[The tithe must be a definite tithe] and not a dubious tithe. The verse is teaching us that the mitzvah of tithing is in effect only when the counting process will yield a definite ‘tenth’. If the status of the ‘tenth’ will be dubious, there is no requirement to go through the tithing procedure. We see that the Torah addresses the possibility of a doubt. Elsewhere, (Yoma 74a and Chulin 22b) when the Gemara discusses a verse that deals with a doubt, the Gemara asks: Do we need a verse to deal with a doubt? The presumption of this question is that Hashem knows the reality and has no doubts. Why then would the Torah address a situation of doubts? But our Gemara is telling us that we have a verse to deal with a doubt. Shouldn’t the Gemara here also ask: Do we need a verse to deal with a doubt? Tosfos tells us: We should not ask: Do we need a verse to excludea tithing obligation when the outcome is in doubt? As we explained in Maseches Chulin (22b. Tosfos איצטריך.) Tosfos there explains that there are two different types of doubts: a) A doubt that is the result of varying circumstances. For example: In our case of the “counted” sheep that jumped back into the corral, there are two possibilities. As we count any group of ten that exits the corral, it is possible that the previously counted one is among them and the tenth is not truly a tenth. It is also possible that the previously counted one is not among the group and the designated tenth is truly a tenth. The truth will vary from situation to situation. The answer is not always the same. b) The circumstances are always the same, but our doubt is about the rule that governs this situation. Such as in the Gemara (Chulin 22b), where the Gemara is dealing with the maturity of pigeons. Pigeons are usable as a sacrifice only while young. Doves are usable only when they are older. There is a doubt about when the feathers start changing colors. The Gemara rules that for the pigeons that period is too old and for the doves it is too young. The Gemara cites a verse to prove this point, but then asks: Do we need a verse to deal with a doubt? Tosfos there (Chulin 22b) explains: In situation a) where there is no standard solution because the facts of the case vary, the Torah must tell us how to deal with a doubt. That is why the Gemara here does not ask: Do we need a verse to instruct us about doubts? Indeed, we do need a verse to tell us how we must deal with a situation when doubts arise. However, in situation b), the status of the birds whose color is changing does not vary from bird to bird, the reality is always the same. The Torah has no doubts and knows whether it is an older or younger bird. It is we, who are unaware of the proper Torah ruling in this matter who have a doubt. We cannot say that the Torah wrote a specific verse to address this situation. The Gemara in (Chulin 22b) therefore asks: Do we need a verse to deal with a doubt?

[One who has ten questionable firstborn donkeys] designates ten sheep to exempt them. [He then tithes the ten sheep and keeps them]. In order to understand this Tosfos we must study a small portion of a Mishna in Bechoros 9a: After discussing all the types of sheep that may be used for the redemption of a firstborn donkey, the Mishna concludes: One may redeem a firstborn donkey with a single sheep many times. A simple reading of this sentence seems to be saying that even if one has many firstborn donkeys to redeem, he may use the same sheep and he need not use one sheep per firstborn donkey. This, however, is simply not true. A bit earlier the very same Mishna teaches us: A Yisrael who has two female donkeys that have not yet calved, and they had two males, he must give two sheep to a Kohen. It is obvious that one cannot fulfill his obligation by redeeming two donkeys with one sheep. If so, how are we to understand the Mishna that tells us: One can redeem with [a sheep] many times. There is a difference of opinion about this: a) Rashi Bechoros 9a ד'ה ופודה בו פעמים הרבה says: If the Kohen returned the sheep to the Yisrael after he redeemed the firstborn donkey with that sheep, the Yisrael may use that very same sheep to redeem another firstborn donkey. A single sheep may not be used as a redemption for many firstborn