יתומין שבאו לחלוק כולי—Orphans who come to divide, etc.

OVERVIEW ר"נ אמר שמואל ruled that if minor¹ orphans want to divide their inherited estate,² בי"ד appoints for them executors to carry out the division, and when the יתומים grow up they may nullify this division, according to שמואל, but according to ר"נ they may not nullify it. תוספות qualifies this ruling that we divide the estate.

אומר רבינו תם דוקא שניהם רוצים אבל אחד רוצה ואחד אינו רוצה לא – The ר"ת rules that we divide the estate only if both (all) of the יתומים קטנים want to divide; however if one son wants to divide and one son does not want to divide, we do not divide the estate, but rather leave it as is, until all agree or they achieve maturity. והיכא שלא באו שניהם אלא אחד והשני אינו בפנינו אמר רבינו יצחק דחולקין³ – And in a case where both יתומין did not come before בי"ד, rather only one came and the second did not appear before בי"ד, the ר"י rules that we divide the estate- The ר"י (initially) proves his ruling: דהא בריש פרק ב' דקידושין (דף מב,א) מייתי לה אחלוקת הארץ שהיו שם כמה יונקי שדים – For in the beginning of the second פרק of מסכת קידושין the גמרא brings this ruling (of יתומין שבאו לחלוק וכו') in conjunction with the division of ארץ ישראל,⁴ where there were many nursing babies.⁵ תוספות is reluctant to accept this as a convincing proof: ומיהו אין ראיה גמורה משם דלאו לגמרי מדמי לה – However there is no irrefutable proof from the גמרא in קידושין, because we cannot compare exactly the two cases of יתומים and חלוקת א"י – דחלוקת הארץ היתה על פי הדיבור והיו שם אורים ותומים – For the division of א"י was according to the word of ה', and the אורים ותומים were there – [משום הכי] הגדילו אין יכולין למחות⁶ – [Therefore] it is understood that when these יונקי שדים grew up they could not protest the division; however by יתומין (where there is no דיבור or או"ת), perhaps the division which was made without an explicit request is not valid and הגדילו יכולים למחות. תוספות anticipates another proof and rejects it as well: ובפרק אלמנה ביבמות⁷ (דף סז,ב) דאמר (כולם) זכרים יאכלו⁸ – And in פרק אלמנה in מסכת יבמות where רשב"י ruled that if there are male children (all) the slaves may eat תרומה – אף על גב דשמא ימצא עובר זכר⁹ דעבדינן תקנתא כדרב נחמן¹⁰ – Even though there is the possibility that perhaps the עובר will be a male, nevertheless they still may eat for we will provide a solution to this issue based on the ruling of ר"נ. This concludes the citation from that גמרא – נמי אין ראיה¹¹ דהתם שאני דאף על פי שלא בא כי אם האחד עבדינן להו תקנתא – That is also not a proof, since there it is different, for if even only one came to divide we will perform this תקנה of ר"נ – לפי שיש תקנה גם לעובר ומתעלה חלקו בכך¹² – Since there is also a benefit to the עובר and his portion of the estate increases by doing the תקנתא דר"נ –

So that the slaves of these children will eat תרומה and they will not perish in the hunger. ¹³

SUMMARY If all the (minor) parties agree to a division we appoint an אפוטרופוס to divide; if one expressly disagrees we do not divide; if not all are present, we still divide; however תוספות did not have conclusive proof (unless it is a case where it is clearly beneficial to the absent יתום).

THINKING IT OVER

1. תוספות differentiates whether the יתומים קטנים agree to divide (then מעמידים להם אפוטרופוס), or they refuse (or don’t agree explicitly), where we do not divide. Seemingly what difference does it make whether the קטנים agree or disagree, they are not בני דיעה?!¹⁴ Their agreement is meaningless!
2. The ר"י refuted the two proofs; on what then did he base his ruling¹⁵ that if one agrees and the other is not present, we do divide?¹⁶

