"Huppah that completes [the marriage], is it not logical that it should acquire?!" Problem: Let us say a "dayo" on the end of the ק״ו, for from where do we derive that huppah acquires? because it completes, [therefore we should say the dayo:] the target of a ק״ו can't be more stringent than the starting place—just as there [huppah acquires] after money, so too here [money should acquire] after money! Solution: [The sugya] follows Rabbi Tarfon who says (Baba Kama 25a) that "Anywhere a ק״ו would be broken, we do not say a dayo", for here, if we said a dayo, the ק״ו would be broken since we don't need [money] after money. New problem: According to us who say that huppah does not acquire, let us say that money completes after money [i.e. that betrothal money followed by more money would equal full marriage] from the ק״ו of huppah: just as huppah, which doesn't acquire, completes, money, that does acquire, isn't it logical that it should complete?! Solution: We are only able to prove [through this] that [money] completes after money like for huppah, but why should this money be stronger than that money!?

"I could include huppah which purchases elsewhere and purchases here. But couldn't the common denominator [of contract, sex, money] be that it's against her will [which would exclude huppah, which must be with her consent]!?" Even though he hands over his minor daughter to the huppah without her consent, since he stands in place of his daughter, it is not considered to be without her consent [his consent stands in place of her consent]. Problem: But will can still find a huppah which is against her will! Designation [of a Hebrew slavegirl to marry the master or his son] is separate from marriage, so it will turn out that after designation the master enters her to the huppah without the father's consent! Solution: Even though the designation can be done without the father's consent, the huppah needs to be done with his consent.

"But Rav Huna [thinks that] with marriage nevertheless we don't find [that she can be acquired] against her will." Even though the the father can betroth his minor daughter against her will, nonetheless, since it is with the father's consent, it is not called "against her will", as I explained. Furthermore, with huppah we also find that the ruling is like this (in Ketubot 47a) for the father can hand over his minor daughter [against her will] to the huppah [but we don't call this "against her will"].

"Therefore, if he gave and she said..." The reason [the Talmud] never mentioned at all [the case] "If she gave and he said" is because it is not so clear-cut, for sometimes she can be betrothed [in this manner] with an important man, as we say later (Kiddushin 7a).

"So if this isn't true, then [he is] not [a nazir]! Therefore, [Shmuel] thinks that yadayim (shorthands) that are not clear are not effective!" Problem: Why didn't [the Talmud] resolve [this by saying] that certainly he thinks that [these unclear shorthands] are effective, but there [in Nazir, the guy] said "I will be" isn't even effective as an unclear shorthand, since perhaps he meant "I will be in a fast"!? Solution: The language of "I will be" is more fitting for nezirut than it is for a fast, for "I will be" implies immediately, and sometimes he [already] ate [that day] and won't be able to be fasting until tomorrow, but regarding nezirut he can immediately begin being a nazir whenever he wants.

"This is what we're dealing with: 'When he said "to me"'". This implies that the Shmuel's conclusion here is that unclear yadayim (shorthands) are not effective. Problem: In the beginning of Nedarim (Nedarim 2b), [the Mishnah] said: "One who says to his fellow: I am vowed from you, I am separated from you, I am distanced from you, that I won't eat of yours, that I won't taste of yours—is forbidden [i.e. the vow works]". And we say in the Gemara on this (Nedarim 4b): "Shmuel said: About all of these [first statements in the Mishnah (I am vowed from you etc.), none of them work] until he says: That I won't eat of yours, [or] that I won't taste of yours'". And it concludes: "What's the reason [for Shmuel to require more explication for the vows to be effective]? Perhaps 'I am vowed from you' means 'I won't speak with you','I am separated from you' means 'I won't do business with you', 'I am distanced from you' means 'I won't stand within your 4 amot'". And [the Talmud] objects (Nedarim 5b): "Let's say that Shmuel thinks unclear shorthands are not effective!" And it resolves: "Shmuel assigns our mishnah according to R. Yehudah who says 'Unclear shorthands are not effective'". And since Shmuel assigns it to R. Yehudah, it implies that he doesn't agree with him but rather thinks that they are effective! And it is not possible to explain that Shmuel assigns our mishnah to R. Yehudah and agrees with him based on what is said later: "And what forces him to assign our mishnah to R. Yehudah!?", and what's the problem!? Why would he be forced to assign our mishnah to R. Yehudah if he he also agreed with him!? Therefore, he assigns it to R. Yehudah but certainly thinks that [these unclear shorthands] are effective. Another place where this contradiction comes up: [The Talmud] said in Gittin 85a: "The core of the get is [in Hebrew] 'Behold you are permitted to any man' (an unclear shorthand, since it doesn't have any form of relation to the declarer), R. Yehudah says [in Aramaic]: 'This one should go from me' is the core of the get" (he makes the shorthand less unclear because he doesn't think unclear shorthands work), and the majority disagrees with him (R. Yehudah), and Shmuel agrees with the majority! [So again Shmuel thinks that unclear shorthands are effective.] Solution: This "Behold you are betrothed" without "to me" doesn't imply at all that "You are betrothed to me" since it is common for a man to betroth a wife for his fellow and these are shorthands which are totally unclear, which for these Shmuel certainly thinks that they are not effective shorthands, but in this case in Nedarim, [these shorthands] are more clear, and this is also the case for divorce since a man doesn't divorce his fellow's wife. But there are other versions of the beginning of Nazir 2b. Version 2: "'I will be'—this is a nazir. Shmuel said: And there was a nazir passing by him"; and [the Talmud] said "Let us say that Shmuel thinks that unclear shorthands are not effective!? Yes! Because of this, when a nazir passes before him they are clear shorthands and are effective, but if there is no nazir passing before him they are unclear shorthands and are not effective" [in other words, it is not possible here to read Shmuel as ever thinking that unclear shorthands are effective, version 2 here specifies explicitly that he thinks they are not]. Version 3: "Let us say that Shmuel thinks unclear shorthands are not effective!?", and [the Talmud answers:] "If he passes before him, this is minimally unclear shorthand, but if he is not passing before him then it is not even unclear shorthand" [so Shmuel certainly would think according to version 3 that unclear shorthands are effective and only quibbles on things that are so unclear as to not be shorthands at all, like Tosafot argued for our Gemara in Kiddushin].