donkeys at one time. The Mishna is only saying that it may be used for a second redemption when it is returned to the Yisrael’s possession. b) Rabbeinu Tam says: When the Mishna says that one can use the same sheep for many redemptions, the Mishna is speaking of when the sheep was used to redeem a questionable firstborn donkey. In such cases the redemption is done by designating a sheep in place of the questionable firstborn donkey, but it need not be given to the Kohen, since there is a doubt as to whether the Kohen is entitled to receive the sheep. The sheep designated as the redemption can be designated again and again, since it need not be actually given to the Kohen. A proper analysis of this material will yield that Tosfos’ upcoming question is valid only according to Rabbeinu Tam, but not according to Rashi. (See Tosfos Bechoros 11a, ד'ה שהיו לו, who states this clearly. Also see Artscroll Bechoros 4b3, note 21.) Tosfos asks three questions that he cannot resolve. The first: **This is bewildering! For in the first perek of Bechoros (11a) [the Gemara] says that one sheep exempts many firstborn donkeys.**If so, **so why are ten sheep needed?**We can exempt all of the questionable firstborn donkeys with only one sheep! The second: **Furthermore, what is [Rav Nachman in the name of Rabah bar Avuha] teaching us?**Ultimately, this is the lesson of **the Mishna: The dubious [firstborn donkeys] are gathered into the corral to be tithed.**When the Gemara *searches for an explanation of this Mishna in Bechoros 9a: “The questionable sheep are gathered into a corral to be tithed”, it concludes that the Mishna is teaching us Rabah bar Avuha’s rule. If this is in fact the only viable explanation of the Mishna, it emerges that this is in fact the lesson of the Mishna. If so, why did Rabah bar Avuha need to teach it, we already know this from the Mishna? The third question: Furthermore, since [Rabah bar Avuha] said that [the Yisrael] must tithe them, why does healso need to inform us that they are hisproperty?It is abundantly clear that since [the Yisrael owner] is obligated to tithe them, they must be his property. For if they were the property of the Kohen,¹[the Yisrael] would notbe required to tithe them, for they would be equivalent to sheepthat were purchased. For we have learned in a Mishna in Bechoros (55b): sheep that were purchased or given to [the Yisrael owner] as a gift are exemptfrom tithing. Thus, there is no need to inform us that the tithed sheep are the property of the Yisrael owner. And if he is informing us that even though he tithed [the group], [the titheitself] still belongs to the owner, that too is apparent, for the tithe*of animalsalways belongs to the[Yisrael]**owner.**The Yisrael owner offers it as a sacrifice in the Temple and the flesh is eaten by his family. If the tithe was blemished, the Yisrael owner eats it as regular non-sacrificial meat. [See also Tosfos Bechoros (4b) ד'ה ופודה, and also Bechoros (11a) ד'ה שהיו.]

footnotes: ¹ Tosfos seems to be entertaining the possibility that there is truly a doubt as to whether the redemption sheep belong to the Yisrael or the Kohen. However, since we do rule that the Yisrael may keep the sheep because he is in possession, he might be considered the true owner and would be liable to tithe the questionable sheep. Tosfos rejects this understanding because even if we were to say that because of his questionable ownership, he is obligated to tithe the questionable redemption sheep, there would still not be an obligation to tithe this group. The fact that the Yisrael is allowed to retain ownership of the sheep, despite the fact that they may belong to the Kohen, must be viewed as if the sheep were sold to him, since the sheep are not inherently his. It is only because of the ruling that he who is in possession of such items may continue to maintain possession that the Yisrael is permitted to keep the sheep. The right to maintain ownership of these sheep must be viewed as if the sheep were taken from their possibly rightful owner - the Kohen, and given to the Yisrael to keep. This is the equivalent of purchased sheep, which are not subject to the tithing obligation. See משנת הלוי by Harav Raphael Schorr, שליט"א, who discusses this issue.