footnotes: ¹ See ‘Thinking it over’ # 1. ² If the children are all adults, any one of them can (usually) force a division of the estate. ³ See ‘Thinking it over’ # 2. ⁴ The גמרא there derives the ruling of יתומין שבאו לחלוק וכו' בי"ד מעמידין להן אפוטרופוס from the fact that by חלוקת הארץ it is written ונשיא אחד וגו' תקחו לנחול את הארץ (במדבר [מסעי] לד,יח); indicating that the נשיא acted as an אפוטרופוס to divide א"י among all the Jews even the יונקי שדים (who were קטנים). ⁵ These יונקי שדים did not come before us to claim their share; nevertheless since they did not protest (and the other members of the שבט certainly wanted their share), we divided the entire lot. Similarly here if some of the minor heirs want to divide, we do so, even if not all the heirs are present; as long as no one insists that there should be no division. ⁶ We can (nonetheless) derive from חלוקת הארץ the rule that יתומים שבאו (willingly), הגדילו אין יכולין למחות (even though that חלוקת הארץ was ע"פ הדיבור ואו"ת), because we may consider their willingness to divide, the equivalent of ע"פ הדיבור ואו"ת being effective [even] in regards to the יונקי שדים. However if not all the יתומים agreed to divide, then we cannot derive it from חלוקת הארץ since there it was ע"פ דיבור ואו"ת. (See אמ"ה # 84.) ⁷ The wife and עבדים כנענים of a כהן may eat תרומה. If the כהן dies and leave no heirs, they may not eat תרומה.The משנה there on סז,א teaches that if a בת ישראל was married to a כהן and he died and left her pregnant (and she had other sons), her slaves – עבדים כנענים (which she brought into the marriage) may not eat תרומה, because the עובר (who is a partial owner of these slaves, and) even though he is a כהן, does not have the power to allow them to eat תרומה. Only a ילוד (a born child) can be מאכיל, but not an עובר. ⁸ רשב"י maintains that if there are בנים זכרים (from the deceased כהן) the slaves may eat תרומה, because the slaves are the property of these בנים זכרים who are כהנים. ⁹ If the עובר is a זכר, then it turns out that he owned them (partially) when he was an עובר, which should prevent them from eating תרומה. [If she is a נקבה there is no problem since a בת במקום בנים does not inherit.] ¹⁰ ר"נ rules here that the אפוטרופוס choses a share for each child (and אין יכולין למחות), similarly there we will chose for the עובר other assets of the estate, so that he will have no partial ownership in the slaves. ¹¹ [Seemingly] there we are choosing a share for the עובר without his consent; this should prove that we can divide the estate without the express consent of all the minor heirs. תוספות rejects this proof. ¹² If we will make the תקנתא so that the עבדים may eat תרומה (which is cheaper than חולין), the share of this עובר will increase (for it will be less expensive to feed the עבדים; increasing the total value of the estate) for he will receive assets to offset their share of the עבדים. However if we do not do this תקנה and will not allow the עבדים to eat תרומה, they may die, thus decreasing the value of the estate and the sעובר' share as well (and even if they are fed חולין it will still decrease (greatly) the value of the estate since חולין is more expensive than תרומה [see תוספות קידושין מב,א ד"ה יתומים]). ¹³ In a case where it is obviously beneficial for the יתום (or עובר) to divide, then we will surely divide without his express consent (since it is for his benefit; זכין לאדם שלא בפניו); however if it is not clearly beneficial for the יתום (and it might even be detrimental), then perhaps we will not divide unless they give their express consent. ¹⁴ See תפא"י. ¹⁵ See footnote # 3. ¹⁶ See בית יהודה (חי' מהריב"ן).

בית דין מעמידין להם אפוטרופוס ובוררים להם כולי—בי"ד appoints for them an אפוטרופוס and they choose for them, etc.

OVERVIEW ר"נ אמר שמואל taught us that בי"ד appoints an אפוטרופוס for the יתומים and they choose for them a חלק יפה. It is not clear whether בי"ד chooses one אפטורופוס for all the יתומים (as the expression מעמידין להן אפוטרופוס [in the singular] indicates), or one אפטוטרופוס for each יתום (as the phrase ובוררין להן חלק יפה indicates¹). It is also not clear who are the בוררין (is it בי"ד or the אפוטרופוס) and how are they בורר a חלק יפה for each יתום. This and many other issues will be clarified in this תוספות.

