the field to רוניא?
2. From the expression רבינא סבר, it seems that רבינא erred in his judgment. Seemingly there is no error at all.
3. Why is this story of בר מצרא cited in our גמרא? It seems to have no relevance, here.
4. צלא means a hide; not a tanner. תוספות offers two interpretations of this story: A. רבינא boxed in two fields with his surrounding fields. רוניא owned one of these fields, then bought the other. רבינא was of the opinion that since he is a בר מצרא from three sides of this field and רוניא was a בר מצרא from only one side therefore he, רבינא, should have priority and be considered the rightful בר מצרא. רב ספרא explained to him, using the example of curing hide, that it cost the same amount to cure a large hide as a small hide. Similarly the gain for רוניא is the same as the gain for רבינא. B. רוניא, who was the sharecropper of רבינא, bought a field adjacent to those of רבינא, which would enable him to take care of his own field whilst he is caring for s'רבינא fields. רבינא thought that he should be considered the rightful בר מצרא since he owned the property adjacent to the field in question, while רוניא merely worked (as a sharecropper) on the adjacent fields. רב ספרא corrected רבינא by pointing out that the cost of labor צללא, is the same as the cost of material צלא. This places the worker and the owner on an equal basis as far as בר מצרא is concerned.

THINKING IT OVER What are the relative advantages of each of the two תירוצים of תוספות over the other תירוץ? 2. Why (in first answer) did תוספות find it necessary to specify the reason why a בר מצרא has a priority in the adjacent field?¹⁸ 3. Which story happened first; the first story or the second?¹⁹ 4. Does a tenant possess the rights of a בר מצרא?²⁰

footnotes: ¹ רש"י in his first (and last) פירוש translates צלא as a ‘tanner’. ² רש"י in his second פירוש as well as תוספות translate צלא as a ‘hide’. ³ This ‘Overview’ follows s'רש"י first interpretation. ⁴ [See ‘Overview’.] A case must be decided on its merits, without taking into account the financial situation of the litigants. If רבינא was a rightful בר מצרא, then the financial plight of רוניא should not be considered. רבינא should have the right to evict רוניא. ⁵ According to s'רש"י interpretation, רבינא had every right to remove רוניא. It is just that רב ספרא convinced him not to do so on account of complying with the injunction of ועשית הישר והטוב. The term 'סבר', would seem inappropriate according to פירש"י. ⁶ The first story is relevant to our סוגיא, for it is discussing the case of the משנה concerning a מקיף וניקף. Once the גמרא related one story of רבינא and רוניא concerning מקיף וניקף it also cited an additional story, even though it is not relevant to our גמרא. ⁷ Why is it that two stories are mentioned here and another different story is mentioned in ב"מ? This indicates that only these two stories mentioned here are related to each other, not the story in ב"מ. The question is what is the connection between these two stories? ⁸ See רש"י ד"ה ארבעה, where רש"י comments similarly that צלא refers to the leather and not the tanner. For a defense of פירש"י, see פני שלמה et al. ⁹ The four fields of רבינא formed a box enclosing two fields. רוניא originally owned one of these fields ([say] the northern one, the southern boxed in field belonged to someone else. רוניא then bought this (southern) field, which was on his southern boundary. The other three sides of this field (east, west, and south) were adjacent to s'רבינא fields. ¹⁰ רבינא was of the opinion that since his properties are adjacent to this property (that רוניא bought) on three sides, whilst רוניא was adjacent only on one side, therefore he, רבינא, should be considered the true בר מצרא, and be able to remove רוניא from the property. This explains the reason why (only) these two stories are both related here. The first story sets the scene for the second story. ¹¹ The others cannot take it away from him. They cannot argue that we are also ברי מצרא. Since the buyer himself is a בר מצרא, they have no right to remove him from the property. ¹² It is not comparable to the case of המקבל. There, none of the other בני מצרא had an advantage over the fourth בר מצרא who purchased the property. They were all בני מצרא on one side only. Therefore they could not remove him. However here where רבינא was a בר מצרא on the majority of the boundaries, he should have the right to remove רוניא. ¹³ See ‘Thinking it over’ # 2. ¹⁴ Alternately the ‘folk saying’ gives us an insight into the דין of בר מצרא. The same work that is required for a large hide is (basically) required for a small hide. Similarly the same effort of plowing two fields is (basically) required to plow one field. ¹⁵ The הגהות הב"ח amends this to read ה"ה מצרן כמוך דאמרי. ¹⁶ It seems that this answer does not resolve תוספות third question; why is this story mentioned here. See מהרש"א. See ‘Thinking it over’ # 1. ¹⁷ See ‘Overview’. ¹⁸ See footnotes # 13. ¹⁹ See נח"מ בד"ה ועוד. ²⁰ See נח"מ בד"ה מ"מ.

