[The] entire [mishna] is [in accordance with the opinion of] Rabbi Tarfon. See Tosafot 14a ד"ה לא לזה ולא לזה לפירות אלא דחד, note 2, for a lengthy discussion of the material that we are discussing in this Tosafot. A short review: The text of our Gemara here and on 14a is that the area that the Braita on 14a and the Mishna on 15b are speaking about is a jointly owned courtyard where both partners, Reuven and Shimon, have the right to bring their oxen, but only one partner, Reuven, may store his produce there. This is the text of Rashi, Rif and Rambam. This area is equivalent to a public domain as far as keren is concerned, since both oxen have the right to be there as they do in a public domain and is considered Reuven’s private courtyard in regard to shain and regel, since he has exclusive rights to store his produce in the courtyard. Rabbeinu Tam vehemently disagrees with this text, because he holds that it is impossible to consider this area as a private domain for shain and regel, when the oxen that damage by shain and regel are allowed to be there. He alters the text to read: this one and that one do not have the right to bring in oxen, thus it is a private domain for shain and regel. For keren it is equivalent to a public domain, since both partners equally do not have the right to bring in their oxen. In our Gemara we are once again searching for an area that has a dual function, where for keren it will be a public domain and according to R’ Tarfon a tam will pay only half damages, whereas for shain and regel it will serve as a courtyard of the nizok where they are liable. In our Gemara we find R’ Elozor who disagreed with Rav Chisdo on 13b and 14a, expressing his opinion as to when a courtyard has a split ruling. This should be very telling about the exact dispute with Rav Chisdo. Here as well we amend the text to read: It is designated for one of them, Reuven,for produce, and not for this one, Reuven,nor for that one, Shimon,for oxen. This is bewildering! For it is to be understood from R’ Elozor¹ who says the jointly owned courtyard is a private domain for shain and regel because it is designated for only one of them, Reuven, for produce, but if it would be designatedfor both, Reuven and Shimon, for produce, one would be exempt for shain and regel. And if so, we should resolve from this Gemara that they, Rav Chisdo and R’ Elozor,argue about the question of R’ Zeira, who asked: “How can an area be considered a courtyard of the nizok when the damager may also store his produce there?”and the solution of Abaye, who answered that it is considered the courtyard of the nizok because the damager had no right to bring his oxen there, and earlier in the Gemara on 14a, the Gemara is in doubt about whether they disagree at all. On 14a the Gemara was not sure that R’ Elozor disagrees with Rav Chisdo who holds that when even both have the right to store their produce in the courtyard it is still considered a private domain. However, here on 16a it is clear that R’ Elozor who is reconciling our Mishna in accordance with R’ Tarfon is saying that it is considered a private domain when only one, Reuven, has the right to store his produce there. R’ Elozor holds that if both have the right to store their produce there it is not a courtyard of the nizok for shain and regel. Why does the Gemara on 14a even have the slightest doubt about R’ Elozor’s position in this matter? The fact that R’ Elozor expresses his opinion here about what is considered a jointly owned courtyard with a split ruling presents a problem to the text of Rashi, Rif and Rambam as well. And according to the manuscripts that have the text that the courtyard was designated for this one, Reuven, and for that one, Shimon, for oxen, the reverse is difficult, that the Gemara should resolve that they, Rav Chisdo and R’ Elozor on 14ado not argue when the courtyard is designated for both for produce when neither has the right to bring in oxen, and they agree that this area is considered a courtyard of the nizok, and there is no dispute between them,because he, R’ Elozor,**** here on 16a,considers a jointly owned courtyard as a courtyard of the nizok, even though the damager has the right to leave his ox there, as he clearly states his position on this matter in our Gemara, where he says that when both have the right to bring in their oxen and only one has the right to store his produce it is a courtyard of the nizok, certainly, when the courtyardis not designated for oxen at all, it should be considered a courtyard of the nizok even though it is designated for both Reuven and Shimon**for produce.**²

footnotes: ¹ Tosafot is using the opinion expressed here as a first hand view of R’ Elozor’s opinion in this issue and therefore proceeds to ask his questions on both texts of our Gemara, which are essentially: why is R’ Elozor’s view in this issue, mentioned here on 16a ignored? Others say that our Gemara is the opinion of R’ Elozor in the name of Rav. This may not be R’ Elozor’s personal opinion in this matter and is therefore not used to verify R’ Elozor’s position in his dispute with Rav Chisdo. ² This kal v’chomer follows Tosafot’ belief that the prime factor to be considered in designating the jointly owned courtyard as a courtyard of the nizok is whether oxen may be brought into the courtyard. If the presence of oxen does not remove its status as a courtyard of the nizok, certainly the presence of Shimon’s produce, when oxen are forbidden should not affect its status as a courtyard of the nizok. Rashi as we have seen has a totally different view on this matter. The prime issue causing the designation as a courtyard of the nizok is the exclusive rights of Reuven to store his produce there. According to Rashi, Tosafot’ kal v’chomer is not compelling.