אומר רבינו תם וכן רבינו חננאל דבוררים להם בית דין דצריך שומת בית דין² – The ר"ת and ר"ח say that the words ובוררים להם refers to the בי"ד, that an assessment by בי"ד is required in order to divide the estate. תוספות explains what is the role of the אפוטרופוס (since בי"ד does the assessment) – ואפוטרופוס מעמידין להן לשמור לכל אחד חלקו בפני עצמו³ – And we appoint the אפוטרופוס for the יתומים, to protect the assets of each יתום individually – דעד עתה היה שומר הכל ביחד – For up till now he protected the entire estate as one. תוספות explains what is meant by בוררין להם [חלק יפה]: ובוררין על ידי גורל דאין טריחותא להטיל גורלות – And בי"ד⁴ chooses by a lottery, since it is not burdensome to cast lots – תוספות responds to an anticipated difficulty:⁵ ואפילו בגורל שייך לברור חלק יפה – And even by a lottery it is possible to choose a good portion – כגון אם יש שלש שדות דטוב שיטול כל אחד ואחד שדה אחת ויהיה חלקו בבת אחת – For instance if there are three fields (and three יתומים), it is preferable that each יתום receive one field and his share will be together in one place – ממה שיחלוקו כל שדה לג' חלקים – Rather that they should divide each field into three portions.⁶ וכמה ענייני ברירות יש בו בחלונות⁷ וסולמות⁸ ודרך⁹ – And there are many possibilities for ‘choosing’; including windows, ladders, and a pathway. ¹⁰ תוספות qualifies this division: ודוקא בדבר שאין שייך בו גוד או איגוד¹¹ חולקין – And we divide only something to which the rule of גוד או איגוד does not apply¹² – תוספות proves this last ruling: ומדקדק רבינו תם דאי חולקין אפילו בדבר ששייך בו גוד או איגוד – And the ר"ת infers this ruling**** as follows; for if you will say that we divide even those things for which גוד או איגוד is applicable, then – אמאי דחיק בריש האיש מקדש (קידושין דף מב,ב)¹³ יכולין למחות ברוחות – Why does the גמרא in the beginning of פרק האיש מקדש awkwardly answer that they can protest regarding which direction their assets are facing, when the גמרא – הוה ליה למימר דיכולין למחות בגוד או איגוד – Should have said they can protest regarding גוד או איגוד! ¹⁴ תוספות anticipates a possible refutation to this proof: והא דלא קאמר יכולין למחות אם טעו בפחות משתות דמכרן קיים¹⁵ – And why is it that the גמרא did not answer that יכולין למחות in a case where**** בי"ד made a mistake of less than one-sixth of the value, in which case their sale is valid; this seems to be a very usual case¹⁶ – תוספות rejects this refutation:¹⁷ משום דלא מסתבר שיאמר שמואל אם הגדילו יכולין למחות בשביל טעות דפחות משתות – Because it is not logical that שמואל should maintain that when the יתומים mature they can protest such a minor error of less than a sixth – דמודה שמואל ויש ליפות בכך כח בית דין דהוי כמאן דלא טעו כלל – For in that case שמואל admits that we should empower the כח בי"ד, because such a minor mistake is considered as if the בי"ד did not err at all – תוספות responds to a possible refutation of the previous assumption:¹⁸ אף על גב שיכולין למחות ברוחות בזה אין ליפות כח בית דין דאין זה תלוי בשומא¹⁹ – Even though the יתומים can be מוחה ברוחות, nevertheless we cannot compare it to פחות משתות, for in this case of רוחות there is no reason to empower the כח בי"ד and not permit them to protest, for this (the allocation of where the field will be) is not dependent on the assessment of בי"ד; rather it was done by lottery – The distinction between פחות משתות and רוחות will – וכל שכן דאם נפרש דמכרן קיים ומחזיר האונאה²⁰ דאתי שפיר²¹ – Certainly be properly understood if we interpret that the ruling of מכרן קיים by פחות משתות means that the amount that he was deceived is to be returned. תוספות concludes: ומיהו יש לדחות דחדא מינייהו נקט²² – However this proof can be rejected, for the גמרא mentions only one of many possibilities where they can protest. תוספות anticipates another proof that we do not divide items of גא"א (and rejects it): ומההוא דיבמות דפרק אלמנה (דף סז,ב) דמשמע שעושים תקנה לכל העבדים שיאכלו בתרומה- And from that גמרא in מסכת יבמות פרק אלמנה, where it seems that we make the תקנה of ר"נ in order that all the slaves should eat תרומה²³ – שנותנין לבנים כל העבדים וחלק אחד נותנים לעובר כנגדן²⁴ – Where we give all the slaves to the (born) sons, and we give the fetus one share (of other assets), corresponding to the value of the**** share which each brother received in the slaves – אין להוכיח דחולקין אפילו בדבר ששייך בו גוד או איגוד כגון העבדים²⁵ – We cannot prove that we divide even items where גוד או איגוד applies, like slaves for instance. The reason there is no proof from that גמרא is that – דשאני התם דמתעלה חלק העובר בכך במה שעבדים אוכלים בתרומה²⁶ – There it is different, for the value of the sעובר' share increases by allowing the slaves to eat תרומה ויש לעובר בכך חלק יפה יותר²⁷ – So that the עובר will receive a more valuable share. תוספות offers a different explanation to the solution mentioned regarding the עבדים: ועוד לא לכל העבדים באנו לעשות תקנה אלא לחלק הבנים שנולדו²⁸ – And furthermore we are not enforcing this תקנה for all the slaves, but only for the portion that belongs to the born children. תוספות continues that it is possible that all the slaves are given to the sons: ועוד [ה"מ²⁹] שיש שדות שיכולין ליתן לעובר כנגד העבדים– And in addition we may give all the slaves to the born sons and none to the עובר in a case where there are fields in the estate (besides the עבדים), in which case it is permissible to give fields to the עובר corresponding to the (single share) value of the עבדים – שיש כח לבית דין לעשות כן³⁰ כדאמרינן בהניזקין (לקמן דף נב,א) – For בי"ד has the power to do so as the ברייתא states in פרק הניזיקין.³¹ תוספות presents a related issue: ושותף הבא לחלוק שלא בדעת חברו – And a partner who wishes to divide the assets of the partnership, without the knowledge of his partner; one partner wants to remove all his assets from the partnership and leave his friend with his share of the partnership – מספקא לרבינו יצחק אם יכול לחלוק הקרקעות ששייכא קפידא ברוחות – It is doubtful to the ר"י whether he can divide the properties (שלא בדעת חבירו), since being particular as to the location³² is relevant.³³ תוספות anticipates a possible resolution to this dilemma, but rejects it: ואין לדקדק מהא דאמר בפרק בית כור³⁴ (בבא בתרא דף קו,ב) – And we cannot infer from that which the גמרא states in פרק בית כור – אלא מעתה הני בי תלתא אחי דקיימי ואזול תרי מינייהו ופלוג הכי נמי דבטלה מחלוקת – But now (according to רב) these three brothers that exist and two of them went and divided the estate into three parcels, would you also assume that their division is nullified?! This concludes the citation from the גמרא; continues תוספות – דמשמע שהחלוקה קיימת³⁵ אף על גב דבקרקע מיירי שהחלוקה שבקרקע קיימת – **So it appears (**from the tone of the question) that the division remains, even though we are discussing land, for the assumption is that an equitable division of land is substantiated. This would seemingly resolve the doubt of the ר"י³⁶ – תוספות rejects this solution: איכא למימר³⁷ היינו³⁸ כשחזר וחלקו עמו נפל לו בגורל אותו חלק עצמו שנפל לו בתחילה – We can say that the חלוקה is קיימת, only in a case where when they went back and divided it with the third brother; he received the same parcel that was allotted to him originally – כשחלקו השנים בלעדיו דאז קיימת חלוקתם – When the two brothers divided without the third brother, it is only then that their division remains – אבל מכל מקום חוזר ומטיל גורל עם שניהם כאילו באים לחלק בתחילה: However the third brother casts a lottery with both brothers (for his share) as if they are initially dividing (without any prior division).

SUMMARY It is בי"ד who assesses the value of the estate, if the minor children wish to divide it. The division is done by lottery but it does not include single use items which are divided by גוד או איגוד (when the יתומים reach maturity). תוספות questions whether מחאה ברוחות is applicable where one partner wishes to remove his assets from the partnership without the participation of the remaining partner.