מארבע אמות ולמעלה אין מחייבין אותו כולי בחזקת שלא נתן—From four אמות and higher we do not obligate him to pay etc.; it is assumed that he did not pay

OVERVIEW The משנה teaches that if a dividing wall collapsed in a חצר, either neighbor can be coerced to rebuild the wall up to four אמות. However neither can be coerced to pay for rebuilding the wall above four אמות even if the original wall was higher than four אמות. If one of the neighbors (“A”) rebuilt the wall on his own and subsequently the other neighbor (“B”) indicated that he is pleased with this new wall (by building an adjacent wall) and intends to make use of it, then he is obligated to share the expense of the wall above the four אמות. Furthermore if ‘B’ claims that he had already paid ‘A’ for the addition, he is not believed unless he can provide proof of payment.¹ תוספות is troubled by this last ruling. Why is ‘B’ not believed? How indeed do we know that ‘A’ built the wall himself? Perhaps ‘B’ built the wall. Granted that ‘B’ agrees that ‘A’ built the wall; he merely claims that he paid his share to ‘A’. However ‘B’ should be believed that he paid since he has a מיגו!² He could have claimed the he, not ‘A’, built the additional section.³ תוספות will answer this question.

איירי כגון דידעינן דקדם חד וארציה לחבריה והיה מסרהב – The משנה is discussing a situation where for instance it is known to us (בי"ד) that one of the parties (‘A’) proceeded to persuade his friend (‘B’) to rebuild the wall and ‘B’ was reluctant to rebuild the wall. תוספות goes on to prove that this situation is actually implied in the משנה – כדמשמע לישנא אין מחייבין אותו ולכך הוי בחזקת שלא נתן – As the language of the משנה indicates, for the משנה states that we do not obligate him (‘B’) to rebuild the wall above four אמות. The fact that the משנה states that ‘we do not obligate him’, indicates that he is reluctant and does not want to rebuild the wall.⁴ Indeed בי"ד supports his rights of refusal and does not obligate him to share the expense of building above ד' אמות. However בי"ד is now aware that he does not want to raise this wall and therefore it is understood why it is assumed that he did not pay for the rebuilding of the wall above four אמות. It is known to בי"ד that he refused to participate in building the wall. It can be therefore safely assumed that the party who was encouraging the building of the wall (‘A’) did indeed build it himself. The reluctant party does not have a מיגו that he could have claimed that he built it himself, since it is known that previously he refused to participate in building the wall. Once there is no מיגו it is presumed that he did not pay.⁵

And it is not necessary to qualify the משנה that it is discussing a case where ‘A’ made a חזית to prove that he built it himself. We can assume that ‘A’ built it himself even if there is no חזית, as long as בי"ד is aware that ‘B’ refused to participate in building the wall.

SUMMARY The respondent (‘B’) is not believed that he already paid for the wall in a case where בי"ד is aware that he originally refused to participate in building the wall (above ד' אמות). In such a case he does not have the מיגו that he built the wall (himself). It is therefore assumed that the plaintiff (‘A’) built the wall. This same ruling would obviously apply if ‘A’ built a חזית indicating that he alone built the wall.

THINKING IT OVER

1. What would be the דין if ‘B’ claimed that he built the wall himself (even after he originally refused to raise the wall)?
2. Would there be an advantage to say that the משנה is discussing a case where ‘A’ made a חזית?
3. Why is it necessary to infer from the משנה that בי"ד is aware that one party refused to build the wall; it is seemingly obvious that one party refused, for otherwise there would be no issue?!⁷
4. תוספות states it is not necessaryto qualify the משנה that it is discussing a case where the תובע made a חזית. It would seem to be problematic if the משנה is discussing a case of a חזית; how would we then explain the רישא that it is בחזקת שנתן if there is a חזית?!⁸

