A Hanukkah lamp that one placed above twenty cubits is invalid, just as a sukkah and as an alleyway: But perhaps you will say, "It should have said, 'Reduce [the height of] it,' like regarding the alleyway. Since there (Eruvin 2a), it said, 'an alleyway is rabbinic - [that is why] they taught the rectification.'" But it can be said (answered) that it mentioned, "invalid," because it needed to say, "just as a sukkah," which is from the Torah. Or also (another explanation) is that it did not want to speak at length: "Extinguish it, reduce [the height of] it and light it." As to reduce it and leave it as it is, would not be possible - as is shown later (Shabbat 23a).

Sukkah was taught: It is implied that the reason for the decorations of the sukkah is on account of contempt towards the commandment. But this is difficult to RI: In the chapter [entitled] Kirah (Shabbat 45a), it is implied that the reason is on account of, 'given that it is set aside for its commandment!' And he answered that they need both [reasons]. For [it it was only] on account of, 'it is set aside for its commandment,' we would not have forbidden it during the intermediate days of the festival. For setting aside is only relevant to Shabbat and to a holiday. And [if it was only] on account of contempt, we would not forbid them when they had fallen. But now that we say that they were set aside and [there is] contempt of the commandment, we forbid them even when they fell and even on the intermediate days of the holiday. And it is difficult to RI: Since the decorations of a sukkah are forbidden because of contempt - if so, what did it ask in Beitzah (30b) in the chapter [entitled] HaMevi, from the decorations of a sukkah to the wood of a sukkah (used for its roof)? As it said, "And does a stipulation not help with a sukkah for the holiday; and did we not learn, 'One who roofed according to its law [and hung decorations], etc.?'" But what is the question? Perhaps the condition does not help with the wood of a sukkah, because [its being put aside] is extracted from a verse [in the Torah] - as it is expounded there, "From where [do we know] about the wood of a sukkah, that it is forbidden all seven [days of Sukkot? Hence] it teaches to say (Leviticus 23:24), 'The festival of Sukkot is seven days, etc.'" And it is a full-fledged teaching, as it is shown in the first chapter of Sukkah (9a) that Beit Shammai invalidates an old sukkah from this verse, whereas Beit Hillel render it proper - since they need [the verse] for the wood of a sukkah, that it is forbidden all seven [days]. But a stipulation does work with the decorations of a sukkah, since they are only forbidden on account of contempt. Moreover, in the chapter [entitled] Kirah (Shabbat 45a), it is explicitly understood that the wood of sukkah is only forbidden on account of, 'it is set aside for its commandment!' And Rabbenu Tam responded that both the decorations of a sukkah and the wood of sukkah beyond [what is required for] the validation of a sukkah are only forbidden on account of contempt; or (alternatively) on account of, 'given that it is set aside for its commandment' - but only enough for the validation of a sukkah is forbidden from a verse. And the one who asked in Beitzah (30b) from the decorations of a sukkah, about the wood of a sukkah, did not know that there is a difference between more than enough for the validation of the sukkah and enough for the validation of the sukkah. And it answered, "Where one says, 'I am not removing myself from them throughout twilight' - as no sanctity attaches itself" to the decorations of a sukkah, as well as to the wood of a sukkah beyond the validation of a sukkah. There a condition helps. But with the wood of a sukkah of the sukkah's validation, "the sanctity attaches itself" perforce, from the word of the Torah, "all seven [days]." So his condition does not help. And that which it said over there, "And if he made a condition, it is all according to his condition"; and it asks, "Is that saying that his condition helps, etc.?" And it answers, "The second part [in which a condition is said to help is talking about] a hut in general." And after this, it asks, "And does a stipulation not help with a sukkah for the holiday; and did we not learn, 'One who roofed, etc.?'" [About this], it did not want to answer [that], "it is all according to his condition," is about that which is beyond the validation of the sukkah" - since, "it is all according to his condition," implies [that it is so] in the whole sukkah.

It is prohibited to use them until the conclusion of the last day of the festival: And that which an etrog (citron) is permissible on the last day of the festival, more than a sukkah, is explained in the chapter [entitled] Lulav VeAravah (Sukkah 46b): Because when it is a doubt if it is the seventh or eighth [day], we sit in the sukkah. So if a meal chanced upon him at twilight, he would eat it there; and since it was set aside at twilight, it was set aside the whole day of the doubt about the eighth and the ninth [day]. However an etrog is not taken (shaken), when there is a doubt if it is the seventh or eighth [day], so it is only forbidden on the doubtful eighth [day] because it was set aside at twilight on the seventh [day]. And even though it is also forbidden at twilight of the eighth [day] because of the doubt about the day - since it is only forbidden on account of the doubt whether it is day or night, the whole day is not put aside with this. This is similar to an egg that was born on this [day] being permissible on [the other day], even though it was forbidden at twilight on account of the doubt whether it is day or night.

The paradigm of them all is blood: That which it did not say, "the paradigm of them all is the wood of a sukkah, that we extract from a verse" - like it said at the beginning of [the chapter entitled] HaMevi: RI says that it is because we could not have learned from the wood of a sukkah, as a sukkah is different. For one who uses some of it negates the commandment, whereas with the decorations of a sukkah and with the changing of money by the light of the Channukah lamp, there is no negation of a commandment.

Rav said, "One may not untie tzitzit from [one] garment to [another] garment": It is not necessary [to say] that it is forbidden if it is an obligation upon the garment; but even if it is an obligation on the person, it is forbidden as well. It is as we find with a mezuzah, that the one who took it was punished - in Bava Metzia (102a) at the end of the chapter [entitled] HaShoel - even though it is an obligation on the room. And Shmuel said that we may untie it: Even though Shmuel himself holds that it is on a obligation on the cloak, we remove them nevertheless; since he does it for the need of another garment. And concerning the mezuzah - such that he is punished - perhaps he did not have in mind to place it in another house. Or also (another answer), a mezuzah is different, since it is made to protect [one] from damaging spirits. And even though, according to everyone, we do not untie [tzitzit] when it is not to place them on another garment - that which is customary to untie the tzitzit from the cloaks of the dead is not difficult. For we only do not untie them from a cloak of one who is alive, as he is someone obligated.

In all matters of the Master, he acted in accordance with Rav: There is a difficulty in the first chapter of Ketuvot (6a) - it is written there.