THINKING IT OVER תוספות questions whether מחאה ברוחות is applicable where one partner wishes to remove his assets from the partnership without the participation of the remaining partner.³⁹ Seemingly if the division was done properly (ע"פ שומת בי"ד or similarly) and he is taking his half of the property through a גורל, what right does the other partner have to complain? If he were here he would also be forced to accept this גורל?⁴⁰

footnotes: ¹ The phrase ובוררין להן חלק יפה seems to indicate that each אפוטרופוס makes an effort to receive the best חלק for his יתום. See רש"י ד"ה אפוטרופוס וד"ה ובוררין להן. ² בי"ד (and not the אפוטרופוס) must evaluate all the assets of the estate (how much each of them is worth) and then divide it evenly among the יתומים. ³ תוספות is addressing a seeming difficulty. Why does the גמרא say יתומים שבאו לחלוק וכו' בי"ד מעמידין להם אפוטרופוס, seemingly בי"ד appointed for them an אפוטרופוס as soon as they became יתומים to manage their affairs?! תוספות explains that the אפוטרופוס has a new ‘job description’; he must now protect the individual assets of each יתום. ⁴ See תוה"ר and אמ"ה footnote # 7 ⁵ We are dividing the estate by a lottery; how is it possible that we choose for each יתום a חלק יפה?! ⁶ The meaning of ובוררים להם חלק יפה is that בי"ד tries to see that all of them receive a חלק יפה (but not that we try for each one individually that he should receive a חלק יפה [better than his brothers]). ⁷ Each child should receive equal amount of lighting in their respective houses, or the division should not cause the (partial) blocking of window rights. ⁸ Some properties require ladders to be accessible (which decreases the value of the property); alternately no one should prevent the initial right to place ladders in order to gain access. ⁹ The pathways for access should be taken onto consideration, and to insure that all owners have proper easement. ¹⁰ בי"ד is required to make a very careful accounting of the entire inventory of the estate and the various rights, to insure that all the parcels, which will eventually be apportioned, are equal. ¹¹ גוד או איגוד literally means, ‘you pull or I will pull’. Let us assume that there is one item in the estate that all need (a chair for instance), where we cannot actually divide the chair; one party may say to another party you have the option of (pulling away, i.e.) buying this chair from me for a hundred dollars (for instance) and if you do not want to buy it, then I will pull it away from you by paying you a hundred dollars. The one saying גא"א must give the other party the option to do as he pleases, either to buy or to sell. The offering price to buy or to sell must be the same. ¹² תוספות rules that on these objects where גוד או איגוד applies, we do not divide them through גא"א (trading off one asset for another or for money), but rather we leave them as is and let the parties settle it [through גא"א] when they reach maturity. The reason is because we do not know what each one really desires or is willing to give up. ¹³ The גמרא there (on מב,א) asks a contradiction on ר"נ from another ruling that יכולין למחות, and answers that ר"נ ruled אין יכולין למחות only when בי"ד did not err in their assessment. The division was done properly. The גמרא asked if there was no error, why (according to שמואל) would they want to protest. The גמרא answers יכולין למחות ברוחות. This means that if one received a property on the north side of the estate, he can protest that he prefers the property on the south side, for he has other properties (not from this estate) there. תוספות maintains that this answer is a דוחק. ¹⁴ Let us assume that there was only one chair and only one table in the estate, of equal value. If we maintain that we divide even items of גוד או איגוד (as this chair and table), בי"ד will draw lots and award one the chair and the other the table. The one who received the chair can protest that he prefers the table over the chair. This seems (to תוספות) a much more common issue than רוחות. The fact that the גמרא did not mention it, proves that these גא"א items are not included in the division, but rather בי"ד leaves it up to the יתומים to divide it eventually through the גא"א process when they mature. ¹⁵ There is a משנה (cited in קידושין מב,א) that if בי"ד made a mistake in their assessment by one sixth (the property was worth six סלעים and בי"ד sold it for five) the sale is invalid (according to the חכמים to which ר"נ agrees to). If the mistake was for less than a sixth (it was worth ten and it was sold for nine), the sale is valid. ¹⁶ The fact that the גמרא did not bring this more common case, indicates that the גמרא was not particular in which case it used to demonstrate the מחאה. Therefore there is no proof from the fact that the גמרא did not use the case of גא"א, that we do not divide items of גא"א, for the גמרא does not necessarily mention all the cases even the more common ones. ¹⁷ It may indeed be that a mistake of פחות משתות is common, but the גמרא could not mention it, because for such a minor mistake they cannot protest. ¹⁸ תוספות asserted that by a minor error of פחות משתות there can be no מחאה. Seemingly the complaint of רוחות is more trivial than פחות משתות and yet the גמרא claims that they can be מוחה ברוחות ¹⁹ When בי"ד errs in its assessment (by less than a שתות), then in order to uphold the dignity of the בי"ד, we will not allow the יתומים to overrule the assessment which בי"ד made (since it is an insignificant amount); however when the person is dissatisfied in which direction his property is located, we will not diminish the dignity of the בי"ד, by upholding his request for change, since בי"ד did