footnotes: ¹ Generally a defendant (נתבע) is not required to prove that he paid a debt. On the contrary, it is the responsibility of the plaintiff (תובע) to prove that he is owed money. In this case however, it is the responsibility of the נתבע to prove that he paid for his share in the wall above four אמות. The גמרא explains this on 'עמוד ב (cited by רש"י here in the משנה ד"ה בחזקת). It is presumed (חזקה) that a person will not pay a debt unless it is clear (to him) that he actually owes the monies. It is not obvious that by merely building an adjacent wall, one is liable to share in the expenses of the (common) raised wall above ד' אמות. Therefore it is presumed that the נתבע will not pay for the heightened wall unless he is coerced by the בי"ד. Consequently the נתבע must prove that he indeed paid for the raised wall. See footnote.# 3 ² See ם"מהר. ³ Even though there is a חזקה that the נתבע did not pay (see footnote # 1), nevertheless this should be considered (at least) as a מיגו במוקם חזקה (see the גמרא later 'סוף עמוד ב), which may be a valid מיגו. ⁴ Just as in the רישא when the משנה states מחייבין אותו it means that he is obligated to build the wall initially; here too it means that he is not obligated to participate in raising the wall higher than ד' אמות. Without this inference (had the משנה not stated 'אין מחייבין אותו'), we could have mistakenly interpreted the משנה to be discussing a case where the wall was already rebuilt above four אמות and the תובע (‘A’) demanded that ‘B’ pay him for the entire wall. In this case if ‘B’ would claim that he already paid him he may be believed and not be obligated to pay, for he has a מיגו that he could have claimed that he (‘B’) built the (entire) wall.Now however that the משנה states אין מחייבין אותו, this indicates that we are discussing a stage before the wall was rebuilt (above ד' אמות); where ‘A’ is demanding that ‘B’ should contribute to rebuild the wall (above ד' אמות) and ‘B’ refuses. In this case ‘B’ loses his מיגו.It would seem that (the same would be) if the תובע had עדים that the נתבע refused to pay him at any time after the תובע finished building his wall. The נתבע would subsequently also not be believed to claim פרעתי; for he forfeited his מיגו by virtue of his refusal to pay. תוספות however chooses the case of where the נתבע refused to participate in initially enlarging the wall (above ד' אמות) since that is what is inferred from the expression 'אין מחייבין אותו' (instead of פטור מלשלם or likewise). See footnote # 6. ⁵ See footnote # 1. ⁶ תוספות rejects the possibility that the משנה is discussing a case where ‘A’ built a חזית; for this is not at all implied in the משנה. However the case of refusal is indeed implied in the משנה. See footnote # 4. ⁷ See footnote # 4. ⁸ See נח"מ וסוכ"ד אות לה.

אף על פי שלא נתן¹ תקרה מגלגלין עליו את הכל—Even though he did not place the beam over the wall**, we extend his** liability for everything

OVERVIEW The גמרא in ב"ק queries² what is the דין in a case where a person lives in another’s courtyard unbeknownst to the owner; is he liable to pay rent or not. The גמרא refers to this as זה נהנה – the squatter is deriving a benefit (for otherwise he would have to pay rent elsewhere) וזה לא חסר – and the owner is not suffering a loss (for he has no intention of renting out this vacant courtyard). The consensus of opinions in the גמרא is that זנוזל"ח is פטור. The case in our משנה seems to be a classic case of זנוזל"ח; the neighbor is deriving a benefit from the raised wall (above ד' אמות); that the other built, without causing any loss to the benefactor. תוספות offers two distinctions between our משנה and the rule that זנוזל"ח is פטור.

תוספות anticipates the following difficulty: אף על גב דזה נהנה וזה לא חסר פטור – Even though that where one derives a benefit from another (נהנה), however the benefactor does not suffer a loss (לא חסר); the rule is that the beneficiary is exempt from paying the benefactor. Seemingly, here too, the benefactor who raised the wall above ד' אמות (for his own benefit) is not suffering any loss from the fact that the beneficiary is intending³ to place a beam on his wall. Why then should the beneficiary be obligated to pay the benefactor?! תוספות responds: מכל מקום כיון דגלי דעתיה דניחא ליה בהגבהה⁴ חייב – Nevertheless since the beneficiary expressed his view, by building an adjacent wall that he is pleased with the raising of the common wall above ד' אמות, therefore he is obligated to pay. וכן משמע נמי בכיצד הרגל⁵ (בבא קמא דף כ,ב ושם) דקאמר טעמא⁶ דניקף הא מקיף פטור – And indeed this is also implied in פרק כיצד הרגל that**** זנוזל"ח**** is פטור only when there is no גילוי דעת on the part of the נהנה that he is pleased with the action of the benefactor. תוספות continues with quoting the גמרא: for the גמרא says; the reason the ניקף is חייב is because the ניקף fenced the fourth wall however if the מקיף built the fourth wall (as well as the other three walls) the ניקף would be פטור; even though the ניקף is deriving a benefit from the מקיף – שמע מינה זה נהנה וזה לא חסר פטור⁷ – We can derive from this ruling that where one derives a benefit, however the benefactor suffers no loss, the beneficiary is פטור. This concludes the quote from the גמרא. תוספות concludes his proof: ואפילו הכי כשעמד ניקף חייב⁸ כן נראה לי – And nevertheless when the ניקף arose and built the fourth wall he is obligated to pay (his share in the previous three walls)! תוספות concludes: This is how it appears to me. That by זנוזל"ח if there is no גילוי דעת that he is pleased then he is פטור; however if there is a גילוי דעת that he is ניחא ליה, then he is חייב. תוספות offers an alternate answer: אי נמי הכא זה חסר הוא שגורם לו שהגביה הכותל למעלה מד' אמות – Or you may also say; here the benefactor is suffering a loss on account of the beneficiary for it is the beneficiary that caused him to raise the wall higher than four אמות in the first place –