[If it] is fitting for it, [then] yes; [if it] is not fitting for it, [then] no. R’ Elozor in the name of Rav said that all the cases of our Mishna can be in accord with R’ Tarfon. Rav Z’vid of N’hardo challenges this contention. The Mishna clearly states that shain is muad and pays full damages for that which is suitable for it, namely food; this implies that shain is not muad for eating things that are not suitable to be eaten such as garments and utensils. In effect this means that for eating garments and utensils the ox owner will pay only half damages, even though the damage occurred in the courtyard of the nizok. This undoubtedly does not concur with R’ Tarfon who holds that keren pays in full when the damage occurs in the nizok’s domain. Tosafot suggests that there might be another way of understanding the implication of the Mishna that shain is not a muad for garments and utensils that can concur with R’ Tarfon. We should not ask: Perhaps that, which the Gemara says that shain is a muad for eating that which is suitable for it, that means that the owner is liable to pay from his choicest assets and the payment is not limited to the value of the ox. And when the animal eats that which is not suitable for it such as garments and utensils, even though the owner pays full damages in accordance with R’ Tarfon, the Mishna is saying that he is not a muad in regard to paying from choicest assets, as the Gemara says in the second Perek (below 18b), that according to R’ Tarfon a tam pays full damages in the courtyard of the nizok, but only from its body. Thus even this sentence of the Mishna concurs with R’ Tarfon. Tosafot needs to prove that the term “it is not a muad” may be interpreted as meaning that one is not required to pay from his choicest assets, even though full payment is required. And the term muad can be used for this purpose, to indicate that the payment must be made from the choicest assets and is not limited to its body, as the Gemara says (below 18b): a chicken hopping and sends pebbles flying and they break utensils is not muad, and some say it is muad. And the dispute is about this issue, that one master who says the chicken is not muad, holds that payment is to be made only from its body, and the other master who says that the chicken is muad, holds that payment is to be made from the choicest assets of the chicken owner.¹ We see that the term muad can be used to indicate that payment must be made from general assets and ‘not muad’ means that payment is limited to the body of the damager. So too, our Mishna that implies that an animal is not muad to eat unsuitable item, such as garments and utensils, may mean that even though full payment is required, it is limited to the value of the body of the damager. Tosafot explains why this interpretation of “it is not muad for unsuitable items” is not a viable option for our Mishna.** For we are compelled** to say that when our Mishna implies that when consuming unsuitable items it is not muad even though this occurs in the courtyard of the nizok, it means that the owner pays only half damages, which is not in accordance with R’ Tarfon. Because later in the second Perek (19b) the Mishna which is explaining in detail the generalities of our Mishna,clearly says in regard to the explanation of the sentence the ‘shain is muad’ that if she ate garments or utensils she pays half damages. Since the Mishna on 19b is explaining our Mishna, and it says that when the animal consumes items that are not suitable for it, which is a derivative of keren, that the payment is half damages, it is definitely not following the opinion of R’ Tarfon.

footnotes: ¹ The Gemara on 18b says that the first opinion “it is not muad” follows the opinion of the Rabonon who hold that when an animal steps on a pebble and it jumps and damages, the liability is only for half payment and the second opinion that “it is muad” follows Sumchus who holds that for damage by jumping pebbles one is liable for full payment. Tosafot’ interpretation that the dispute is whether payment is from its body or from general assets is extremely difficult to understand. See שיטה מקובצת who quotes a גליון תוספות who deals with this issue.

[A case] where [he] did not bow during [the blessing of] thanksgiving. Seven years after a person’s death his spine becomes a snake if he did not bow when reciting modim. What relationship is there between the sin of not bowing by modim and the spine becoming a snake? Because it is a mitzvah to bow when reciting modim, and when straightening after bowing, one must straighten himself like a snake, who raises his head first and then his body, so that it should not appear as if the bowing is a burden upon him, as we find about Rav Shaishes in Masechet B’rochos (14b). The punishment is measure for measure, since he did not bow and then raise his spine like a snake does, his spine becomes a snake. This is his punishment, for it is humiliating for him that his spine becomes a snake. גליון Gilyon offers a second explanation for the connection between the sin of not bowing when reciting modim and the punishment of the spine becoming a snake. There are those who explain the relevance of the spine becoming a snake as follows: Because the Midrosh says that there is a bone (vertebrae) in the spine of a person from which he is resurrected in the time to come, when Hashem will resurrect the dead, and that bone is so strong and hard that fire cannot consume it. Thus, it survives through the millennium and will be the initial component from which his body will be resurrected. And now, when that bone becomes a snake, he will not be resurrected because the bone that is used as the initial component of his resurrected body will not be available because it is a snake and will not live in the time to come, when the dead will be resurrected. It is not logical to say that one will punished so harshly for committingthis relatively minor transgression.¹For we have learned in a Mishna (Sanhedrin 90a): All of Yisro’ail has a share in the world to come. Even though there are exceptions as mentioned in the Mishna there, not bowing when reciting modim is not listed among the exceptions nor is it as severe a transgression as some of the exceptions and it cannot be compared to them.

footnotes: ¹ See Maharsho in חידושי אגדות who explains the deeper significance of not bowing when reciting modim as a rebellion against the authority of Hashem, much in the same way the snake rebelled against Hashem’s dominion. Thus, the transgression although minor on the surface, is very telling about the depths of one’s feeling toward his relationship with Hashem and is deserving of such a harsh punishment.