not rule where his property will be located; it was (merely) ordained by (the chance of) the גורל. ²⁰ When בי"ד errs by a שתות (or more) the entire sale is void; a new assessment and sale needs to be made. If the error was less than a שתות, then the sale is valid. There is a dispute whether the sale is valid as is, and the one who was deceived (for a פחות משתות) must swallow his loss, or even though the sale is valid, nevertheless the difference between the assessed value and the true value must be returned to the rightful party. ²¹ In the case of פחות משתות the aggrieved party loses nothing, for the difference is returned to him, therefore he cannot protest; however by רוחות the aggrieved party experiences a real loss when his property is not in the proper location, therefore we accept his protest. ²² We cannot proof conclusively that there is no division of items where גא"א is applicable, from the fact that the גמרא did not say that they can protest regarding items of גא"א (instead of saying they can protest regarding רוחות), for the גמרא happened to mention [only] one of the many possibilities where they can protest. ²³ See previous תוספות ד"ה יתומין (TIE footnote # 7 and onwards for a more lengthy explanation). ²⁴ It would seem from that גמרא that we do divide (even) items where גא"א applies, such as the עבדים in return for something else. ²⁵ We are giving all the עבדים to the sons and something else for the עובר in return; this is the classic case of גא"א. ²⁶ See תוד"ה יתומין (TIE footnote # 12). ²⁷ The proposed limitation of dividing גא"א items is limited to cases where the one who is presented with the גא"א option will not gain from such a division; here however the עובר stands to gain by accepting the גא"א division, therefore we do divide the גא"א assets. ²⁸ Let us assume that there were two born children and one עובר. There were also three slaves in the estate. תוספות maintains now that we give two עבדים to the sons (their share) and these עבדים may eat תרומה, and one עבד is given to the עובר (his share) who may not eat תרומה. Therefore it is not a case of גא"א, since we are dividing the slaves. [See (however) בית ישראל, who finds this explanation puzzling.] ²⁹ This can be read either as הני מילי or (as the נח"מ states) הכא מיירי. ³⁰ The אפוטרופוס (and certainly בי"ד) may sell the slaves of the יתומים in order to buy fields with the proceeds (but not the reverse), since fields are more valuable (and stable) than עבדים. It is therefore understood that בי"ד can sell the sעובר' share of the עבדים to the brothers and receive fields as payment. ³¹ In summation: according to the first explanation of תוספות we give all the עבדים to the brothers and the עובר receives מטלטלין (or money) in return; even though it is גא"א, nevertheless it is for the benefit of the עובר. According to the second explanation (the first ועוד) we split up the עבדים between the brothers and the עובר (where the עבד of the עובר cannot eat תרומה). According to the last explanation (the second ועוד) we give all the עבדים to the brothers provided there are fields with which to compensate the עובר; otherwise we split the עבדים (as in the second explanation). ³² Assuming the partnership consisted of two fields of equal value, the one partner cannot choose a field by himself (even with a גורל) and leave the other field for the absentee partner, for perhaps the absentee partner prefers the other field because of its location and proximity to other properties he owns. See ‘Thinking it over’. ³³ תוספות cited previously the גמרא in קידושין that יכולין למחות ברוחות. ³⁴ The גמרא there cites a מחלוקת between רב ושמואל in a case where two brothers divided the estate, and later a third brother appeared (whom they did not know previously that he existed). רב rules the entire division is nullified (בטלה מחלקות), and they have to divide again anew amongst the three brothers. שמואל maintains (מקמצין), that each brother gives a third of his property (a sixth of the original estate) to the new brother (so each one receives two sixths or one third of the entire estate). ³⁵ תוספות now understands the rhetorical question, 'הכי נמי דבטלה מחלוקת', to mean that the third (absentee) brother must accept the remaining parcel (since all three parcel were equal and a גורל was made). He cannot be מוחה ברוחות. ³⁶ In a case of two partners where one made an equitable division, the second cannot be מוחה ברוחות (if it is done by lottery); for otherwise why is the חלוקה valid here by the three brothers, if the absentee brother can be מוחה ברוחות. ³⁷ We can assume that the absentee partner can be מוחה ברוחות and similarly here the absentee brother can demand a new גורל since he too can be מוחה ברוחות, and when the גמרא ruled קיימת חלוקתם that is in a limited manner as תוספות continues to explain. ³⁸ Let us assume there were three brothers and many fields. The two brothers divided all the fields into three equal parcels and drew lots for their shares. Brother A received parcel A and brother B received parcel B. When brother C arrives, he can cast a lot for all three parcels, if he is allotted parcel C (the original parcel allotted to him by the first lottery), then brothers A and B receive parcels A and B respectively without any requirement for a new lottery as to who will receive parcels A and B. This is the meaning of קיימת חלוקתם. If however brother C did not receive parcel C in his lot (but either A or B), then brothers A and B must cast new lots to determine who receives the remaining two parcels. In any case brother C can certainly demand a new גורל (for himself) since he can be מוחה ברוחות. ³⁹ See footnote # 32. ⁴⁰ See עד"ז in אמ"ה # 111.