In order that he, the benefactor, should not have any היזק ראיה from the beneficiary in any manner at all. The reason the benefactor raised his wall more than four אמות, was to protect himself from the beneficiary. The beneficiary should not be able to see him even if he stands on a high place and can look above a wall of (only) ד' אמות. Therefore since the benefactor had a loss on account of the beneficiary, it is no longer a case of זנוזל"ח,⁹ the beneficiary has to pay his share.

SUMMARY זה נהנה וזה לא חסר is פטור only if there is no דעת גילו on behalf of the beneficiary; however if the beneficiary is מגלה דעת that he is pleased with the הנאה, he is חייב. In our משנה the נהנה is מגלה דעת דניחא ליה through building an adjacent wall. Alternately our משנה is considered a חסר because the מהנה raised the wall on account of the נהנה, that the נהנה should not cause him any היזק ראיה.

THINKING IT OVER

1. Why is there a difference whether the נהנה is מגלה דעת that he is ניחא ליה or not?¹⁰
2. What are the practical differences between the two תירוצים in תוספות?¹¹
3. How much is the נהנה required to pay in our משנה; for his הנאה from the wall or for the entire (half of the) wall?¹²
4. Why is he considered a נהנה, if all he did was to build an adjacent wall!?¹³

footnotes: ¹ The הגהות הב"ח amends this to read נתן עליו את התקרה. ² דף כ,א. ³ It would seem from תוספות heading ‘אע"ג שלא נתן עליו את התקרה' that the question is why the beneficiary has to pay when he is only intending to use the wall. However once he placed his beam on the common wall, it is understood that he has to pay. It is not a case of זנוזל"ח anymore. The weight of the additional beam on the common wall is considered a loss to the benefactor. It will hasten the deterioration of the wall. The דין is that even if the חסר is minimal, the נהנה must pay for his entire הנאה, not just for the חסר. See תוס' רע"א על המשנה. See ‘Thinking it over’ # 4. ⁴ See תוספות ב"ק דף כ,ב ד"ה טעמא where תוספות states that ניחא ליה בהוצאה; i.e. he is pleased to the extent that he is willing to spend additional monies of his own in order to derive the benefit. This would distinguish this case from הדר בחצר חבירו שלא ברשות. There, even though the squatter is obviously מגלה דעת that he is pleased, nevertheless there was no outlay of his own monies. In our case however (as well as by מקיף וניקף) the גילוי דעת was accompanied by an outlay of money. It is in this case (only) that he is חייב. ⁵ The גמרא there in כיצד הרגל attempted to resolve the issue whether זנוזל"ח is חייב or פטור. The גמרא cites our (previous) משנה on דף ד,ב concerning a מקיף וניקף. The opinion of ר' יוסי is that (only) if the ניקף built the fourth wall מגלגלין עליו את הכל. ⁶ The הגהות הב"ח amends this to טעמא דגדר ניקף. ⁷ The גמרא there ultimately rejects this proof. תוספות however is deriving his interpretation from the ס"ד of the גמרא. ⁸ Seemingly even when the ניקף built the fourth wall, it should still be considered זה נהנה וזה לא חסר! Why is there a difference who built the fourth wall?! This indicates that the rule of זנוזל"ח is פטור only when the נהנה did not express his satisfaction with his benefit. However, when the נהנה expresses his satisfaction, even though the benefactor is לא חסר, nevertheless the נהנה is חייב. This explains the difference in the cases of מקיף וניקף as well as our משנה. When the מקיף built all four walls, even though the ניקף is נהנה he is still פטור, for he did not express his satisfaction in any manner. However if the ניקף built the fourth wall, or in our משנה where he built an adjacent wall, in these cases the נהנה is חייב for he is doing an action which expresses his satisfaction from the הנאה he is deriving from his benefactor. ⁹ See ם"מהר who explains that זה חסר is not limited to a case where the benefactor loses on account of the הנאה of the נהנה, but even if the benefactor incurred the loss (from the beneficiary) not in conjunction with the beneficiary’s הנאה (as in our case), it is still considered זה חסר. See בל"י אות קי. ¹⁰ See בל"י אות קט בד"ה והנה עיקר. ¹¹ See נח"מ בד"ה א"נ. ¹² See בל"י אות קט בד"ה אולם. ¹³ See footnote # 3. עי' בסוכ"ד סי' לו, לז.