If [the husband] can pull [the bill of divorce and bring it back to himself, she is not divorced]. The Gemara differentiates between acquiring a piece of garment for the purposes of effecting an acquisition and what is needed to effect a divorce. In regard to acquisition Scripture (Ruth 4, 7) uses the verb ונתן and he will give’. Even if a major portion of a garment remains in the hands of the giver, as long as the recipient has three fingers worth in his hands, the three finger section has been given to the recipient. The acquisition is valid. However, in regard to divorcing the Torah uses a much stronger term ‘כריתות - severance’. This requires a greater degree of separation between husband and wife in the act of divorcing. If the husband controls the bill of divorce to any degree, the divorce is invalid. The divorce document must be delivered to the wife in a manner which we will describe as irrevocable. If the husband can bring the bill of divorce back to himself, the divorce is invalid. The term used in our Gemara, ‘if he can pull the string and bring [the divorce document] back to himself’ is somewhat vague. Tosfos attempts to clarify the issue to some degree. מהר"ם explains that initially Tosfos assumes that one can pull the bill of divorce via the string when her hand is open. He cannot pull the string and bring it back when her hand is clenched. But this explanation generates a difficulty, as we will soon see. It appears that if her hand was open when he placed the bill of divorce into her hand, and the string remained attachedso that at that point in time he could pull the string and bring the bill of divorce back, and shethen clenched her hand tightly, so that if he pulls the string he will not be able to bring the bill of divorce to himself, she is not divorcedeven though she is presently in total control of the bill of divorce. Why not? For when he placedthe bill of divorcein her hand before she clenched her hand, he was able to bring [the bill of divorce] to himself. But now after she clenched her hand, he cannot bring the bill of divorce to himself? The divorce should be valid since he no longer controls the bill of divorce. The clenchingof her hand which prevents him from pulling the string and bringing the bill of divorce back to himself, is not the result of **his action, rather,it is a result of heraction. We cannot view this ultimate result as the husband delivering the divorce document to his wife in a way that is irrevocable. His action did leave the bill of divorce susceptible to being pulled back. It is her clenching of her hand that prevents him from pulling the bill of divorce back. [This case] is comparable toa husband who tells his wife pick up your bill of divorce from the ground,where we rule that she is not divorced, because we cannot saythat this method of giving the divorce document that fulfills the requirement of the verse- and he will givethe bill of divorceinto her hand.When he places the bill of divorce on the ground and she picks it up, he did not give her the bill of divorce, rather she lifted it herself. So too, when the husband places it into her hand, but remains in control because the string is attached, when his wife then takes control by clenching her hand, she has taken the bill of divorce. It was not given to her and the divorce is invalid. If when she clenches her hand the divorce is invalid, when is the divorce effective? Remember מהר"ם says Tosfos that assumes if her hand remained unclenched, it would always be possible to pull the bill of divorce back. Here, where [Rav Chisda] says: if he cannot bring [the bill of divorce] backto himself, she is divorced,*he***is speaking of a situation where her hand was clenchedtightly and he pushed [the bill of divorce] into herclenched hand with such force, that if he would pull the string, he could not bring itback **to himself.**In this case the irrevocable act of delivery is accomplished completely by the husband who placed it into her tightly clenched hand. She contributed nothing and therefore the divorce is effective. But is this really true? She definitely did not actively contribute to the irrevocable delivery of the divorce. But the status of the delivery as irrevocable is very much dependent upon her continuing to clench her hand. Can we attribute the irrevocable delivery of the bill of divorce exclusively to her husband? This question is the subject of much debate. Rabbeinu Tam may disagree with Tosfos’ conclusion. It seems that he maintains that even when she continues to keep her hand clenched, it is as if she is contributing to the irrevocable delivery of the bill of divorce and that too is ineffective. After all, she must continue to clench her hand in order to prevent her husband from bringing it back to himself. There are those who argue that Rabbeinu Tan does not necessarily disagree with Tosfos, he simply offers a different explanation of the Gemara’s condition, ‘if he can pull the string and bring the bill of divorce back’. This depends on the text of the sentence in Tosfos we are about to learn. Rabbeinu Tam (also)¹explained: if the bill of divorce is so heavy that if he wants to pull the divorce document to himself, thepuny string will break, she is divorcedbecause his delivery of the divorce document is irrevocable. [Rav Chisda] is speaking of when her hand is open, not clenched and she did absolutely nothingto keep the document in her hand.

footnotes: ¹ If we have the word ‘also’ in the text of Tosfos, Rabbeinu Tam is in agreement with the first explanation of Tosfos, that placing the bill of divorce into a clenched hand satisfies the requirement that she must only act as a recipient of the divorce. If we delete the word ‘also’, Rabbeinu Tam is disagreeing with the previous explanation. He is saying that even her passive act of maintaining her hand clenched is considered as - taking her divorce, and the divorce would be invalid. A case of not being able to pull the divorce with a string is possible only when the bill of divorce is so heavy that it cannot be pulled by a puny string. See Gittin 78a Tosfos אם יכול לנתקו ולהביאו כו for further clarification.