התם ממונא הכא איסורא—There it is money; here it is a prohibition

OVERVIEW רב נחמן maintains that the הלכה is like רבי by ביטלו מבוטל [and יכול לבטל זה שלא בפני"ז (both are cases of איסור)], and we do not say מה כח בי"ד יפה. Similarly regarding שום הדיינים שפיחתו שתות (which is ממון [but בי"ד made a mistake]) the rule is מכרן בטל (like the חכמים) and we do not say מה כח בי"ד יפה. It is only regarding יתומים שבאו לחלוק וכו' (which is ממון where בי"ד did not make a mistake) that ר"נ maintains אין יכולין למחות because of מה כח בי"ד יפה. The גמרא explains the distinction (of ר"נ) between יתומים וכו' (where we do say כח בי"ד יפה) and גט (where we do not say כח בי"ד יפה), is because we only say מה כח בי"ד יפה by ממון (where בי"ד was לא טעו).

תוספות asks: ואם תאמר אם כן היכי דייק לעיל¹– And if you will say; if indeed there is a difference between ממונא and איסורא,² how did רב יוסף previously infer – ממה שחזר רבי ועשה כרבן שמעון בן גמליאל בההיא דכתובות³ (דף ק,א) – From that episode in מסכת כתובות, where רבי retracted and ruled like רשב"ג (how was רב יוסף able to infer from this) – דחזר בו נמי ממאי דאמר ביטלו מבוטל⁴ – That רבי also retracted from that which he ruled that ביטלו מבוטל – הא איכא לחלק בין איסורא⁵ לממונא⁶ – Since we can differentiate between איסורא and ממונא?! תוספות answers: ויש לומר דרב נחמן דאמר הלכה כרבי בשתיהן⁷ הוא דמפליג בין איסורא לממונא – And one can say; that ר"נ, who maintains that the הלכה is like רבי regarding both disputes with רשב"ג, only he differentiates⁸ between איסורא and ממונא⁹. תוספות responds to an anticipated difficulty: אף על גב דרבי¹⁰ גופיה לא מפליג בין איסורא¹¹ לממונא היכא דטעו¹² – Even though that (רבי) [רב נחמן] himself does not distinguish between איסורא and ממונא where they erred¹³ – מכל מקום רב נחמן מפליג אליבא דרבי אפילו בממונא דטעו – Nevertheless, ר"נ distinguishes according to רבי between איסורא and ממונא even if it is a ממונא where בי"ד erred. We are forced to say this – דהא רבי גופיה חזר בו בכתובות¹⁴ והכא¹⁵ פסיק רב נחמן כוותיה¹⁶ – For רבי himself retracted in מסכת כתובות, and here ר"נ rules according to רבי. This is the view of ר"נ to differentiate between איסורא and ממונא שטעו according to רבי – אבל הנהו דלעיל¹⁷ לא מפליג¹⁸ – However these other אמוראים mentioned previously do not distinguish (according to רבי) between איסורא and ממונא דטעו. תוספות responds to an anticipated question: וכי פריך הכא דרב נחמן אדרב נחמן¹⁹ – And when the גמרא here presented the contradiction between one ruling of ר"נ and another**** ruling of ר"נ, the גמרא – היה יכול להקשות והא רבי גופיה הדר ביה מביטלו מבוטל כדמוכח ההיא דכתובות²⁰ – Could have asked instead,**** how can ר"נ maintain that the הלכה is כרבי regarding בטלו מבוטל, since רבי himself retracted from his original ruling of ביטלו מבוטל as is evident from that which we learnt in מסכת כתובות²¹ – תוספות responds; the reason the גמרא did not ask from רבי is because the גמרא – אלא דניחא ליה לאקשויי דרב נחמן אדרב נחמן גופיה – Would rather contradict one ruling of ר"נ on another ruling of the same ר"נ. In summation: According to this explanation, ר"נ maintains that only by ממונא דלא טעו (such as יתומים שבאו לחלוק) do we say מה כח בי"ד יפה; however ר"נ will agree that רבי differentiates between איסורא (where there is no כח בי"ד יפה) and (all) ממונא (even ממונא שטעו) where we do say מה כח בי"ד יפה. While רב יוסף disagrees and maintains that רבי does not distinguish between (any case of) ממונא and איסורא; we always maintain מה כח בי"ד יפה. תוספות offers a different answer to explain why by ר"נ we differentiate between ממונא ואיסורא and previously רב יוסף did not differentiate between ממונא ואיסורא: ועוד יש לומר דהכא מחלק בין איסורא לממונא דלא טעו²² – And in addition one can say; that here (regarding ר"נ), the גמרא differentiates between איסורא and ממונא דלא טעו (יתומים שבא לחלוק וכו') – אבל לעיל מדמה ממונא דטעו לאיסורא²³ – However previously, רב יוסף compares ממונא דטעו (שום הדיינים) to איסורא. תוספות supports his view that there is a difference by ממונא whether it was טעו or not: ובפרק ב' דקדושין (דף מב,א) ובכתובות בפרק אלמנה (דף ק,א) – And in the second פרק of מסכת קדושין and in מסכת כתובות in פרק אלמנה, the גמרא – פריך ארב נחמן דפסיק התם הלכה כחכמים²⁴ – Challenges ר"נ who ruled there that the הלכה is like the חכמים; the גמרא questioned this – מההיא דיתומים שבאו לחלוק דאית ליה לרב נחמן מה כח בית דין יפה – From the case of יתומים שבאו לחלוק where ר"נ does maintain מה כח בי"ד יפה – ומשני הא דטעו הא דלא טעו – And the גמרא answers; here (by שום היתומים, we do not say כח בי"ד יפה since) בי"ד erred; here (by יתומים שבאו לחלוק, we say כח בי"ד יפה since) בי"ד did not err – ורבי ודאי כשחזר בו מההיא דכתובות חזר בו גם מביטלו מבוטל²⁵ – So רבי when he retracted by the case in כתובות (and maintained מכרן קיים since מה כח בי"ד יפה, he equally retracted also from ביטלו מבוטל and רבי maintains ביטלו אינו מבוטל – תוספות responds to the anticipated question:

And that which ר"נ ruled like רבי regarding ביטלו מבוטל (since רבי himself retracted and maintains ביטלו אינו מבוטל), this is because ר"נ rules in the case of מסכת כתובות (שום הדיינים) like the חכמים that מכרן בטל and we do not say כח בי"ד יפה (by ממון שטעו) and therefore we also do not say כח בי"ד יפה by איסורא (like בטלו מבוטל). In summation: According to the second explanation ר"נ and רב יוסף (can) agree that there is a similarity between איסורא and ממונא שטעו and if we say כח בי"ד יפה by ממונא שטעו (the retracted view of רבי) we will also say כח בי"ד יפה by איסורא.