הקובע זמן לחבירו—One who sets a time limit for his friend’s loan

OVERVIEW ריש לקיש maintains that when the מלוה sets a due date for the loan, the לוה cannot claim (on the due date) that he already paid before the due date. There is an assumption (חזקה) that a person does not pay his loans before they are due. A loan without a specified due date is considered due and payable at the end of thirty days. Can the לוה claim that he paid the loan during the thirty days? תוספות addresses this issue.

The ר"י says that this rule (of אין אדם פורע תוך זמנו) applies only when he specifically set a time limit; but by a unspecified loan, where no time limitation was set as to the repayment of the loan; even though the rule is that a סתם הלואה is for thirty days, and after thirty days the לוה is obligated to pay the מלוה, nevertheless the time within the thirty days is not considered as within the time of the loan, before it is due. The לוה can claim that he paid the loan within the thirty days. It will not be considered a case of פרעתיך תוך זמני. It is not the same as when the due date was specified; in which case any payments before the due date are considered תוך זמנו.

SUMMARY The ruling of אין אדם פורע תוך זמנו applies only to a loan whose due date was specified. By a סתם הלואה, however, payment within the thirty days is not considered תוך זמנו.

THINKING IT OVER Why indeed is there a difference whether the due date was specified or not? Seemingly the חזקה should apply in all cases!²

footnotes: ¹ It is only then that we maintain that a borrower will not repay the loan before it is due, and is therefore not believed to claim פרעתיך תוך זמני. ² See נח"מ and בל"י אות קיא.

ובא בזמנו¹ ואמר פרעתיך תוך זמני אינו נאמן—Andthe מלוה came on time and the לוה said I paid you during the time, he is not believed

OVERVIEW There is a query later² in our גמרא whether a מיגו is effective when it opposes a חזקה. The case in question is if the מלוה approached the לוה after the due date. The לוה responded that he paid before the due date. On one hand there is the חזקה that אין אדם פורע תוך זמנו which would lead us not to believe the לוה. On the other hand the לוה should be believed for he has a מיגו that he could have claimed that I paid you after the due date (some time before the מלוה approached him). תוספות anticipates the suggestion that in the case of ר"ל itself there is a מיגו במקום חזקה. The לוה could have claimed that you never lent me any money, etc. The fact the ר"ל does not give credence to the לוה would seem to prove that ר"ל maintains that לא אמרינן מיגו במקום חזקה. Our תוספות will refute this proposition.

ונראה לי שיש עדים שחייב לו³ וקבע לו זמן – And it seems to me that the דין of ר"ל is valid (only) if there are witnesses who can testify two things; a) that the לוה owed him money and b) that the מלוה set a time when the loan is due. It is only under these circumstances that the לוה is not believed if he claims פרעתיך תוך זמני. דאי לאו הכי ניהמניה שפרעו תוך זמן במיגו דאי בעי אמר לא הלוית לי כלום – For if it were not so, if there are no witnesses that can testify that the לוה owed money and that a due date was established, then we (could)⁴ believe the לוה that he paid תוך זמנו**,** since he has a מיגו that he could have said, ‘you never lent me anything’, if there are no witnesses that the לוה owed the מלוה money. Had the לוה claimed that I never borrowed from you, the מלוה would not be able to collect. או לא קבעת לי שום זמן – Or even if there are witnesses that the לוה owed the מלוה, however if there are no witnesses that a due date was set, the לוה should also be believed to say פרעתיך תוך זמני with a מיגו that he could have said you have not set a date when the monies are due. It is a סתם הלואה. In the previous תוספות, the ר"י maintained that by a סתם הלואה the לוה is believed to say פרעתיך תוך זמני.⁵ תוספות concludes his proof that ר"ל is discussing a case where there is no מיגו; for if ר"ל is discussing all types of cases even when there are no עדים that he owed him money and/or was קובע זמן, then how can ר"ל maintain that the לוה is not believed – ולקמן מיבעי ליה אי אמרינן מיגו במקום חזקה⁶ – For later the גמרא queries whether a מיגו is effective in the face of a חזקה**.** If the דין of ריש לקיש that אאפת"ז is valid in all cases even when there is a מיגו, then what is the query? ⁷ תוספות anticipates the following question. We have been forced to establish that there are עדים that the לוה owed money to the מלוה (otherwise the לוה has a מיגו of להד"ם). Why then does ר"ל maintain that the לוה is not believed to say פרעתיך תוך זמני (only) because of the חזקה of אאפת"ז; even without the חזקה the לוה should not be believed, since there are עדים that maintain that he owed money to the מלוה! Seemingly the only answer to this question is that ר"ל maintains that one who borrows money in the presence of עדים need not repay the מלוה in the presence of עדים. The לוה is believed to say פרעתי without עדים even if there are עדים who testify that he borrowed the money. This issue whether המלוה את חבירו בעדים צריך לפורעו בעדים or אינו צריך לפורעו בעדים is a מחלוקת. We can seemingly derive from our discussion that ר"ל is of the opinion that המלוה את חבירו בעדים א"צ לפורעו בעדים.⁸ תוספות will refute this assumption. ומכל מקום אין להוכיח מכאן⁹ דקסבר ריש לקיש – However notwithstanding the above, we cannot prove from here that ר"ל maintains that – המלוה את חבירו בעדים אין צריך לפורעו בעדים – When one lends someone money in the presence of witnesses, the לוה is not obligated to repay him in the presence of witnesses; but rather the לוה is always believed to say פרעתי without witnesses. This would explain why ר"ל maintains that the (only) reason the לוה is not believed is because it is תוך זמנו; and not because there are עדים who testify that he owed money. For if ר"ל would maintain that המלוה את חברו בעדים צריך לפורעו בעדים, why does ר"ל say that the לוה is not believed on account that it is תוך זמנו, since תוספות has already ascertained that in this case there are עדים that the לוה owed money, the לוה would not be believed regardless if it is תוך זמנו or not, since המלוה את חברו בעדים צריך לפורעו בעדים. תוספות refutes this attempted proof by explaining there are two different types of עדות concerning the לוה owing money to the מלוה. דאפשר דמיירי הכא שהלוהו שלא בעדים¹⁰ אלא הודה לו בפני עדים – For it is possible that here in the case of ר"ל we are discussing a situation that he lent him the money not in the presence of witnesses, however the לוה subsequently admitted in the presence of witnesses that he owes the מלוה money.¹⁰ Now it is understood why ר"ל may maintain that המלוה את חברו בעדים צריך לפורעו בעדים and nevertheless maintain that in this case the reason he is not believed is only because it was תוך זמנו and not because there are עדים. תוספות explains: דאפילו למאן דאמר צריך לפורעו בעדים – For even according to the one who maintains that one who borrows in the presence of witnesses must repay in the presence of witnesses; otherwise he will not be believed to say פרעתי – הני מילי היכא דהלוהו בפני עדים מעיקרא¹¹ דלא הימניה אלא בפני עדים¹² – These words are valid only where originally he lent him the money in the presence of עדים; in this instance the לוה cannot claim פרעתי, but must rather have עדים who can corroborate his payment. The reason for this is because the מלוה did not trust the לוה himself with the loan, only in the presence of עדים. תוספות asks an additional question: ואם תאמר מכל מקום ניפשוט מהכא דלא אמרינן מיגו דאי בעי אמר פרעתיך עתה¹³ – And if you will say that notwithstanding that which was previously said that there are עדים that he owed him money and that there was a קביעת זמן for payment, which would preclude the לוה from having the מיגו of להד"ם or לא קבעת זמן; nevertheless we can still prove from this statement of ר"ל that we do not say that a מיגו can stand up in the face of an opposing חזקה. The לוה still has a different מיגו for the לוה could have claimed that I paid you now; today before we came to בי"ד.¹⁴ תוספות answers: ואומר רבינו יצחק דהא לא חשיב מיגו כיון דמיירי דקיימי ביום אחרון של זמן – And the ר"י says that this claim of פרעתיך עתה is not considered a valid מיגו since we are discussing a situation that is taking place on the last day of the time; the day that the loan is due. תוספות elaborates and explains: ואף על גב דמסקינן בשילהי דהשואל (בבא מציעא דף קב,ב ושם) – For even though the גמרא concludes in the end of פרק השואל – דעביד איניש דפרע ביומא דמישלם זימניה – That it is plausible that a person will pay on the day that the time has come; the due date. Therefore it is true that had the לוה actually claimed that he paid today on the due date he would have been believed – מכל מקום אין זה מיגו דלא חציף איניש למימר פרעתיך היום¹⁵ – Nevertheless this is not a מיגו for a person does not have the audacity to say that I paid you today; when it is not true. A מיגו is that we believe what he claims now, because he could have offered a different claim which would have been accepted. Here however he would not have the gall to claim that I just paid you. That is too blatant a lie to say to the מלוה. תוספות anticipates a question: If the מיגו of היום פרעתיך is not a valid מיגו since לא חציף איניש, why is the מיגו of פרעתיך תוך זמני any different. He is seemingly also claiming a blatant lie in the face of the מלוה. תוספות responds: אבל רגיל הוא לומר פרעתיך אתמול¹⁶ ושכחת:¹⁷ However it is quite usual to claim that **I paid you yesterday (**i.e. some time ago) but you must have forgotten about the payment;