SUMMARY תוספות offers two explanations to reconcile the גמרא (the view of ר"נ), which differentiates between ממונא ואיסורא, and the גמרא (the view of רב יוסף), which compares them. Either ר"נ ור"י argue (regarding רבי), or all agree that איסורא and ממונא שלא טעו are different; however איסורא וממונא שטעו are similar.

THINKING IT OVER

1. When ר"נ stated הלכה כרבי (בשתיהם); what did he mean?²⁶
2. Is תוספות question (why did not the גמרא ask on ר"נ from the retraction of רבי),²⁷ applicable also according to the second answer of תוספות?

footnotes: ¹ לג,ב (אמר רב יוסף נחזי אנן וכו'). ² We are willing to empower בי"ד by monetary issues since הפקר בי"ד הפקר (see רש"י ד"ה התם); however regarding prohibition (like גיטין and עריות) we are reluctant to empower בי"ד (beyond the legal limit). ³ The רבנן rule there that if the בי"ד erred in their assessment of property by a sixth (or more), the sale is voided. Initially רבי agreed with the רבנן, but later retracted and agreed with רשב"ג that מכרן קיים since מה כח בי"ד יפה. ⁴ רבי maintains that if the husband was מבטל the גט (even) not in the presence of the שליח or the אשה, the גט is בטל. ⁵ The case of ביטול הגט is איסורא (of אשת איש), we leave it as the דאורייתא ruling that the גט is בטל and we do not say א"כ מה כח בי"ד יפה. ⁶ In the case of שומת בי"ד (which is ממונא), we empower בי"ד beyond the legal limit and sustain their assessment (even though they erred by a שתות), since א"כ מה כח בי"ד יפה. ⁷ ר"נ ruled (see לג,ב at the bottom) that the הלכה is like רבי that בטלו (שלא בפניו) מבוטל and also that יכול לבטל (עדי הגט) זה שלא בפני זה. ⁸ Therefore even though רבי retracted by שום הדיינים and did agree to כח בי"ד יפה (since it is ממונא), nevertheless ר"נ maintains that the הלכה is like רבי by both cases of איסור (בטלו מבוטל and יכול לבטל זה שלא בפני"ז), and that רבי did not retract in these two cases (since it is איסורא). ⁹ However רב יוסף who inferred from שום הדיינים to גיטין does not differentiate between איסורא וממונא. ¹⁰ The מהרש"א and the מהר"ם שי"ף amend this to read רב נחמן (and not רבי), עיי"ש. [The מהרש"ל maintains the גירסא of 'רבי' and explains תוספות to mean that (even though) we do not find that רבי distinguishes between איסורא וממונא (so would should assume that just as he retracted by ממונא he also retracted באיסורא), nevertheless ר"נ maintains that we will make this distinction between ממונא ואיסורא (even) according to רבי.] ¹¹ This refers to the case of בטלו מבוטל. ¹² This refers to the case of שום הדיינים שפיחתו שתות וכו' מכרן בטל (which is ממונא דטעו). ¹³ In both these cases we do not say מה כח בי"ד יפה; indicating that איסורא וממונא שטעו are equivalent (according to ר"נ). How then can ר"נ rule like רבי regarding בטלו מבוטל [(that we do not say כח בי"ד יפה) when רבי retracted by שום הדיינים (which is ממונא דטעו) and maintains there מכרן קיים because מה כח בי"ד יפה], since ר"נ equates איסורא (ביטול הגט) with ממונא שטעו (which is שום הדיינים). ¹⁴ This is regarding the rule of שום הדיינים שפיחתו שתות (a case of ממונא שטעו) where רבי ultimately maintains מה כח בי"ד יפה and מכרן קיים. ¹⁵ In the case of בטלו מבוטל (which is איסורא) רבי (according to ר"נ) does not agree to כח בי"ד יפה. ¹⁶ Perforce we must say according to ר"נ that רבי distinguishes between איסורא and ממונא דטעו; even though ר"נ personally does not distinguish between איסורא and ממונא דטעו but rather maintains that in both these instances we do not say כח בי"ד יפה. We say כח בי"ד יפה only by ממונא דלא טעו (like יתומים שבאו לחלוק וכו' אין יכולין למחות). ¹⁷ This refers to רב יוסף (and ר' יאשיה דמן אושא [see נח"מ]) mentioned on לג,ב. ¹⁸ רב יוסף maintains that since רבי agreed to מה כח בי"ד יפה regarding ממונא דטעו (the case of שום הדיינים), it follows that he agrees by איסורא as well (ביטלו שלא בפניו) that it is not בטל for א"כ מה כח בי"ד יפה. ¹⁹ On one hand ר"נ rules that ביטלו מבוטל (no כח בי"ד יפה) on the other hand he rules אין יכולין למחות (for כח בי"ד יפה). ²⁰ At this point we are not aware of the distinction between איסורא and ממונא (for otherwise there would be no contradiction between the two rulings of ר"נ [as our גמרא subsequently answers]), Therefore we can ask, since רבי in כתובות agreed that מכרן קיים for כח בי"ד יפה, therefore presumably he always agrees that ביטלו אינו מבוטל for the same reason of כח בי"ד יפה. See ‘Thinking it over’ # 2. ²¹ The advantage of asking this question (as opposed to asking from יתומים שבאו לחלוק וכו') is that this is the issue at hand which we are discussing. רב יוסף just proved that ביטלו אינו מבוטל since רבי retracted (regarding כח בי"ד יפה) as evidenced in the גמרא in כתובות. How can ר"נ maintain הלכה כרבי since רבי retracted and maintains כח בי"ד יפה. ²² There is sufficient reason to distinguish between איסורא where we do not want to ‘bend’ the תורה ruling, to ממונא where we can modify the תורה ruling (especially) since the בי"ד was not טועה. ²³ When בי"ד is טועה there is no strong reason to say כח בי"ד יפה (since they erred), and if nevertheless we do say כח בי"ד יפה (by שום היתומים), then the same should apply by איסורא (regarding ביטול שלא בפניו). ²⁴ The חכמים rule that שום הדיינים שפחתו שתות וכו' ממכרן בטל (no כח בי"ד יפה). ²⁵ We are now assuming (in the second answer - the ועוד) that we only differentiate between איסורא and ממונא דלא טעו, but not between איסורא and ממונא דטעו), even according to ר"נ. ²⁶ See נח"מ and עד"ז in אמ"ה # 121. ²⁷ See footnote # 20.