SUMMARY We cannot infer from the דין of ר"ל, whether he maintains מיגו במקום חזקה or not; and similarly whether he maintains המלוה את חברו בעדים צריך לפורעו בעדים or not. The case of ר"ל may be in a situation where there are עדים that the לוה owed the מלוה money and that the מלוה was קובע זמן. This precludes both the מיגו of להד"ם as well as לא קבעת לי זמן. On the other hand since the עדים merely testify that the לוה admitted that he owed money (but not that they were present at the loan), everyone agrees that in this situation א"צ לפורעו בעדים. There is also no מיגו of פרעתיך היום, for that is a מיגו דהעזה.

THINKING IT OVER

1. What is of greater concern to תוספות: whether we can derive that ר"ל maintains לא אמרינן מיגו במקום חזקה or if ר"ל maintains המלוה את חבירו בעדים א"צ לפורעו בעדים?
2. Can we differentiate between the נאמנות of פרעתיך תוך זמני במגו דפרעתיך לאח"ז and the נאמנות of פרעתיך תוך זמני במגו דלא הלותיני (or שלא קבעת לי זמן)?¹⁸
3. According to the מסקנא of תוספות if the לוה said that I paid you today on the due date, is he believed, or is it too much העזה on part of the לוה to be believed?
4. Can we conclusively infer from this תוספות that מגו דהעזה לא אמרינן?¹⁹

footnotes: ¹ The words 'ובא בזמנו' do not appear in our גמרא texts. See מהרש"ל cited in מסורת הש"ס. See footnote # 14. ² דף ה,ב בסופו. This איבעיא is (only) according to the viewpoint of ר"ל; for according to אביי ורבה the לוה is believed regardless whether there is a מיגו or not. ³ The language of תוספות is precise. The עדים are not (necessarily) testifying that they saw the loan; but rather they are aware that he לוה owed the מלוה money. See later in תוספות (by) footnote # 11. ⁴ It would seem that whether we actually do believe him or not is dependent on the outcome of the איבעיא later in the גמרא, whether we say מיגו במקום חזקה or not. The following sentences have been translated to reflect the ruling if we were to assume that we do accept a מיגו במקום חזקה. ⁵ In either of these two cases had the לוה utilized the מיגו he would be believed. He should therefore also be believed if he claims פרעתיך תוך זמני. Therefore since ר"ל maintains that the לוה is not believed if he claims פרעתיך תוך זמני, we are forced to say that ר"ל is discussing a case where there are עדים that he owed him money and was קובע a זמן. In this instance there is no מיגו. There is only the חזקה of אאפת"ז; the לוה is not believed. ⁶ This איבעיא is (only) according to ר"ל. See footnote # 2. ⁷ Obviously we do not say מיגו במקום חזקה. We can, therefore, derive from the איבעיא, that the דין of ר"ל is (perhaps only) when there is no מיגו, i.e. that there are עדים that he owed money and there was a זמן קביעת. When there are no עדים and there is a מיגו, then it will depend on the outcome of the איבעיא whether a מיגו is accepted במקום חזקה, or not.See ‘Thinking it over # 2. ⁸ תוספות is arguing ממה נפשך. If there are no עדים, then we can derive that ר"ל maintains that לא אמרינן מיגו במקום חזקה. If there are עדים then we can derive that ר"ל maintains המלוה את חבירו בעדים א"צ לפורעו בעדים. ⁹ In the case of ר"ל there are עדים that the לוה owed the מלוה money, nevertheless we cannot prove from here, wherein ר"ל maintains that the (only) reason the לוה is not believed is because it is תוך זמנו; and not because there are עדים who testify that he owed money, that המלוה את חבירו בעדים א"צ לפורעו בעדים. ¹⁰ This is does not contradict that which תוספות explained previously that there are witnesses that the לוה owed the מלוה money. as תוספות goes on to explain, ¹⁰ See footnote # 3. ¹¹ One may have mistakenly thought that the reason why בעדים לפורעו צריך בעדים חבירו את המלוה is because since we know that the לוה certainly owed the מלוה money, therefore he is not free from this obligation unless the לוה can prove that he paid him. If that were the reason then it would be no difference whether it was המלוה את חברו בעדים or the לוה was עדים בפני הודה, in both case the לוה would not be believed to claim פרעתי without עדים. תוספות teaches us that this reason is not correct. The reason is as stated 'וכו הימניה דלא. See also אילימא ד"ה תוספות on this (ב) עמוד. ¹² By giving the loan only in the presence of עדים it is as if the מלוה is informing the לוה that he does not trust him and in effect is saying to the לוה you must have witnesses testify that you paid. However in our case where the loan took place without witnesses; the מלוה did trust the לוה, therefore even if subsequently the לוה (for whatever reason) admitted to witnesses that he owes the מלוה money, this admission does not preclude the לוה from subsequently saying פרעתי without עדים. We have now reconciled these two factors. On one hand the לוה has no מיגו of להד"ם since there are עדים to whom he was מודה that he owed the money. On the other hand even if ר"ל would maintain המלוה את חברו בעדים צלפ"ב, the לוה would have still been believed to claim פרעתי since there were no עדים at the time of the loan. That is why ר"ל maintains that the only reason the לוה is not believed is because it is תוך זמנו. ¹³ See the heading of תוספות where the גירסא is 'ובא בזמנו'. See footnote # 1. ¹⁴ Today is the due date. If the לוה would claim that he paid today on the due date, he would have been believed. Therefore even if the לוה claims that I paid you previously תוך זמני, he still has a מיגו of פרעתיך עתה. The fact the ר"ל maintains that the לוה is not believed, even though he has this מיגו, proves that ר"ל maintains לא אמרינן מיגו במקום חזקה. The גמרא should have cited this as proof to resolve the איבעיא. ¹⁵ In every מיגו there is the טענה he is claiming and there is the מיגו which he could have claimed, which is obviously not true (he did not even claim it). The idea of a מיגו is that we believe what he is claiming in his טענה, for he could have just as easily claimed the מיגו. However if he could not have just as easily claimed the מיגו, as in our case, then there is no נאמנות of a מיגו. We assume that he is indeed lying but he claimed the lie which was the most comfortable lie. The lie of היום פרעתיך is so uncomfortable, compared to the lie of פרעתיך תוך זמני, that he prefers פרעתיך תוך זמני to היום פרעתיך. If however he actually claims היום פרעתיך then he is believed, since there is no reason not to believe him. The fact that it an uncomfortable lie, makes it all the more believable, for if it is not true how is he claiming such an uncomfortable lie. It must obviously be true. ¹⁶ תוספות may be referring to the איבעיא of the גמרא concerning מיגו במקום חזקה where the מלוה approached the לוה (even one day) after the loan was due. The גמרא does consider the argument of אתמול פרעתיך as a valid מיגו (providing we say מיגו במקום חזקה). ¹⁷ Even though it is also a lie; however it not so brazen a lie for the לוה will say to the מלוה ‘you forgot’. This is not something the לוה can say when he claims that I paid you today. We therefore suspect that the לוה is lying. It is easier for him to say the lie that I paid you תוך זמנו and שכחת than to claim I just now paid you today, where the מלוה knows that it is a blatant lie. There is no מיגו for it is assumed that the לוה does not possess the wherewithal to make such an outrageous claim. ¹⁸ See footnote # 7. See בל"י אות קיב. ¹⁹ See קיג 'סי י"בל.