ואי משום גלויי דעתא פלוגתא דאביי ורבא—And if because of גלויי דעתא; that is a dispute between אביי and רבא

OVERVIEW The גמרא cites a case where a person told his ארוסה, I am giving you this גט if we do not have נישואין within a month. When the month passed (without נישואין) the man said (but) ‘I tried my best to have the נישואין feast ready’; indicating that he does not want the גט to be effective. The גמרא says that this will depend on the dispute between אביי ורבא whether a גלוי דעתא בגיטין can nullify the גט (רבא) or not (אביי). תוספות comments; when the גמרא states that the ruling in this case depends on the מחלוקת between אביי ורבא – היינו לפי סברת אביי¹ – That is only according to the reasoning of אביי (that our case is an example of גלוי דעתא בגיטא) – אבל רבא קאמר לעיל² אטו לבטולי גיטא קבעי לקיומי תנאי קא בעי – However רבא stated previously: ‘does he want to nullify the גט; he wants to satisfy the stipulation (so it is not a case of גלוי דעתא בגיטא) – ולא פליג רבא הכא:³ And therefore רבא will not argue here and will also maintain that it is a valid גט.

SUMMARY According to אביי any indication that he does not want the גירושין to take place is considered a גלוי דעתא בגיטא (but it is not effective). רבא maintains that a גלוי דעתא בגיטא (which is effective) is where he wants to be מבטל the גט, but not where he does not want the גירושין to happen (there it is not effective).

THINKING IT OVER

1. It seems that both according to אביי and רבא, the גט is not בטל;⁴ so why does the גמרא say, פלוגתא דאביי ורבא? There is no argument!⁵
2. When the גמרא concludes והלכתא כנחמני (which is אביי), is that only that גלוי דעתא בגיטא לאו מילתא היא or does it also mean that the case of שמואל, or הא טרחנא (which are considered גלוי דעתא according to אביי but not according to רבא) is considered a גלוי דעת (like אביי) and not like רבא who does not consider it a גלוי דעת but rather לקיומי תנאיה בעי?⁶
3. תוספות compares the cases of 'הא טרחנא' and 'ניסן אמרי' to the case of 'חזו דאתאי', that according to רבא they are not considered גלוי דעתא בגיטא but rather are לקיומא תנאי בעי.⁷ Seemingly however there is a difference in the case of חזו דאתאי, all he said was, ‘I was מקיים the תנאי’ – I am here! Therefore it is not considered a גלוי דעת regarding ביטול. However in the latter two cases he seemingly did not say he was מקיים the תנאי, rather he was explaining why there should be no גט (either because טרחנא or ניסן אמרי); this seems to be more like the case of 'ברוך הטוב וכו' where (he also was not מבטל the גט, but) he gave the impression that he does not want there to be a גט.⁸

footnotes: ¹ אביי will claim that רבא will maintain in this case that the גט is בטל since (according to אביי) his excuse of הא טרחנא is considered a גלוי דעתא בגיטא. ² The case there was a person gave a גט with the stipulation that it should be nullified if he returns (home) within thirty days. When the thirtieth day arrived he was on his way home but could not reach it because he could not cross the river. The husband shouted, ‘see I have returned’. שמואל ruled the גט is valid since he did not return. אביי derived from this that גלוי דעתא בגיטא is meaningless, for here we have a case where the husband does not want the גט to be effective and nevertheless the גט is valid. רבא claimed that in that case the person was not מגלה דעת that he wishes to nullify the גט (per se), but rather he is claiming that he fulfilled the stipulation and therefore the גט should be בטל. There is no גלוי דעת that he is מבטל the גט. The claim that he fulfilled the stipulation is invalid as שמואל ruled there. ³ In this case (of הא טרחנא) as well, רבא will maintain there was no גלוי דעתא to be מבטל the גט, merely an excuse why he did not fulfill his obligation. See ‘Thinking it over’ # 1 & 3. ⁴ See footnote # 3. ⁵ See נח"מ. ⁶ See רש"ש and אמ"ה # 68 (on the גמרא) ⁷ See footnote # 3. ⁸ See דברות משה הערה כג בד"ה וכן (עמ' תעח)